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ABSTRACT 
Jacques Derrida contended that Marxism is dead, along with its hopes, and its 
discourses (1994: 52). This thesis arose from an assertion that the socialist utopia as a 
paradigm of perfect justice, equality and freedom, has been progressively effaced from 
most cultural and artistic enterprises, supplanted by economic need, political consensus, 
and social compromise. Class differences remain acute, yet the notion of class struggle 
is effectively absent across the Humanities. I propose Edward Bond's philosophical 
model as a unique route to reclaiming this neglected utopian function of culture. 
Bond's plays and theoretical writings have been marginalized by the British theatrical 
mainstream. This study demonstrates that Bond's creative and ideological position is 
incompatible with any reactionary notion of 'mainstream'. Bond's radical materialism 
demonstrates an inherent and inevitable critique of most genres of theatre and 
performance. 
Through an exploration of key philosophical theories that underpin the work of the 
dramatist, I reach a re-evaluation of aesthetics as an ambiguous medium of the dominant 
bourgeois ideology. Art is a repository of cognitive truths, but not of universal 
cognitive truths. In terms of class culture, it really forms part of a tradition "of the 
oppressed" (Benjamin, 1999: 248). Habermas proposes a unity of experience in the arts 
by bridging "the gap between cognitive, ethical, and political discourses". I contend that 
these discourses are undermined by bourgeois aestheticization, which distorts values 
and understanding, manifested in the daily delivery of most culture as an industrial 
enterprise. 
Bond contends that, "[his] philosophy ... makes ethics an ultimate reality" (Stuart, 2000: 
56). Identifying an interaction between Marx's theory of reification and Nietzsche's 
evaluation on men of ressentiment, I construct a platform for approaching this 
complicated ethical question. I evaluate the dialectical validity of what Bond calls "the 
problem"; the "extreme" lives we lead in our liberal democracies, establishing his 
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philosophical position not as provocatively controversial but as logical, realistic, and 
materialistic. 
Capitalist reification progressively conceals human meanmg under "the essence of 
commodity-structure [ ... ] in all its aspects" (Lukacs, 1990: 83). With its emphasis on 
the meaning of the human self, Bond's dramatic strategy is in a sense the application of 
Lukacs's prescription against the reified mind. For Bond, drama is crucial because it 
allows reified individuals to enact human choices that are impossible in their daily lives. 
I conclude by addressing issues that anse from Bond's involvement in Drama in 
Education (DIE). Bond's theoretical output is evolving into a discrete, autonomous field 
and needs to be approached as such. Volume II, a transcribed interview with the 
dramatist himself, contributes further to the issues arising from this thesis. 
v 
Table of contents 
VOLUME I 
Overall introduction 
Structure of thesis 
Endnotes 
PART I 
1. CHAPTER I - Art as a 'Knowing' 
Introduction to chapter I 
1.1. Section I 
1.1.1. Beyond factual knowledge: the 
cognitive 
1.2. Section II 
1.2.1. "Knowledge perceives us" 
(appendix: 16) or the sublime: a stage of choice 
toward the ethical 
1.3. Section III 
1.3.1. Cognitive experience versus 
aesthetics principles - theory as abstract 
knowledge 
1.3.2. One theory: Adorno's Aesthetic 
Theory (1997) 
Conclusion to chapter I 
Endnotes 
Page 
1 
7 
17 
18 
18 
18 
20 
20 
25 
25 
32 
32 
37 
44 
47 
Vl 
2. CHAPTER II - The legacies of Marx 
and Nietzsche: dealing with 
reification and ressentiment - the 
numbed self 
Introduction to chapter II 
2.1. Section I 
2.1.1 The state of play 
2.1.2. Human reification 
2.1.3. Adolf Eichman among us 
2.1.4. Reification as state of emergency 
2.2. Section II 
2.2.1. Ethics alongside Marx and 
Nietzsche: an attempt at reconciliation 
2.2.2. Nietzsche's men of res sentiment 
Conclusion to chapter II 
Endnotes 
PART II 
Recap and introduction to Part II 
The Culture Industry - contradiction, 
commodity and ideology 
Endnotes 
3. CHAPTER III - Culture or Contradiction 
Introduction to chapter III 
51 
51 
53 
53 
56 
60 
63 
67 
67 
76 
85 
91 
96 
96 
96 
104 
106 
106 
Vll 
3.1. Section I 
3.1.1. Culture as industry 
3.1.2. Culture and power 
3.1.3. Culture, society and socialism 
3.1.4. Culture as contradiction 
3.2. Section II 
3.2.1. Negative Dialectics and Benjamin 
3.3. Section III 
3.3.1. Demanding the impossible 
Conclusion to chapter III 
Endnotes 
4. CHAPTER IV - Culture or Industry 
Introduction to chapter IV 
4.1. Section I 
4.1.1. Class homogeneity through cultural 
consumption 
4.1.2. Symbolic violence 
4.1.3. Placing the petty bourgeoisie 
4.2. Section II 
4.2.1. The fields of restricted and large scale 
production in culture 
4.2.2. Hand-crafting v. Assembly line 
4.2.3 The Magnet Theory 
4.2.4. Neo-liberalism and Big Capital 
107 
107 
109 
112 
114 
116 
116 
122 
122 
128 
130 
135 
135 
138 
138 
139 
142 
144 
144 
145 
147 
149 
Vlll 
4.3. Section III 
4.3.1. Industrial boundaries - intellectual 
responsibility 
4.3.2. Administering the FRP 
4.3.3. The battle for and against cultural 
status 
4.3.4. The legitimization of class 
differences 
Conclusion to chapter IV 
Endnotes 
5. CHAPTER V - Culture or Ideology 
Introduction to chapter V 
5.1. Section I 
5.1.1. Preliminary reflections on socialism 
5.1.2. Eagleton versus Bond- 'one' 
socialism versus 'another' socialism 
5.1.3. Socialism is too difficult; fascism is 
too easy 
5.2. Section II 
5.2.1. Fascism or fascisms 
5.3. Section III 
5.3 .1. Rethinking fascism: class 
neutralization by 'other' means 
5.3.2. Historical parallels of the petty 
bourgeoisie and fascism 
152 
152 
153 
154 
160 
169 
174 
184 
184 
186 
186 
195 
199 
208 
208 
211 
212 
219 
IX 
5.4. Section IV 
5.4.1. The enemy within: equivalences in 
the postmodern 
5.5. Section V 
5.5.1. Civilization through inequality 
Conclusion to chapter V 
Endnotes 
Overall conclusion 
Section I 
The problem of communicating through 
the ethical 
Section II 
The problem of grouping and/or 
classifying the Bondian realm 
Epilogue 
Endnotes 
Bibliography 
Conferences 
Letters and papers sent to author 
Letters from Edward Bond 
Broadcast programs, documentaries, and 
staged play 
Diagrama: "Truth Content" (derived from on 
Adorno's Aesthetic theory (1997) 
224 
224 
230 
230 
235 
240 
252 
254 
254 
261 
261 
273 
276 
278 
302 
303 
303 
304 
40 
x 
VOLUME II (appendix) 
Interview transcribed and edited following a visit to the dramatist on 
the 30th October 2004. 
Introduction to appendix 
Sections of the transcription: 
I. On acting: Yvonne Bryceland 
[II.] Drama is the creation of reality. 
[III.] That's what makes you human. You have the sense 
of the tragic, the comic and the moral sense. 
[IV.] They think that drama can be a lesson but it is not. 
[V.] In a way I think the most important thing society could 
do is to produce a viable form of tragedy. 
[VI.] Knowledge perceives us? 
[VII.] We are not players in the world, we are the STAGE 
of the world. 
[VIIL] When you have a thought, the world changes. 
[IX.] There are ideological structures in ME, 
which are lies and truths. 
[X.] Somebody said to me "when one is watching 
one of your plays, if it's properly acted or 
properly staged and all the rest of it, you are absolutely alone." 
1 
v 
p. 1 
p.2 
p.3 
p.8 
p.11 
p. 16 
p. 17 
p. 19 
p.21 
p.22 
Xl 
(XI.] The tragic always, ALWAYS touches on the comic. 
(XII.] "But what is the Invisible Object." 
(XIII.) The postmodern is the conspiracy of style. 
(XIV.] Talking about the neonate or something like that, 
I'm really trying to get to one of the sources of 
why socialism was the logic of humanness. 
(XV.] Each new generation goes back to the very basic problems. 
(XVI.] I think that the danger is now 
this continuous propaganda of terror: 
every time you listen to the news, 
everything is always a disaster. 
(XVII.] Without imagination, 
nothing would be as irrational as reason. 
(XVIII.] It is not saying "how do I get the children 
out of the burning house," it's saying "Why do you do it?" 
(XIX.] And therefore I have to say, 
in the end you are frustrated, 
not because you haven't got a fast car, 
but because nobody actually says "you are a human being." 
(xx.] It would do no good to your lorry driver 
because he sees a Harold Pinter's play! 
(XXI.] In fact, it will be wrong 
if they were to think of the play 
as I had to think of it when I wrote it! 
(XXII.] The way we think is "we've got a problem, solve it." 
p.25 
p.26 
p.28 
p.32 
p.34 
p.35 
p.36 
p.40 
p.43 
p.46 
p.47 
Xll 
And the answer is "no; we've a problem, make it creative." 
[XXIII.] And now we need to make a distinction 
between theatre and drama. 
[XXIV.] I do not want to teach anybody anything. 
I do not want to persuade anybody of anything. 
Endnotes to Appendix 
Index of names 
Index of subjects 
p.49 
p.51 
p. 52 
p.57 
p.62 
p.63 
1 
Overall introduction 
In the introduction to the essays of Adorno, The Culture Industry, J. M. Bernstein 
pinpointed a major problem in the arts which, in my view, is equally true of theatrical 
fields. Bernstein suggests "If the division between the culture industry and high art was, 
during modernism and the early stages of post-modernism, the negative truth about 
society, where does that truth lie now?" (Adorno, 2001:26). This may need further 
explanation. In a letter to the author, Bernstein suggested that the separation between 
high art and the art of the culture industry inscribes the problem of our situation, since it 
gives us compelling art that is without explicit significant social content and without 
mass appeal - "elitism is a truth of the art world" he says - and art which has social 
content but lacks aesthetic authenticity. This is a negative truth in the simple sense that 
it reveals the problem, our fractured condition; "not where we should go and how we 
might get together." Thus, Bernstein contends, "an art that would be both social and 
authentic, as Brecht wanted to generate, is what we do not have" (letter to author: 
18.05.02). My own experience corroborates Bernstein's argument: this frustrating 
perception has undermined my theatrical experience from the very start. If only because 
this study has radically challenged most of the notions I have accumulated through 
several years of theatre practice, I will use some of my own biographical accounts to 
facilitate further disclosure, and I invite the reader to regard these accounts as if I was 
my own guinea-pig under observation. 
Theatre has been part of my life in one way or another for the last twenty-two years and 
my involvement came about in a very accidental way. Some time during the 1980s in 
Spain, one of the teachers of the school where I was studying technology asked me 
whether I would like to be involved in one of those plays most schools stage at the end 
of an academic year, and I agreed to it more for the fun and the company than to fulfil 
any acting aspirations. As a matter of fact, I was already seventeen and theatre had not 
had any meaning, significance or social value for me up till then. Calderon or Lope de 
Vega were, for me, embedded in the past and their plays and dates of birth were merely 
facts to be memorized in order to pass an exam at school and Shakespeare was the name 
of a foreigner whose name one could pronounce badly but definitely could not spell. 
However, after concluding our play, a well-known theatre director, Juan Antonio 
Quintana - who happened to be there by chance - came to the dressing room and, 
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literally embracing me, asked me whether I would like to join his theatre company, the 
"Teatro Estable the Valladolid". All this was completely unexpected. From then on, 
other students and teachers of my school of technology looked at me differently thanks 
to something I did during that representation. Through subsequent studies, I discovered 
that my case was not unusual; a number of known actors and actresses have begun their 
professional acting careers in similarly fortuitous ways. For the first time in my life, 
they made me think I was "special" and "different" (later on in Chapter IV through 
Pierre Bourdieu I will come to realize that I had found an ideology: "charisma"). Still, I 
could not say what the real causes behind this newly-acquired identity were - was it the 
movement I made with my arm; the way I looked at the audience; or was it all the 
make-up and the lights? It was a mystery but I could not let it go. Finally I had found a 
purpose in life where up till then there had been none. There and then, I became an actor 
of the "Teatro Estable", leaving behind my aspirations for a 'real' job. 
In the "Teatro Estable" we explored and staged theatre in its broadest and most 
disparate terms: from Valle Inclan to Lorca, from Ibsen to Strindberg, from Genet to 
Pinter. In addition to our own rehearsals schedule and experiments, we enjoyed the 
seminar classes of highly reputed professionals: Juan A. Hormigon, Pilar Frances, 
Ricard Salvat, and others. There was a profusion of skills which needed to be learned 
such as voice, corporal expression, dance, mime, and so on. However, it was not long 
before I realized that something was terribly wrong in that cultural sphere; that 
something which was terribly important to me was missing. During my working class 
upbringing our only serious concern was food on the table, the heating in winter, and to 
pay the basic bills; music was the last pop-song one heard on the radio, films were 
spaghetti-westerns in our local cinema and drama was TV soap-operas in which people 
were always guilty of something and "cried a lot"; with a bit of luck, the future was a 
job for life in the assembly line of a car manufacturer. We were not poor, but a short 
step away from it. Yet, most of the young actors I found in the "Teatro Estable" were 
virtually part of another world: students in law, journalism and medicine, with parents 
from the higher classes with high aspirations for their offspring. My fellow actors had 
enjoyed private classes of piano, had knowledge about art, classic music, theatre, spoke 
foreign languages and had travelled to the United States. There was throughout an 
aesthetic sense of the world which had nothing to do with the other world I knew to be 
out there. Art was "art" and we were "artists" forming part of an active culture. 
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A change of theatrical milieu did not change this perception. A few years later I 
became a student in the Paolo Grassi theatre school and in the Piccolo Teatro Studio of 
Milan (Italy) where theatre continued to be "theatre" and acting was now taught as a 
profession; it was a "job" like any other job. Here an actor had to learn discipline, 
disciplines, and not to question the director or the instructor but to do well just what one 
was told to do; it was - so we were told - for our own future well-being. An actress or 
actor as a "quixotic artist" was not "realistic" during my Italian instruction; in the search 
for a job, everything was up for grabs: advertisements, entertainment, or TV soap-
operas. For the first time I started to be aware of the Culture Industry as an unavoidable 
imperative. Thus, during my first stage as theatre practitioner, the politics of theatre 
seemed to appear wrapped up in its own aesthetics to the point of concealment. Now 
this thesis has made me re-evaluate my memories of those times and realize that there 
was another factor which was never discussed, never pointed out among students or 
tutors: class differences - a real socio-historical condition that now underpins this thesis 
throughout. 
A transfer into the realm of political theatre was, given the account above, only natural, 
but it did not help to relieve my frustration. As Bernstein contends, political theatre 
offered social content but, in the main, aesthetic authenticity seemed to me mostly 
absent; or, as Garcia Duttmann explains, mutated sometimes into a rational device 
(therefore scientific, as if impregnated with the scent of formalin) and other times just 
into an unformed or unfinished spectacle. I was experiencing the politicization of 
aesthetics (Duttmann, 1991: 533-34). That the good intentions of political theatre have 
created a backlash of contempt in people's attitudes seems to be generally 
acknowledged. Baz Kershaw reports that "for some time now the idea of 'political 
theatre' has been in crisis" because, he says, "postmodernism and related theories have 
profoundly upset established notions of the 'political' in theatre" (1999: 16). This thesis 
has allowed me to see (especially through Chapters IV and V) that it might be the other 
way round. It might be that postmodernism as we know it - that is, bearing in mind 
Gianni Vattimo's The End of Modernity, as an era defined by the crisis of humanism 
(1991: 31) and/or a historical stage of overall scepticism towards any holistic approach 
(Ibid: 180) - is a consequence of the social disillusions which were brought about by 
both political theatre and the political left. Political theatre and the political left have 
been offering solutions to social problems while, consciously or unconsciously, turning 
a blind eye to the fact that what we need is to change the system - or at least to work 
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towards that end. Of course, such a proposition - to change the system - would appear 
to most of us, perhaps now more than ever before, as an impossible utopian dream. 
This is nothing less than trying to imagine a world without capital, class differences and 
without private property. I recall Kant, who argued that moral values were the result of 
people's inability to imagine a future without God. 1 Now I think there is a relationship 
between current moral values and people's inability to imagine a world without capital. 
The fact that the political may become extinct is a worrying prospect to Kershaw: that 
Brechtian vision of a world with "a growing measure of justice, equality and freedom" 
which could become a "thing of the past". (1999: 17). So, with this argument, Kershaw 
pursues the notion that "radical performance might [my italics] usefully replace 
'political theatre' [because] it will allow us to more directly encounter [ ... ] the 
promiscuity of the political in post-modernism" (Ibid). Kershaw suggests repeatedly 
that radical performance may produce or stimulate "radical freedom" but, as is the case 
with his use of justice and equality, he does not seem to offer a reliable or positive - that 
is, humane or ethical - account of what radical freedom is. Of course, he proposes 
freedom as "various freedoms" which are "resistant to dominant ideologies [ ... ] but that 
also are transgressive and even transcendent of ideology itself' (Ibid: 18). The problem 
is that, as he acknowledges himself, "radical performance is made problematic by 
cultural praxis" (Ibid: 20); and I would say, extremely so. As I discuss in the second 
part of this thesis, transgression, transcendence, and even forms of "resistance" to 
dominant ideologies seem also to be some of the propelling components behind the 
Nazi and fascists emergences in 1920s' Germany and most of Europe. Not surprising 
that radical performance is for Kershaw "always a creative opportunity to change the 
world for better or for worse" (Ibid). Indeed, radical performance would always be a 
form of creativity but its structure and functioning tell us that it can be destructive as 
much as constructive - it could be good for us, but also bad or very bad; it could be for 
the worse. Transgression and transcendence are 'languages' prone to be used to serve 
the purposes of fascism; the ethical platform is not. 
Searching for one aesthetic approach that is politically promising, Kershaw chooses 
radical performance because its transgressive and transcendent qualities might facilitate 
an exit towards spheres situated beyond ideology and "existing formalised powers" 
(1999: 18); but, as I will discuss in Chapter V, transgression and transcendency are 
intimately related to the phenomenal social success of fascism in 1920s' Europe.2 If 
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fascism - which, as Chapter V will explain, is always incipient in capitalist societies -
continues to be a real threat to humanity and humanism, I believe we need to invent or 
find concepts or languages that are completely unusable for the purposes of fascism. 
The dramatist Edward Bond is developing such a language - which is none other than 
the ethical language - because he too believes fascism is an all-too-real threat, that we 
live now in extreme times. In his "Thesis on the Philosophy of History" (orig. 1940) 
Walter Benjamin observed: 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which 
we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of 
history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is 
our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our 
position in the struggle against Fascism (1999: 248-49). 
Bond's output reflects that we have not left behind that state of emergency today and 
has tried tenaciously to pass this perception on to others during his intervening 45 years 
as a dramatist. I believe he is correct in doing so. 
I initially suggested through Bernstein that we do not have an art that can be both social 
and authentic. This is, Bernstein contends, art's negative truth. But there appear to be 
some exceptions to this rule. In my view and that of others (Davis, 2005), Bond has 
been uninterruptedly and consciously confronting this seemingly insurmountable 
"negative truth" in the arts by balancing content and form rather successfully. 
Ultimately, Bond answers "yes" to my initial question about whether - or to what extent 
- it is possible to enact the ethical question in the age of the culture industry; in other 
words, whether we can represent through symbols, not that which we want or need, but 
that which we ought to want or need. 
In Bond's work social responsibility also has different meanings, depending on the 
platform on which it is situated, namely the political or the ethical. But as I will discuss 
throughout this thesis, his drama is not looking for answers. For Bond, we are being 
confronted by an impossible situation: to be a human being will be always problematic, 
but capitalism undermines, as he designates it, our humanness. By way of Bond's 
philosophy of drama I believe we could have an opportunity to develop an ethical 
language through which we would not offer answers to a particular social class, but to 
be able to ask the question "what does it mean to be human" for humanity as a whole. 
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We would not depict just one of the many problems that affect our societies, but the 
"problem", as he calls it persistently (throughout in appendix). 
Summarising, this is the purpose of this thesis: not a critical study of theatres and/or 
theatre, or an analysis of Bond's creative output, rather an evaluation of the ontological 
problem to which Bond refers. Before his drama can be, as he says, not acted but 
enacted (appendix: 45), we need first to understand "the problem". For Bond, 
contemporary society is defined as an extreme situation in which inequality is 
considered the 'natural' order of things; where a human being needs the favours of 
another one - in the form of a job for example - in order to be; where privileges are a 
matter of chance and birth. Simultaneously, I expect to justify dialectically Bond's 
stated position as incohesive or unrelated to any other artistic field. While many other 
playwrights and theatrical genres have been influenced by his philosophy and output in 
one way or another (Sierzs, 2000: 34; 93; 97), I, like Jenny Spencer (1992) or David 
Davis (2005), have not been able to fully associate Bond with any field or any other 
particular author. He stands alone. His theatre is not theatre, it is drama; but nor it is 
like any other drama; he also proposes his drama for educational means but, as I will 
discuss in the conclusion of this thesis, its ontological intentions do not relate fully with 
current drama in education in the broadest sense; it is art but not like any other art. As 
he says, dissociating his drama from the rest of "theatres": 
Boulevard theatre glosses over the human paradox. Performance art thinks the 
solution is transcendental. Beckett thinks there is no solution. Brecht thinks that 
if the problem is clearly shown the solution can be found by thought. If that were 
so there would never have been a need or even the possibility of ideology. 
Euripides said you cannot talk reason to the mad - the clinically or socially mad. 
You cannot talk reason to fanatics, and most people are fanatics when it comes 
to earning their daily bread or walking the streets in safety. It is the creed of 
law-and-order (Bond, 2004:27-8). 
I am not saying that his is a new philosophy. Through Bond, there is a rediscovery of a 
two and a half thousand year old philosophy: that of the ancient Greeks such as 
Sophocles and Euripides. For Bond is first and foremost a tragedian; and this is a basic 
or starting point in the dramatist's line of thought. Evoking the ultimate conclusion of 
Jan Kott's The Eating of the Gods: "In the theatre the present of the tragic heroes is also 
the present of the spectators" (1974: 265), Bond says, "each new generation goes back 
to the very basic problems, and therefore the very basic questions are never settled" 
(appendix: 34). Furthermore, Bond thinks that current perceptions about art and 
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culture act as critical barriers obstructing the communication of his philosophy and 
output to practitioners and audiences at large. For him, the role of drama and of 
dramatists is to ask "how do you create humanness" but, as a result of ideology - or 
rather, as a result of the ideologized mind - "[this] question has lain aside for two-and-
a-half thousand years. [Thus] it must be asked again.,,3 
To begin a discussion towards the ethical question with Bond is difficult, since there is 
in it a non-definite language at work. Bill Roper tells us that while Bond's underlying 
structure seems to be "remarkably similar,,4 during his whole life as dramatist, the 
language he uses changes continuously (Davis, 2005: 127). This is, I believe, the 
consequential approach of one that has made of the ethical realm its working tool. As 
Roper explains, "it is impossible to present Bond's account of human psychology as a 
clear and simple mechanical edifice [ ... ] the ideas required for such project would be 
inimical to the subtleties and range of purpose of the human mind as it actually exists in 
the world and society" (in Davis, 2005: 127). Bond finds in the ethical the right site 
from which to propose his ancient question - namely, what does it mean to be a human 
being; but he is also aware that there are a number of obstacles preventing clear 
communication between him and audiences. These obstacles have their origin in 
ideology, for it is the one barrier that swathes and corrupts everything, including our 
experiencing of aesthetics. 
The sub-title, "a road to Edward Bond," is an evocation of George Lukacs' earlier study 
on Marx "My Road to Marx" (1933) (Lukacs, 1990: ix) - and in more than one sense. 
As he explains in his preface to the New 1967's Edition of History and Class 
Consciousness (1990), Lukacs was initially led to Marx through Hegel and Max Weber 
but fundamentally out of the "hatred and contempt [he] had felt for life under capitalism 
ever since [his] childhood (Ibid.: xi). If Kierkegaard had played a significant role in 
Lukacs' initial road to Marx and then to his interest in ethics (Ibid.: ix), then similarly, 
without my earlier encounter with the writings of the Italian poet Pier Paolo Pasolini 
(1977; 1995), my appreciation of Edward Bond's drama and philosophy would have 
been rather improbable. In fact, it now feels as if my own road to Bond started even 
before I knew his name. Lukacs' social and political contradictions led him into 
contact with diverse lines of thought which produced "a highly contradictory amalgam 
of theories" (Ibid.: x). They became, nevertheless, Lukacs' decisive transitional phase 
towards ethics or his "inner human motivations", giving rise to his imperative need to 
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clarify some of the "mental confusions" he had accumulated as a result (Ibid.: xi). In 
other words, if Lukacs approached Marx by other means and with other ends - ethics -
so do I with Bond. If a road signifies a way between different places, my change of 
"place" comes about also as a result of necessity. 
In one of his letters Bond tells me: "My problem is that I need to create a radical new 
theatre but one which has none of the flashy tricks - the reductive and reactionary 
effects - of most self-styled radical new theatre."s My concern here is to unearth and 
support the reasons behind Bond's needs for such a new theatre, and in doing so to 
contribute to further understanding of his stated position. As Bond says: "the first thing 
to say about my philosophy is that it makes ethics an ultimate reality" (in Stuart, 2000: 
56). 
Structure 
This thesis suggests a rethinking of aesthetics in the politics of theatre because it takes 
into account the uniqueness of Bond's stated position - that is, the ethical position -
which appears to be in conflict with most cultural and artistic enterprises. This is posited 
as a point of reference throughout the following work. In the introduction to Chapter V, 
I emphasize Kate Katafiasz's assertion that Bond is "too provocative to be ignored". 
Bond provokes us because, as I will illustrate, within the mental vision of the dramatist, 
all meaning and/or perception is in need of reassessment. Justice is not justice, it is 
vengeance. Equality is mistaken for opportunity. And freedom does not extend beyond 
an act of shopping. Art - and therefore aesthetics - is a modem and ambiguous 
invention which does not secure a humane immediacy (in appendix: 2): it can work 
towards socialism but also towards fascism (in Stuart, 1996: 126). Hence, the title of 
this study: prior to appreciating in its fullest sense, the enormous humanist value of 
Bond's drama and philosophy, we need first to rethink the way we perceive the world. 
Through his letters (in bibliography), Bond explains that the fundamental problem 
which he must deal with through his drama and philosophy is to find channels of 
communication with the ideologized mind. This is why this thesis suggests that, before 
Bond's plays can be approached, one must first explore the writer's thinking and the 
possible theoretical approaches that support it. In addition, this thesis will attempt to 
reveal the difficulties that are involved in the ethical frame - its proper discovery as a 
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question - in order for it to be used as future reference in what now I would suggest as 
the Bondian field. 
Thus, this thesis consists of two parts. The first part explores, through Chapter I, 
plausible notions of art as a conveyor of knowledge - that is, as Peter de Bolla suggests, 
art as a "knowing" (in Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 212) - observing that these notions 
must be seriously undermined by ideology; chiefly, by conditions such as reification 
and resentment. Insofar as aesthetics is considered a specifically bourgeois discipline 
(Eagleton, 1991 :8), especially since the rise of capitalism in the middle of the eighteenth 
century, its experiencing must be operating "as a thoroughly ideological category" 
(Eagleton, 1991: 90). If that is the case, the intrinsic knowledge of art - or, as Adorno 
calls it, art's "truth content" (Adorno, 1997:354) - must suffer severe distortions; 
including those instances in which an artwork alludes to or searches for what is of main 
concern here: a functional platform towards justice, equality, and freedom. That is why, 
Adorno says, in the history of bourgeois society, the existence of all great forms of art is 
paradoxical: "Aesthetic truth [is] bound to the expression of the untruth of bourgeois 
society" (Adorno, 200 I: 77). 
Chapter II attempts to find a feasible theoretical representation of the ethical question. 
It first exposes hidden structures of our capitalist society through Marx's theory of 
reification which helps us to comprehend a situation otherwise incomprehensible - that 
is, as I would say via Fredric Jameson, current capitalism strategically depicted by itself 
as an ahistorical "natural given" (Jameson, 2004). However, as I discuss in chapter I, 
Marx repeatedly reminds us that reification - or alienation - is above all a scientific 
category (Tucker, 1972: 355-58), and science does not seem to secure ethical 
questioning This is where Nietzsche's evaluation on men of ressentiment (Nietzsche, 
200 I; and in Reginster, 1997) seems to present itself as the supplementary building, the 
missing extension of Marx's reification. As Wittgenstein explained (Bunnin and Tsui-
James, 1999: 685-70 I), the ethical field is a language like no other, which requires a 
holistic mind equipped to undertake intuition and imagination as much as reason. For 
ethical purposes, these two approaches seem to support each other. As absolute value of 
judgment (that is, not the assessment of what we want or what we need but what we 
ought to need or want) the ethical question, requires that we put under scrutiny both 
society's structures and ourselves, concurrently. While their philosophies dwell in 
different worlds - Marx the external or "us" and Nietzsche the internal or "I" - they 
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both argue for a revaluation of all values. As such, they counterbalance each other. 
Chapter II ends by suggesting the complex symbiosis of Marx and Nietzsche as a 
plausible platform from which to develop an understanding of the difficult ethical 
question. I propose this concept more like a two-dimensional glass which, when placed 
in a particular setting, reflects the world and ourselves - or paraphrasing Lukacs, that 
which functions without ourselves and that which functions within (in Bentley, 
1992:448) - at the same time. Bond's answer to reading the first part of this thesis - his 
poem "The Sheet of Glass" (originally written in 2002; now published in Davis, 2005: 
94-5) - is of enormous significance because it expresses an analogous concept in 
relation to this work, favourably strengthening my own suggestions while 
simultaneously indicating that, in my journey to Edward Bond, I have set off along one 
feasible road. 
The second part of this thesis, Chapters III, IV and V, attempts to articulate the 
constructed reconciliation of Marx and Nietzsche that has been suggested in the first 
part by way of what I think are culture's most relevant and conditioning frames or 
platforms: first through contradiction, then industry, and finally through ideology. By 
dialectically revaluating these grounds, I hope in this part to defend Edward Bond 
against those critics and scholars who pinpoint his philosophy as "too controversial and 
polemic".6 I shall demonstrate that his position is more logical than irrational, more 
realistic than idealistic, more humanistic than partisan, more flexible than dogmatic. 
But what is dialectics? Lukacs, through Hegel, answers: "dialectics is this immanent 
process of transcendence, in the course of which the one-sidedness and the limitation of 
the determinants of the understanding shows itself to be what it really is, namely their 
negation" (1990: 177). Indeed, if one thing is made apparent in this part, it is that the 
ethical question refuses to take for granted notions like justice, equality and freedom. 
The synthesis through dialectics always ends negatively because in bourgeois society 
reification envelopes all life and thought. That is why dialectical thinkers are revealed 
here as criticizing the ground on which they stand and, in doing so, they reflect certain 
autonomy of thought, but they do not go as far as to really undermine it. Thus, 
humanist thinkers, precisely the ones who ought not to give up hope but to put life at the 
top of their agendas, can ultimately reveal themselves to be desperate nihilists who 
capitulate to fear with death or with defeatism - as is the case with Walter Benjamin's 
suicide or Adorno proposing Beckett as a solution (in Chapter III). 
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Education, intellectual and artistic activity are supposed to be liberating agencies but, as 
Pierre Bourdieu explains (1985), they "covertly" legitimize class differences (in chapter 
IV). The conservative bourgeois rejects the artist as a dangerous transgressor but, as 
Eagleton rightly explains, only because he is rejecting an "intolerable image of himself' 
(in Chapter V; 2002: 128). This is, therefore, a thesis that locates the bourgeois and the 
artist side by side on the same platform. A dialectics that is ultimately negative because 
through it justice is revealed as injustice, freedom as oppression, and equality 
confounded with opportunity. Class differences are today as unvarying as ever but the 
rallying cry for class struggle seems to have been vanished from the cultural realm. As 
Bond contends in his letters, this social situation has been brought about by the 
dominant bourgeois ideology which not only spreads through our external world (from 
without) but also through our internal self (from within) mediating our very faculties of 
perception and understanding. The problems seem innumerable, yet they all have a 
single core: social inequality. That is the ultimate conclusion of the second part of this 
thesis. 
So this second part is constructed as if the subject of attention is covered by a number of 
layers which we must peel off. This process of unpeeling is in itself a means to an end. 
The layers are composed of an ever-increasing number of problems. Bond contends that 
these are none other than the problem's symptoms: 
The particular danger that we have from contemporary culture is that, instead of 
letting the problems be alive and create their own solutions, technology becomes 
so powerful, that it can deal with the problem itself. But really what it is doing 
is dealing with the symptoms of the problem (appendix: 34). 
Chapter III attempts to articulate Bond's view of current society as an "impossible" 
situation through sources of contradiction in culture. Through Bond capitalist reality 
does not offer spaces of ideological indulgence. As he says, taking the Adornian thesis 
of negative dialectics to its most pungent limits: "owning a house in our democracy 
implicates me in murder - in everything I'm against" (1995: 13). Supporting Bond's 
philosophical standpoint, this chapter teases out post-Marxist discourses trapped in the 
contradiction between means and ends. As Irving Wohlfarth contends, most post-
Marxist critical theory seems to be entangled in whether there is any true autonomy 
within the "knot" of bourgeois aesthetics (1979: 975). Contradiction in culture is 
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revealed not as an innate and inherent element of human existence, but a condition 
determined by the relations between people's imperative to survive and a power which 
exploits that imperative. This chapter then poses a final question: What happens to art 
when real power is so abstract it cannot be adequately identified? 
Chapter IV sifts the argument of our social situation as "impossible" into discourses of 
culture as industry. Through Pierre Bourdieu (1984; 1985; 1998) the chapter analyses 
the perception that most cultural practice ekes out its existence through a submissive 
capitulation to the wishes of capital growth on the one hand, while offering on the other 
a feasible explanation of the disappearing class struggle in post-industrial liberal 
societies. Amongst the ensuing issues discussed are the roles of the expanding petty 
bourgeoisie in the neutralization of society, or a social petty bourgeoisification. It also 
provides, through some of the examples proposed by the French sociologist, an 
empirical articulation of the interdependence suggested in Part I between Marx's 
reification and Nietzsche's ressentiment, mapping the functional relationship between 
class "jealousies" - that is, ressentiment - and class homogenization and/or 
neutralization - that is, reification - in culture. The chapter evaluates Bourdieu's 
division of culture into two fields: one as the field of large-scale cultural production 
(FLP) - material goods like cars, clothes, and popular art - and the other the field of 
restricted cultural production (FRP) - non-material goods like works of art, literature, 
and institutional education. The resulting picture suggests that class structures and real 
class differences are effectively blurred by the former field, while the later legitimizes 
those differences. Bond has completely abandoned the mainstream channels of 
theatrical representation relocating his output within the peripheral spheres of children's 
education. Assuming that post-industrial culture is truly an impossible terrain, Bond's 
latest strategy is not really the result of him being "difficult", as some critics suggest, 
but more a manifestation of his characteristic authenticity. Thus far and by way of 
Bourdieu's analysis of capitalist culture, intellectual and/or cultural activity itself 
appears as a fierce violent battle for supremacy. Every single intellectual activity 
appears to have an implicit relation with our consequent dominant ideology: 
competition aimed at dominance (1985: 40-3). 
Chapter V continues the investigation of Bond's philosophy of drama and our social 
situation as "impossible" (and therefore "extreme"), focusing on ideology and, more 
specifically, exploring fascism and its meaning/so Bond claims that "the basis of art 
Overall introduction 
13 
must be socialism: all other art is fascist. There is no art in between" (Stuart, 1996: 
126). This chapter attempts to evaluate the extent to which the dramatist's claim is 
defensible, while simultaneously attempting to reinsert these two notions (which seem 
to have been erased from the dialectical spectrum) back into the agenda of theatre 
studies. 
If we had thought of socialism and fascism simply as two ideological branches or 
models, Bond's platform of thought would have to be situated antithetically or 
irreconcilably not only against the likes of Adorno and/or even Trotsky, but against a 
good part of his own philosophy. Art, through Adorno, is supposed to be neutral and 
autonomous (O'Connor, 2000: 238-63); and through Trotsky classless: not the product 
of a class culture but of a humane culture.7 With his drama, Bond does not want to teach 
or persuade anyone of anything: for humanness cannot be taught (in appendix: 52). 
That is why Chapter V attempts to explain that neither socialism nor fascism are 
ideologies per se. The former has yet to come into existence and the latter has yet to be 
"deciphered" (Poulantzas, 1974: 253; Allardyce, 1979: 368; Schnapp, 1993: 90). If the 
Oxford Encyclopedia (1997) has trouble defining socialism, this is because it is actually 
the ultimate ethical reality. In Marxist terms, it is the next stage in the history of human 
social development; the stage at which class differences and private property become 
conditions of the past, of pre-history. Traditional Communism has attempted to achieve 
that stage through the inculcation of its ideology with well-documented results: because 
the aims become more important than human beings, and because the human imperative 
is replaced, even through violent force, with the ideological imperative. Fascism is 
highlighted in this chapter because it is considered here not as an aberrant and/or 
abnormal event of history but as a real and continuous threat: an extreme consequence 
of capitalism and of capitalist representative democracy. 
Through a comparative and contrasting evaluation of other contending lines of thought 
such as those of Terry Eagleton, this chapter attempts to defend the claim that fascism is 
a constant feature of capitalism. Through the agency of Bondian philosophy, before 
fascism becomes extreme it is perpetually incipient (in Davis, 2005: 186); and through 
Adorno and Horkheimer, that the culture industry as such is a sophisticated and 
deodorized form of fascism (Horkheimer, 1979: 167). Nicos Poulantzas's Fascism and 
Dictatorship (1974) receives lengthy consideration for this reason: because it explains 
the complex associations that the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisies have with the 
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final materialization of fascism during the 1920s and 1930s in Europe; chiefly, the 
overall social effect produced upon all classes by the crisis of the dominant bourgeois 
ideology. Consider how significant Poulantzas' sociological classifications and 
definitions of the pro-fascist petty bourgeoisie are, when mirrored against some of the 
endorsed current post-modem practices: a penchant for transcendency and transgression 
as a strategy to overcome ideology; "neutrality" and a request for a neutral and fair 
State; their proclivity for and association with egalitarianism and equality of 
opportunity; praising of individualism and of the rise of the best and most able 
individuals. In sum, always frustrated, the petty bourgeoisie oppose big capital but fear 
proletarianization; they want changes but not to change the system. 
For Bond reification tears out the human self - our humanness - creating a vacuum 
"into which ideology moves" (in Davis, 2005: 186). This line of thinking implies that 
we do not contrast opinions, but ideologies. Reification tells us that we do not need to 
consciously subscribe to a political creed; the pervasiveness of the dominant ideology 
orders for us our perceptions of the social world. However, the reality of our social life 
as unequal individuals is not totally erased from the human mind, giving rise to 
ressentiment and with it fear, hate, and suspicion of "otherness". Thus, the chapter 
concludes by recapturing the essence of all problems which reveals itself not just to be a 
result of capitalism, but of civilization itself: inequality. 
This thesis does not conclude as if it had reached the end of a road - a road to Bond -
but rather, the starting point. It is only from here, once the importance of the Bondian 
philosophy has been substantiated, that the problem commences. It considers the 
Bondian approach as a promising response to the claim that we do not have an art that 
can be both social and authentic; but recommends first of all that we rethink aesthetics 
in the politics of theatre before undertaking any study of the dramatist's output. For 
many of our acquired ways of perceiving art and the activities which are involved in the 
organization and execution of theatre are inappropriate in the, nevertheless, demanding 
Bondian realm. That is why I have attempted to circumscribe my study to a literary 
enactment of Bond's complex philosophical site - the ethical as ultimate reality -
through a series of philosophical, political, and sociological theories, rather than making 
a critical analysis of Bond's theory and/or dramaturgical output. 
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It is beyond question that, in Britain, Bond is disapproved of by a rather large number of 
highly-reputed scholars, practitioners, and critics.8 As Peter Billingham points out, that 
Bond is described by a journalist in a major British newspaper like The Guardian as 
"Bolshie [Logan, 2000], is a depressing but accurate reflection of the ways in which 
Bond has come to be viewed by many critics within both the press and the theatrical 
establishment".9 The Bondian field is difficult. It requires a re-mapping of modem 
cultural consciousness, which unsurprisingly creates bewilderment and provokes 
antagonisms. Bond asks us to think of our liberal democracies as extreme while our 
lives are surrounded by an ideological network of securities and entertainments. 
In her attempt to defend Bond's philosophy of drama as the sought-for radical discourse 
for theatre, Dorian Lambley explains that our cultural system appears to us as unified 
and natural because "the interwoven matrices of signs and symbols which constitute 
language are represented to us as specific discourses through our institutions -
educational, judicial, recreational, social". In other words, it is because, she says, while 
language is used to transfer knowledge, it is also used to transform meaning (Lambley, 
1992: 38). In the following study, especially through Chapter II and V, I have 
attempted to suggest a rather more specific reason to the problem of communication 
between Bond and 'others': reification according to Marxist theory. This study, 
therefore, concludes by recommending that which it has attempted to transmit 
throughout: that if, as Lukacs contends, the problem in our societies is that all meaning 
is hidden by capitalist reification (Lukacs, 1990: 83), Walter Benjamin explains that 
meaning would be perceivable once we are able to consciously apprehend that the "state 
of emergency" in which we live against fascism is not the exception but the rule (1999: 
248-49). Both, Lukacs and Benjamin, plainly support Bond's fundamental 
philosophical premises: the latter recognizing society as extreme and a call to an 
awareness of it and the former by claiming capitalist societies without meaning; as 
Bond says, "in the way in which societies use it [meaning], it does not exist" (1990b: 
213). 
Finally, this conclusion looks forward to the involvement of Bond into the realm of 
Drama in Education (DIE). While the dramatist's commitment to writing for the 
youngest undoubtedly has the potential to enrich schooling through drama, I query his 
discrete standpoint in relation to current DIE's literature. In my view, this stance will-
yet again - give rise to conflicts among DIE's practitioners and theorists. Inasmuch as 
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the Bondian field is not considered a field in itself, unconnected as it is with current 
forms of art, theatre, drama, Theatre or Drama in Education, it will continue to create 
conflict. It cannot be neatly grouped, classified, formulated. In other words, Bond will 
not allow his work to be institutionalised. Bond's ethics as ultimate reality is a difficult 
concept (as I hopefully reflect through Chapter II, ethics is itself a very demanding 
realm; see, however, pg. 67) but, as I recommend through Lukacs' final delivery, ethics 
might be the only way of thought - or modus operandi - through which drama will 
unearth for us again meaning. As Lukacs explains, it functions in the same way that 
mythology, inexistent today, did for the ancient Greeks (in Bentley, 1992: 448). 
The appendix, which forms part of this study as Volume II, attempts to incorporate an 
image of the dramatist and his latest philosophical development. Its content and form is 
specified in its introduction. It is fundamental to this thesis' exploration, for it is a 
continuous source of reference and inspiration. However, it is intended also as a 
celebration of the dramatist and his ideas, which have truly transformed my own reality 
- the way I now perceive the world; or as he would say, acknowledging that knowledge 
perceives us. 
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Endnotes 
'Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, electronic edition, (www. 
arts.cuhk.edu.hklPhilosophylKant/cpr) in "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," Chapter I, 
Section 3, "Opining, Knowing and Beliving." 
2 Much could be said about the real ideological motives behind the carnival form of radical 
perfonnance. The basic principle could be resumed as a momentaneous purgation of social 
tensions by way of perfonned excesses so that we can go on being the same we were. This 
perfonnative fonn, as Kershaw suggests radical performance is, is "a producer of a sense of 
freedoms" (1999: 19). 
3 This is part of a lctter originally written for a conference in Paris, and then, Bond tells me, 
published on the front page of Le Monde. It was sent to me by the author and is dated 3rd 
October 2003. 
4 There are five reference points, Roper notes, which "remain identifiable positions across the 
intervening 45 years" of Bond, and these are: 
• The self 
• The potentially corrupting or creative group or society 
• The void, the boundary, the gap or nothingness 
• The natural world of matter 
• The mind as essentially dramatising 
S Copy of a letter addressed to the French director Jean-Pierre Vincent; dated: 13 October 2004. 
6 There are numerous examples of this: see for example Spencer, 1992:xiii and 11; Hay & 
Roberts, 1980:31; Michael Billington's "Bond's Have I None," Thursday November 14,2002, 
The Guardian; Brian Logan's "Still bolshie after all these years," Wednesday April 5, 2000, The 
Guardian. 
7 In his essay "What is Proletarian Culture and is it Possible?" (1923) 
8 For examplc as "acerbic" (Mick Wallis, letter to author: 23.07.03), "Bolshie" (Logan, 2000), 
"dogmatic [ ... ] right of Genghis Khan" (Hall, 1993: 342; 349), and/or "in need of dialectics" 
(Terry Eagleton, lcttcr to author: 30.04.05) to name but few. 
9 Peter Billingham's original draft version of an eventually published 15,000 word essay for the 
series Dictionary of Literary Biography, Vol. 310: "British and Irish Dramatists Since World 
War II," USA: Thomson Gale, 2005 (sent to me by the author on 26th June, 2003). 
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PART I 
1. CHAPTER I 
Art as a "Knowing" 
Introduction 
Ever since Kant and Hegel, philosophers and dialecticians have continued to argue 
about art's properties, definition, and goals (Dickie, 1974; Fried, 1998; Graver, 1998; 
Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999). However, in their arguments most disputants overlook 
the very detail that to me seems most important. As Terry Eagleton has suggested, 
contemporary concepts of the nature and function of art - and consequently aesthetics -
are bourgeois in the most literal sense (1991: 8): "Freedom and legality, spontaneity 
and necessity, self-determination, and autonomy" are some of the crucial aesthetic 
elements included in works of art, says Eagleton (Ibid.: 3). Indeed, these are also the 
very attributes which enabled the bourgeoisie to finally leave behind those historical 
subjugating systems of the Church and the Monarchy. Today more than ever before, the 
bourgeoisie has declared itself triumphant over everything else. 
In spite of this, Eagleton extends his argument above art's contradictory nature by 
suggesting that the concept of aesthetics as autonomous entity is "radically doubled-
edged: if on the one hand it [aesthetics] provides a central constituent of bourgeois 
ideology, it also marks an emphasis on the self-determining nature of human powers 
and capacities" (Eagleton, 1991: 9). It is true that in this instance the critic's argument 
might seem both ambiguous and highly contentious. However, through Eagleton's 
criticism, I see also that the utopian longing for justice and equality might be a 
conception intrinsic to aesthetics and this, in my view, acts also as an important function 
in Edward Bond's philosophy. 
Today, I think utopia is understood in general terms to be that which is impossible to 
attain. But historically, utopia has been seen as a functional element of culture. Culture 
- both subjectively and objectively - expresses "the need for freedom [which is] denied 
by the class organization ofsodety" (Gartman, 1991: 440). Culture did indeed fulfil, in 
a functional way, the aspirations of the bourgeoisie when it finally freed itself from the 
1. Chapter I 
Art as a "Knowing" 
19 
feudal yoke - historians tell us how it culminated with the European revolutions of 1848 
(Burne, 1989: 891-98). Does theatre, and culture for that matter, fulfil that utopian 
function (which in my view ought to be its raison d'etre) now? Current criticism and 
studies indicate that this is a question under continuous scrutiny. 
Only recently, a number of prominent scholars and critics of the theatrical realm held a 
symposium enquiring into the social function of theatre, proposing the debate "How can 
theatre contribute to unmasking and critiquing [sic] injustice?,,2 I had originally come 
into theatre believing that this was indeed what theatre was supposed to have achieved. 
But after many years of theatrical innovation, theatre is still asking how to do it. 
Perhaps Bond is correct when he distances himself from theatre as such. The question 
itself is deeply problematic of course, not least because injustice cannot be identified. 
As the postmodernist would say, nothing is what it seems. But, to take just one 
example, is it not a clear fact that our society is made up of disproportionate inequality 
and/or class difference? That a few are extremely rich while the majority suffer 
depravation? I do not think 3.6 million children living below the poverty line in Britain 
alone (Denny and Elliot, 2004) is an ''unjust'' situation that somehow cannot be 
recognized because "masked". As I suggested at the above symposium, perhaps the 
question should not be how to unmask injustice but, as Bond contends, what is the 
meaning of justice itself? That approach then elicits a whole new set of questions. 
Unfortunately, it became very clear to me that within this milieu there was a general 
unawareness of Bond's output - especially of recent works such as The Children 
(2000), Have I None (2000), Chair (2001), Existence (2002), Born (2004), The Short 
Electra (2004), and particularly The Under Room (2005).3 
In my view, Bond assesses the problem through a logical process starting with a simple 
remark from which the rest of his thought develops: that society is not just and therefore 
the meaning of justice is always adapted for the purposes of injustice. "No one can be at 
home in it" (Bond, 2004: 25). His approach is not new but an ancient viewpoint which 
seems to have been forgotten: that in an unjust world human beings live in a constant 
yearning for justice. The problem he observes is that, in our ideologized societies, "the 
desire for justice becomes the psychological need [his italics] for injustice" (Ibid.). 
Thus, questioning whether we can apply justice or whether we can even recognize 
justice or injustice is not feasible. Bond proposes instead that we step back and examine 
what the real meaning of justice is and, more important still, why human beings have an 
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intrinsic imperative for justice. Although the dramatist cannot gIve us a perfect 
definition of what justice is, the dramatization of "the problem" might give us an 
insight. Bond calls this problem the "Invisible Object", but he knows that, as it was for 
the ancient Greek dramatists, "in tragedy no one is guilty - justice has another meaning" 
(Ibid.: 31). A theatre still hoping to unmask injustice is, in reality, looking around for 
guilty parties - that is, trying always to resolve a series of social problems - while the 
drama Bond suggests is seeking to challenge "the problem", the whole social system -
that is, capitalism. It is the difference between wanting changes and changing the 
system. I will return to this most important differentiation through Chapters IV and V. 
However, I think that aesthetic discourses present some important perspectives on the 
kind of non-grammatical language involved in ethics as ultimate reality, and thus throw 
light on the complexities of Bond's philosophy, so I will touch on the most pertinent of 
these accounts next. 
1.1 SECTION I 
1.1.1 Beyond factual knowledge: the cognitive. 
Attempting to resolve the unresolved contradictions of theatre is not a characteristic of 
theatre studies and its practitioners. As a matter of fact, in order to unfold the question 
of this thesis, theatre will form part of the discussion less and less; for theatre's 
contradictions are one and the same as those of the arts and culture at large. As I hope to 
expose in the following chapters, critical theory has attempted to resolve the 
intrinsically contradictory languages of an art trapped within social systems dominated 
by ideology (be it capitalist or communist), contributing with new questions and new 
theories but without much real success. Having said that, to me, one of the most 
pertinent and hopeful of the propositions made by critical theorists came initially from 
JUrgen Habermas. According to Lyotard, what Habermas requires from the arts "is, in 
short, to bridge the gap between cognitive, ethical, and political discourses, thus 
opening the way to a unity of experience" (Lyotard, 1984: 70). This formula seems 
both appealing yet highly complex. But though Lyotard says that he does not know 
what sort of unity of experience Habermas has in mind (1984: 72) and Habermas 
himself does not seem to say what it is either (Habermas, 1981; 1989; and 1993), the 
general idea of bridging the gap between cognitive, ethical and political discourses has 
strong parallels with Bond's philosophy. Bond says that our society is extreme because, 
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within social structures based on inequality, human beings cannot make true responsible 
choices (appendix: 12-3). However, there is a gap where, in his view, we can make 
these choices, and this gap is drama. More specifically, drama is the gap because "we 
are the gap" (Ibid.: 17). While Habermas addresses the arts as if it was a universal 
given, for Bond, art as such - and therefore culture as industry (appendix: 45-6) - is a 
fairly recent bourgeois phenomenon, more a part of the problem than part of the 
solution. This will be examined later on through Eagleton's criticism, especially 
through his work The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990). However, for the time being and 
for the benefit of the discussion, I will continue to use terms like 'art' without pointing 
to any of their conflicting contradictions. I will now explore Habermas' formula by way 
of its three elements - the cognitive, the ethical and the political - and in doing so, 
provide some insight into the main focus: the ethical. 
In order to discover how we could bridge this "gap" between cognitive, ethical and 
political discourses, we could argue that we need first of all to examine what the modus 
operandi of each one is, so that we might establish later what a unity of experience in 
the arts - and consequently in theatre - would be. Originally, my findings suggested 
that of the above three discourses proposed by Habermas, the ethical and the political 
could have been viewed alone if the cognitive discourse of a play - of a work of art -
was examined first. This is suggested particularly in Kemal and Gaskell (1999 and 
2000) and more specifically in the study of Peter de Bolla (Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 
206-220). Yet, as I will explain in the next chapter, subsequent evaluations of the works 
of Marx and Nietzsche show that it is the ethical discourse that contains the most critical 
promise of unity. 
But what could be seen as primarily a cognitive discourse in theatre? The most plausible 
response would be that which is concerned with the aesthetic values of a dramatic 
piece.4 It would appear that the political is always inherent in a work of art - for bad or 
for good - but that is not the case with either the cognitive or the ethical discourse. 
Augusto Boal has already noted the intrinsic nature of politics in theatre. As he 
suggested in his Theatre of the Oppressed, "those who try to separate theatre from 
politics try to lead us into error - and this is a political attitude."s Moreover, and 
according to current thinking on the philosophy of aesthetics, it would appear that the 
cognitive discourse emerges from the aesthetic qualities of a work of art (Krausz, 2002; 
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Pillow, 2000: 72-86 and Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 206).6 Let us proceed to discuss the 
cognitive discourse for it seems to have some definitional problems. 
One of the obstacles in examining the cognitive discourse is that, in reality, it transcends 
knowledge (theory, history etc) itself This is so because factual empirical knowledge 
does not mean knowledge as we commonly understand it. As Adorno contends, the task 
of understanding dissolves and yet preserves art's enigmatic quality (Adorno, 
1997: 177). Nevertheless, to say that a true work of art has intrinsic cognitive qualities 
is for most of the theorists examined here a highly plausible assumption. According to 
Alex Neil, Aristotle defends art as innately cognitive when he holds that poetry "speaks 
. .. of the kind of events which could occur, and are possible by the standards of 
probability or necessity" and therefore poetry "is both more philosophical and more 
serious than history" because it "speaks of events which have occurred" (Kemal, & 
Gaskell, 1999: 68). In other words, if for Aristotle poetry - that is, art - is a 
predominantly cognitive experience, he is also saying that cognitive knowledge is more 
"trustworthy" than any other field of knowledge. But the crux of the problem today is 
not only how to discern what true art could be but also distinctions between true art and 
popular, post-industrial culture. I will address this issue in more depth in Part II. In my 
view, the writings of Theodor Adorno on the culture industry should continue to be 
seriously considered. The next extract from Adorno's "The Culture Industry 
Reconsidered" gives a concentrated summary of what the culture industry is for the 
philosopher: 
The culture industry is the purposeful integration of its consumers from above. 
It also forces a reconciliation of high and low art, which have been separated for 
thousands of years, a reconciliation which damages them both. High art is 
deprived of its seriousness because its effect is programmed; low art is put in 
chains and deprived of the unruly resistance inherent in it when social control 
was not yet total. (Adorno, 2001: 98-9) 
As a consequence of the above, Adorno has been accused of elitism, but we should at 
least acknowledge that his examinations and conclusions on the culture industry ring 
more true today than when Adorno and Horkheimer together published Dialectic of 
Enlightenment in Amsterdam in 1947; that culture has been taken on by the very same 
powers some "culture" used to attack. Some prominent agents of the culture industry 
offer visible examples: Mick Jagger, of Rolling Stone fame, was initially a living model 
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of the popular anti-establishment who has recently accepted an aBE from the Queen; 
similarly, David Hare and Harold Pinter accepted honours from the Queen in 1998 and 
2002 respectively (Saunders, 2004: 256). I will return in full to the analysis of culture 
when it is confined within the mechanics of industrial production. Before this can be 
addressed, I need first to explore cognitive discourses and the possible implications in 
rethinking aesthetics. 
What is a cognitive discourse?7 A broad definition can be extracted from most 
dictionaries as the notion of a knowledge that has been acquired by people without the 
support of scientific evidence. Unconsciously, from infancy to adulthood, it seems that 
our brain acquires empirical data - that is, when sense-experience has a primacy over 
reason and intellect in the acquisition of knowledge. But human cognition does not 
seem to be just about the acquisition of knowledge as we generally understand it (that is, 
the acquisition of language, mathematical rules, the learning of behavioural convention, 
and such like), it appears to transcend knowledge itself, to the point of being supplanted 
by a seemingly universal "knowing" (Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 212). The means with 
which I designate this "knowing" comes from the realm of psychology and the notion 
that human beings, irrespective of their geographical, historical and cultural boundaries, 
display a sense or sensitivity towards what is good or bad, true or false for themselves 
and for their communities. 
Sigmund Freud dedicated a life to the study of how the memory acts in the unconscious, 
disrupting people's thought and feelings, especially in relation to instinctive sexual and 
self-preserving motivations. But it was his student, Gustav lung, who posited both a 
personal and collective unconsciousness, when he observed parallels of myths and 
symbols exhibited by different and separate traditions and cultures. lung's cited 
examples of collective unconsciousness include the universal human apprehension of 
darkness, and the sharing of a divine entity which, according to lung, is broadly in 
conflict with and therefore an extension of the human mind.8 
However, a dialectical distinction has been made, in which the dialectics on the 
cognitive have shifted from the acknowledging of an acquired "knowing" - which is 
what really interest us here - to the search of the ''unknown'' and "occult" - which is out 
of my advocacy for a unity of experience in theatre and its evaluation. In this 
distinction I cannot ignore one of the most influential figures amongst those who search 
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in theatre for the unknown and occult, Eugenio Barba. Barba has given substance to 
theatrical anthropology - he is the founder of the International School of Theatre 
Anthropology (ISTA) based in Denmark - which has become an important venue in the 
field of theatre. Barba could be presented as a theatre practitioner whose main interests 
in theatre are the qualities of cognition, but his approach is rife with defective 
discourses on knowledge and current criticism has adjudged his work to be driven 
towards incongruence and contradiction.9 As Barba says, his work "is not a search for 
knowledge but for the unknown" (Barba, 1995: 5). These aesthetic-mystical traits of 
Barba call to mind the perpetual, always present thought of Nietzsche, when in Human 
All Too Human, with his satirical style, he reflects on the dangers that art might visit 
upon the artist: 
When art seizes an individual powerfully, it draws him back to the views of 
those times when art flowered most vigorously; then its effect is to form by 
retrogression. The artist comes more and more to revere sudden excitements, 
believes in gods and demons, imbues nature with a soul, hates science, becomes 
unchangeable in his moods like the men of antiquity, and desires an overthrow 
of all conditions that are not favourable to art, and this with the vehemence and 
unreasonableness of a child. (Section IV, No. 159) 
It appears that the cognitive offers certain joint properties involving discourses of 
psychology, art, philosophy and anthropology among others. IO In the realm of theatre, 
the notion that I will follow on the cognitive discourse is the perception of art as a 
"knowing" (see below). This human knowing seems palpable when experiencing art or 
reading philosophy. I will not say here what knowledge this "knowing" has, because 
perhaps it does not have any at all in the factual sense. Yet, who, when reading good 
philosophy or experiencing "true art," has not experienced the surprise of finding 
oneself exclaiming "Yes, it is true!" as if what is revealed to us is a knowledge that we 
already possess? Or, following Edward Bond latest philosophical conclusion, as if 
knowledge itself "perceives us" (appendix). Peter de Bolla proposes that an aesthetic 
event gives us a kind of knowledge that is not available in other forms of learning and 
provides three-pointed definitions: 
The artwork is a knowing. 
Our attempt to know that knowing is called our affective response to or 
experience of the artwork. 
This experience of response raises in us the feeling of sublimity; hence what we 
know of that knowing is called the sublime. Sublimity, then, is the name we 
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give to what we recognise, or know, as that which we have yet to know: the 
artwork is a knowing. (Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 212) 
I will go on to argue that this cognitive sense of art as knowing is made recognisable by 
way of experiencing the sublime; a knowing through which it might be possible to 
overcome the external influences of ideology and towards an ethical experience. 
1.2. SECTION II 
1.2.1. "Knowledge perceives us" (appendix: 16) or the sublime: 
a stage of choice toward the ethical. 
"Knowledge perceives us." This is one of the most defining and challenging thoughts I 
have found in my analysis and one that sets the boundaries of Bond's philosophy and 
his latest dramatic strategies. Bond's approach to knowledge as if it had a theological 
quality has led me to reconsider some studies which perceive the sublime rather as a 
cognitive experience. In my view, Bond refers not just to knowledge per se but to that 
situation or setting in which we would be perceived by knowledge. Of course, he is 
referring to his unique way of understanding drama. Thus, through Bond's assessment, 
knowledge might be envisaged both as unreachable and/or unexpectedly reachable. 
Unreachable because if knowledge perceives us and not the other way round, current 
channels of education and scholarship could not grant the attainment of knowledge; if it 
is knowledge which perceives us, sometimes we will necessarily take the wrong path 
and look for knowledge where it is not. It would not mean either that we have to "sit 
down" passively waiting for it to come to us, it means that there are concrete situations 
where knowledge might just touch us - and only then. It is unexpectedly reachable 
because we would be unprepared for the unexpected experience which would leave us 
in awe - in amazement, fear or terror - in other words, experiencing the sublime. Bond 
explains it thus: 
There is a sense, not in which we understand knowledge or learn knowledge, but 
a sense in which knowledge perceives us. [ ... ] if it's dark, and I stumble in the 
dark and I hit that tree, in a certain sense though I haven't seen the tree, the tree 
has seen me. Do you see what I mean? That tree is there and I've run into it; I 
haven't seen it. So the tree says "no, I'm here; you can't pretend I'm not." You 
can't fabricate that reality. Well, if you think about that in a slightly more 
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complex way, not just as a tree; if you think about knowledge in a more complex 
way, you can also say "it is not that I understand this but that this perceives me. 
And then I will be at home in the world." I will be at home in the world because 
the world would not become an instrument by which I can corrupt my 
humanness. Let's pretend I say "let's go and dig for gold" and therefore "let's 
us have mines but instead of working at it ourselves, we'll have slaves to go and 
work in the mines for us." By this example, the world is in a sense corrupting 
my humanity: because I'm using the world in a way that destroys other people. 
If you read Aristotle's Politics - 'Book V' I think it is - which is about slaves ... 
it's extraordinary! It is like, you know, both the slave and the master should 
agree that slavery was good for them. And one thinks "Oh, c'mon, you know! 
How can this very intelligent person think these things?" Because it was logical 
then; because at that moment in history he couldn't imagine a world beyond that. 
Now, I think it would be possible for us to be so certain of the world that we 
could then say "knowledge perceives us; that there would not be a barrier; we 
would not use the world to corrupt." At the moment, of course, we use the 
world constantly to corrupt ourselves. The world becomes a witness on our 
behalf to our corruption. And one doesn't have to say "yeah, well, I need a 
theory of Thanatos or human beings are animals" or something like that. You 
don't need any of this. You can think in terms of concepts [the italics intend to 
reflect Bond emphasis on the words] (appendix: 16). 
I think there are striking parallels between a knowledge that perceives us and some of 
the philosophical notions about the sublime. Most scholars agree that the concept of the 
sublime has been left unaddressed by art critics from the end of Romanticism up to the 
overcoming of post-modernism's first shock (Souza, 2003: 310). But now the sublime 
is reappearing with great impetus in most writings in the realm of the arts in general and 
aesthetics in particular. There is also an important treatise called On the Sublime 
attributed to Longinus (circa 1st century AD)lI which continues to be a good source of 
discussion among aestheticians (though the name of the author seems to be down to a 
scribe's error). What most interest us now of Longinus' Sublime is that his formulation 
suggests transference of a cognitive nature, when he says "the true sublime uplifts our 
souls; we are filled with a proud exaltation and a sense of vaunting joy, just as· though 
we ourselves had produced what we heard" (in my copy: 107). This has Nietzschean 
parallels in The Birth of Tragedy, in "the joy of becoming" from Greek tragedy 
(Nietzsche, 2000: 75), as well as with Peter de Bolla's suggestions that the aesthetic 
qualities of a work of art are a "knowing". In very general terms, according to James 
Mandrell, we could also say that the sublime "is an experience of transcendence 
expressed as the passing of any reasonable limits; it represents an attempt to take hold 
of the unimaginable, the ineffable" (1991: 298). To Peter de Bolla, the sublime starts 
where aesthetics distinguishes beauty from something "else;" that "else" is the 
sublime.12 In other words, Bolla suggests that the sublime comes into sight when 
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something is beyond the formal descriptions of beauty, which itself is based on a 
pleasing kind of harmony. The sublime is also associated with vastness, magnificence 
and violence in nature, like the vision of a sunset, a volcano or the firmament. But it is 
also associated with the particular, there where the particular explains the universal. 
Bolla uses the example of exclaiming "Oh, sublime" when looking at some cakes or 
when someone says "cool shoes": we do not know what it is about that particular object 
and yet it "has" it. 
Kant (1982), Hegel (1975) and Burke (1987) argued for different interpretations on the 
sublime. Through the agency of Jonathan Strauss, Christine Battersby suggests that the 
Kantian sublime expresses reason as the clear victor (Battersby, 2003: 73-4; Strauss, 
1998:36). But not unlike Hitler (Turner, 1972: 552), Kant also thought that long periods 
of peace "usually debases the mentality of the populace" preventing it from 
experiencing the sublime (Kant, 2000: 263). However contextual this might be of Kant 
and his era, it seems to me a totally irrational viewpoint; a viewpoint which was 
eventuall y adopted by the futurist movement and fascists like Marinetti (1876-1944) or 
communists like Mayakovsky (1894-1930).13 For Hegel beauty and the sublime are 
spiritual phenomena or Geist, (Lectures, Vol. 1: 90-91). But the argument that better 
fits with my ethical questioning is the one laid down by Edmund Burke who argues that 
terror is the ruling principle of the sublime (1987: 46). Burke's philosophy on the 
sublime seems to have been an influential source of inspiration for Melville's Moby 
Dick (a copy of the Enquiry was found in Melville's personal library) (Glenn, 1976: 
165). 
Kant, Hegel and Burke all support the idea that the sublime is mainly a religious 
experience. All three argue that when we experience the sublime, we get a glimpse of 
God's omnipotence emanating from those objects whose particulars attract our 
attention. However, through Burke (1987) and Immanuel Kant the sublime is also a 
consequence of power, and it is linked with those people or things who have power over 
us "so that strength, violence, pain and terror, are ideas that rush upon the mind 
together" (Burke, 1987: 65). As Kant says, we enjoy the sublime where terror is 
distinguished from real fear, that is, when we contemplate the sublime in astonishment 
from a position of safety (Kant, 1982: 260). In other words, if we were really afraid, 
we would be unable to make a judgment about the sublime "it is impossible to find 
satisfaction in terror that is seriously intended" (Ibid.: 261). What Bond is looking for 
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in drama 14 is to place us, its audience, in such a position that we feel totally alone in the 
world. As he says: 
"You are alone in tragedy because you have to accept responsibility for it; only 
you in the whole of the universe of that moment. And the universe then 
becomes a theatre, in which only you can make the choice. Only you can be 
perceptive or not see what's happening "there". It's said that Napoleon could 
glance along a rank of soldiers and say "that man's button is undone". Because 
he had this peculiar form of perception, he just went like that and saw it. I say 
Napoleon, but I think drama can do something like that to everybody. And in 
that sense drama will perceive you, it would say "this is the situation," and then 
you are absolutely, entirely alone [ ... ] you got to make a decision (appendix: 23-
4). 
I have recorded Bond often referring to Kant or Hegel in his writings, letters, or in 
conversation but I do not have any record of him mentioning the sublime. Nonetheless, 
I think strong parallels can be perceived here between what Bond expects from his 
drama and what Kant and Burke expect from the sublime. Terror, violence and fear are 
predominant elements of Bond's drama. And as with the sublime, we experience them 
from a position of safety - a position which might allow us to make choices - that is, 
the type of choices which we cannot make when going about our daily routines. Could 
it then be that the sublime is the answer to Habermas' initial proposition: the element 
which bridges the gap between the ethical, the cognitive and the political? Bond says 
that our social system is extreme because it does not allow us to undertake human 
choices but, he says, there is a "gap" in drama. Could the sublime be the "gap" Bond 
identifies for us in his drama? Could the sublime be one fundamental part of what Bond 
ultimately aims at in his drama - ethics? (Stuart, 2000: 56) Wittgenstein concludes that 
ethics is ultimately like no other language to the point that he considers it to be a 
"silence" (Cahoon, 1996: 199); and is it not silence that forms another important 
element of a subliminal experience, a fundamental part of experiencing loneliness? 
One more of the parallels between Bond's dramatic aim and the cognitive nature of 
subliminal experience needs to be pointed out here. We can say that in both the sublime 
and Bond's dramals we can experience loneliness. However, Bond's ultimate end in the 
strategy of his drama is socialism - or a society in which everyone is equal and in which 
private property has finally been abolished. This would necessarily mean a world in 
which everyone acknowledged everyone else. Thus, through Bond we are not talking of 
that loneliness related to the celebration of the individual as an independent and 
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autonomous agent who only thinks about his or her own pleasures and necessities; 
through Bond we are talking of a loneliness which replaces the imperative "I" with the 
imperative ''us''. Is there, in the sublime experience, an ontological knowledge that 
proposes a classless society? Illustrating further the sublime reflection as productive not 
of conceptual structures, but of "affine networks" (Pillow, 2000: 115), Kirk Pillow 
suggests that the sublime might have the potential to unite that which seems to preclude 
any form of unification (Ibid.: 111-115). He seems to be identifying the sublime as a 
functional dismantler of class differences. Pillow's suggestion is, in my view, further 
supported by Christine Battersby's readings of Kant, through which she indicates the 
sublime as a functional element that rejects individualism. For Battersby, the Kantian 
sublime expresses an incompatibility between abstract reason and sensuous imagination, 
but represents reason as the clear victor, and she adds: 
[Experiencing the sublime] is a moment in which the '1' identifies with an 
abstraction and in so doing negates the individual that it had previously been. 
The sublime moment is thus a self-identification in which an abstract and 
impersonal self rejects a sensuously interested and personally interested self. 
This triumph is felt as terror, which in itself reveals a profound aversion or 
resistance to this sublimation on the part of the individual (Battersby, 2003: 68). 
If the experiencing of the sublime works against any doctrine of multiple interpretations 
or multiple meanings, would it not mean that the sublime also works against all art 
forms whose main interest is to represent the emotional individual, the subjective, and 
there where an artwork reflects the state of mind of the artist rather than the external 
world? Assuming that in experiencing the sublime the individualist is forced to 
capitulate cognitively to a sense of being both together and interdependent with 
everyone else in the world, would it not mean that the sublime is in an antagonistic 
relationship with all expressionist forms of art (Futurism, Symbolism, Dadaism, 
Surrealism, Theatre of the Absurd, Abstract Expressionism), and all those forms which 
reflect first and foremost the mind of the artist? Bond objects to all art forms as 
incapable of offering the utopian liberation he is looking for: "art is another form of 
scratching on people's eyes, of a blindfold" (letter to author: 31.10.03). 
I must note, parenthetically, that the appreciation of the sublime by an individual 
depends also on her or his "aesthetic disposition" (Gartman, 1991: 424) which seems to 
be directly proportional to her or his position within a social system based on class 
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differences. As current encyclopedias suggest, expressionism with a small "e" can be 
detected as early as in EI Greco's distortions of his paintings, and yet, these paintings 
seem also to offer a subliminal experience or content (I am thinking for example of the 
Burial of Count Orgaz (1586». Art criticism tells us that it is from van Gogh, in 
painting, and August Strindberg, in theatre, that expressionism becomes Expressionism 
(Burne, 1989: 1000; 1005). Is there a subliminal passage towards the ethical through 
their works? In my view, van Gogh stands alone as, perhaps, one of those few cases 
where the particular finds the universal and vice versa. His expressionism becomes 
almost theological and epic, interiorizing the external and not the other way round - that 
is, exteriorizing the internal as I think most expressionist artists do. However, the 
contrast between van Gogh's letters and those of Strindberg could not be more striking: 
both lived turbulent lives and battled with mental instability, but while van Gogh's 
letters reflect a man longing for a world of justice and equality (1958), those of 
Strindberg reveal a man afflicted by a fierce hate towards Jews (Meyer, 1988: 171) 
women (Ibid.: 170) with an incipient celebration of the of the Arian race as "superior" 
(Ibid.: 169). I will expand further this discussion in the next section when I evaluate 
some of the reasons behind Bond's objections to art and culture. 
Returning, however, to my main argument on the parallels between notions on the 
sublime and Bond's philosophy of drama as an ethical choice, the sublime takes an 
additional and unexpected turn: that of the need for social justice - or at least, an 
awareness of it. Take for instance, the unprecedented events of9/11 in New York: how 
many of us experienced the sublime while we were witnessing the horrors of the Twin 
Towers collapsing with thousands of people inside, from the safety of our homes and 
through our televisions? This is a highly disturbing question yet one that a critic like 
Jean Baudrillard does not circumvent when he says: "that we have dreamed of this 
event, that everybody without exception has dreamt of it, because everybody must 
dream of the destruction of any power hegemonic to that degree - this is unacceptable 
for Western moral conscience, but it is still a fact, and one which is justly measured by 
the pathetic violence of all those discourses which attempt to erase it. It is almost they 
who did it, but we who wanted it.,,16 Do not we take particular pleasure from reading, 
imagining or being told about the fall, ruin or distress of a great empire? Thus, 
assuming Kant and Burke are also correct, Baudrillard must be right in positing 9/11 as 
a subliminal experience in which, from a position of safety, we witnessed such a 
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powerful empire bearing such terrifying destruction. When confronted by a subliminal 
experience we are told what we already know. 
There seems to be a clear correspondence between Bond's conceptualization of what 
good or correct drama is - that is, as a knowledge that perceives us - and the cognitive 
nature of the sublime. Through this analysis it seems clear that there is no one art that is 
subliminal to the exclusion of the others; instead, through true art we always experience 
the sublime. However, in his search for the ethical, Bond rejects in the strongest terms 
all the "other" forms of art, culture or any creative field that has been legitimised by 
social configurations - like institutions of cultural authority - and/or theoretical 
principles. "Art is something elite" he says, and adds: 
As far as one can see, for Shakespeare and say, Euripides, it wasn't an elite 
audience but a mass audience. It came from different strata of society. We are 
not more stupid than the people were then. On the contrary, I'm sure we're 
more intelligent. So, it's no use taking kids or asking older people to go to the 
theatre and see something that is called art. Or indeed, going to see something 
called Brecht! You have to write those plays in such a way that will have an 
immediate impact on people's lives. Otherwise, there is no point to it ... 
(appendix: 46). 
In the following sections, I will look into the ideas that emerge from discussions on the 
aesthetic principles in art, specifically those between particularism and generalism. In 
addition, I will continue to explore Bond's attitude of rejection towards most modem art 
and culture, and whether this is justified. 
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1.3. SECTION III 
1.3.1. Cognitive experience versus aesthetic principles - theory as 
abstract knowledge. 
What is a work of art? For every definition there seems to be a counter-example. 
Sebastian Gardner presents two simple definitions: "art as the imitation of beautiful 
nature, and art as the communication of feeling" (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 236). 
But there are many things that are not art and yet still might be beautiful or that 
communicate feeling. Fascist propaganda appeals to irrational feelings and to a sort of 
perfect social balance in an "utopian" sense of it; a gun might also be beautiful (I will 
return to discuss fascism in chapter V). For some time now, Wittgensteinians,17 such as 
George Dickie, have put forward the idea that art can be defined through an Institutional 
Theory (Dickie, 1974). The theory states that something is a work of art as soon as a 
figure within the artworld has given it the status of being a candidate for appreciation, or 
if it has been created in order to be presented to the artworld (Ibid.: 60-1) (I make 
further evaluations on culture and industry in Chapter IV). As Gardner very reasonably 
argues, art would, as a consequence be nothing but an "honorific" term. Institutional 
Theory, Gardner says, tends to classify rather than to evaluate: "Evaluation [of an 
artwork] is just as integral to the concept of art as it is to moral concepts" (Bunnin and 
Tsui-James, 1996: 236). It would be reasonable to suggest instead that we should 
appreciate art for aesthetic values first before classifying it. Gardner holds this view 
when he concludes "we do not first classify objects as art and then discover that they 
happen to be aesthetically rewarding" (Ibid.). 
There are controversial debates in the field of aesthetics because scholars do not seem to 
agree on whether their principles of aesthetic judgment exist (Conolly and Haydar, 
2003: 114). One of these debates relates to the distinctions between particularism 
(Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 557-58) and generalism (Conolly and Haydar, 2003: 
114). The Generalist thesis tells us that the reasoning behind our aesthetic evaluations 
is general in nature. So, if we say that "an artwork X is good (V) because of quality A, 
we must then be committed to principles"; principles that, nevertheless, may be 
undermined by continuous debate (Ibid.). By contrast, Particularism states that there are 
no general reasons and thus, no principles - that is, "when we say that X is V because 
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A, we are not committed to the notion that generally A is a good-making quality in 
works of art" (Ibid.: 115). 
I would be inclined to argue that, today, most art and its criticism gravitates around 
particularism, for "there are no rules linking the presence of [particular or general] 
properties in artworks" (Ibid.: 119). Particularism is, of course, the easiest way of 
circumventing the problem of whether our appreciation of art is correct; with it 
everything is permissible and all interpretations are valid. However, from the context of 
our main argument - that is, the ethical properties of an artwork - particularism brings 
with it serious problems. Particularism is not committed to whether an artwork has 
positive or negative properties - that is, whether it is "good" or "bad" for us all in an 
ethical sense. An art critic might argue that such and such artwork has a positive 
"value" but, as Oliver Conolly and Bashshar Haydar explain, the critic of a particularist 
artwork is not committed to the notion that the artwork's property has a positive or a 
negative "valence" (2003: 118). Conolly and Haydar use the psychological term 
"valence" to mean its intrinsic emotional significance "either positive or negative" 
(Ibid.). 
The generalist approach has one significant point of value - it allows the analysis of 
whether an artwork contains a sense of balance and/or elegance, and a positive valence. 
Of course, the concept of elegance invites a highly complex discussion and would 
require far more attention than I can afford here: a particularist could argue that there is 
"balance" - or the intention of it - in a tin full of excreta; but few would argue that such 
"artwork" has a positive valence. On the other hand, one could argue that an image 
depicting love or justice encompasses both a positive emotional force in itself - that is, 
positively valenced properties - and elegance through, say, their ultimate 
consummation. But it is also true that, in the name of love and justice, people are 
capable of committing terrible acts. This is one of the most important philosophical 
preconditions in Bond's drama: "paradoxically the imperative to justice can never let us 
rest, yet it may destroy us" (Davis, 2005: 136). 
That said, there is truthfulness in the balanced properties of a work or art - in the 
cognitive sense - for the same reason that there is truthfulness in the sublime. Conolly 
and Haydar find truthfulness in Shakespeare through the fact that the comic scenes of 
plays like Hamlet or Macbeth do not dilute their dramatic intensity; the comic actually 
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adds intensity (2003: 120). Their claim recalls Bond's dramatic principle which asserts 
that in good drama the tragic needs the comic and vice versa. As he says "the tragic 
always, always touches on the comic" (in appendix: 25). For the dramatist, good drama 
has a logic which some authors corrupt - especially, he says, those like Brecht - in 
order to win the audience over to the authors' ideology. By way of reinterpreting 
Brecht's Mother Courage, he explains his posturing as follows: 
['Mother Courage'] is upset by the loss of her daughter. Now, what 'Mother 
Courage' would really say is "Oh, I must get another person; I must get another 
servant to help and I'll have to pay until I have another daughter" or something 
like that. She wouldn't mourn about her daughter! [ ... ] Well, it should be 
according to Brecht. If we are entirely made by the objective situation, what is 
this soul he [Brecht] suddenly produces? And she then has to pay somebody to 
bury her daughter; she has to hand over the money. [ ... ] So she pays somebody 
to bury her daughter, and then she puts the cart handles on and starts to move off 
and the wheel comes off. Now, 'Mother Courage' cannot change the wheel -
she is not physically strong. Consequently she has to go to the man and says 
"would you repair my cart." He says "I'm burying your daughter." She says 
"no, no ... I want you to repair my cart, because I have to get to the market" and 
the man would say - wouldn't he? - "well, you know, to bury your daughter 
costs 10 Marks; to repair you wheel costs 50 Marks." Obviously! And so 
'Mother Courage' would say ''well, if I have to spend 50 Marks, I have to spend 
50 Marks, but I cannot spend 60 Marks." So Mother Courage goes and buries 
her daughter herself. Now, that I would regard as an extreme situation. But 
Brecht wouldn't do it. Partly also because it is dangerously comic. (appendix: 
25) 
Bond has a strong sense of the unity of "the comic and the tragic", seeing them as 
interdependent elements. As a principle, could this unity measure the cognitive qualities 
or the "knowing" values of a work of art (Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 212) and therefore 
be regarded as affine to the generalist thesis? It could be in more than one way because 
Bond's philosophical interest is focused not just on theatre and/or drama, but on the 
whole spectrum of the creative fields. For example, Bond reserves his praise more for 
leading painters than playwrights, from Caravaggio, in his painting The Death of the 
Virgin or Doubting Thomas (Davis, 2005: 206) to Manet and Van Gogh (appendix: 40). 
As George Bas notes, "for Bond all arts call upon dramatic expression or rhetoric" 
(Davis, 2005: 201). Furthennore, "the comic and the tragic" is just one among several 
important technical tenns of the Bondian theatre, including "Accident-Time," "Aggro," 
"Agon," "the Lierrruth", and others. While it is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse 
the meaning of these tenns and how they operate -Georges Bas and Jerome Hankins 
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have already done this in depth (Ibid.: 201-20) - to me, they indicate Bond's awareness 
of the limitations of factual language within the field he is really interested in: ethics. 
Words, terms, expressions or designations have, within Bondian "theory", a figurative 
character, in the sense that they are intended more as the metaphorical construction of 
an ethical question. 
Through his evaluation of ethics and knowledge, Wittgenstein arrived at a point where 
he felt it was impossible to speak any further, recommending "silence" as the final 
solution - hence his dictum "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" 
(Cahoon, 1996: 199). I believe Bond is trying to take over from that point at which 
Wittgenstein declared it was not possible to make further linguistic comment; and that 
point is none other than drama. As a result, any discussion of principles or rules in 
relation to Bond becomes a rather complex matter. Rules and principles imply a science 
which, for the dramatist, would only answer the whats-and-whens of a problem, while 
his drama also wants to consider the whys, simultaneously and without conflict (Bond, 
1998: 3). Herein lies a problem: whats-and-whens imply the need for a solution to a 
particular problem; whys imply that this particular problem must be discussed within the 
context of many other problems which themselves are only single parts of the problem 
in the ontological/universal sense. It seems to me only logical that Bond finds that art 
should not be assimilated to science in any way; for the same reason that Kant and then 
Wittgenstein thought it erroneous to contemplate ethics or even philosophy as a science 
(Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 601; 689). As I will discuss below, the scientific search 
for criteria, rules or principles in the arts can mutate into a means by which art faces its 
own destruction. 
In his essay "Petrus Camper's Angle", Stephen Jay Gould (1991: 229-40) presents the 
case of the Dutch anatomist Petrus Camper (1722-1789) who, like many of us, believed 
that the cultures of ancient Greece and Rome had reached a height of refinement never 
since repeated and perhaps impossible to recapture (Ibid.: 234). However, observing 
that the heads of Greek statues, such as Venus or Apollo were of a superior beauty even 
to those of Rome, he could not think this was the result of sheer intuition on the part of 
the sculptor, "for proportion and harmony, geometrically expressed, were hallmarks of 
Greek thought" (Ibid.: 236). Camper knew that the people of ancient Greece were no 
more physically beautiful than those of ancient Rome; after all, he had evidence - from 
coins for example - that they were very much like us today, warts and all. Camper, says 
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Gould, was first of all a scientist for whom the motto "beauty is only beautiful by its 
own beauty" was absurd and in need of a scientific resolution (Ibid.:235). He could not 
apply scientific criteria to a sunrise, a calm sea, or a starry sky - such things that excite 
a sensation of pleasure in all people - but he could study the physical proportions of the 
head of Venus as possessor of a superior beauty. After much research, Camper found 
the "secret". The beautiful busts of antiquity had achieved their pleasing proportions by 
an exaggeration of the facial angle beyond values attained by real people. "Romans, he 
found, preferred an angle of 95 degrees, but the ancient Greek sculptors all used 100 
degrees as their ideal" (Ibid.: 236). At values of more than 100 degrees, a human face-
shape begins to look displeasing, as if it was afflicted with hydrocephaly. The ancient 
Greek sculptors pushed beauty's value right to the edge, where maximal beauty tends 
towards deformity. However, when Camper defined the criteria of aesthetic abstraction 
- that is, of beauty - with geometrical exactitude he also supplied a tool for the 
"ordering of human races by facial angle - and in the usual direction of later racist 
rankings, with Africans at the bottom, Orientals in the middle, and Europeans on top" 
(Gould, 1991: 229-40). Stretching his argument even further, Camper wrote: 
As the facial line moves back [for a small face tucked under a bulging skull] I 
produce a head of Antiquity; [ ... ] as I bring it forward [for a larger, projecting 
face] I produce the head of a Negro. If I bring it still further forward, the head of 
a monkey results, more forward still, and I get a dog, and finally a woodcock 
(Gould, 1991: 238). 
Giving preference to the whats-and-whens over the whys, the anatomist concluded by 
grading Africans closest to apes and North Europeans nearest to Greek gods. The 
forces of destruction and exploitation did not fail to notice Camper's angle, and used it 
as one more device of the later quantitative approach to scientific racism, formerly 
during the European expansion into Africa and Asia, and subsequently during the Nazi 
Germany as a foundational device of Eugenics and the classification of "inferior" races. 
"Good", Bond tells us, "is a universal derived from the holistic mind in response to 
why" (Bond, 1998:3). And "why", I would say paraphrasing the dramatist, needs 
reasoning as much as imagination. 
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1.3.2. One theory: Adorno's Aesthetic Theory (1997) 
Theory in the arts needs to be taken with a certain amount of reserve, not just because it 
comes as result of speculative thought about the abstract, but also because art theory 
needs to be put into its socio-economic and historical context. Bond notes that our 
surroundings change continuously, but the question continues to be the same, that is, 
"What does it mean to be a human being?" Yesterday's theory needs to be upgraded 
because we find ourselves looking at "the problem" from today's platfonn, so "the 
problem" seems to have changed while in reality it is the same old one. (appendix: 31-
2). By way of Bond I would question how many of us are able to rearrange our mental 
conceptual structures so that we can make appropriate choices, especially if what 
concerns us is a humane future. In my view, changes in the socio-political are being 
produced at such a fast pace - especially through continuous technological and 
economical developments - that few of us can keep up. Daily, our perception of the 
world becomes outdated, causing further social alienation. Bond helps explain through 
his assertion that he would not write Bingo (1984) now because the social situation is 
too different and disconnected with the times in which it was written a few years before, 
during the 1970s (appendix: 46). 
As I have mentioned, situating Bond's philosophy into any of the known types of 
theatre and theatrical theory is a difficult task not because he totally rejects theory, but 
because he is constantly rewriting it. It is not coincidental that Adam Thorpe looks 
around for British playwrights at the forefront of dramatic attack against war, and he 
only finds Bond (The Guardian, 2006: 18-19). Kate Katafiasz has also recently weighed 
up some of the most crucial theories of the theatrical field (Davis, 2005: 25-48) - that is, 
the mimetic, the fonnalist and the expressionist theories among others - against Bond's 
philosophy in order to evaluate his "extreme dissatisfaction with the practitioners and 
dramatic structures of the twentieth century" ( Ibid: 35). In each instance Bond's work 
is mostly portrayed as a case apart, unconnected with any other theory or theorist. 
But theatrical theories, practices and Bond's output are not the main subject of enquiry 
here. Bond's philosophy functions here, so to speak, as aftlfer, in order to reveal an 
ethical frame of reference: that is, to what extent knowledge and/or truth is transferred 
between a producer of artworks - an artist - and the recipient of that artwork, an 
audience. Bond finds this impossible because, he says, the human "self' has been lost 
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through reification, "creating in us a vacuum into which ideology moves" (Davis, 2005: 
186). Amongst those frames that could be suggested from the philosophy of aesthetics 
(and with Bond's philosophy of drama in mind as a defensible model), one stands out as 
a plausible frame of departure: a frame built from Adorno's Aesthetic Theory (1997). 
This is the case in spite of a series of contradictory arguments characteristic of Adorno's 
aesthetic theory, that place him in conflict with those of Bond, and with art as an ethical 
venture. 
One of these particularly contradictory propositions claimed by Adorno in his Aesthetic 
Theory is the autonomy of art. IS He states that true art has no political influence, does 
not intervene politically and where it does, it is detrimental for the artwork itself 
(Adorno, 1997: 255). And yet he also argues that art demystifies power (Ibid.: 243) 
which, politically speaking, should be considered as a powerful way of changing 
society. I would instead support Brian O'Connor's reading of Adorno's thesis, which 
argues that "if society is, as Adorno claims, ideological then culture, art specifically, 
cannot exist harmoniously with society without merely repeating ideology" (O'Connor, 
2000: 17). This seems to suggest that an artwork should try, at all costs, to go beyond 
ideology, but at the same time it cannot avoid it. It is, in other words, like promising the 
impossible which is why works of art are for Adorno utopian constructs of necessity; 
the impossible is embedded in our social life which subjects our humanness to a 
continuous degradation. For Adorno, works of art effectively reverse this predicament: 
"whereas in the real world all particulars are fungible, art protests against fungibility by 
holding up images of what reality might be like, if it were emancipated from the 
patterns of identification imposed on it" (Adorno, 1997: 122). Interestingly enough, 
Adorno's observation on our daily lives as a condition of hopelessness, and art as a 
promise of the impossible, is very similar to what Bond pursues with his drama. Again, 
for him our society is extreme because it does not allow us to enact human choices in 
relation to our future; his drama is the site where we can enact responsible choices, seek 
out the meaning of justice and freedom, without being crushed by the capitalist 
"extreme situation": 
[ ... ] it's as if you can deal with human society as if human beings were machines. On 
one hand you have reason and on the other there is something called entertainment 
(pleasure) and "art," and the two have nothing to do with each other. I think that if you 
divide the two, you dehumanise both. That's why I say that with imagination the search 
is for reason. This means that drama always has to create extreme situations, because is 
only in the extreme situation that you actually have to identify what are you going to do. 
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You have to make a choice. To consciously make a choice is the human dilemma 
(appendix: 12). 
Drama as a place of choice is what, in my view, makes of Bond a true architect of 
optimism. Quite a different sphere is the art envisaged by Adorno. "Art is the promise 
of happiness, a promise that is constantly being broken" (Adorno, 1997: 196) he says, 
but it is because the philosopher reflects upon an art exclusively framed within the 
hopelessness induced by the bourgeois ideology. From Joyce to Beckett and then 
subsequent Absurdists like the latest In-Yer-Face theatre: why trouble oneself with 
visions of justice and equality if we are cursed, predestined to fail? It is not accidental 
that the Hegelian concept of the "truth content" of art is one of Aesthetic Theory's 
central tenets. It seems that Adorno conceives works of art primarily as vehicles of 
philosophical truth, which with him is as to say transcendental truth; a truth that escapes 
the fallibility of the human condition. Art in that vein is not concerned with improving, 
revealing and renovating the lives of existing individuals; it is just an esoteric exercise 
for the privileged few who themselves must be previously initiated into the 
sophisticated and charismatic realm of art appreciation. In spite of this, I believe 
Bond's philosophy of drama could redeem a good part of Adorno's aesthetics insofar as 
they both give emphasis to the present indigent state of human reality and seek to 
illuminate a path toward what has never-yet-been. Adorno's Ie/os is utopia in the sense 
of reconciliation of man with nature - existence and essence, thought and being (in 
Wolin, 1990: 42-4); Bond's is also utopia but in the sense of a socialist society of equals 
and free individuals. Bond and Adorno converge in two more important points of 
reference in their work and thinking: one is that they "stand in defence of a modernism 
that would not betray the hopes of the past" (Adorno, 1997: XX).19 The other - and the 
consequence of the first - is that for both "artistic experience demands comprehending 
rather than an emotional relation to the works of art" (Ibid.: 355). 
Adorno's aesthetic theory, I would suggest, is demanding and intimidating precisely 
because, as Brian O'Connor observes, his distinctions are "exceedingly fine." 
(O'Connor, 2000: 241). It is also demanding because his theory reflects his 
contradictory position of entanglement between a longing for a neutral art and an art 
that nevertheless has to have "truth content" (see below) without trying to bypass the 
bourgeois order. The problem is that when he wishes art as neutral, Adorno is in reality 
referring to what he melancholically calls "the great art of the bourgeois era" which, as 
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O'Connor explains, for Adorno was characterized by its apparent independence from 
society: "[great art] is not created for the purposes of public utility nor does it serve 
what Benjamin called a 'cultic function' [his italics]" (O'Connor, 2000: 239). The 
following diagram attempts to cluster Adorno's complex aesthetic theory into a more 
comprehensible image: 
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. ". " " 
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1 EXPERIENCE ~ ~------~ ~ANDTHOUGHT I ~ ~------~ I FORM I. .I CONTENT 
Thus Adorno states: 
TRUTH CONTENT 
(sic.) 
(Emancipation from 
and reconciliation 
with myth) 
The relation between determinacy and openness in aesthetics is perhaps clarified 
by the fact that the ways available to experience and thought that lead into 
artworks are infinitely many, yet they converge in truth content (sic). (Adorno, 
1997: 354) 
From this frame, determinacy and openness tell us of the autonomy of art, but also of 
authenticity and social responsibility. Of course, it is difficult to argue that in order for 
the artist to reveal this, there are (mediated by form and contentiO indeed infinite ways 
to do it. But art seems to me to be bound by experience (history) and thought 
(philosophy). And yet, bound as it is, Adorno makes a very relevant point: that truth 
content is 'the emancipation from and reconciliation with myth" (Ibid.: 212). Here I 
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most recognIze Edward Bond's work and philosophy of drama, for example his 
demystification of Shakespeare in Bingo in the 1970s. In a sense, Bond has 
emancipated himself from two myths, Brecht and Beckett (who have to this day 
maintained their canonical status within theatre studies) despising them both, the former 
as a liar and the latter as a pessimist nihilist (appendix: 15; and Saunders, 2005: 68 
respectively). I also interpret his position against Brecht and Beckett as an act of 
reconciliation in the sense that, by breaking off from them, Bond does not endure any 
further conflict from that department - and in the process he also has liberated his 
audiences. Even if, to a certain extent, the philosophies of Adorno and Bond often 
intertwine - especially through their assessment on current culture as industry (Adorno, 
2001) - Bond objects to that famous dictum of Adorno "to write poetry after Auschwitz 
is barbaric" (O'Connor, 2000: 210) to which the dramatist replies: "It's nonsense. [ ... ] 
Adorno talks absolute foolish nonsense when he says you can't write poetry anymore 
after Auschwitz. The-home-of-poetry-IS-Auschwitz. That's where poetry comes from" 
(appendix: 7).21 
While I would regard Adorno's aesthetics as a good model - art with implicit truth 
content and working towards utopia, which reflects to a good extent Bond's philosophy 
itself - the elements which comprise such a formula cannot be unaffected by ideology. 
As we will see in the next chapter when we evaluate Marx' reification and Nietzsche's 
"man of ressentiment", human predicaments like openness, determinacy, experience and 
thought cannot be given for granted in a society made up of class differences. This 
seems indeed to be our condition and an important subject of discussion, influencing 
this study throughout. With his formula, Adorno might as well be proposing art within 
an accomplished utopian situation - that is, in a socialist society made up of free and 
equal individuals. As David E. Cooper explains, Adorno sought to remonstrate against 
the scientific bent of industrial capitalism (which he says, dismisses any human purpose 
"beyond objective knowledge") by siding with the avant-garde artists who, he thought, 
were resisting the "capitalist transformation of the arts into a tranquilizing entertainment 
industry" (in Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 708). For this purpose, he proposed 
Beckett and Schoenberg as two of his greater exemplars: a move that Terry Eagleton 
properly identified as a self-defeating "compact with failure": 
It is the most caricatured side of his thought: Beckett and Schoenberg as the 
solution to world starvation and threatened nuclear destruction. This is the 
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Adorno who deliberately offers as a solution what is clearly part of the problem, 
the political homeopath who will feed us sickness as cure (Eagleton, 1991: 360). 
However, I do not think that compactness with failure is an idiosyncrasy unique to 
Adorno's thought, as Eagleton implies. Instead, and especially within advanced 
capitalism, it forms a crucial component of the aesthetic dimension at large. As I will 
discuss in Chapter V, Eagleton himself does not seem to be free from it. Adorno tries to 
conceive works of art as vehicles of philosophical truth (1991: 54; 129; 212), as 
vehicles of the utopian "promise of happiness", which is a promise that he 
acknowledges is constantly being broken (Ibid.:196). After all, Adorno knows that 
artists must give way to their utopian promises - that is, trying to reveal truth content by 
creative means - from within a capitalist society and through the means of bourgeois 
culture which makes of the whole an "impossible" setting, as I will explain in Chapters 
III, IV and V. 
To support this, I use the example of the Italian poet Pier Paolo Pasolini (1972-75) who 
spent a lifetime's work attempting to find a language of liberation against the 
bourgeoisie. In the 1960s Pasolini concluded that there were only two types of art (and 
therefore only two of types of theatre): one bourgeois and the other bourgeois anti-
bourgeois (Pasolini, 1995: 716).22 This can be extended to encompass the whole 
spectrum of theatrical activity: one being traditional and the other avant-garde; one 
institutional and the other of protest; one academic and the other of underground and so 
on (Ibid.). To make his divisions of art/theatre even more "vivaci" [lively], he 
categorized the bourgeois theatre as the theatre of "chiacchiera" [of gossiping] and the 
bourgeois anti-bourgeois as that of the "gesto 0 dell 'urlo" [of gesture or of screaming] 
(lbid.).23 In order to oppose a theatre of oppression (that is, bourgeois), Pasolini 
conceived six tragedies24 together with a "Manifesto per un Nuovo Teatro" (1965) 
(Ibid.: 711-32) which he called "II Teatro di Parola" [The Theatre of the Word]. In a 
very well documented account, Pasolini' s "Theatre of the Word" intended theatre to be 
a democratic "cultural ritual" without any "spectacular, or mundane interest" (Ibid.: 
732); posited in opposition to a theatre understood as "social ritual", "political ritual", or 
"religious ritual" (Ibid.: 731). In a sense, his theatrical manifesto recalls Trotsky's 
support for a new human culture against a culture of classes;2s but while the latter 
thought it impossible "to create a class culture behind the backs of a class" (Ibid.), 
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Pasolini intended to do precisely that, trying to reach the working class surreptitiously 
by siding with the intellectually advanced bourgeoisie. As he says: 
II teatro di Parola e popolare non in quanto si rivolge direttamente 0 
ret6ricamente alIa classe lavoratrice, rna in quanto vi si rivolge indiretamente e 
realisticamente attraverso gli intellectualy borghesi avanzati che sono il suo 
pubblico (Pasolini, 1995: 732). 
[My translation: The theatre of the Word is popular not because it is addressed 
directly or rhetorically to the working class, but because it is addressed 
indirectly and realistically [to them] through the intellectually advanced 
bourgeoisie which are its audiences.] 
A ware as he was that class differences and social inequality are at the heart of "the 
problem", Pasolini sought to oppose the bourgeoisie in all his manifestations. How? By 
way of the bourgeoisie itself. This time it is not the "gossiping" bourgeoisie or the 
"scandalous" bourgeoisie, this time it is the "intellectual" bourgeoisie. Was Pasolini, 
like Adorno offering a solution that is (paraphrasing Eagleton) part of the problem?26 
Eagleton might be right and Adorno's thought might be conditioned by his own 
compactness with failure, but are we not all conditioned in one way or another by the 
same ideological affliction? Aesthetics are bourgeois; but has not the bourgeoisie 
demonstrated well enough that it will not permit the abolition of class differences nor of 
private property? It seems to me imperative to press on towards the next historical 
stage of emancipation but revolutionary discourses seem to have been erased from our 
cultural framework. Bond says "I criticise at length our present situation because 1 
think we are failing to recreate humanness. In this sense we are "already dead" (17 July 
2003: 2). The dramatist - I think correctly - dismisses any ideological stance as a 
corrupting agent of that humanness he is looking for. Art might be the ultimate, socially 
emancipating force with which to illuminate the natural development of human beings, 
but the question is, what art? The art of whom? 
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Conclusion to chapter I 
This is not a discussion against theory; like Heidegger, I think theory is important but 
limited when humanness and/or the creative self is the object of attention (Wild, 1963). 
Through Heidegger we might say that there is a traditional misunderstanding of 
humanness which starts with Plato's fascination with theory (1955). Indeed, as I work 
through this thesis I realize that the fundamental problem behind my ethical questioning 
is not only capitalism, but civilisation itself. This explains why Heidegger should want 
to make anthropological ontology out of philosophy (Wild, 1963: 664-77). It also 
seems to be a fundamental pillar of Bond's philosophy: "what is the origin of the 
individual self?" He tells me in one of his letters "The answer would throw light on 
culture, politics, society and whatever other things are human." (Davis, 2005: 186). 
Bond, like Wittgenstein, does not have a final answer but rather than keeping silent as 
the latter suggests, he produces a great amount of "theoretical" writing, not only about 
how his drama ought to be made, but on the whole spectrum of humanistic thought. 
This has created a good deal of misunderstanding about the dramatist. In his thesis, 
Ahmed Hasaballa Elhag disputes whether Bond is actually an artist at all, for should not 
an artwork itself say all that the artist needs to say? If Bond needs to explain what his 
plays are about so exhaustively, does not this demonstrate that his plays are a failure? 
(Elhag, 1989: 34-40). It would seem that Elhag has a fair point. As I explained in the 
overall introduction, I myself thought of art - or theatre - as something which can only 
be explained through itself, or that it could be only intuited, say, charismatic ally. But 
ultimately I realized that this kind of mistaken analysis leads us to become victims of 
the kind of theatrical mysticism that, as Pier Paolo Pasolini noted, makes of us actresses 
and actors, "ignorant, pretentious and ridiculous" (Pasolini, 1995: 724). Elhag does not 
recognise the fact that, in the fonnation and final legitimization of art and artists, there 
are at work complex interactions between arbitrary concessions, institutional authority, 
and economical imperatives which are all conditioned by the dominant ideology. 
Provided that art and theatre continue to be finned constituents of the bourgeois culture, 
it would be inappropriate to criticize Bond from within those confines. 
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This will be indeed my final deduction: in order to apprehend Bond's ends we must try 
first to step back from prevalent forms of modem theatre which, the dramatist 
relentlessly contends, are inadequate for the purposes of the ethical question (Davis, 
2005: 126). That is why I think a revaluation of culture - that is, art's location - is 
required here, particularly through Chapter IV when I deal with culture as contradiction, 
the politics of cultural appreciation, and the cultural legitimization of class differences 
through the "ideology of charisma" (Gartman, 1991 :425). 
Nevertheless, why is it so crucial for Bond to explain at length what his drama is about? 
This question is an implicit part of the title of this thesis. In questioning the ethical, 
terms like aesthetics, politics, or social responsibility acquire new meanings. For 
example, we have said that when we experience true art we perceive a knowledge we 
already posses; Bolla calls it a "knowing". Kant and Burke tell us that there is also a 
"knowing" in the sublime, but that we can experience the intrinsic truth content of the 
subliminal experience only from a position of safety. Consider now two hypotheses: 
one, that an important component of all artistic representation is indeed the sublime; and 
two, that in our capitalist societies only those who form part of the top classes benefit 
from a real sense of safety. Would it not mean that only the privileged few can access 
the true content of art? Or even worse, would it not mean that universal appreciation of 
great artworks is just self-deception on a massive scale? This cannot be stressed enough 
because, I believe, most of us do not live in a position of safety. Bond even holds that, 
because of our daily need to survive in an unjust social system, our "se1f,27 has been 
lost, creating a "vacuum into which ideology moves" (Davis, 2005: 186). He writes 
exhaustively about it because he believes our sensory perception has been corrupted. Of 
course, the task of this thesis is to answer the old epistemological predicament: to what 
extent can Bond's claim to knowledge be justified? 
Through Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, David Bell tells of three fundamental powers 
of the mind: one is intuition and sensibility ("sensations, impressions, sense-data" and 
so on), the second is the faculty of ''understanding'' (our intellectual capacities, which 
also involves the power to conceptualize), and the third is to reason (that "we are able to 
infer logically, and to draw valid conclusions") (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 593). I 
do not take issue with whether or not human beings have these three fundamental 
powers, but I would argue that Marx's theory of reification and Nietzsche's evaluation 
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of "men of res sentiment" (see next chapter) undennine Kant's powers of the mind. 
Andras Gedo comments that after a debate with Oswald Spengler, who was 
contemptuous not only of Marx but also of Nietzsche, Max Weber said: 
The honesty of a contemporary scholar and above all, of a contemporary 
philosopher, is to be decided on the basis of his attitude to Nietzsche and Marx. 
Those who do not acknowledge that they could not carry out considerable parts 
of their work without the work done by these two, are cheating themselves and 
others. The world in which we ourselves exist intellectually is a world largely 
molded by Marx and Nietzsche. (Gedo, 1998:337) 
As I will illustrate in the next chapter there seems to be a Marx-Nietzsche ontological 
relationship juxtaposing their apparent antithetical standing which might enable us to 
unfold the convoluted discussions related to the ethical, the political, and the cognitive. 
Ultimately, I believe they offer a serious departure point towards an ultimate reality -
Bond's ethical reality. Finally, the power of principles and theory of aesthetics which 
discloses to us art's multiple values and/or faults might be debated but one thing is 
incontestable: as Bond writes in one of his letters, "art notoriously may serve power" 
(letter to author: 31.10.03); art is not always "good" for all of us; it can be "bad" and 
"very bad". As Benjamin put it, art can be the result of "a 'good' (socialist) and a 'bad' 
(fascist) aestheticization of experience" (Vattimo, 1988: 55). It is unclear at this stage 
whether the dialectical situation we are broaching is a pessimistic or optimistic one. On 
the one hand, a solution seems impossible but, as Bond states, at least we have drama -
we can dramatize "the problem". As he told me "I'm not optimistic about the solution; 
I'm optimistic about the problem" (appendix: 18). 
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Endnotes 
1 Indeed, Brecht also regarded aesthetics as the specific device of the bourgeoisie. But he did 
not just stop at this as an assessment of aesthetics: through his own interpretation of epic 
theatre, he called for the destruction of aesthetics itself (Brecht, Vol. 1, 1963: 17). That is why, 
from the realm of ethical discussion, I would consider Brecht's theoretical engagements highly 
contentious and/or dangerous. As I explain later on via Garcia Duttmann (1991), the proletarian 
dictatorship's ideology was virtually engaged in the destruction of aesthetics through its total 
politicisation. Sending millions to torture and to certain death in the Gulag formed part of 
aesthetics' destruction. On the other side of the scale, stands of course the aestheticization of 
politics: fascism - with well known consequences (Duttman, 1991). 
2 This was one of the questions posed in the symposium "Beyond Postmodernism: Performance, 
Politics, Publics." The panellists included Baz Kershaw, Graham Ley, Helen Nicholson, Alezs 
Sierzs, Sophie Nield and Dan Rebellato. It was held at Birkbeck College, Universtiy of 
London, on Monday 19 September, 2005. The main areas under discussion were correlated 
with Aesthetics, Politics and Ethics in the field of theatre which, in many senses, underlines the 
current relevance of this thesis. In my view, the symposium's general outcome did, once again, 
support with vivid evidence the conclusions of this thesis. One of them, as I will discuss 
further, Fredric Jameson's final remark that if modernity and the discourses surrounding it are to 
be regarded as "ways of talking about capitalism," then those surrounding post-modernity are 
"ways of refusing altogether to talk about it" (Prendergast, 2003:109). 
3 During my encounter with him, Bond gave me original and unedited copies of Chair (2001), 
Existence (2002), Born (2004), and The Short Electra (2004), which might be of great 
biographical value and can be supplied if required. 
4 And yet, it could well be argued that intrinsic cognizance in art is in itself the whole undivided 
'unity of experience', and therefore that it would not be feasible to divide a unity of experience 
in three different discourses - the ethical, the political, and the cognitive. Consequently 
aesthetics in theatre (that is, when we talk of theatre as a work of art) is the unity of experience 
itself. It could also be seen that the political and the ethical are in themselves autonomous 
discourses but when they are put in the context of the arts they loose their autonomy, and 
become blended and intrinsic to aesthetics itself instead of being three autonomous concepts. 
That is why I suggest the examination of the cognitive discourse or, as the title of this thesis 
implies, what are the aesthetics in the politics of theatre. 
s 1979: Foreword. 
6 Also John Gibson's 'Between Truth and Triviality', in British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 43, 
No.3, July 2003, pp. 225-237; John Dilworth's 'Artworks Versus Designs', in British Journal 
of Aesthetics, Vol. 41, No.2, April 2001, pp. 163-177. 
7 Here I have also considered earlier readings made of Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams 
translated by James Strachey, Harmondworth: Penguin, 1976; Jung in Context ed. by Paul 
Bishop (1999) Routledge; and Jung: Selected Writings, by Anthony Storr, London: Fontana 
Paperback 1983. 
8 Jung seems to have dedicated most work to the conflictual relationships between personal 
creed, that is, "a confession of faith intended for the world at large and [ ... ] thus an 
intramundane affair"; and the relationship of the individual to God, that is, religion as an 
extramundane factor (in Wehr, 1988: 36; and footnote 21: 134). 
9 See Jane Turner's article "Theatre Anthropology" in Anthropology Today, Vol. 5, October 
1995, pp. 20-21. In it she makes a report of her participation at the ninth annual session of the 
1ST A. Turner explains how Barba does not engage in debates about his work agenda and its 
political implications when he is accused of things like cultural appropriation. As Turner says 
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"He [Barba] remains aloof from the participants, and although we are all told at the beginning of 
the session that we are all part of the ISTA family, it is as the children who should be seen but 
not heard." Turner also give details of how now Barba is only interested in "pre-expressive 
scenic behaviour", which shed light on my doubts about Barba as merely an irrationalist who is 
moved by his spiritual interpretation of the world. Turner describes an incident in which, at 
Barba's instigation, performers from Odissi, Kabuki, Orixa, Decroux and Topeng traditions 
were obliged to improvise together. The result of this approach was that, in a performance, the 
spectators were seduced only by the spectacle; an affirmation of the 'other' as exotic. Turner 
then remarks that most of the participants were frustrated by the seeming disparity between 
what Barba says and what he does. 
10 Among others which have not been included here, such as linguistics and computer science 
(for more on this see Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 12-15 and 174-85) 
11 Widely available on the Internet: see for example W. Rhy Roberts translation at 
classicpersuasion.org/pw/longinus, Cambridge University Press, 1899. 
12 Broadcast by BBC4, Melvin Bragg's In Our Time, "On the Sublime with Peter de Bolla", 
Thursday, 12th of February, 2004, 9:00 am 
\3 Two of the main representantives of Futurism: the Communist Vladimir Mayakovsky (1894-
1930) whom Stalin declared to be him the 'best and most talented poet of the Soviet epoch' and 
the Fascist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876-1944). As Benjamin says, the examples below 
show its most dangerous trait, a "virtue of clarity:" 
For twenty-seven years we Futurists have rebelled against the branding of war as anti-
aesthetic .... Accordingly we state: ... War is beautiful because it establishes man's 
dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying mega-
phones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the 
dreamt-of metalization of the human body. War is beautiful because it enriches a 
flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it 
combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, and the stench of 
putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, like 
that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning 
villages, and many others ... Poets and artists of Futurism! ... remember these principles 
of an aesthetics of war so that your struggle for a new literature and a new graphic art ... 
may be illumined by them! (From Marinetti's "Manifesto on the Ethiopian Colonial 
War") (in Benjamin, 1999: 234-35) 
And from Mayakovsky's "Left March" (1919): 
Does the eye of the eagle fade? 
Shall we stare back to the old? 
Proletarian fingers 
The throat of the world 
Still tighter hold! 
Chest out! 
Shoulders straight! 
Stick to the sky red flags adrift! 
Whose marching there with the right?!! 
LEFT! 
LEFT! 
LEFT!" 
(From Britannica Online: www.mayakovsky.comlindex; accessed: 07.04.02). 
14 I will not enter into Bond's new acting and staging techniques here - that will require a whole 
analysis of its own. However, David Davis's Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child (2005) is 
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the latest appraisal of Bond's recent theoretical and philosophical developments intended for 
young, adults and educators alike. 
IS On the other hand, it should be added that some might not experience anything at all through 
Bond's drama - that is, not even a sense of loneliness. As a matter of fact, Bond is perfectly 
aware of this, which is why he has effectively withdrawn from writing for adult audiences and 
into writing for young/students audiences. His change of strategy is a very logical one though: 
he does not say society is extreme in a figurative way just to be controversial; he really believes 
that that is the case. He finds that our society is corrupt and corruptive - for injustice forms part 
of our daily lives as if it was a natural given. Therefore, adults have been corrupted and from 
that he concludes that the drama he intends to do would work mainly with those who do not 
(yet) have to endure a daily grind of injustice throughout (see for example appendix: 2; 45-7). 
Of course, this is a judgment which I imagine many adults would find highly contentious. 
Indeed, critics might argue that if adult audiences did not experience what Bond expect them to 
experience, then it is not because their perception has been corrupted by an extreme society, but 
because Bond has not been successful construing or exposing his play's aims. However, I 
certainly experienced as adult that ontological sense of loneliness during his last play The Under 
Room (staged on the 8th November 2005 in Birmingham by Big Brum theatre company). I 
suppose I have been as exposed to the dominant ideology as any other human being. That is 
why I also think that Bond's shift into drama in (or as) education is a very logical one, which 
tells me of his authenticity. That is why the following re-evaluation on Marx' theory of 
reification and Nietzsche's evaluation of men of ressentiment in the next chapter becomes so 
important and relevant. 
16 "The Spirit of Terrorism," Translated by Rachel BIoul, Le Monde 2 November 2001. 
17 See for example Adorno's Aesthetic Theory in which the critic remodels Wittgenstein's 
thought "Die Welt ist alles was de Fall ist" ("The world is all that is the case": from 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) repeatedly (Adorno, 1997: 205; 318; or 369). 
18 O'Connor "The Autonomy of Art", pp. 238-263. O'Connor, the editor, quotes the section as 
being from "Society", Aesthetic Theory (1970) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984) pp. 
320-52 (abridged), Translated by C. Lenhardt). 
19 That is, looking forward to a more egalitarian, just and rational world, which are the 
foundations of humanism and the conclusion of art. See (just few of many examples): Ian 
Stuart's Edward Bond's Letters 5, preface xiii, in pages 4, 5-6, 38,67-8. Routledge 2001. Also, 
Ian Stuart's Selections from the Notebooks of Edward Bond, Volume One 1959-1980, p.201, 
Methuen, 2000. 
20 Adorno suggests that "form is mediated in-itself through content [ ... ] and content is mediated 
by form; while mediated the two must be distinguished [ ... ] form and content are not to be 
confused, but they should be freed from their rigid antithesis" (Aesthetic Theory, 1997: 356) 
21 The discussion on Auschwitz and the death of poetry requires further discussion which I shall 
give later on in this thesis. See also O'Connor's The Adorno Reader (2000) firstly page 210 and 
then page 86 where Adorno seems to apologise, reconsidering his earlier assertion. 
22 My translation from an Italian edition. 
23 On the theatre of "gossiping" Pasolini refers to authors like Chekhov, lonesco or Albee; and 
on the theatre of "gesture" or of "screaming" he refers to groups like The Living Theatre (1995: 
717). 
24 These are: Orgia [Orgy] (1968), Porcile [Pigsty] (1968), Calderon (1973), AfJabulazione 
[Fabulation(?)] (1977), Pilade [Pylades] (1977), and Bestia da Stile [Beast of Style] (1977). 
Published in Pasolini's Teatro (1995). 
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25 "What is proletarian culture and is it possible" (1923), in www.marxists.orglarchive/trotsky; 
accessed: 17.07.01. 
26 He must have been aware of his own contradictory condition, as one can easily find him 
apologising for what he called his own bourgeois "linguistic contamination". For example, In 
the collection of letters Le Belle Bandiere (1977) ("The Beautiful Flags") he protests when his 
narrative works Ragazzi di Vita (1955) and Una Vita Violenta (1959) are taken by the "idiotic" 
critics as "leterari documentarismo" (literary documentarism) whereas, he says, they are works 
in the line of "Verga, Joyce and Gadda" (1977: 63). But he could not be oblivious to the fact 
that these are writers who form part and parcel of the bourgeois literature. Furthermore, later in 
the same letter, Pasolini apologises again for having to adopt, out of pure necessity, such 
language -that is, that of Joyce - which he calls "contaminazioni linguistiche" (linguistic 
contaminations) (Ibid.). One can find Pasolini apologising again for his bourgeois 
contaminations in the introduction of his play Calderon (1995: 27). 
27 For an account of Bond's "self' see Davis, 2005: 59 and 127. 
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(PART I) 
2. CHAPTER II 
The Legacies of Marx and Nietzsche: 
dealing with reification and ressentiment - the numbed self. 
Introduction 
One could suggest that art expresses things about life, about people and about the self 
that are not revealed in political or scientific thought; its great power consists in its 
ability to connect human beings, as though by invisible wires, at the most profound and 
intimate levels. If human beings search for truth about themselves in the world, it is 
said that art offers it. We have said in the previous chapter that art contains a 
"knowing" but if Adorno is correct and aesthetic truth is "bound to the expression of the 
untruth of bourgeois society" (Adorno, 2001: 77), then the existence of art itself is 
paradoxical, for we might say that we live in an era of bourgeois celebration. In his 
writings Nietzsche calculates that truth about the world does not mean the attainment of 
an absolute truth (for further discussion see below), which is actually unattainable. The 
attainment of an absolute truth would also be counterproductive: should we attain 
absolute truth, further thinking would be redundant and so, therefore, would humanity. 
That is one of the flaws of the main religions: they have the certainty of a life after 
death, and so tangible life is only secondary, and a short passage to the 'true' eternal 
life. In other words, suffering, as the Catholic Church likes to tell us, for example, 
would be a good 'tactic' in order to reach the divine heavens. 
In Nietzschean terms, the search for truth about the world means the evaluation of 
history for an understanding of the present which would enable us to question the 
future. This, according to Nietzsche, is only possible if human beings are truly honest 
with themselves (see below). This sort of honesty would go beyond our everyday, 
'more or less' honest acts such as paying taxes, or being 'sincere' with our partners and 
neighbours, and saying what we 'really' think. The act of honesty Nietzsche is 
proposing is a shattering act, because we will get shattering answers. As Nietzsche says 
in The Gay Science, such honesty "would bring disgust and suicide in its train" (Section 
107). Perhaps Nietzsche is suggesting that a true state of "knighthood" (see below) is 
attainable, though the way to get there would be painful in the extreme. Adorno makes 
one suggestion: that we should recognise that the society we create is fundamentally 
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antagonistic to ourselves and that nevertheless we accept it to the extent that we 
ourselves help to maintain such a society (O'Connor, 2000: 12-13). In other words, that 
our own lives are dominated by an irrational situation, which is inter-dependent with a 
society based in market-philosophy and its "principle of exchange". 
This principle of exchange is to me one of the most important of Adorno's arguments 
and in its briefest form is explained thus: "that the essence of this society [is based] in a 
mechanism to which individuals are entirely subordinate in even the most basic features 
of their lives" (Ibid, 13). Adorno holds that we seem unable to recognise the inhuman 
situation in which we live - as he says, from "within" - and therefore, do something 
about it. He also says that the origin of this socio-mental 'paralysis' has its core in a 
modern human "false consciousness" which "generates irrationality in that it disguises a 
state of affairs which has to be transformed."} Of course, as we will see later on, with 
the term "false consciousness" Adorno is continuing the discourse started by Marx and 
developed by Lukacs, in History and Class Consciousness (1990). Bond also coincides 
with Adorno when he tells us that we are living in a situation we simply do not 
understand: it is too complex, too ideologized, and too impossible. It is a situation 
which, he says, makes us mad and "as Euripides says 'you can't go along to a madman 
and teach the madman to be sane'. It's impossible" (appendix: 10). 
Adorno's and Bond's thought coexists only momentarily: Bond also thinks that 
solutions are impossible if one pretends to claim a human world from inside the 
regulated world of capital growth and cultural production. But, differing with Adorno, 
Bond claims to have found in drama a terrain where the impossible becomes possible; 
where the forces of the regulated world cannot obfuscate or threaten our search for a 
human meaning. As he says, "the world doesn't give us our humanness - or a god for 
that matter. It is something we create: from ourselves, through our relationship with 
other people. That is, drama and ONLY drama can solve that situation" (appendix: 9). 
Thus, with Bond, all is not lost as it is in Adorno's "Dialectics of Enlightment" 
(O'Connor, 2000: 155-74) or his "Negative Dialectics" (Ibid.: 54-79). Adorno stops at 
his thesis on mass deception, that is, what he calls "the Culture Industry", and sees that 
our humanness has been numbed by advanced capitalism, claiming for his theory 
Oedipus' answer to the Sphinx's riddle: "It is man!" (O'Connor, 2000: 159). It seems 
logical then that at the end of his Aesthetic Theory (1991) Adorno presents Beckett as 
one of the greatest artists of all times and his Endgame (1973) a true artwork. The 
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position of Adorno in relation to Beckett is entirely in keeping with his own theory. For 
Adorno the situation is impossible because we are our worst enemies - that is, horrors 
and demons are mirror images of men (Ibid.) - and for Beckett "we all are born mad" 
(in Waiting/or Godot, Act II, 1973: 80). Bond also thinks that current culture works as 
a device of mass deception but objects in the strongest terms to the Darwinian and/or 
Freudian view that we are our worst enemies (appendix: 10-1): for him the problem 
rests upon humanity not being able to make logical choices because of the situation in 
which it is located. Thus Bond tells us: "If I talk about the logic of humanness, THIS is 
also the logic of drama, because drama is seeking the logic of humanness; that's what 
the logic of drama is about: the constant imperative of what does it mean to be human, 
and that means to try and make the world a home" (appendix: 15). For Bond we are not 
born mad; the social system, the world/situation into which we are born makes us mad. 
Let us look then at that situation and see whether Bond's stated position can be justified. 
2.1. SECTION I 
2.1.1. The state of play 
Some may argue that we are not entirely subordinated - to the wishes of the market, for 
example - because we live in democracies, whose governments are elected freely by us, 
the people. But do we in live in democracy, following the specific terms found in the 
dictionary? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, democracy is "Government by 
the people (from its Greek Demos=people and Kratia=power); a form of government in 
which the power resides in the people and is exercised by them; a form of society which 
favours equal rights, the ignoring of hereditary class distinctions, and tolerance of 
minority views". As a matter of fact, this definition does not seem to reflect our society. 
As Aristotle tell us in his Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes Athens was a timocracy (time 
= value - though also honour), that is, a government ruled by the ruling-class, which 
was considered a constitution (Book VIII, part 10). For Aristotle, Timocracy was even 
worse than the other two constitutions, monarchy and aristocracy, because it was a time 
of tyranny; for tyrants "pursue only their own good [ ... ] look to their own advantage" 
(ibid.). What Aristotle notes in Book VIII of Ethics has an enormous relevance in the 
studies of ethics, for it stands in direct opposition to the Hegelian idea that during the 
Classical period the Greeks lived unreflectively as citizens of the polis and therefore 
saw no conflict between self-interest and the common good.2 That Aristotle evaluated 
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Timocracy, indicates that there was some reflection taking place. This also has a 
contemporary relevance when considered in relation to current domestic and 
international policies, and the latest and most immediate events. I will not elongate the 
contemporary political discourse. Some theatre practitioners want to believe that theatre, 
as a fully artistic enterprise, can answer the question of whether people are able or not to 
answer for their own lives; the more immediate problems of how and with what effect. 
Adorno does not think that we can see clearly where we stand, for the reasons stated 
above. We ought, though, to be able to answer Aristotle when he asks: is our world run 
by tyrants - that is, by those whose only aim is self-interest - or by people whose only 
concern is the common good? 
Adorno's approach leads me to conclude that the condition of "false consciousness" is 
reflected in the kind of democracy we have at the moment. The sort of democracy we 
have in the West is called Liberal or Representative Democracy. In his paper "Theatre 
and Democracy" John McGrath3 holds that "its main current purpose is to provide the 
global legal framework for the multinational corporations to increase their power and 
profit" (2002: l34). And in order to support his suggestion he quotes extensively the 
social critic and editor, Cornelius Castoriadis,4 whose ethical account of representative 
democracy calls into question its moral value: 
Nowhere among the political philosophers - or among those who claim to be 
such - has there been any attempt to provide a reasonable foundation for 
representative democracy. What is this theological mystery, this alchemic 
operation that makes of your sovereignty, one day every five years, a fluid that 
spreads over the entire country, enters into the ballot boxes, and comes out again 
that same evening on the television screen, on the faces of the 'representatives of 
the people'? This operation is clearly of a supernatural character, and no one 
has ever attempted to provide a foundation for it or even to explain it. People 
limit themselves to saying that under modem conditions direct democracy is 
impossible, therefore that representative democracy is necessary. (ibid.) 
In addition, the executive, a fundamental part of Representative Democracy, 
demonstrates that a rational and fair communication between government and its people 
is just not there. In Great Britain for example, the Prime Minister stands at the apex of 
the executive. He has autonomous power to choose his cabinet which in tum is 
responsible for implementing the policies of the executive - that is the Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, in conventional British politics, all the members of the cabinet must 
publicly support the executive's policies or resign (as we have seen in recent events 
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when the cabinet members, Robin Cook and Claire Short, had to resign because their 
opposition to the war on Iraq). Castoriadis defines the executive thus: 
In the modem period, where Governments are nearly omnipotent, we notice that 
in the imaginary sphere and in political and constitutional theory the 
Government is hidden behind what is called the "executive" power. This term is 
tantamount to mystification, it is a fantastic abuse of language, for the 
"executive power" does not "execute" anything. The lower echelons of the 
administration do engage in "execution" in the sense that they apply, or are 
supposed to apply, pre-existing rules. When the Government wages war, 
however, it does not "execute" any law; it acts within the very broad bounds of a 
law that recognizes it has this "right." And this we have seen in reality, in the 
United States with the Vietnam War, Panama, Grenada, and now we are 
probably going to see it again in the case of the Persian Gulf, after which time 
Congress will be unable to do anything but approve of the action [all through 
were his inverted comas] (ibid.) 
Democracy has been severely distorted by this multinational form of Representative 
Democracy. Consequently, we do not live in a democracy. Do people acknowledge 
this situation? Following Heidegger, Gianni Vattimo seems to associate our detachment 
from the social postmodern with Heidegger's term Verwindung (Vattimo, 1988: 172). 
Vattimo tells us that only Heidegger could translate it into French as a "going-beyond 
that is both an acceptance [or 'resignation'] and deepening, while also suggesting both a 
'convalescence', 'cure' or 'healing' and a 'distorting' or 'twisting"'{Ibid.: xxvi; 172). 
For Vattimo Verwindung is a term which indicates "the end of philosophy in the form of 
metaphysics" (Vattimo, 1988: 173); a crucial concept for any philosophical nihilism that 
is not resigned to a world of illusion and the paralysis of all understanding (Ibid.: xlix-I). 
Do we live in a sort of limbo then? How could it be otherwise? The fluctuations of the 
market on the one hand and powers of the "executive" on the other make our lives 
excessively dependent on something which is literally unreachable. 
We seem paralysed and also conforming because most of us expect to prosper (how, 
otherwise, could anyone have the courage to initiate a family and to nurture children?). 
However, according to Marx, Lukacs and Adorno, our expectations towards the future 
must be measured in relation to an effectual alienation from the present which, 
nevertheless, is modelled by parameters manipulated by present information - media, 
newspapers, governmental manifestos, institutional education, and so on.s If "false 
consciousness" stands up to its definition, the prospect of a prosperous future cannot be 
acknowledged nor can it be recognised by individuals of the modem, post-industrial 
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world. If our internal, mental abilities to discern the world as we live it, is false, the so-
called cognitive perception (that is, the way artists and audiences recognise the 
"knowing" intrinsic in works of art) has to be negatively affected by it. In my view, we 
cannot fail to take into account that an ethical position needs to be weighed up against 
the suggestion that, in the contemporary world, our lives - and our thoughts - are 
conditioned by the predicament of false consciousness. 
2.1.2. Human Reification 
Adorno's false consciousness IS a corollary of Marx's reification. The term 
"reification" is hardly an everyday word, and its verb form, "to reify," is defined by 
Oxford Encyclopedia as "to convert (a concept, etc) mentally into a thing". Its noun's 
definition, "reification", is explained more conspicuously as "The mental conversion of 
a person or abstract concept into a thing." According to Marxist theory, reification is 
also depersonalization, especially when, in capitalist industrialization, the worker is 
considered as a commodity (in Capital, Chapter One, Section 4).6 For Lukacs, 
reification conveys the sense of the process of being changed into a thing, which 
irremediably changes people's relationships among themselves - in a crude way 
"people take on the character [of being] a thing" (Lukacs, 1990: 83), leaving behind, or 
putting onto a second plane, their humanity. For Adorno, reification means "the 
perception of what is qualitative as quantitative" (O'Connor, 2000: 13). 
Perhaps because a Neo-Marxist, more interested in the conciliation of Marxism within 
post-industrial societies,1 Adorno does not give further insight into the origins of that 
perception, therefore I need to re-evaluate some of Marx's theory here. There are, 
however, other definitions of human reification outside the Marxist one that need to be 
distinguished. Some social studies suggest that reification is interpreted as a state of 
amnesia in which the individual 'forgets' the human origins of the social world. In this 
view, social phenomena are apprehended instead "as if they were something other than 
human products - such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of 
divine will" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 89). This "forgetfulness" is explained, in 
tum, as a defensive reaction by which the individual seeks to establish psychic stability 
in the face of "some fundamental terrors of human existence, notably the terror of 
chaos" (Berger and Pullberg, 1966: 68). I will argue that instead, and according to 
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Marx, reification should be viewed as the result of specific socially-structural conditions 
intrinsic to the capitalist system rather than as a universal feature of human psychology. 
The necessary opening point for an evaluation of Marx's theory of reification is the 
section in Chapter One of Capital entitled "The Fetishism of Commodities and the 
Secret thereof'. The notion of commodity fetishism which lies at the heart of Marx's 
theory of reification is introduced in the following passage: 
A Commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social 
character of men's labor appears to them as an objective character stamped upon 
the product of that labor; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of 
their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between 
themselves, but between the products of their labor. This is the reason why the 
products of labor become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the 
same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses [ ... ] A definite social 
relation between men [ ... ] assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation 
between things [ ... ] This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the 
products of labor, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is 
therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. 8 
There is a second and linked cause of reification which is suggested by Marx as the 
notion of the "personification of things". With this notion, Marx draws a direct 
connection between alienated forms of social practice and reified forms of social 
consciousness. Reified consciousness, like all forms of consciousness, is determined by 
the concrete life-activities of which it is a part. For Marx, knowledge of social relations 
- 'theory' in the broadest sense of the term - is constructed in and through the actions 
which produce, maintain, and transform those social relations - 'practice'. 9 Marxism is 
not the only theory to see a connection between the above defined powerlessness and 
resigned human condition and the reified forms of social consciousness. From studies 
on child development, Val Burris, for example, notes the extreme reification of the 
young child's conception of the social world and attributes this to the underdevelopment 
of the infant's sense of autonomous SUbjectivity (Burris, 1982: 307). Burris says that 
when the child confronts a system of pre-existing, external, and "frequently coercive" 
social institutions, the infant views the "ontological status" of these as equivalent to that 
of natural objects (Ibid). Names, for ,example, are understood as belonging "to the 
intrinsic nature of things and emanating from them". Moral norms are thus projected 
onto the objective realm and understood as "categorical imperatives" (Ibid.: 320). Such 
reification declines as the child "becomes increasingly autonomous of adult constraint 
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and gains a stronger sense of his or her own subjectivity" (Ibid). By way of Marx and 
Lukacs we know differently. 
The theory of Marx was the result of social criticism of 19th century capitalism. Then, 
the social relations of manual production and factory work were the chief source of 
reified forms of social consciousness, while in contemporary liberal capitalism the 
application of science to industry has transformed the relations of production into 
relations of services - that is, mental labor has displaced manual labor in most parts of 
the economy.10 Lukacs tells us that the reifying market relations have been, not just 
modified, but increased by the progressive power of monopolistic corporations which 
are themselves helped by the bureaucratic state (1990: 98). As a result, new forms of 
human reification have emerged. 
Alongside the fetishism of commodities, we now have a fetishism of technology, a 
fetishism of bureaucracy, and a fetishism of occupational credentials - that is, 
professional qualifications. The introduction of new technologies for mass production, 
communication, and control appear to some theorists - including Adorno, Horkheimer, 
Lukacs, and Benjamin himself - as the most important sources of reification in 
contemporary capitalist society. The functions of "decision-making" and the 
coordination of production have been transferred from workers to machines, so that 
work roles have become fragmented and "deskilled".11 Furthermore, as Jacques Ellul 
explains in a rather fatalistic fashion, from the standpoint of the individual producer, it 
appears as if technology itself were responsible for the alienating character of work in 
contemporary society, rather than the social forces shaping the development of 
technology. In The Technological Society, commenting upon the "dehumanized 
factories" of modem society, Ellul writes: "It is useless to rail against capitalism. 
Capitalism did not create our world; the machine did" (Ellul, 1964:5). Taking the cue 
from Ellul we might say that this modem form of reification has left the individual with 
a degree of fatalism, but more as if it was some kind of non-reflective theology. 
Other forms of reification can be observed in the fetishism of bureaucracy, which is 
manifested in the common attitude towards the unresponsiveness of government as an 
unalterable fact of nature - this attitude has been more visible recently in the sphere of 
journalism, and its response to the global war on terrorism led by US, the unilateral war 
and the resulting occupation of Iraq. According to Max Weber, an irrefutable trait of 
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modern society is the spread of bureaucracy as a technical imperative which affects the 
inflexible and undemocratic character of contemporary liberal democracies, "increasing 
the distance between government and its people" (Weber, 1968:973). But it is in the 
following extract that the traits of bureaucracy seem to me to be depicted with a 
character of permanence; and as characteristic of liberal democracies as it was once of 
totalitarian systems like those of Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany: 
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always 
been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The 
fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations 
exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. 
Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, 
unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal 
costs - these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic 
administration. (Ibid.) 
Another source of reification III contemporary capitalist society has been the 
development of a mass system of public education as an institution for the acquisition of 
academic qualifications - and the sorting of individuals into positions within the social 
division of labour. Indeed, the transfer of class privilege, once the direct and visible 
result of the inheritance of property, has been replaced now by a complex system of 
unequal schooling. Social relations that were once responsible for the inequality of 
class, have now been incorporated in (and disguised behind) "the technical processes of 
skill acquisition" (Bowles and Gintis, 1976: 123-9). As if it was merely another 
commodity, academic qualifications produce a fascination which comes to be fetishized 
as an inherent source of value, rather than seen as a token granted as the result of 
knowledge gained, and the underlying structure of social relations. 
It is bureaucracy though, at its different levels of complexity observed during the 
twentieth century which could be proposed as one of the most alienating methods of 
social reification. The methods specified by Weber above - precision, speed, 
unambiguity, and so on - specific to bureaucracy, have had a key role in the running of 
totalitarian systems like fascism and communism as they have now in liberal 
democracies. During the Nazi period in Germany and its occupation of Europe, it was 
the machinery of bureaucracy that made possible the transportation of millions of men, 
women and children to the gas chambers, efficiently, cheaply and swiftly. Only the 
methodology of bureaucracy could make possible the task of killing and incinerating 
12,000 people daily, as it did in Auschwitz. 12 
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2.1.3. Adolf Eichmann among us. 
Indeed, from the days of Nazi Germany, there exists a case that might help a general 
appreciation of the grave consequences of human reification. When the chief of the 
bureaucratic apparatus of Nazi Germany, Adolf Eichmann, was put on trial in Israel -
after being abducted in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1960 by Mossad (Israeli 
intelligence) - his only and continuous defense was that he had merely been a devoted 
civil servant (Levy, 1994:121-34); and there is enough evidence to suggest that he was 
telling the truth at its simplest. Simon Wiesenthal13 himself, who was internationally 
known as a dedicated Nazi hunter, indicates that he made a mistake in looking for a 
motive in the earlier life of Eichmann. "There was [in Eichmann] no motive, no hatred, 
no anti-Semitism" says Wiesenthal (Ibid.: 1 00). Eichmann's case needs to be 
emphasized here because his personal circumstances could describe the life of any 
ordinary person going about their daily business now. At the time he was arrested, he 
was considered by all those who knew him as a model father of three and a 
commendable, hard working manager in the Mercedes-Benz car factory of Buenos 
Aires (Ibid.: 130). 
His life story confounds the assumptions of those who would think of the Holocaust 
executioners as "monsters". Wiesenthal and the Israeli prosecutors were unable to find 
any signs of monstrosity or deviancy in Eichmann. During his interrogation in Israel, 
Eichmann acknowledged that, if his bosses had ordered him to kill his father, he would 
have done so. And if Hitler had ordered him to ship the Jews to Palestine, instead of 
Theresienstadt and Auschwitz, and let them start a Jewish state, he would have done 
that too (Levy, 1994:131-32).14 Wiesenthal reports how a good friend of the Eichmann 
family, one who had not been a Nazi, simply refused to believe the accusations against 
"that oafish, lackluster Adolf who never spoke up and often seemed to get stupidly 
stuck in just one idea" (Ibid. 100). From the investigation he made into the lives of 
many Nazis, Wiesenthal confirms what very few want to acknowledge: that nobody was 
a born killer. They had been farmers, workers, clerks or bureaucrats. None had a prior 
criminal record; some had very good early childhoods. In other words, they were the 
kinds of people that one meets every day. 
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What lesson we can learn from the case of Eichmann? That one does not need to be 
fanatical, sadistic or mentally ill to murder millions? That it is enough to be a loyal 
follower, eager to do one's duty for any powerful and unaccountable established system 
- be it the Fuhrer or Stalin or another? That it is enough to be driven by the prospect of 
a successful career? The similarities of bureaucratic functions throughout modern 
history are palpable. In Nazi Germany the hand of a civil servant puts a signature with 
the stroke of a pen, confirming and authorizing the shipping of thousands to their 
deaths, in today's Occident the hand of another civil servant implements a policy for a 
minimum wage in the same fashion, ignoring the fact that as a result, millions of 
children and adults will continue to live below the official levels of poverty, while a few 
will continue to accumulate monumental richness. IS Wiesenthal was bewildered by the 
fact that, on examining their private lives, the characters of the Nazi executioners, of the 
administrators of death, were those of normal and caring individuals. And he 
concludes, "in the moment Eichmann put on the swastika, the first casualty he deported 
was not a Jew, but his own conscience." (Levy, 1994:101). In response to this, I would 
suggest to Wiesenthal that, as Marx explains in Capital, as Adorno and Horkheimer 
sustain in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (1979), as Georg Lukacs holds in History 
and Class Consciousness (1990), and as Walter Benjamin defends in his thesis Art in 
the Era of Mechanical Reproduction (1999: 211-45), reified individuals like Eichmann 
are the consequence of a particular socio-political state of affairs, in which, by the act of 
embracing any given prevailing ideology, they attain a blind conscience. In its simplest 
designation, the essence of the reification of human beings is tracked down to capitalist 
values - that is to say, to economic factors. Eichmann did not throw out his conscience 
the day he put on the swastika; when he put on the swastika, his conscience was already 
supplanted by material value. As Lukacs explains: 
[ ... ] the reified mind has come to regard them ["the relations between men that 
lie hidden in the immediate commodity relation"] as the true representatives of 
his societal existence. The commodity character of the commodity, the abstract, 
quantitative mode of calculability shows itself here in its purest form: the reified 
mind necessarily sees it as the form in which its own authentic immediacy 
becomes manifest and - as reified consciousness - does not even attempt to 
transcend it. On the contrary, it is concerned to make it permanent by 
'scientifically deepening' the laws at work. Just as the capitalist system 
continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and higher 
levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more 
fatefully and more definitively into the consciousness of man. Marx often 
describes this potentiation of reification in incisive fashion. One example must 
suffice here: 
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"In interest-bearing capital, therefore, this automatic fetish, self-
expanding value, money generating money is brought out in its pure state 
and in this form it no longer bears the birth-marks of its origin. The 
social relation is consummated in the relation of a thing, of money, to 
itself. Instead of the actual transformation of money into capital, we see 
here only form without content. [ ... ] It becomes a property of money to 
generate value and yield interest, much as it is an attribute of pear trees 
to bear pears. And the money-lender sells his money as just such an 
interest-bearing thing. But that is not all. The actually functioning 
capital, as we have seen, presents itself in such a light that it seems to 
yield interest not as functioning capital, but as capital in itself, as money-
capital. This, too, becomes distorted. While interest is only a portion of 
the profit, i.e. of the surplus value, which the functioning capitalist 
squeezes out of the labourer, it appears now, on the contrary, as though 
interest were the typical product of capital, the primary matter, and 
profit, in the shape of profit of enterprise, were a mere accessory and by-
product of the process of reproduction. Thus we get a fetish form of 
capital, and the conception of fetish capital. In M-M' we have the 
meaningless form of capital, the perversion and objectification of 
production relations in their highest degree, the interest-bearing form, the 
simple form of capital, in which it antecedes its own process of 
reproduction. It is the capacity of money, or of a commodity, to expand 
its own value independently of reproduction-which is a mystification of 
capital in its most flagrant form. For vulgar political economy, which 
seeks to represent capital as an independent source of value, of value 
creation, this form is naturally a veritable find. A form in which the 
source of profit is no longer discernible, and in which the result of the 
capitalist process of production - divorced from the process - acquires 
an independent existence." [Marx's Capital, Vol. III] (Lukacs, 1990: 93-
4). 
Thus, through the above evaluation we might extract at least one simple list of 
equivalences: firstly, that we, people, are reified by capitalism; secondly, when people 
suffer from reification all things develop an intrinsic value, people included (that is, 
with a value that can be used for exchange); and thirdly, reification must be impairing 
the way we perceive life - or how life ought to be in a humane world. If the reality of 
today corresponds with the Marxist evaluation of human life, and reification and/or 
"false consciousness" is imbedded in us to the extent that human consciousness is not 
there, how can we trust our own judgment? Returning to my main argument here, if we 
all are totally rooted in capitalism, how can philosophers, cultural and art practitioners 
and then critics recognize the true value of a work of art? If we all are reified to the 
point of having replaced even our own unconscious with material value, to the extent 
that our own acquired "false consciousness" prevents us from perceiving it, how can we 
make discourses on the cognitive, on the ethical and on the political? Reification casts 
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doubts on every single aspect of our lives: from art to science, from education to social 
inter-relations. One could even say that our ideas are shaped by the social system in 
which we live, and not the other way round. In spite of this, figures like Castoriadis 
offer auspicious arguments "that a society is autonomous not only if it knows that it 
makes its laws but also if it is up to the task of putting them into question" (McGrath, 
2002:136). 
For Bond, drama is a way of questioning; the questions of the holistic mind whose 
unattainable solution blossoms in drama. And while the dramatist shows distinctive 
warning signs about our society and the loss of humanness, one certainly cannot accuse 
Bond of being a pessimist, as he tells me: "You also ask about my current situation [ ... ] 
I think we can understand the situation and need not withdraw into Beckett's despair or 
serve gangster-states as finally Brecht did [ ... ] unlike Sarah Kane I cannot kill myself -
and certainly don't want to. If my plays have any use they will be used" (letter to 
author: 17.07.03). But again, how can we individuals be up to the task of working 
towards freedom, democracy and justice, if according to the above, our lives are 
determined by an ontological reification? Would it not be as if we were asking a blind 
person to see? Racing as he was for position and status, could we ask "Eichmann" to 
forget about his aspirations? 
2.1.4. Reification as state of emergency. 
McGrath is optimistic when he argues that we should not undervalue human thought 
and endurance: "the dialectics of society can never be stopped or suppressed for too 
long" (2002: 138). He then suggests fourteen commendable points or ethical strategies 
for a theatre that will consciously work towards an hypothetical authentic democracy 
(Ibid.: 137).16 However, as Walter Benjamin had already suggested in "Thesis on the 
Philosophy of History" (1999: 245-56), the problem of human reification has a 
character of urgency, because it would be too easy to underestimate the foremost 
universal imperative of having to make a living. As Benjamin concluded, "the tradition 
of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the 
exception but the rule" (Ibid.: 248). The very human characteristics of Eichmann 
described above can be identified throughout the social spectrum of social life today: we 
yearn social success and status. In the process we might find ourselves submitting to 
the powers that be, and to their requirements of total loyalty, unquestioning obedience 
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and strict compliance with whatever the established rule of law. Eichmann was not a 
"monster," but a reified individual, and as such, he could not identify human values in 
people, just their economic values. How long will Bond's or McGrath's sort of 
philosophies of drama and theatre have to operate before the capitalist condition brings 
about another Auschwitz or Hiroshima? Because if Lukacs is correct, human reification 
by way of capitalism does not remain a stable characteristic, it grows continuously, 
penetrating into us deeper and deeper. As he says, the task is phenomenal: 
Even thinkers who have no desire to deny or obscure its existence and who are 
more or less clear in their own minds about its humanly destructive 
consequences remain on the surface and make no attempt to advance beyond its 
objectively most derivative forms, the forms furthest from the real life-process 
of capitalism, i.e. the most external and vacuous forms, to the basic phenomenon 
of reification itself (Lukacs, 1990: 94). 
I shall stress it again here and in following chapters. The notion that our lives are 
characterized by the "extreme" (that is, by an impossible human condition in which we 
do not really have a choice but continuously feed a system that works against us) shapes 
Bond's philosophy of drama and plays entirely. One of the main goals of this thesis is 
to evaluate whether the position of Bond and his philosophy of drama is justifiable or 
not. In more than one sense, the dramatist is proposing a language of destruction: that 
is, a language which intends or hopes to destroy all those elements that, in his view, 
work against humanity: be it capitalism, religion or morality, types of philosophies, 
types of theatre, the modem concept of art or culture, and so on (see appendix). 
Worryingly though, as Garcia Diittmann explains, fascism has a chameleon-like 
tendency to appropriate any language of destruction that does not fulfill the aims of 
fascism itself(199l:537). I am arguing from the perspective that any practicing theatre 
that stands for true democracy and against fascism would, by definition, also propose a 
language of destruction. That is, it would have to try and find its own language, so that 
it had a chance to destroy those conventional languages which obstruct true democracy 
in the first place. I say conventional languages; Nietzsche would say conventional 
moralities. Searching for new forms of communication, one could argue, is what many 
theatre practitioners have been doing for some years now, but while this process is 
going on, we should take into account that there are two most relevant and substantial 
dangers. One is that fascism could appropriate the very devices that theatre might use in 
the struggle against fascism: "Fascism, whose goal is to conserve tradition in the midst 
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of the very destruction which protects and threatens it, profits from this ability: it 
exploits the consequences and so institutes a tradition of destruction." (Ibid.). The other 
danger is that, as Duttmann says, a language of destruction "only says destruction, it has 
nothing to say, it communicates nothing" (Duttmann, 1991:554). I will examine 
fascism thoroughly in Chapter V. At this point I advance the idea that fascism is so 
inconspicuous it can be many different things to different people. As Horkheimer 
contends, fascism is not unique to Germany, Italy or Spain but is the culmination of 
capitalist societies; or, as Lukacs says above, fascism could be reification's "destructive 
consequences"; or a capitulation of the individual to a mainstream cultural trend 
(Horkheimer, 1979: 154). Insofar as the masses are unconscious "slaves" to the culture 
industry, could fascism already be a dominant societal system hidden in the background 
of our culture? This is a complex issue which defines the contours of Part II of this 
thesis. 
Individual will is compromised by the industries that manufacture our needs and 
desires. It makes no difference whether or not the majority of people recognise their 
society as fascist; moreover, fascism unrecognized is all the more dangerous because it 
is impossible to fight what cannot be identified. Indeed, as Horkheimer believed during 
the earlier period of his life as critical thinker,17 our sensory abilities can only perceive 
surrounding structures (that is, the context in which we live) through a process of 
abstraction; in other words, not by attending to the logic of human reification as a 
problem, which is real, but by withdrawing from it. 
The most intimate reactions of human beings have been so reified that the idea 
of anything specific to themselves now persists only as an utterly abstract 
notion: personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining white teeth and 
freedom from body odor [sic] and emotions. (Horkheimer, 1979:167). 
One could wonder to what extent is the political concern with the theory of reification. 
Baz Kershaw suggests that the political has been tried exhaustively in recent times 
without major consequences (1999: 18). Yet, what really does seem to have been 
exhausted is the number of forms of political discourses. Human beings are political 
per se, and the content of the political is and will continue to be of the utmost 
importance. For the purpose of unity of experience in the arts towards the ethical, the 
political will have to find a new definition for itself, perhaps in the vein of an ethic-
ideological character; or taking forms of discourses from the ethical. I am not arguing 
2. Chapter II 
The legacies of Marx and Nietzsche 
66 
here for a rejection of our cognitive capabilities, but as we have seen above, if human 
reification in capitalist societies is a pennanent condition, we are also saying that our 
empirical-factual knowledge might have been, at least in part, damaged. It will 
necessarily mean that our cognitive perceptions are distorted in one way or another. 
Through Bolla, I have suggested that true art is, or has a "knowing". Through Kant and 
Burke, I have said that the sublime tells us a "truth". But to whom is this truth told? To 
all of us or only to a chosen few? To what extent does an individual without education, 
status, or the safety of a bank account, experience the "intrinsic" truth of an artwork or 
the truth of a subliminal setting? Have we not suggested through Kant and Burke (in 
Chapter I) that people perceive this truth content in artwork, in the sublime, only from a 
position of safety? Regardless of our status or social condition, most of us live within 
the human threshold of constant need, but some very much more than others. This must 
create per force an imperative of competitiveness in which the other becomes an item of 
value no different from any other commodity for sale or purchase. Hence, I would treat 
ethics as the embodiment of a unity of experience in the arts, which eventually might 
give its own voice to the political and to the cognitive. 
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2.2. SECTION II 
2.2.1. Ethics alongside Marx and Nietzsche: an attempt at 
reconciliation 
From the numerous theories and philosophies that contribute to modern human 
knowledge, very many of them converge sooner or later into the thought of two major 
figures of modem thought. One is Marx; the other is Nietzsche. As Andras Gedo 
explains, both Nietzsche and Marx have common nihilistic essentials (Gedo, 1998:331). 
He notes how Lyotard strove in the early seventies to reinterpret Marx's Capital with 
reference to Nietzsche, and Foucault "presumed" to have found in the mid-sixties a 
common denominator in Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. ls Nietzsche's work is reflected in 
the work of many philosophers, and in current journals of the most diverse realms, 
Nietzsche is being reviewed with growing impetus especially in Anglo-American 
philosophy. 19 Most would agree that a characteristic of Nietzsche's thought is its 
complexity. As A. C. Pigou explains "His exposition is disjointed, sometimes almost 
incoherent" (Pigou, 1908:343). Yet, as Brian Leiter holds, what distinguishes Nietzsche 
from the recent Anglo-American writers is that the former situates his critique of 
morality within a broader "cultural critique", attacking morality as a variety of social 
and cultural forces "posing obstacles to human flourishing" while the latter group seem 
to be "critics of particular philosophical theories of morality [his italics]" (Leiter, 
1997:252).20 This is because, in my view, poetry and philosophy are sharply contrasted 
by scholars at large (it could be argued that there is always a philosophical content in 
poetry and not vice versa). With Nietzsche this is not the case. 
In order to appreciate the real value of Nietzsche, we have to acknowledge first that "the 
spirit of wonder that prompts poetry [and] the impulse to philosophy" (Pigou, 1908:343) 
converges in Nietzsche. A. C. Pigou explains that the difference between Nietzsche and 
current Anglo-American philosophies on morality "is not in attitude but in method, the 
[latter] following the hard road of systematization, the [former] flying to the same goal 
on wings of intuition" (Ibid.). Furthermore, Pigou contends that the point where 
philosophy and poetry meets in Nietzsche is Ethics because "positive construction in 
ethics is insight and little else [his italics]". In this Nietzsche distances himself from the 
general tendency to take Ethics as a systematic work, which in that department, "is 
entirely negative" (Ibid.). 
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Pigou suggests then that any hope to understand Nietzsche rests in the employment of 
"a time-worn distinction between means and end" (p. 344) in Nietzsche's work as an 
entirety. Peter Berkowitz (1996) concurs, remarking that the dominant theme to The 
Birth of Tragedy "is not artistic creativity, as is commonly supposed, but wisdom: how 
it is acquired, what it reveals and its staggering impact on the individual who dares to 
lift its veil" (Berkowitz, 1996:61). In the preface to The Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a 
Self-Criticism",21 Nietzsche wants to remind us that "the entire book recognizes only an 
aesthetic sense and a deeper meaning under everything that happens"; that "the 
existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (Nietzsche, 2000: 
Section 5). Berkowitz interprets this not as a contradiction, but as an emphasis on the 
idea that the fundamental human activity is "individual creativity". 
It appears to me that the real meaning that Berkowitz takes from Nietzsche is that 
wisdom and art are, if not the same thing, closely related. Although one could argue 
that Nietzsche's critique on morality seems to be in constant contradiction, as Leiter 
explains, this is because he uses the word "morality" (Moral) "in both positive and 
negative senses" (Leiter, 1997:263). As I shall explain, Nietzsche uses morality in both 
senses because his work is not a theory of morals, but an ethical work about 
conventional morality, which is why he seems to reject any systematic approach. It is 
appropriate to point out here the distinction between ethical and the moral discourses 
for, as I have observed, there is a tendency to blend one with the other. Irving Horowitz 
offers the following: 
Ethics is the investigation of alternative theories and modes of conduct. Its 
primary concern is not with the resolution of moral controversy as such, but the 
reduction of indeterminacy in explaining how people (philosophers included) 
come to make valuative choices; the social and ideological basis upon which 
these choices can and are made; and the possible range of consequences of one 
frame of value decisions over another. In short, ethics is the empirical science 
of human conduct. 
Morals is the essentially arbitrary choice of one set of value decisions over 
another. The study of morals is the study of the obligations and consequences 
imposed by postulating a specific course of action. A moral standpoint is 
furthermore a guide to the selection of categories for the purpose of resolving 
moral dilemmas. In short, moral theory is the rational appraisal of the 
paradoxes in human conduct made from a particular existential standpoint. 
(Ibid.: 1 05) 
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According to Horowitz's definitions, we might say that Nietzsche is, above all, an 
ethicist. And he is so because he evaluates conventional morality empirically - that is, 
with an intuitive and evaluative character. He carries out an historical estimate of moral 
conventions and in doing so - most of the time in a characteristic satirical key - he sees 
that these conventions are a mask behind which people hide their basest instincts?2 
While it would be inappropriate to think of Nietzsche as connected with anyone or any 
particular field, we might say that although Nietzsche is a non-revolutionary in the 
Marxist sense (Ged5, 1998:332), he is a revolutionary in the ethical sense. 
In The Birth of Tragedy for instance, Nietzsche sees creative man in perpetual conflict 
with two antithetical concepts: the Apollonian and the Dionysian. In Greek mythology 
Apollo is the God associated with science and civilization - with rationality. By contrast 
Dionysos, who was the patron of the arts, is the God related with drunkenness, orgies 
and ecstasy - with irrationality. And yet, in my own reading of The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche proposes to reconcile both science and poetry, rationality and irrationality 
while at the same time maintaining a difficult boundary, more like a convergence where 
conflict/affinity are intertwined. His re-evaluation of everything brings forward a 
demanding balance which attempts to indicate a path towards an ethical reality. I think 
this notion is made palpable in the following extract from The Birth of Tragedy: 
From the feverish excitement of these festivals, knowledge of which reached the 
Greeks from all directions, by land and sea, they were apparently for a long time 
completely secure and protected through the figure of Apollo, drawn up in all his 
pride. Apollo could counter by holding up the head of Medusa in the face of the 
unequalled power of this crude and grotesque Dionysian force. Doric art has 
immortalized this majestic bearing of Apollo as he stands in opposition. This 
opposition became more dubious and even impossible as similar impulses 
gradually broke out from the deepest roots of Hellenic culture itself. Now the 
effect of the Delphic god, in a timely process of reconciliation, limited itself to 
taking the destructive weapon out of the hand of his powerful opponent. This 
reconciliation is the most important moment in the history of Greek culture. 
Wherever we look the revolutionary effects of this experience manifest 
themselves. It was the reconciliation [my italics] of two opponents, who from 
now on observed their differences with a sharp demarcation of the border line 
between them and with occasional gifts send to honour each other (2000). 
Thus, recapitulating, we might say that the Apollonian condition is, in Nietzsche, a state 
of intensity in which a creative vision of form is fully realized. The Apollonian 
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inclination is toward method, rationality, and rules. Conversely, the Dionysian 
condition is characterized by an explosion of form, and by a release of energy; it is like 
an impulse towards disorder, irrationality, and spontaneity, and by an ability to respond 
to any stimuli, in a state of emotional intensity. Thus, Apollo and Dionysius are two 
different characters but according to Nietzsche, in the arts they counterbalance each 
other. I question myself then, is it not here where the ethical, political and aesthetical 
discourses want desperately to touch each other? 
Introducing Marx into this Nietzschean discourse, it would be natural to place Marx as 
Apollonian and Nietzsche as Dionysian (though, as we have seen, one could argue that 
in full terms Nietzsche is not fully Dionysian, and then that neither was Marx 
completely Apollonian).23 By taking the matter of distinctions even further and for the 
sake of insight into the subject that will matter more hereafter - that is, in discussing 
Nietzsche's profound sense of honesty - I would like to include now some important 
peculiarities of these two important figures. Given that "the world in which we 
ourselves exist intellectually is a world largely molded by Marx and Nietzsche" (Gedo, 
1998:337), their apparent unawareness of each other seems to me extraordinary. 
During 1850s and 1860s, Marx's and Engels' "The Communist Manifesto" (1848) had 
been made widespread throughout Europe by intellectuals and working leaders. Surely 
Nietzsche had to come into contact with the communist pamphlet in one way or another 
during his earlier studies (Nietzsche was born in 1844). How is it then that Nietzsche 
does not seem ever to acknowledge Marx or the incipient Communist movement? Marx 
is the theorist of revolutionary materialism, but he is also part and parcel of ethical 
theory. At a time when the bourgeois intellectuals were dazzled by the prospect of fame 
and success in all realms of the arts and the sciences, Marx focused his attention upon a 
simple yet huge fact which locates him outside ideology and materialist theory, and at 
the head of what one day could be referred to as the 'ethico-universal': Marx discovered 
the law of development of human history. He identified the simple fact, I would say 
hitherto hidden by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, 
have shelter and clothing, before it can indulge in such pursuits as politics, science, art, 
1·· 24 or re IglOn. 
Marx came to this conclusion at a time when social success and innumerable 
innovations were being celebrated at all levels. Astronomical discoveries were at their 
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height in the 1840s and 1850s. These were the remarkable years that saw the advent of 
Morse Telegraph, BruneI's 'Great Britain', 'The Great Exhibition of London', and 
above all, Darwin's The Origin of Species. This period of discovery and scientific 
wonder, of social achievement in all realms, from science to philosophy, from literature 
to drama, is also the time when the Irish Famine (1845-51) brought starvation to 
350,000 men, women and children. While the advanced classes were being dazzled by 
the enlightenment's radiance; misery and suffering was rampant among the majority, 
the lower classes. Technological progress meant that many machines required an 
unskilled backup workforce of women and children in the new factories - especially by 
the textile mills and the mines (Miihlberg, 1988: 21). Naturally, these social facts need 
to be considered within their historical context and it is unwise to judge yesterday'S 
norms by today's standards. Indeed, in the 1840s a Prussian government adviser 
reported that the employment of children was not only "natural" but a "charitable 
blessing" (Miihlberg, 1988: 22). But in his report, the government adviser could not 
avoid observing that their one-sided occupations were "indisputably pernicious"; and 
this attitude is reflected in the following report after a visit to a pin factory employing 
100 children: 
Their tasks are not exactly difficult, yet some of their labours are at least tiring, 
and others not undangerous. This applies specifically to the casting of the heads. 
The skill, agility and dexterity of the children in all these labours is astonishing. 
The tools and machines which they operate are meaningful; the children 
themselves, who sit working in rows bending forwards and backwards, but all 
making the same movements and the same sound almost to a beat, strike the 
observer as if they were machines (Ibid.) 
Although most people then judged such a society as perfectly 'normal', today we find 
aberrant the kind of human exploitation perpetrated during the 19th century. One can 
only wonder whether in hundred years time, people will find appalling what we now 
consider normal: unemployment at 17 million in the EEe alone on the one hand, and 
low paid tedious jobs with long and exhausting shifts on the other; selective, private and 
exclusivist education versus state education - in short, the social structure of our liberal 
democracies. The Enlightenment of the 19th century offered so much that glittered but 
Marx was one of only a few that paid due regard to the other human misery which was 
hidden behind the glitz. It was all apparently ignored by Nietzsche. 
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Attempting to bring Marx and Nietzsche into a state of reconciliation for the purpose of 
a common, ethical end is not an easy task. The latter retained for himself the Hegelian 
formulation that the mind or the spirit determines the course of human history, while 
Marx reverses Hegel and tells us that human life is determined by economics, which 
forms the basic core of Marxism. However, a reconciliation does not mean to merge 
them into a single philosophy - that would be unworkable - it means to pay due 
consideration to both when decision-making is at stake. It might be interesting to note 
that their very upbringing puts their lives in conflict with each other. Marx was born 
Jewish, he was subsequently baptized with the name of Harry Heine.25 Being Jewish 
during the second half of the 19th and early 20th century in most European countries, 
especially France, Germany, Poland and Russia, meant to be hated, persecuted, and to 
live in constant fear. It was only natural that Marx's father - himself a petty bourgeois 
- sought for his son the chance of opportunity denied to the Jewish people as a matter of 
birth. While Nietzsche, the son of a protestant priest, was a successful academician at 
the University of Basel,26 Marx was the most hated and calumniated man of his time 
because he said the unthinkable: that all men should first have decent lives. 
Governments, both absolutist and republican, deported Marx from their territories. The 
Bourgeoisie, both conservative and ultra-democratic, rivaled one another in heaping 
defamations upon him. 
Contrast this with what has been the fiercest argument of all among scholars: whether or 
not Nietzsche was an anti-Semite. As I will explain, single evaluations cannot be taken 
to the letter with Nietzsche, nor can we make judgments from single paragraphs of his 
writings. If Nietzsche was read so, plundering through his works by way of paragraphs 
here and there - and he warns against this method of reading his works himself - he 
certainly would appear monstrous. However, if many individuals misread Nietzsche, 
we should also acknowledge that only Nietzsche is to blame. (We shall remember it 
again hereafter: namely, that it is difficult to decide whether there are two Nietzsches -
the poet and the philosopher - or one). At the time when he was publishing the second 
part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in 1883, he had already written and published "Part I" 
in which his critique on moral decadence is expressed in such terms: "Rabble-
hodgepodge: therein is everything mixed with everything, saint and swindler, gentleman 
and Jew, and every beast out of Noah's ark.,,27 It seems clear that Nietzsche intends, 
"saint" and "gentleman" to equal "good", and "swindler" and "Jew" to equal "bad". 
Later on in Part I, what Nietzsche allows us to see is that in reality he is referring to 
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Plato, Descartes, or Kant who are as unacceptable to him as Christianity or any other 
metaphysical religion. "Be faithful to the earth!" he admonishes his followers time and 
again in Zarathustra (Part I). And yet, while Nietzsche was writing the last words of 
the second part of Zarathustra, his sister married Bernhard Foster, a leader of the 
German Anti-Semitic movement, who had enormous influence during the Nazi period?8 
And it would appear that Nietzsche had excellent relations with his sister and brother-
in-law. 
"The worst readers", protested Nietzsche, "are those who behave like plundering 
troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, and 
revile the whole" (in Hollingdale, 1977:16). This indicates that he was aware that his 
work was prone to misinterpretation. However, to whom was he addressing his 
writings? What for Marx was fundamental in the foundation of a better world - that is, 
bread - is simply ignored by Nietzsche. Nietzsche was not addressing his writing to the 
world, but to the socially privileged few (such as his ex-friend Wagner). When he 
refers to "people", which he does rarely, he does do by drawing attention to conventions 
and negativity, but the only people he lets us visualize are the particular and small group 
of bourgeoisies and ruling-classes ignoring the masses: 
How repulsive pleasure is now, that crude, musty brown pleasure as it is 
understood by those who like pleasure, air "educated" people, our rich people 
[note parenthetically that a remark on anything directly related with money is 
extremely rare in Nietzsche], our rulers! How maliciously we listen now to the 
big country-fair boom-boom with which the "educated" person and city dweller 
today permits art, books, and music to rape him and provide "spiritual pleasures" 
[all his inverted commas] (The Gay Science, section 4). 
In 1870, Nietzsche served as a volunteer medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War. 
The complexity of the man might be explained by laying out a set of hypothetical 
questions in relation to this. The first is whether he volunteered because he was a dutiful 
servant of the institutions of authority. If he did so, Nietzsche would present himself 
with a lack of authenticity, for his writings clearly argue for a revaluation of all values; 
not only religious but civil values too. The second supposition is whether he went to the 
Franco-Prussian war out of nationalistic pride and in support of the 'Iron Chancellor', 
Bismarck, the instigator of the Franco-Prussian war and an important forebear of Nazi 
idealism?9 This would add further support to the simplistic theory that Nietzsche is 
himself one of the precursors of Nazism; after all, his concept of the will to power is 
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directly linked to the idea of the "supennen" without feelings and without compassion, 
and his hostility towards "polluting" lewishness well documented.30 But Nietzsche 
denies it categorically: 
We who are homeless are too manifold and mixed racially and in our descent, 
being "modem men" and consequently do not feel tempted to participate in the 
mendacious racial self-admiration and racial indecency that parades in Gennany 
today. (The Gay Science, section 377) 
And a third supposition is whether Nietzsche went voluntarily to serve his country 
during wartime because he felt the moral obligation to do so. But was he not supposed 
to be the anti-moralist?31 This is where misunderstandings on Nietzsche are rife. As 
Pigou explains, it would be wrong to assert that he condemns sympathy and love: 
"What he condemns" says Pigou "is the direction which it [love and sympathy] at 
present takes" (Pigou, 1908: 349); that is, for example, as a means to an end. In the 
essay "Why Marx or Nietzsche?" Andras Ged6 explains that "the philosophical Marx-
Nietzsche controversy implies an awareness of the fact that Marx is the alternative to 
Nietzsche" (Ibid.: 338). From the reading he makes on Nietzsche, Gedo explains that 
this conclusion comes from Nietzsche himself; that in the work of Nietzsche as a whole 
there is a sempiternal foreboding of the fateful consequences of his own philosophy, and 
he supports his suggestion with the following: 
There shall one day be attached to my name a reminder of something 
monstrous--of a crisis the like of which has never been on earth, of the deepest 
collision of conscience, of a decision against everything that up to now has been 
believed, demanded, kept holy. I am not a human being, I am dynamite. (Ibid.: 
339i2 
In my view, here Nietzsche is not talking of Nietzsche. It is more as if, by putting 
himself forwards as the sacrificial lamb, he was saying to the Gods "Do you see all 
these men here? They are repulsive in body and soul, their actions are horrifying, they 
do not learn from their actions, but before you take them, give them more time. Here, 
take me, it is me, and only me the monstrous thing; I am dynamite." What I read is that 
the Anti-Christ Nietzsche becomes Christ (we should remember here that he was the 
son of a preacher). Subverting Ged6's analysis, Nietzsche is actually looking to a better 
future; looking towards that day when the unborn - as Wole Soyinka likes to call those 
who are in the future33 - will be horrified when, looking back in history, they see the 
horrors and miseries that their ancestors had to endure, which we shall repeat again: 
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"There shall one day be attached to my name a reminder of something monstrous - of a 
crisis the like of which has never been on earth." In the act of talking to himself, he is, 
in my view, detaching himself from Nietzsche and so embodying the human being as 
universal. 
On Nietzsche I would say to Gedo, yes, Nietzsche the philosopher has ignored Marxist 
theory. In his evaluations he approaches the human dilemma as 'I' as opposed to 'us', 
he is oblivious to class differences and human economic conditions, and is all too well 
within the threshold of bourgeois philistinism. But are not men what other men allow 
them to be? Where can we situate the "Will to Power" in relation to Nietzsche's 
contextual class, the son of an orthodox protestant priest, the former lexicological 
linguist on Latin and Greek, the former admirer of Bismarck? In my view only with his 
opposite - but 'opposite' in the sense that a coin has two opposites - heads and tails. 
And Nietzche's opposite is Marx. 
According to Marx, the evolution of man, in all history, is characterized by man's 
struggle with nature. Marx is referring not only to the nature 'outside' man, that is the 
material world, but to the nature 'inside' as well: the conscious, cognitive nature of 
man, in the ontological sense. And he says "When this antagonism between man and 
man, and man and nature is resolved the prehistory of man will come to an end and truly 
human history will begin.,,34 Is he not talking here about the "super-man" Nietzsche 
longs for? Our struggle with nature goes beyond those basic physiological needs like the 
supply of food, time for rest, sex, and the expulsion of our various excretions. Men 
abuse and exploit the weak, and make wars and kill. For Marx, the primordial source-
setting of man is simply economic, and simpler still, an embedded thirst for money. 
According to Marx, the real nature of money is depicted superbly by Shakespeare, who 
pinpoints two of its most spurious properties as follows: 
1. It is the visible divinity - the transformation of all human and natural 
properties into their contraries, the universal confounding and distorting of 
things: impossibilities are soldered together by it. 
2. It is the common whore, the common procurer of people and nations. 
[And then Marx adds] 
Money, then, appears as this distorting power both against the individual and 
against the bonds of society, etc., which claim to be entities in themselves. It 
transforms fidelity into infidelity, love into hate, hate into love, virtue into vice, 
vice into virtue, servant into master, master into servant, idiocy into intelligence, 
and intelligence into idiocy.35 
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They are two coexisting thinkers who seem to evaluate two different "worlds" - one the 
material, the external, the palpable, the objective 'us'; the other the immaterial, the 
internal, the psychological, the sUbjective "I" - and in exclusivity.36 Where Marx 
identifies the suffering of men in their capitalized conditions, Nietzsche points to the 
vacuity of moral conventions, which are the inspiring source of profit and exploitation. 
Where Marx defines the paralyzing alienation of men by capitalism as reification, 
Nietzsche in a non materialistic way defines it as ressentiment. By means of this logic, I 
would be inclined to defend the hypothesis that the ethical question - indeed its proper 
discovery as a question - starts by crossing out any delimitations between Nietzsche and 
Marx a priori. If Marx covers the material reasons for historical injustice through the 
exploration of all classes, Nietzsche goes as far but in another 'direction': indeed 
towards the dark sides of our inner mental being. 
2.2.2. Nietzsche's men of ressentiment 
One of my most significant findings in assessing aesthetics towards the ethical has been 
Nietzsche's evaluation of resentment - or Ressentiment, as he terms it in his Genealogy 
of Morals (2001). As a result of this, the frame of reference from which I intended to 
approach my ethical aim has been fundamentally reconsidered and my analysis has 
taken an unexpected turn. Nietzsche evaluates Ressentiment through the very subject 
that made him notorious in the public eye: religion. In the reading I make of the 
"Second Essay", "Guilt, Bad Conscience and Related Matters" (2001},37 the priestship 
category to which Nietzsche refers is related specifically to Jewish culture and then 
consequently to that of Christianity. Even so he does not criticize Judaism and 
Christianity in racial terms, but in socio-cultural and historical terms. This cannot be 
stressed enough. While Jewishness and Christianity have been major influences on 
Western culture from the fall of the Roman Empire to modern times, for Nietzsche they 
correspond to a "slave" and "submissive" type of culture. In Bernard Register's 
"Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation," the author makes a very helpful critical 
analysis of the Genealogy explaining that it inquires into the psychological origin of a 
"typified" priest (1997: 281-305). He also notes that the actual history Nietzsche uses 
in Genealogy is of dubitable value (Ibid.: 282). However, I would agree with Peter 
Berkowitz that, in order to present essentially ethical views, what Nietzsche does in 
Genealogy is to "poeticize" history (Berkowitz, 1996: 27-8). 
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Although the term ressentiment as such seems to be outside the general use of 
lexicographers, the defmition that Oxford Encyclopedia has of its co-relative 
"resentment," has corresponding similarities to the Nietzschean discourse on the 
moralities of priestship, and this is: "a negative attitude towards society or authority 
arising, often unconsciously, from aggressive envy and hostility, frustrated by a feeling 
of inferiority or impotence." This "feeling of inferiority or impotence" is indeed the 
substance from which Nietzsche construes his "Priest" type and which is then applied to 
his designation of Judaism and Christianity as a "slave-morality". Ressentiment is 
Nietzsche's particular and radical way of defining the whole of conventional morality, a 
critique on hypocrisy, and an attempt to detach himself from Plato, Kant and especially 
from his former tutor, the pessimistic Schopenhauer.38 Reginster sees that, in 
Nietzsche's view, modem morality - that is, "the distinction between good and evil, the 
feeling of moral guilt, and the ascetic ideal - all have their origin in ressentiment" 
(1997:282). As I pointed out above, in my view the ethical question is as much 
conditioned by Marx's reification as it is by Nietzsche's evaluation on men of 
ressentiment. The Neo-Marxist dialectics of Adorno on "false consciousness" and 
Heidegger's apology for postmodernism through the term Verwindung (Vattimo, 1988: 
xxvi, xlix-I, 172-3) have both come about through the evolution of Marx's theory of 
reification and Nietzsche's evaluation on ressentiment. Thus, according to the readings 
made by Reginster, for Nietzsche the men of ressentiment - or priest type - "who are 
physically 'weak' and 'unhealthy' are defeated by the 'powerful physicality' and 
'overflowing health' of the knights [he quotes from Genealogy, I, sections 6 and 7]" 
(Reginster, 1997:285). Consequently they develop a sense of "impotence" (Ibid.:286). 
From the various types of men of ressentiment listed by Reginster, I will enumerate here 
those which for my purposes are the most relevant: 
1. The weakness of the priest creates their feeling of impotence only because 
they hold it responsible for the loss of their political supremacy. (Reginster, 
1997: 286) 
Here we could make allusion again to what seems to be an inter-relation between 
ressentiment and reification; between Nietzsche and Marx; the sought balance between 
Apollo and Dionysos. In my view, Nietzsche and Marx appear as oblivious 
collaborators who delineate a problem that continues to shape modem human society: 
the sempitemal class-warfare produced by class divisions and inequality. But 
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Nietzsche's evaluation of the world does not stop at a mere class-struggle. It gets worse 
than that. According to Reginster, for as long as the Judeo-Christian morality continues 
to hold sway in our minds, Nietzsche does not see an escape from this condition of 
ressentiment - and incidentally seems to take the same pessimistic view as Adorno's 
Theory of Aesthetic. As Reginster says: 
2. The feeling of impotence [in men of res sentiment] is not a temporary state of 
mind caused by an accidental reversal of fortune. It must rather have become an 
essential feature [ ... ] the analysis [of Nietzsche] presupposes that the priest 
believes he has tried everything he could think of to regain power and failed [ ... ] 
It therefore inhibits any further attempt to recover political power (Reginster, 
1997: 286). 
Yet Nietzsche does not offer a material conclusion for a more "just and fair" society as 
Marx indicates we would with the fulfilment of a revolution of the masses. For 
Nietsche, it would depend on where one wanted to be incorporated, with the "priests" or 
with the "knights". If we chose to be a "knight" - the honourable man, the man of 
higher ethical values - we would not be sheltered from harm, because priests are 
nevertheless around. Nor would the destruction of the "priest" at the hand of the 
"knight" be desirable, because then the knights would have debased themselves to the 
levels of the priests by killing and destroying, thus becoming priests themselves. What 
Nietzsche urges is to be aware of the men of ressentiment because their condition is 
highly contagious. And he says so when he compares priests (or men of ressentiment) 
to sick people: "Sick people are the greatest danger for healthy people. For strong 
people disaster does not come from the strongest, but from the weakest. Are we aware 
of that?" (Genealogy, 2001, essay II, section 14). Reginster holds in the following 
manner the third and last feature of his evaluation on Nietzsche's men of res sentiment: 
3. [ ... ] the priest evidently refuses to accept, or resign himself to, his impotence. 
The priest's sickliness does not eradicate his "lust to rule," but only makes it 
"more dangerous" [his inverted commas] (Genealogy, I, section 6). 
Furthermore, rather than subsiding, as it would in the case of resignation, the 
hatred the priest harbours towards his victorious rivals, the knights, grows to 
monstrous and uncanny proportions. (Reginster, 1997:286-7). 
Not surprisingly perhaps, German Nazi intellectuals of the period failed to recognise 
themselves as men of ressentiment, not even in the house of Nietzsche's sister, whose 
views concurred with those of the Nazi intelligentsia and where the philosopher's works 
were indeed discussed.39 In my view, the portrayal of the principal protagonists of the 
2. Chapter II 
The legacies of Marx and Nietzsche 
79 
Nazi period fits Nietzsche's description of ressentiment like a glove. According to 
Wiesenthal's research, as a young person, Hitler was an unsuccessful artist of urban 
paintings who failed to be accepted at the School of Art in Vienna (Levy, 1994: 15). He 
was also intensely in love with a rich Jewish girl who never noticed him, and who, 
nevertheless, was unreachable for the very reason that she was from a higher social 
class (Ibid.:19). Apparently Hitler had serious problems communicating with women 
and what is more, and perhaps as the result of this 'timidity', he also caught syphilis 
from a prostitute who, incidentally or not, was Jewish (ibid). Himmler was a chicken 
farmer in Bavaria during his earlier life (Ibid.: 114), and Eichmann tried repeatedly to 
obtain a University degree - mostly under pressure from his father - without ever taking 
it to a successful end (Ibid.: 93). They were common, futile men, in a culture that rated 
personal success and glory above all else. Their failures must have driven them to the 
darkest comers of their minds, feeling near to nothing. As the political philosopher 
Hannah Arendt puts it in her account of his trial, Eichmann in Jerusalem, which is 
pertinently subtitled A Report on the Banality of Evil (1964): 
From a humdrum life without significance and consequence the wind had blown 
him into History, as he understood it, namely, into a Movement that always kept 
moving and in which somebody like him - already a failure in the eyes of his 
social class, of his family, and hence in his own eyes as well- could start from 
scratch and still make a career. (Ibid.: 91) 
Nietzsche saw them coming - the Hillers, the Himmlers, and the Eichmanns and, we 
must say, the Stalins too - even before they were born. By way of the "hatred they 
harboured towards the knights", they grew into a monstrous killing machine filled with 
vengeance. They were men of ressentiment. How visionary was Nietzsche of the 
variants of human nature when we can observe now that the whole functioning device 
of the Nazi machinery was an extension of priesthood: Hitler at the head, omnipotent, 
unreachable, who was unquestionably taken as the only one who could speak to a god, 
and therefore of a divine character. And then his summum priests, Himmler and 
Eichmann, with their performative paraphernalia; one the extended arm of the leader, 
the other the organizer of the executions. They were priests with the same monstrous 
vengeful purposes of the Spanish Inquisition, the Catholic monarchs Ferdinando II and 
Isabella at the head, the 'Great Dominican Inquisitor' Tomas de Torquemada as the 
extended arm who coordinated the burning and torturing. A 'cleanliness' thereafter 
prolonged for more than five hundred years, killing thousands throughout Europe and 
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the expanding colonies.4o Both types of "cleanliness", Nazism and the Inquisition, 
differed in fonn but they have their origin in same sense of baseness of priesthood to 
which Nietzsche refers: ressentiment. 
But what happens when the men of ressentiment, the priestlike types, display signs of 
love, compassion and charity? Are they not signs of nobility and decency, of righteous 
morality? That, says Nietzsche, is the overwhelming craving of the priest for power, 
and for the feeling of being in power (Reginster, 1997:290-2). These "noble" signs, 
explains Nietzsche, are the revaluation the men of ressentiment make on what they 
really value: power. Reginster presents Aesop's famous fable of the fox and the sour 
grapes as a good parallel: "Unable to reach the grape it covets, the fox attempts to get 
rid of its feeling of frustration by persuading itself that the grapes were sour and so were 
not what it wanted anyway" (Ibid.:290). Likewise, when the priest seems to love or 
give charity, he is not changing his values, he is reconsidering how to get there: "as not 
all grapes are sweet, so not every fonn of power is 'real' power" (ibid). When the men 
of ressentiment give away something, they do so because it makes them feel superior. 
I will illustrate this further with the following example: a writer friend of mine, who is 
black - I will omit the name for obvious reasons - tells me that when he goes to 
symposiums of literature, in order to know if he is among "racist bastards", he uses the 
trick of talking gibberish nonsense. If the people listening assent condescendingly to his 
mumbo-jumbo, then he knows he is surrounded by "snakes". Such patronizing 
behaviour, like giving away love and money, could be another fonn used by the men of 
ressentiment when they revaluate how to get the power they crave. The revaluation the 
men of ressentiment make is a far more radical fonn than that of Aesop's fox because 
what the priests have changed are their very values. Reginster explains that "if the fox 
were to emulate this type of revaluation, it would have to say not that the grapes are 
sour but rather that the sweetness itself is evil" (Reginster, 1997: 291). This takes us 
directly to a portrayal of so-called "virtuous" individuals. With unimpeachable morals, 
blameless, guiltless; they consider sex "dirty" and pleasure and enjoyment as "mundane 
banality" (it seems highly probable that Nietzsche was thinking as well of 
Schopenhauer). "One should not imagine," says Nietzsche, "it grew up as a denial of 
that thirst for revenge, as the opposite of Jewish hatred! No, the reverse is true! That 
love grew out of it as its crown" (Genealogy, part I, section 8). What does Nietzsche 
really mean here? Reginster offers a skillful explanation with the following: 
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The devaluation of power motivated by ressentiment thus turns out to be a last-
ditch effort to gain it. The priest professes to embrace values and ideals he 
deems incompatible with power and political superiority, which he now regards 
as evil. But his unacknowledged [my italics] wish is that his altruistic "good 
deeds" for example, will bring him at last a taste of that power he still craves: 
"The happiness of 'slight superiority,' involved in all doing good, being useful, 
helping, and rewarding, is the most effective means of consolation for the 
physiologically inhibited." [the fragments in inverted comas are from 
Reginster's notes on Genealogy, III, 18] (Ibid.:29l) 
From this analysis, a series of unsettling questions follow. As I have suggested, 
Nietzsche defined ahead of time and to the point of perfection, the Nazi leaders in his 
evaluation of the men of ressentiment as the weak priests that hate the knights, the 
"hatred" the priest harbours towards his victorious rivals, the knights, "grows to 
monstrous and uncanny proportions" (see above). Could a parallel be drawn between 
the men of res sentiment, who made an ultimate revaluation of their own values for the 
purposes of power-appropriation, and the cases of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) around the globe, with their various charities and aims? Could charity be, by 
way of its very existence, maintaining a system of injustice to the point where it 
becomes difficult to discern who, ultimately needs whom? 
In fact, Nietzsche's men of ressentiment extend across the whole spectrum of humanity. 
In Chapter V, by way of Nicos Poulantzas (1974), I will attempt to define the petty 
bourgeoisie as a class frustrated by its continuous demands for changes - that is, a 
"neutral" State, "social fairness", "opportunity", "condemnation of Big Capital's 
monopolies" and so on (Poulantzas, 1974: 251) - but fiercely opposing any attempt at 
changing the system; an idiosyncrasy which is determined by its own peculiar ideology. 
The link between Nietzsche's men of ressentiment and Poulantzas' definition of the 
petty bourgeoisie as the class which both despises and craves power appears 
extraordinary to me. 
Furthermore, and for the sake of taking these Nietzschean considerations to their proper 
end - that is, round honesty's orbit - some self-exploration is due here. Is the purpose 
of this very thesis the attainment of knowledge? Or is it, on the contrary, for the 
purposes of prestige; for the debased and corrupted own cravings for happiness I do not 
have, which, by way of an academic title - itself granted by an institution of authority-
will supposedly give me an intellectual superiority, which may put me in a superior 
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social setting in relation to the majority? By aspiring to a PhD, am I a "priest" or a 
"knight"? A crisis then develops because whether I have answered yes to one or the 
other, it always makes me a "priest". If I answer "yes, I am priest", therefore, I am 
"priest"; if I answer no, I am a "knight", because of course I want to tell to myself I am 
"of superior values", this craving for being "something or someone superior" makes me 
ipso facto a "priest". To me, Nietzsche's evaluation always answers "I am Eichmann". 
Consequently, we might say that "the man of ressentiment" is a state of deep frustration, 
in constant need of a resolution. Sometimes this frustration manifests itself by way of 
extremes - as the 1930s' and 1940s' European fascism - but it never goes away; always 
incipient, waiting to re-emerge. As Reginster, concluding, explains: 
The "man of res sentiment" [his italics] is thus left pathetically hanging between 
the impossibility to enjoy the satisfaction of desires he does not really have, and 
the impossibility to enjoy the satisfaction of desires he has, but cannot embrace. 
(Reginster, 1997:303) 
Reginster does not offer solutions, as at no point does he venture beyond the modem 
standardized realm of philosophy. Towards the end of his article, he very briefly 
suggests that perhaps the "connection between the notions of integrity of self' and the 
idea of "self-creation" might offer a compatibility with Nietzsche's perspectivism about 
values - that is, a view of the world "about values" which is, inevitable, partial and 
limited (1997:305). Yet it would be wrong to think that we are damned. As I said 
initially, if we agree with Nietzsche's assessment on humans, he seems to suggest that 
one possibility for man would be to conquer that terrain in which we are finally able to 
be truly honest. To me this is like saying free - free from ideology, from morality, 
tradition, gods; in sum, from anything attempting to direct a way towards humanness 
and therefore a place in which we could create a society made up of equals. But he also 
says that such honesty "would bring disgust and suicide in its trail" (The Gay Science, 
Section 107). I will suggest then a hypothetical approach which might become not so 
putative if it is stressed within the following context. 
We might say that Nietzsche attacks morality 'fiercely', at least Judeo-Christian 
morality and values. From a cursory reading of his writings one could deduce that he 
despised Jewishness as much as Christianity - the latter a development from the former. 
What is clear though, is that he despised their values, not the individuals. He attacked 
Judeo-Christianity for the same reasons that he later assailed Wagner (who went from 
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being Nietzsche's dearest and most admired friend to the lowest rank of human being). 
Nietsche saw in both the dangerous hypocrisy that emanates from an unappeasable 
resentment. When he saw a Christian or a Jew giving a few coins to a beggar, 
Nietzsche was horrified because he felt that the do-gooder demonstrated compassion 
whilst thinking "Thank god that I am not like thee!"41 
Hypocrisy is, in my view, at the centre of all of Nietzsche's evaluations on the human 
being. His critique of disgust was centred on the conventions of morality which had to 
be induced, nevertheless, by a priori historico-cultural considerations. For Nietzsche, 
determining the origin of moral values was only a "means" to address his real concern; 
"to be precise, the value of morality" itself (Genealogy of Morals, Preface, 5). This is 
also revealed in another particular detail of Nietzsche's life. Initially, Nietzsche was a 
close friend of the German composer Wagner.42 Now, in the second version of The 
Birth of Tragedy (1886), Nietzsche includes a sort of introduction entitled "An Attempt 
at Self-Criticism", in which he reminds us that, while the first version of 1871 The Birth 
of Tragedy was written with the "great artist" Wagner in mind, this was no longer the 
case with the second version of 1886. After seeing Wagner's Parsifal for the first time 
in 1882, the philosopher changed from admirer to fierce enemy of the composer, never 
missing the opportunity to use him as example of what he saw as the lower of men, the 
"priest" type. So he says in his Genealogy: 
[ ... ] why Wagner was concerned about that manly (and also so unmanly) 
"simpleton from the country", that poor devil and nature boy Parsifal, whom he 
finally turned into a Catholic in such an embarrassing way. What? Was this 
Parsifal really meant to be taken seriously? For we could be tempted to assume 
the reverse, even to desire it-that the Wagnerian Parsifal was intended to be 
cheerful, as it were, a concluding piece and satyr drama, with which the tragic 
writer Wagner wanted to take his farewell, in an respectful manner worthy of 
him, from us, from himself, and, above all, from tragedy, that is, with an excess 
of the highest and most high-spirited parody of tragedy itself, of the entire 
dreadful earthy seriousness and earthy wailing of his earlier works, of the 
crudest form in the perversity of the ascetic ideal, conquered at last. [ ... ] For 
what would Parsifal be if intended seriously? Do we need to see in it (as it was 
put to me) [his brackets] "the epitome of an insane hatred for knowledge, spirit, 
and sensuality?" 
Thus, Nietzsche's whole ethical evaluation was concerned with the differences between 
those who, at the risk of having "fits of nausea" (2000: section 19), take the risk of 
being "truly" honest with themselves, and those that prefer to live as "slaves" 
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submissive to morality in all its pejorative sense. When Nietzsche saw Wagner's opera, 
he saw a "priest" preaching Christian moralities, but understood that behind his work 
Wagner was anything but a Christian, for a Christian ought not to crave fame, success, 
public appreciation, and unlimited access to limited resources. In answer to Wagner's 
Parsifal, Nietzsche wrote The Anti-Christ (1895), in which he is not proposing an attack 
against Christ, but against the men of ressentiment - the "priests" - whom he identifies 
as "these Jews and Christians" and who are for Nietzsche the real anti-Christ. 
I would calculate Auschwitz and Hiroshima to be the ultimate consequence of the 
philosophies of Marx's reification and Nietzsche's men of res sentiment. My concern is 
that these two complex human conditions are as alive today as they were at the end of 
the 19th Century. We can only speculate what their reaction would have been, had Marx 
and Nietzsche faced at first hand such a systematic killing of human beings. On the 
assumption that honesty in its fullest meaning is a determinant of their thought, they 
would have to come to the conclusion that we are as near to an individual such as 
Eichmann as we are to anyone else; that a revolution without first apprehending the 
reasons for which we ought to assert "I am Eichmann" would end as futility or as crime. 
If as F. S. Lucas explains, Aristotle's ideal tragic plot is not when the hero is a good 
man coming to a bad end, but when he is a rather good man coming to a bad end 
(Lucas, 1961: Apendix),43 Eichmann attained that ideal. In the human resolution I am 
proposing, the early life of Eichmann ought to be proposed as the template of a perfect 
hero of an ancient Greek tragedy; just as so many of us would be. Indeed, this is the 
very quality that makes a democratic experience of Greek tragedy. Needless to say, this 
would be a very painful and difficult step to take. Even McGrath's fourteen points on 
how to build a theatre towards democracy (see endnote 30) does not seem to me now 
more than an appeal to reason; the very condition which could all too easily end in 
spelling out new forms of ideology. An education more concerned with truth, 
knowledge, and the meaning of humanness than with markets would be a good 
beginning. Instead of young men and women leaving school crying out learned laments 
like "I am Spartacus! I am Spartacus! I am Spartacus!", education should teach us to be 
honest with ourselves and with history, so that we, even at the price of horror and 
disgust, when we leave school are able to cry "I am Eichmann! I am Eichmann! I am 
Eichmann!" 
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Conclusion to chapter II 
What is the final moral from Nietzsche's ethical evaluation? When a hypothetical man 
or woman emerges - call them an agent - from among us to kill coldly, or steal 
unnecessarily, or become extremely rich through the exploitation of others weaker than 
themselves; or when, indeed, the agent is a tyrant that kills by the million (which, 
through detachment we often designate as a monstrous thing, or an abnormality of 
nature, or simply immoral or evil) that agent is harmful to us because she or he is a 
consequence of the whole. That is, this agent's very existence is a consequence of our 
way of life; a consequence of our moral conventions, our political decisions, our social 
systems. Nietzsche is saying that we would not be sheltered against harmful agents by 
putting them in prison or by hanging them or by going to war with them, because in 
such an unresolved society more and more harmful agents would always reappear. This 
analysis can be weighed up against a variety of modem examples. Take for example, 
West German reparations to the Jews in the 1950s which amounted to more than $37 
billion and became crucial to the early survival of Israel (Levy, 1994:80). Like Simon 
Wiesenthal, I am of the view that when the Jews settled for material rather than moral 
restitution, they made the biggest of all the postwar mistakes (ibid.); a mistake that has 
had, one way or another, major relevance to current events of international terrorism. 
We will be finally sheltered against harmful agents - that is, against fascism44 - when 
we put an end to our whole way of viewing things, including having a deeper 
understanding of what it is to be an advanced human being. 
Nietzsche's evaluation on men of ressentiment unearths a deep-seated and unresolved 
human predicament which has been within us, as Hobbes and Hegel indicated, from the 
times when individuals assented to the establishing of authority, social hierarchy and, 
therefore, differing status (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 530; 612-14). Could it be that 
ressentiment is not a psychological condition intrinsic to human beings as such -
dividing us into "priests" and "knights"; into "bad" and "good" individuals - but a by-
product of civilization per se? This is precisely the critical point from which Marx 
moves forwards, leaving Nietzsche behind in that site Marx regards as prehistory. Yes, 
human ressentiment might be behind the atrocious crimes we commit against each 
other; behind those systems of morality through which it is possible to justify injustice. 
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But Marx, contradicting Hegel and Hobbes, comes forwards and determines that we 
resent not because it is innate in us, but because the economic foundations of our civil 
societies first generates and then legitimizes inequality as a human condition. Edward 
Bond has penetrated even further into this staggering notion and has tried relentlessly to 
pass it on through his writings. This is an extremely complex task because, to begin 
with, it requires a language powerful enough to prevail over ideology, which obscures, 
by way of reification, our very thoughts and perceptions. As an answer to these two 
first chapters, Bond sent me a letter which, in my view, reveals the true political and 
philosophical location of the dramatist. Especially pertinent is the following extract: 
As a species we are condemned to seek justice, it is as if we were driven. But 
the situation is difficult to read. All systems of morality are corrupt because their 
effect is to reconcile us to injustice - and as the effect is always justified by 
ideology, it is the unspoken intention of morality to reconcile us with injustice, 
to live unjustly - and because of the contradiction in the self this leads to the 
paradox that crime (acts against morality and law) may be expressions of the 
human need for justice. From this trap there is no immediate escape: societies 
must organise themselves (dated: 2 October, 2004). 
I will return to this matter of inequality once I have assessed culture from the 
perspective of contradiction, industry and ideology in part II, especially in Chapter V. 
But are there possible solutions? In the letter excerpted above, Bond tells me that this 
is a pure human crisis which he thinks can be "meet head on" only through drama -
because it is the only means through which would be possible to activate "the logic of 
humanness" . 
We might say then that it is not a case of studying whether it is Marx or Nietzsche who 
puts more weight in the balance for a real unity of experience towards an ethical reality 
in the arts or in theatre: our initial objective. Neither is it the case of expecting to 
achieve a unity of experience in theatre - as Habermas said, "bridging the ethical, 
political and cognitive discourses" so questioned by Lyotard (see p.l in "general 
introduction") - constructing a sort of bond with the materialistic theories of Marx and 
with the ethical discourses of Nietzsche. I would now say that Habermas is 
fundamentally wrong. We cannot bridge these three discourses from the situation in 
which we are. How else, when Marx and Nietzsche prove that our empirical knowledge 
is simply not there. In the world described by Marx and Nietzsche a cognitive discourse 
is just a pretension; even worse, an aesthetic decoration. Bridging the political, the 
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cognitive and the ethical discourses could be a reality once our world is made up of 
truly free individuals as Trotsky envisioned it, when culture is 'human culture' instead 
of class cultures as it is now.45 
I will tum to this matter during the following chapters but for now, I will just say that 
very possibly Habermas proposes a discourse that "bridges the gap" for the arts because 
he is, as Benjamin would say, a Neo-Marxist "negotiator".46 If we were to follow the 
evaluations of Marx and Nietzsche, one on our external environment, and the other on 
our internal being and our decision-making, it would not necessarily follow that we 
would be (or would be doing) the just and right thing. It would, however, mean that we 
would not be going to be wrong with intent. We might then know, for example, what 
direction we should take to try to build up an uncontaminated form of human 
expression. Ideology should also be taken into account at all times: Marx proposed the 
solution of class struggle with proletarian revolution and it proved to be one of the 
greatest disasters of modem times, with Russia becoming a grotesque dictatorship ruled 
by men of ressentiment. Duttmann, by way of Benjamin, takes the ideological subject 
further and tells us that, when the destruction of old systems is not carried through to its 
very end, the forces of fascism or communism take on the social lead by definition: they 
both make changes, but class inequality as the original 'problem' goes on unresolved. 
As I see it, the only way we can make sense of the hypothetical symbiosis of Marx and 
Nietzsche, is by using the following metonymic example. Imagine ourselves looking 
through the glass of a window just as the sun begins to rise. In the action of looking 
through it, we can see the external world, and as a result, we are taking a Marxist view 
of the world. But if we look more 'closely', we might suddenly see ourselves reflected 
simultaneously, and as a result we are also taking a Nietzschean view of the world. The 
significant thing is that from looking out of the same window, we obtain at once two 
very different results: 'I' and 'us' - and they complement each other. 
I sent Bond the content of this chapter thus far. Imagine my surprise when with his 
agreeable five-page response, he included the following poem entitled "The Sheet of 
Glass" (of which I had no previous knowledge):47 
There is a sheet of glass. 
You see through to what is beyond. 
A window 
It keeps out cold and rain. 
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The same glass but now it does a different thing. 
The opposite. 
You see yourself but not beyond. 
At night you dream. 
Can't remember who you are. 
You go to the mirror to look for yourself. 
All you see is the dark. 
You can't see through it 
... or anything in it. 
You don't know who you are or what's beyond the mirror. 
A dream is the opposite of being awake. 
Or is it? 
Is a dream a sort of mirror? 
You wake and go to the mirror. 
The dream's upset you. 
You'd like a mirror which shows you 
and at the same time lets you see what's beyond it. 
So you break the mirror. 
You cut your hand. 
It bleeds. 
But it works! 
Through the broken gaps you see what's beyond the mirror 
-you see other people there and what's happening. 
And in the broken mirror still in place you see yourself. 
But only bits of yourself. 
For every bit you see of what's beyond the mirror 
you have to lose a bit of yourself. 
It can't be otherwise. 
It is the law of opposites. 
Now 
The mirror was magic. 
Every morning when you washed your face you asked it 
'Who's the best person in the world?' 
The mirror looked you straight in the eye and said 'You'. 
But the morning on which it was broken 
... it didn't 
- and it never did again. 
Instead it said: 
What are you for? 
What are other people for? 
According to John Doona, "The Sheet of Glass" was Bond's response to a group of 
teachers from seven Tameside secondary schools, on the "eastern edge of Manchester" 
(in Davis, 2005: 93), who posed the dramatist the following question: "What does a 
young person need to think about or to know at this time?" (Ibid.: 94). This poem has 
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been a revelation to me because it appears to be an enhanced version of the ethical 
relationship I had construed through Marx-Nietzsche above: a sort of "glass window" 
which, when situated within a specific setting, reflects "I" and ''us'' simultaneously and 
interdependently. In my view, this is the essence of a hypothetical synthesis of 
Nietzsche and Marx: stardust - what we all are. 
Finally, if, as Lukacs tells us, reification is the "immediate reality of every person living 
in capitalist society" (1990: 197) it must be determining our very perception and 
therefore undermining all thought and creative activity - that is, culture as a whole. Our 
situation seems like a real Catch 22: we long for true freedom, universal justice, and 
genuine equality but reification corrupts the powers of reasoning/intuition which we 
need in order to get there. However, Lukacs also offers us a solution which actually 
detennines the evaluative approach of the remaining thesis: 
[that reification] can be overcome only [my italics] by constant and constantly 
renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating 
to the concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by 
becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions for the 
total development (Lukacs, 1990: 197). 
I think this is precisely what Bond is already attempting to do with his drama: to disrupt 
the reifying process by trying to make conscious the lost self. In a personal letter he 
tells me: 
You write much about reification. It makes sense and I agree with it - I tend to 
concentrate more on ideology. Reification implies a loss of the self, a numbing 
of the self. This creates a gap - space - vacuum - into which ideology moves. 
But the denied self seems to generate its own res sentiment - or as I put it, 
revenge, vengefulness. Ideology then fuels this and it leads to reaction and in 
extreme situations to fascism. Before the extreme, fascism is incipient. But 
what is the self that is alienated? (Now reproduced in Davis, 2005: 186). 
The meaning of the human self is, indeed, the axis around which Bond's current 
dramatic work revolves. My task here is not to evaluate the dramatist's output, but to 
revaluate precisely what Bond calls "the problem", which, in my view, seems to be 
what Lukacs suggests should be constantly disrupted: our "reified structure of 
existence" within capitalism. In the following part, I will cross-examine Lukacs' 
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"reified structures of existence" by approaching culture from three of its most 
significant perspectives: contradiction, industry and ideology. 
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1 In my view, "False consciousness" is a fundamental reference in the work of Adorno, which 
shapes his socio-political, cultural, and aesthetic evaluation throughout. See for example 
O'Connor in pages: 3,5, 12-14,36,65, and specially 230-238. 
2 See for example, Martin Heidegger's "Hegel and the Greeks", from "Conference of the 
Academy of Sciences at Heidelberg", July 26, 1958 in http://www.morec.com/hegelgre.htm. 
(pp. 17) or also Richard Kraut's Review on Nicholas White's "Individual and Conflict in Greek 
Ethics" (2002) in Ethics Vol. 3, no. 1, Autumn 2002, pp. 401-404, p. 403. 
3 He died from leukaemia in January 2002. He is most known for his work with the 1970s 
theatre company 7:84 as well as a good collection of essays, letters, lectures and reviews. 
Edward Batley and David Bradly's book Morality and Justice: the Challenge of European 
Theatre (2001), testifies that McGrath was one of the most important exponents of theatre 
activism in Great Britain. Some of his most well known plays are The Cheviot, The Stag and 
the Black, Black Oil (1981), and Blood Red Roses (1981). 
4 On Castoriadis see for example Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy (ed. David Ames Curtis, 
Oxford University Press, 1991), whose evaluation on matters pertaining modem democracy 
have valuable observations for the application of politics and ethics in theatre. 
5 See also Anustup Basu's essay on fascism and information, 2004. 
6 Online: Marx Internet Archive. http://www.marxists.org; accessed: 25.06.02. 
7 The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School began its work by criticizing Marxism -
especially the concept of the "deterministic relation between the (social) super-structure and the 
economic base" (See on this "Reason or Revolution? Habermas's Theorie des Kommunikativen 
Handelns" by Anthony Giddens, (in Bernstein,1985: 114-31». Of those who were the founders 
of the Frankfurt School - that is, Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin and Habermas - only 
Benjamin did not seem to be overcome by the Neo-Marxist deviations of his colleagues (see for 
example on Adorno: Wohlfarth, 1979; Wolin, 1990; and on Horkheimer: Shaw, 1985). 
Nevertheless, critics do not seem to agree where to situate Benjamin, perhaps more due to his 
own political anachronisms. As Hannah Arendt says, his work was philosophy but he was not a 
philosopher, it was theory but he was not a theorist, he thought as a Marxist but he was not 
communist or committed to political meetings (Benjamin, 1999: 10). 
8 Chapter one, Section 4, Marx Internet Archive; see endnote 6. 
9 See Marx's Capital Vol. III, Part VII, Chapter 48, Part III "Revenues and Their Sources"; see 
endnote 6. 
10 While manufacturing jobs are in continuous decline in western societies, the Service sector 
continues to grow. In UK, the service sector generated 1.3 million additional jobs in the last 
three years, a proportional increase of 7 per cent. At the same time around 400,000 
manufacturing jobs were lost, accounting for a 10 per cent reduction in the sector's employee 
workforce. UK manufacturing now accounts for 14 per cent of all employee jobs compared to 
17 per cent three years ago. See TUC website, www.tuc.org.uklem_researchltuc-5156-fO.cfm, 
accessed: 21.03.02. 
11 See Marglin, Stephen "What do bosses do? The origins and functions of hierarchy in 
capitalist production", Review of Radical Political Economics, 1974, Yo. 6, No.2, pp. 60-112. 
12 Data from Oxford Encyclopedia. 
13 Simon Wiesenthal is famously known as the Nazi hunter. After he spent four years in twelve 
concentration camps during the Nazi era for being Jewish, he dedicated the rest of his life to 
tracking down wanted Nazi criminals. Eichmann, among others, was tracked down by the 
Mossad thanks to Wiesenthal investigations. 
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14 The records on Eichmann are most valuable in the study ofreification and its consequences, 
I would argue, because here we have a man that came into the exterminatory Nazi machinery 
first because he was an expert in Jewish Zionism and was fascinated by it. As Wiesenthal 
records, Eichmann learned and spoke Hebrew perfectly and, before the Final Solution was put 
into effect, he made various efforts to find a solution to what was known then as the Jewish 
Problem, like the establishing of a permanent Jewish state in Palestine. The records shown by 
Wiesenthal tell us that, initially, Eichmann was paid as an expert civil servant on Zionism 
whose job was to implement as far as possible the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (a British 
statement in favour of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, at the time when it was part of the 
British Empire). However, in 1936 the tension between Arabs and Jews culminated in a revolt, 
which forced Britain to stop further immigration of Jews into Palestine - especially because of 
the great numbers of Jews Eichmann intended to move (Levy, 140-44). With a single signature, 
Eichmann passed from being an expert on Zionism to a systematic killer of Jews. 
15 Though 700,000 children have been raised out of poverty since 1997, still 3.6 million live on 
less than 60% of average income - the government's poverty line. The levels of child poverty 
in Britain are among the highest of all European Union. As recently as 1998 Britain had the 
highest of all among the 15 of the Union. Inequality was still higher in 2002 than when Labour 
came to power. The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) says that the richest 10% of Britain take 
home nearly 28% of total income, while the poorest 10% take home just under 3% (The 
Guardian, Wednesday, 31 March, 2004, p. 20). 
16 I shall transcribe here McGrath's fourteen points for its historical importance and for its 
ethical relevance. They are concerned with the role theatre ought to have in the struggle for 
'authentic' democracy and the areas ofthe socio-political on which theatre should focus, and are 
as follow: 
In celebrating and scrutinizing the values within the borders of the Demos. 
In contesting these borders, external and internal. 
In giving a voice to the excluded. 
In giving a voice to the minority. 
In constantly guarding against the tyranny of the majority. 
In demanding the right to speak publicly, to criticize without fear. 
In giving a voice to the oppositional. 
In seeking true and balanced information. 
In combating the distorting and anti-democratic powers of the mass media. 
In questioning the role of large corporations, national and transnational, to influence 
both the law and the government of the day. 
In defining and redefining freedoms for the age. 
In questioning the borders of freedom. 
In giving a voice to the less equal. 
In demanding impartial justice and equality of all citizens before the law, rich or poor. 
(McGrath, p. 137). 
17 Through Brian 1. Shaw's thoughtful criticism we learn how Horkheimer retreated from 
youthful radicalism to the "nostalgic conservationism of his later years" (1985:160). "As time 
went on" says Shaw, "Horkheimer became increasingly obsessed with somehow preserving the 
fading legacy of the Western liberal past. For all its manifest hypocrisy, the ideology of 
bourgeois societies in their formative phases had contained much of value. The emphasis upon 
the autonomy of the individual, the value of the family, and the worth of romantic love all 
played a positive role in the development of freedom and individuality" (Ibid.: 177). 
18 He is making reference to Lyotard's "Notes sur Ie retour et Ie Kapital", In vol. 1 of Nietzsche 
aujourd'hui?, pp. 141-57, 1973, Paris: Union generale d'editions; and from Foucault's. 
"Nietzsche, Freud, Marx." In Michel Foucault: Dits et ecrits 1954-1988, edited by Daniel 
Defert and Fran~ois Ewald, vol. 1: 1954-1969, 5641Iff., 1994, Paris: Gallimard. 
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19 Among the numerous works assessed here, two have proved to be of fundamental 
importance. One is Brian Leiter's "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics", Ethics, Vol. 107, No.2 
(Jan., 1997), pp. 250-285, in which he reads Nietzsche as saying that our untutored morality, the 
morality of ordinary men and women, the morality that infuses our culture is, in fact, an 
obstacle to human excellence (p. 277); and the other is, Bernard Reginster's "Nietzsche on 
Ressentiment and Valuation", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LVII, No. 2,( 
June 1997), pp. 281-305, in which Reginster assesses Nietzsche's evaluation on the 
psychological condition he calls "ressentiment". Also in the bibliography included here we can 
see wide-ranging literary works that document the actuality of Nietzsche's thought and the 
varied discourses it inspires, e.g., Vattimo, Heidegger and most recently Peter Berkowitz's The 
Ethics of an Inmoralist, (Harvard University Press, 1996), also Joseph Margolis' What, After 
All, Is a Work of Art?, Pen State Press, 1999; or Mathew Rampley's Nietzsche, Aesthetics and 
Modernity, Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
20 See for example, the discussion in Roger Crisp's "Egalitarianism and Compassion" (Ethics, 
Vol. 114, October 2003, pp. 119-126, (published by The University of Chicago)) in which the 
author debates the moral problems related to the difference between the rich and the super-rich 
and how we can apply roles of compassion and egalitarianism in those cases. See also on the 
same approach Larry Temkin's "Egalitarianism Defended", in Ethics, Vol. 113, September 
2003, pp. 764-782. 
21 Note that, as the text shows, this first section of the Birth of Tragedy was added to the book 
many years after it first appeared,. Nietzsche wrote this "Attempt at Self-Criticism" in 1886. 
The original text, written in 1870-71, begins with the Preface to Richard Wagner, the second 
major section. 
22 "Nietzsche's Labyrinth": an accomplished Online Website on the life and work of Nietzsche 
(www.nietzschelayrinth.com); accessed: 27.03.01. 
23 The "Marxist Online Archive" shows an earlier Marx as student in the University of Berlin 
(from 1821 to 1823) mainly interested in poetry, history and literature. Also, there is a Marx 
with a permanent passion for Shakespeare during his whole life (in www.historyguide.org). 
09.10.01. 
24 "Communist Manifesto", first published in 1848; and can be found in its entirety in 
http://www.marxists.orglarchive/marxlworks/1848/communist-manifesto/, accessed: 05.05.01. 
25 All the evaluated historical data used here and hereafter has been obtained from 
www.marxist.org/archive and from Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia. 
26 During which Nietzsche was granted several extensions of leave, and even granted a pension 
when he resigned in 1879 (he was then only 33 years old) travelling extensively to Venice, 
Genoa, Monte Carlo, Rome, and in friendship with the most influential figures of his time like 
Wagner himself was (Nietzsche'S Labyrinth Online Archive). 
27 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part I, No. 63, "Conversation with the Kings", translation by 
Thomas Common, edited by Paul Douglas, available Online: http://www. 
gutenberg.orgletextlI998, accessed: 17.05.01 
28 Nietzsche's Archive Online. www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/ntexteng. accessed: 
17.05.01 
29 Oxford Encyclopedia. According to the source, Bismarck was an autocrat and a dictator by 
todays standards. He despised the idea of socialism and he sought to pulverize it with all his 
means. 
30 The house of Nietzsche's sister in Weimar was a magnet for the Nazi ideologists of the 
1930s, where they would extract from the works of Nietzsche those arguments valid for the 
purpose of Nazism. (Nietzsche Archive Online). 
31 Of course the most probable answer is that at that time he volunteered for war, he was just a 
young philologist man of 26 years old, with all the anxieties of a young bourgeois, indeed a 
2. Chapter II 
The legacies of Marx and Nietzsche 
94 
nationalist in search for leadership and camaraderie. Another two years will pass before he 
writes his first book The Birth of Tragedy in 1872, and before his ethical evaluations begin to 
take shape 
32 Also from Ecce Homo, book: "How One Becomes What It Is", section "Why I am a 
Destiny", Part 1, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, R. 1. Hollingdale, and Anthony M. Ludovici, 
available online at www.geocites.com/thenietzschechannel/eh16.htm. accessed: 25.06.01. 
33 "Fourth Stage: Through the Mysteries of Ogun to the Origin of Yoruba Tragedy." D. W. 
Jefferson. London. 1969. 
34 Karl Marx. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Translated by T. B. Bottomore, 
online: http://www.marxists.org, accessed: 27.02.00. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The chronological data available tells me that when Marx died at 64 years old (1883), The 
Birth of Tragedy (1872) had been around as a very successful piece of work for the last eleven 
years. I look with the same astonishment at the fact that Marx plainly seems to ignore Nietzsche 
in his works. Is it possible that Nietzsche never checked out a copy of the 'Communist 
Manifesto' (1848) or Das Kapital (1867)? Or that Marx was never introduced to the then 
explosive The Birth of Tragedy by any of his friends or during any of the many readings he did? 
37 When I make my own reference to the Genealogy, I do so on the translation of Ian Johnston, 
2001. 
38 Both, Plato and Aristotle thought that aesthetics was inseparable from morality and politics. 
And regardless of my Nietzschean aversion to Schopenhauer's pessimistic and oracular precepts 
- which Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy takes very good care of - I am inclined to argue in 
favour of one of the singularities favoured by Nietzsche's earlier instructor, Schopenhauer: that 
the analysis of the will is the best judge in aesthetic matters, or at least it is the best beginning. 
According to Schopenhauer, the way we know that we are witnessing art depends on whether 
our will is or is not being exposed to objects or subjects of desire (wants, cravings, etc). He 
asserts that a subliminal sense emerges from the fact that anything which is hostile to our will 
becomes an object of pure contemplation; instead, the observation of things we may biologically 
need would catapult us into oblivion towards what should be instead our first interest: the 
artistic composition (Schopenhauer, 1981 :48). That is why Schopenhauer scorns "still life" 
paintings - usually Dutch - that display things like food or drink: they would provoke our desire 
for food and therefore it would put to an end any aesthetic experience of the object, and would 
be the contrary of subliminal, which is exciting. (As I am translating from my Italian edition, 
the English adjective 'exciting' does not bring about the intended exact meaning. In Italian it is 
translated as "l'eccitante," which in Italian has connotations with sexual arousal or craving for 
something biological or organic, thus incompatible with Schopenhauer's art criticism; much 
different from the English word 'exciting' which is usually interpreted as 'interesting' 
'inspiring' or 'invigorating'.) 
39 "Nietzsche's Labyrinth:" Online website 
40 As I mentioned before historical facts can be retrieved from Oxford and Encarta 
Encyclopedia. 
41 Thus Spake Zarathustra and introduction by Friedrich Nietzsche. Trans. by Thomas 
Common, Project Gutenberg, see endnote 27 above. 
42 From "Nietzsche's Labyrinth", website online: www.nietzschelayrinth.com. accessed 
27.03.01. 
43 Those very terms are not found to the letter in my copy of Poetics, but can be very clearly 
understood in Section 2, Parts XIII and XV. 
44 The meaning of the term "fascism" - or better what it does not mean - will be examined later 
on in chapter V. 
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45 "What is proletarian culture and is it possible" (1923), in www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky, 
accessed: 17.07.01. 
46 It is well known that for some time now Habermas has been cooperating with NATO in 
international politics. His public support for the bombardment of Serbia durian the war in 
Kosovo is fresh in the memory. 
47 "The Sheet of Glass" was sent to me on 2nd October 2004 but was originally written during 
the spring of2001; it has been eventually published in David Davis 2005: 94-5. 
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PART II 
Recap and Introduction to Chapters III, IV and V. 
The Culture Industry - contradiction, commodity and ideology. 
When I told Edward Bond that, in my view, the most important characteristic of his 
work is an inherent optimism, he was swift to declare "But I'm not optimistic about the 
solution; I'm optimistic about the problem." (appendix: 18). This riposte epitomises 
precisely what I meant. Thus far, in attempting to evaluate the feasibility and 
appropriateness of 'bridging the gap' between the cognitive, the political and the ethical, 
I have identified a substantial problem. This should not, however, be the cause of 
hopeless apprehension. At least we have something: we have "the problem". To 
perceive that there is an urgent, serious problem is in itself a great achievement because 
it is hidden away in the very structure of our society; hidden in a society of distraction 
and entertainment. Moreover, Bond's statement above suggests that, actually, the 
dramatist might even be somehow grateful that the problem exists. Of course, Bond is 
not pleased with our social situation - palpably, quite the opposite - but there is an 
acknowledgement that without the problem - that problem from which all the other 
problems, important and unimportant, arise - there would be no great drama. 
However, perceiving the problem is a problem in itself. The ideas I have discussed thus 
far, specifically the evaluations of the Marxist theory of reification and Nietzsche's 
evaluation on men of ressentiment, tell me that the big problem - the big question - is, 
where, as human beings, ought we to be? Put aside seeing the solution; are we able to 
perceive, or even to imagine where we ought to be? I stress this auxiliary verb 'ought' 
intentionally because it turns out to be a universal which absorbs the particulars of this 
thesis. In his "Lecture on Ethics" (1929) Ludwig Wittgenstein explains how this 
auxiliary 'ought' is an absolute judgment of value, or what Ethics should to be about 
(Cahoon, 1996: 192-8). Wittgenstein explains that Ethics is not about relative 
judgments of value, such as, what it is that one needs and wants, but what it is that one 
ought to need and want. With this angle of thought the particular is expelled and the 
condition of the subject becomes a function of the universal. This discourse on the 
aesthetics in the politics of theatre takes its prerogative from here. 
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Can we pinpoint where and how our situation ought to be then? Can we even see our 
current situation so that we can make a choice? As Terry Eagleton suggests throughout 
his work The Ideology of the Aesthetic, postmodern theorists see a myriad of little 
problems and therefore cannot accept the idea that there is a big one (Eagleton, 1991). 
Heidegger's partisans would tell us that "What health is, only the healthy can say [ ... ] 
What truth is, only the one who is truthful can discern." (Ibid: 30).1, which has echoes 
of a pseudo-Christian allegory: "let he who is without sin among you throw the first 
stone" (John 8:6). People with true religious faith do not have a problem, but a god to 
which all their hopes and potentials are directed. Of course, they have to follow the 
relevant Holy Scriptures, but at least they can follow some rules: in order to go to 
heaven one has to do this or that, and the rest will follow. Then, they can say with 
absolute certainty "I'm on the good side: I'm virtuous, righteous; I'm morally 
superior.,,2 In contrast, those who have chosen to follow a materialist path, whose 
ambition is to make our physical world better for all; those who are concerned, not with 
an illusion or an ideal precept, but with the present and the future of human kind and do 
not have such a thing as a set of divine rules to follow, there is no available guidance as 
to whether they are truly 'on the good side; travelling in a good direction.' 
This is, in short what the first part (chapters I and II) is about. In it, I began by assessing 
whether a unity of experience in the arts could be of benefit to theatre; whether it would 
be achievable in praxis or at least relevant or valid within the hegemonic frame of the 
Culture Industry, and I finished it shouting loudly "I'm Eichmann". This type of 
conclusion generates a very big problem because it creates conflicts with institutional 
education on one side and with cultural praxis on the other, and might be hard to 
overcome. During our most recent cultural praxis most people would recognise that the 
world is a battle between "John Wayne" and the "Apache"; between advanced 
honourable civilizations and savages; between good and evil. This is illustrated by 
Margaret Olin when she notes that in many films or plays whose language is English, 
Italian, French or Spanish, the Nazis are represented with strong German accents, while 
the goodies speak without any - even when the goodies are German themselves.3 "The 
effect is to make the Nazis "them", the Jews and sympathetic German speakers ''us'' 
(Olin, 1997: 7). We can take this equation even further, because from this strategic 
effect one can deduce that by being on the 'good' side, you must inevitably be 
persecuted, raped, or tortured by those that are 'evil' and therefore one is for ever after 
compelled to be alert against the 'other' who is different and foreign. The 'other' 
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becomes, indeed, 'evil'. Following Daniel Cory's train of thought, this sempiternal 
threat becomes a precept in our mind. Threat gets imbedded in our brains as an 
instruction or injunction regarding moral conduct.4 As Bertrand Russell argued, precepts 
are somehow "in the brain", but not, explains Cory, "in the same sense that a match is in 
a matchbox" (Cory, 1960: 581); precepts are as a "state" of the brain "among the events 
that compose the "stuff' of the brain" which is the "location of precepts" (Ibid.: 573). 
When a threat has become a "cerebral event", then the object of this threat can occur, 
not before (Ibid.: 576).This is a very relevant reflection because it might have to do with 
the idea I want to suggest later on, which is that things happen because we first imagine 
them. The idea is echoed in Hamlet's words: "Nothing is either good or bad, but 
thinking makes it so" (Act II, Scene II).5 
But with these discourses, one could argue, I am actually giving the impression of being 
so postmodern, so neutral or uncommitted; of not wanting to discern between good and 
evil - which, I must stress, is different from wanting to go beyond it. When Jean 
Baudrillard suggests (in my view, irresponsibly) that in order to understand 
"something", in order to go beyond "Good and Evil", we should be just "immoral,,,6 he 
does not mean to be immoral in the sense of barbarous indifference. What he is actually 
saying in his essay as a whole has to do more with the old existing conflicts between the 
particular and the universal, and the overcoming of those universal morals whose 
primordial tasks are indeed the triumph of "Good" over "Evil." As a matter of fact, he 
is asking us to do away with our long standing acquired morality: that succession of 
Judeo-Christian precepts that have been, as I say above, imbedded in our brain. But it is 
another thing altogether to suggest to the general public that in order to overcome 
"Good and Evil" we have to be "immoral." It tells me that Baudrillard does not truly 
understand the situation. Ifhis proposal to be "immoral" creates ipso facto connotations 
of depravity, violence and bestiality, in our highly moralized society it would always 
backfire. What Baudrillard perhaps wants is to call attention to such a crucial subject by 
way of being shocking. My approach thus far is to suggest that morality is not just a 
matter of problems, but the problem in itself. As Eagleton explains, "it was so for Marx 
as much as for Nietzsche" and adds: 
For Nietzsche the productive life-instincts are enfeebled and corrupted into what 
we know as moral subjecthood, the gutless, abstract 'herd' morality of 
conventional society. This is essentially a movement from coercion to 
hegemony: 'Morality is preceded by compulsion; indeed, it itself remains 
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compulsion for some time, to which one submits to avoid disagreeable 
consequences. Later it becomes custom, later still free obedience, and finally 
almost becomes instinct: then, like every thing long customary and natural, it is 
linked with gratification - and now is called virtue.' (Eagleton, 1991: 236)7 
And this is why what I am proposing in this thesis is a very, very big problem - in fact, 
from the perspective of current global liberal capitalism, it is quasi an impossibility. 
Whilst I am identifying morality, I am doing it as the starting place for everything else, 
including market competition, class division, the pursuit of a successful career, 
nationalisms and so on. I stress quasi because although the task of forethinking a world 
beyond morality is such an awesome venture, there are, even in this terms, gaps from 
which it is possible to maintain intelligible discourses without giving the impression of 
proposing utopian gibberish. And this thesis is not about idealistic discourses. These 
gaps might be identified with what "in the more literal sense is a bourgeois concept": 
aesthetics. Bourgeois because, as Eagleton explains, aesthetics "provides the middle 
classes with just the ideological model of subjectivity it requires for its material 
operations" (Eagleton, 1991: 9). Though utterly important and useful, aesthetics has a 
kind of "double edged" autonomy: 
if on the one hand it [aesthetics] provides a central constituent of bourgeois 
ideology, it also marks an emphasis on the self-determining nature of human 
powers and capacities which becomes, in the work of Karl Marx and others, the 
anthropological foundation of a revolutionary opposition to bourgeois utility. 
(Ibid.) 
In other words, aesthetics backfires. 
Jiirgen Habermas' proposition for a unity of experience in the arts by a 'gapping' of the 
cognitive (that is, aesthetics) political, and ethical discourses appeared as an ideal 
setting from which to begin a movement towards a responsible drama. Reciprocally, 
Edward Bond's works and philosophy of drama seem to be the best device to ignite that 
unity. Unfortunately, before we can make sense of that unity, first we need to be able to 
discern the above three discourses. But since everything is aestheticized by both 
morality and the dominant ideology, the location in which a unity of experience would 
be pertinent is just not there. Indeed, fitting like a glove, there is here a vindication for 
Bond's decision after all these years of playwrighting and theorizing, to concentrate his 
efforts on writing drama for children - a detail of vital importance and discussed later 
on as a conclusion. It is not that we cannot have confidence in Habermas' critical 
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theory and its praxis though.8 From a kind of "legal pacificism" by means of 
international human rights, Habermas looks forward to "the transformation of 
international law into a law of global citizens" (Habermas, 1999: 263). Lamentably, in 
the global environment in which we live, we are united not by a language of 
international human rights - though we ought to be - but by what we are sold. The 
omnipresence of the corporate logos of McDonald's or Coca-Cola is the closest thing 
we have to an international language, as the world's six billion people can testify. "All 
the systems of morality are corrupt" says Edward Bond (appendix: 8) and Marxist and 
Nietzschean dialectics explains why it so within modem capitalist societies. Their 
theories are confirmed by the fact that it seems to be perfectly all right that a company 
like Nike pays Tiger Woods $125 million for wearing its shoes while Nike's entire 
30,OOO-strong Indonesian workforce work for few dollars a day in conditions not unlike 
the workers of nineteenth century Europe.9 So we are all corrupted and every enterprise 
we undertake, no matter how philanthropic the motive is, always becomes corrupted to 
a lesser or greater degree. 
And how else could it be? From early infancy, human imperatives like belonging, 
relationships, and universal purpose are supplanted by the most powerful precepts: that 
human life is a continuous competition; that we have to contend with others to advance 
our own position, for privilege, for a price, and even for space. In fact, with amazing 
stoicism, children from very different social backgrounds soon conform to the idea that 
some of them are 'brighter' than others, which converts them into the cynics that will 
supplant today's cynics. A society in which parents give their children 'the best 
education they can afford', within the current sway of exchange/value capitalism, 
cannot augur anything but total catastrophe. Children no longer dream of being a sea-
captain, an explorer or an astronaut; they simply 'want to make lots of money'. And 
some of us adults like to display consternation at this as if there was something wrong 
with our children. But there is nothing wrong with them; they just understand perfectly 
the situation in which they are living; living within our situation and making lots of 
money makes sense. It is the situation, which is utterly wrong. 
The problem then ought not to be the adjustment of this or that particular, but to change 
the universal situation itself. Habermas would not say that what he most wants is "to 
make lots of money", but he accepts with thanks prized awards from the Spanish 
monarchy,IO which will earn him lots of money, directly and indirectly. The social 
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connotations of such social events unmistakably work both ways: on the one hand they 
enhance Habennas' international reputation; on the other they further enhance the 
Spanish monarchy's legitimacy. What is really shocking then, the choices ofHabennas 
or the moneymaking dreams of a child? 
That is the conclusion of the last part (chapters I and II): a unity of experience in the arts 
such as Habennas suggests does appear to be an appealing fonnula, but in the context of 
our situation, of our condition, it promises failure. It is a true Catch 22. To propose the 
bridging of the gaps between the cognitive, political and ethical discourses is like saying 
that we can actually distinguish them, their shapes and their edges, when, as a matter of 
fact, the very workings of western capitalism makes them appear to overlap. This is 
remarked upon by Adorno and Horkheimer, and then Heidegger, Vattimo and to some 
extent Baudrillard too. To propose this unity of experience for the purposes of what art 
ought to be within our situation, is to ignore Marx's theory of reification and 
Nietzsche's conceptual evaluation on men of ressentiment. But Habennas does so 
because he is a social negotiator. From the dialectics of his writings, it is obvious to see 
that he has capitulated to the idea that a system without ruling classes - though 
nowadays we should talk of corporate classes - is unthinkable and therefore he has 
undertaken the task of negotiating with them as to what kind of better living standards 
there should be for all. As Eagleton suggests, "Habermas has been at pains to deny that 
the fonns of communicative rationality can simply be projected forward as a utopian 
future [ ... ] the Habermasian answer is that we simply have to talk it over" (Eagleton, 
1991: 406; 412 respectively). And Habennas does so because, like everybody else, he 
only has one point of reference for what it is to be a human being, which is the 
traditional one. I shall extend this discourse throughout the rest of this thesis. I will only 
add here what Wittgenstein suggests are the limits of human inquiry: 
I can only describe my feeling by the metaphor, that, if a man could write a book 
on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an 
explosion, destroy all the other books in the world. [ ... ] Ethics, if it is anything, 
is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold 
a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it. (Cahoon, 1996: 
194) 
But he also adds 
[ ... ] not only that no description that I can think of would do to describe what I 
mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every significant description that 
anybody could possibly suggest, ab initio, on the ground of its significance [ ... ] 
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I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics was to 
run against the boundaries of language. [ ... ] Ethics so far as it springs from the 
desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, 
the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our 
knowledge in any sense. [ ... ] But I cannot help respecting [it] deeply. (Ibid.: 
198)11 
The rules have not being written down yet and perhaps they will never be. We have 
dialectics which help us to go on living but god help us if one day, in order to 
understand fully what a human being ought to be, we shall need the sign of "fraternity, 
freedom, and equality" hanging everywhere. This will be my final argument: many 
great thinkers give us very valuable points of reference, and we take from them as far as 
it suits our arguments but none of them can foresee humanity without taking references 
from tradition and through this process contradictions appear. But be cautious, because 
in this rethinking of aesthetics in the politics of theatre I am not proposing a kind of 
postmodernist nihilism in the spheres of Aleks Sierzs's In-Yer-Face Theatre (2000). I 
am not denying the legitimacy of traditional thinking, but that philosophy and reason 
killed defenceless people by the millions with gas and atomic bombs. I cannot endorse 
Brecht and Brechtians because they teach, and in doing so they ideologize everything; 
and that will send us all sooner or later to the gulag; I cannot endorse Beckett and 
Beckettians because, like Adorno, they propose a pact with failure through their 
'perverse' self-defeatist aesthetic (Eagleton, 1991: 349-50). I am, then, only left with 
the situation. Thus, the dramatist Edward Bond and his philosophy of drama fulfils the 
purpose of my thesis: because he rethinks the whole. He rethinks aesthetics and 
therefore culture. 
In conclusion, through Bond I am left with very, very few models because in the 
aesthetics he is aiming at I cannot teach because all teaching is ideological, I cannot 
moralize with old precepts, I cannot idealise reality, and I cannot succumb to the 
temptations of I 'art pour I 'art - while all the way through, I have to remember at all 
times that, to some degree or other, I have been unmistakably corrupted - or rather, 
contaminated - because I have to live in the real world of our situation. As Edward 
Bond reflects "If owning a house in our democracy implicates me in murder - in every 
thing I'm against - why bother to say.,,12 It is as if the only thing I am left with is 
silence. And that is indeed what I am proposing, because this is not the common 
understanding of silence; it is a different silence which, in my view, only drama speaks. 
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In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein suggests a very remarkable view on 
Ethics: 
7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. [Cahoon, 1996: 
199] 
I would suggest that the silence Wittgenstein identifies is the silence Edward Bond is 
looking for in the praxis of his writing. In drama we can make that silence speak, we 
ought to "pass over" the situation to audiences, without saying it. I would even say that 
Bond, after all these years and with his great reputation, is still learning to come to 
terms with the grandiosity of his proposal. That is why he told me "I don't know how 
to write plays [ ... ] because then I'd write to formula" (appendix: 29). Yet Bond does 
have a kind of formula: he seeks to create a situation in which we, the audience, can 
make a choice; can be responsible for our acts (appendix: 12). All this will be 
considered further in the conclusion. 
"It's the economy, stupid!,,13 With just four words, ex-US president, Bill Clinton seems 
to have distilled the essence of everything. He did actually tell the whole world what our 
situation was about. And of course Clinton is totally right. As Terry Eagleton explains, 
our society is masked throughout with the traditional force of God, freedom and family, 
but profit is the highest empirical value (Eagleton, 1991: 375), to a point at which, as 
Edward Bond asserts,· it seems to own us through and through. 14 It would be 
preposterous to pretend that any of us is exempt from corruption to some extent. In his 
chapter "From the Polis to Postmodernism", Eagleton suggests that there is a sense of 
foreboding infesting everything. In my view this is totally justified: tear apart the world 
economy and we will eat each other. Dante's Hell would become a preferable place, 
because our old moral precepts would continue to live on. Art and artists have to live in 
this world too and as a result a Culture Industry has taken form. Drama has to live side 
by side with the Culture Industry which locks everything into the "structure of 
commodity production" (Eagleton, 1991: 348). "The first thing to say about my 
philosophy," Bond says, "is that it makes ethics an ultimate reality. This aligns it as a 
philosophy with the thoughts of Spinoza and Freud" (Stuart, 2000: 56). I believe that, 
when he pursues his ''ultimate reality" - ethics - Bond is already pursuing the right 
course of action, but why does his "path" seem to run counter to most current culture? 
Is he the problem or is it culture itself? To answer that question I need not only to 
investigate, embedded as it is within the industrial production of goods, but also two of 
its intrinsic and conditioning elements: contradiction and ideology. 
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Law and Morality" (Constellations 6, no. 3, 1999, pp. 263-72). With this, Habermas 
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executive's cabinet of a liberal democracy. He has capitulated to the old pessimistic slogan that 
liberal capitalism is "the best of the worst" possible systems. Habermas is part today and 
benefits purposefully from the very reactive institutions found in the sustainment of the dual 
morality of "Good versus Evil". An example is his recent acceptance of the highly respected 
Spanish Prince of Asturias Prize (2004), which is an equivalent of Royal Honorary awards here 
in Britain. This criticism on Habermas and his current philosophical standpoint can be tested 
against Eduardo Mendietta's "America and the World. A Conversation with Jiirgen Habermas" 
(Logos 3.3 - Summer 2004). As the somehow Habermasian Terry Eagleton explains (1991: 
402-415) "Habermas has been at pains to deny that the forms of communicative rationality can 
simply be projected forward as a utopian future" (p. 406). Agreeing with Habermas, Eagleton 
suggests that normative statements and theoretical ones "admit of truth" and that "they too must 
be submitted to the rest of public argumentation" (p. 406). And who does "the rest of public 
argumentation" refer to if not the various factions of authority? Or is Eagleton implying the 
bizarre idea that the "rest of public argumentation" in liberal democracies could refer to all of us 
- the lorry driver, the factory worker, the public clerk and so on? According to Eagleton, 
"Habermas holds that communication is naturally oriented to agreement." (p. 405). Eagleton's 
final chapter is very estrange, because in the first three hundred pages or so of his The Ideology 
of the Aesthetic, Eagleton illustrates brilliantly how, since the appearance of aesthetics is a 
purely bourgeois concept, and Marxist reification interferes in every human aspect of our lives, 
the current culture industry tends towards the aestheticization of everything, which is where all 
the greater dangers are. And then, he turns into a Habermasian postmodem moderator and with 
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9 "Abuse rife in Indonesia Nike plants", by John Aglionby in Jakarta, February 23, 2001, The 
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10 Mendieta, p. 1. 
II Ludwing Wittgenstein, "Lecture on Ethics" (1929) 
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14 "In the past" says Bond "even the wisest people believed many things which (if we believed 
them) would make us mad. When they acted on these beliefs they seem to us to been inhuman 
and cruel. In time (if there is time) we and our behaviour will be judged in the same way. But 
the old problem is now a new and greater crisis. Even in peace we destroy our natural world as 
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for Drama in Education, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1995, pp. 6-16, p. 13) 
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(PART II) 
3. CHAPTER III 
Culture or contradiction 
Introduction 
In the final chapter of this thesis I will explain why it is my understanding that, perhaps 
more urgently than ever in the past, drama must try to tell that which cannot be told -
that is, saying it without falling into ideological or moral discourses. 1 This approach is 
not without its problems, because drama must live within current culture, indeed, drama 
depends on culture for its own existence. To propose a drama outside the boundaries of 
culture would be like suggesting that drama can be without people. But why am I 
treating culture as if it could be an obstacle to drama; as if culture could oppose drama's 
values and consequences? Because the drama I will propose finds its initial stage in the 
dramatic strategies of Edward Bond; because it is a drama that, as I will expound in my 
conclusion, has more congruity, as it were, with the paintings of the cave dwellers than 
with current culture. 
Despite all the complexities involved in discussions related to and with culture, I would 
like firstly to adopt the most basic definitions of culture from the field of animal 
behaviour, which, in my view, do not apply only to other advanced living things but to 
the evolutionary success of human beings themselves. One, that culture is "the transfer 
of information between individuals by imitative or social learning"; and the other that 
culture is "transfer of information by behavioural means.,,2 Notions such as imitation 
and transfer of information have been specifically formulated to describe group 
differences in human behaviour (ibid) - and therefore culture/cultures - but these 
definitions are by no means unsophisticated. Apparently simple, they hold huge 
complexities - complexities that have surely increased in our post-industrial societies. 
Who should we imitate? Who is imitating whom? What kind of information is being 
transferred, and with what intent? 
The above elementary definitions of culture do, however offer an interesting pattern. 
The growth and development of a group of individuals - that is, society - is relative to 
the inter-relations existent within it - that is, culture. In other words, culture might be 
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considered to be a fundamental factor of society's destruction or survival. Few words 
are as difficult to define as culture, but many would agree that teaching, learning and 
imitation are the very basics of it; in other words, that culture is the transmission of 
information or knowledge. I very much agree with Edward Bond when, in one of the 
rare occasions when the dramatist has used the word "art" in a non derogatory sense, he 
told me that "the people who painted buffalos on the cave walls were artists for all time" 
(appendix: 52). What was the real reason behind those paintings? Were they symbolic 
or merely figurative; just recording what the people saw? No one knows, but behind 
those twenty thousand year-old paintings in northern Spain and southern France one can 
see that people were trying to make sense of their environment and telling of their 
inherent humanness. The power of the cave dwellers' paintings comes from the fact 
that they were painted for us. 3 
3.1. Section I 
3.1.1. Culture as industry 
It would not be difficult to support the thesis that human beings would not have 
survived to this day without the cultural backbone of teaching, learning and imitation. 
But these cultural foundations might also be the axis about which the causes of our own 
destruction revolve. This is, in short, the essence not only of Adorno's Negative 
Dialectics - where everything lives within its own opposition - but the point at which 
Edward Bond's philosophy of drama finds its focal point. "When reason is used in 
human affairs," he says, "the result can be deeply irrational" (appendix: 10). This 
human paradox of being is a Marxist thought, which Adorno called "man's ongoing 
prehistory. ,,4 
I am not trying to romanticize anything here; I am not proposing a return to the Stone 
Age. Instead, the problem I am interested in today, for the purposes of drama, is 
whether the discourses entered into by Adorno on culture on the one hand, and currently 
by Edward Bond on the other, have a proper foundation. Whether, or to what extent, 
inherent humanness has been superseded in culture by economics - or, more 
specifically, whether the imperative of being a human being has been supplanted by the 
imperative of making money. In a post-industrial western society, can drama go on 
being drama - that is, making sense of the world - while fitting within a culture that is 
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seen as an industry: a culture that is both a contaminating agent and the recipient of 
continuous contamination by the market? "Under capitalism" says Bernstein "all 
production is for the market; goods are produced not in order to meet human needs and 
desires, but for the sake of profit" (Bernstein, 2001: 5). 
According to Adorno and Horkheimer, culture now is an industry and as such becomes 
just one definition swathing everything (Adorno, 200 I; Horkheimere, 1979). The 
question of whether culture is now only an industry - and therefore whether it follows 
nothing but the rules and methods of modern manufacturing and trade - has 
extraordinary implications upon any evaluation of culture and any of its manifestations, 
such as drama. If, as Steven B. Smith explains, man is shaped and moulded by culture 
(1985: 651), but culture now exists because, as the Frankfurt School tells us, there is a 
profit to make, what are the consequences then of the deduction "man is shaped and 
moulded by profit?" 
Of course, culture is not (yet) simply industry but, as I will discuss hereafter, it has all 
the symptoms of taking that direction. The realm of sociology offers various meanings 
of what culture is, and these definitions can be placed in two main groups: the 
anthropological and the artistic (Bourdieu, 1977; 1977a; 1984; 1985). The first defines 
culture as the whole way of life in society: its values and ideas, its laws and its customs, 
its institutions and its systems. To the second group - that is, the arts - scholars usually 
apply more constricted definitions, yet perhaps with deeper meanings; more concern 
with what people have thought, made and said at its best. S But in a world which clearly 
has been taken up by the global philosophy of economy and exchange/value, this 
differentiation of culture into two main groups is problematic. It is no longer a question 
of whether cultural materialism can breach any narrow definition separating culture 
from everything else. Instead, the question should be whether there is culture as such at 
all. We have had The End of Ideology (Bell, 1965), The End of History (1992, 
Fukuyama), The End of Modernity (Vattimo, 1991), and even the end or death of man 
(Foucault, 1970:385; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:28-43; Smith, 1985:652) - let alone 
Nietzsche's death of God, which already anticipated all these 'deaths' and encapsulated 
them all. Yet 'the death of culture' does not seem to be a matter for discussion. One 
could rightly argue that proposing a death of culture would be like proposing the death 
of thought itself, offering us no location from which we could carry out such discourses. 
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3.1.2. Culture and power 
Proclaiming the death of such universals should not be taken as a prophecy of man's 
doom; but that would not be a heretical or outrageous thing to propose. As Steven B. 
Smith explains, what I am referring to is not culture's literal death, but "the dissolution 
of the subject" which is not to say that human beings as a species "are bound to 
disappear" (1985: 652). From some perspectives, dissolution is certainly a "death"; but 
from others, it is also a decomposition or disintegration of the mass into its constitutive 
components. What will disappear, argues Smith, are the historically specific 
conceptions that have underpinned our universal concepts through two centuries of 
western philosophy (Ibid.). What has to change is the way we conceive what culture is. 
According to Bertrand Russell, it is one thing "to have awareness of universals" - which 
should be called conceiving - and another "a universal of which we are aware" - which 
should be called concept.6 Whether we have "awareness" of culture or whether we are 
"aware" of it depends, I would say, on the kind of channels and systems employed in 
the transmission of it. If I follow on Smith's train of discourse then, it seems plausible 
that what is coming to an end are the notions of our permanent human attributes like 
freedom, autonomy, dignity, rights and so on (Smith, 1985: 652). Again, with it Smith 
does not mean their literal "elimination", but an end to the way in which these notions 
have been and are being used by the ruling classes; by the bourgeoisie. In contemporary 
Anglo-Saxon societies, for example, the expressions "We fight for freedom" and "In the 
name of liberty" are the daily proclamations of the current US president, George W. 
Bush, his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and of British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. This highly subjective evocation of such moral absolutes provokes impassioned 
citizens to declare "when I hear them using those terms I want to puke".7 The action of 
one side - the American and British leaders - and the reaction of the other - the people 
that live under their rule - constitutes a problem that marks the conceptual boundaries 
that identify an entire tradition of thought. Both sides endow traditional moral concepts 
such as liberality, piety and goodness with new meanings and implications. The 
meaning and praxis of culture must be affected by it in one way or another. 
I cannot ignore Raymond Williams' Culture and Society: 1780-1950, in which he 
defines the meaning of culture from the setting of the French Revolution to that of the 
post-Second World War, making a study of the British working-class life and history 
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(1958). By considering culture in the context of its relations with the four terms -
"class," "industry," "democracy" and "art" - Williams developed an approach which he 
named "cultural materialism" (Ibid.: 31 and 115). Although Williams' "cultural 
materialism" attempts to breach the narrow definitions that separate literature, culture 
and politics, there remains in his work a continuous contrast between "culture as art" 
and "culture as a whole way of life". Thankfully, many things improved in the western 
societies of the 1950s,8 but when Williams made these considerations on culture, culture 
was about to undergo a cataclysmic shift: culture was about to become an industry 
through and through. As a result it is now quite difficult to answer even basic and 
logical questions about what is it that our culture is. Bond expands upon this by asking 
whether people can properly and seriously make sense of their world, and therefore not 
only be able to make choices, but take positive responsibility for those choices too 
(appendix: 13; 54). One cannot ignore the compelling question mark hung over 
Williams' sociological thinking by the Frankfurt School and its neo-Marxist theory of 
'false consciousness'. After all, isn't making sense of the world in which we live what 
culture ought to be about? 
In the 1970s, Williams attempted to assess culture from the angle of Marxist 
Methodology. For Williams at that point, culture was best seen as a specific process of 
production, "a material social process of signification" in its own right, as the way 
around the problem of "reflection" - that is, whether art is more than a simple 
"reflection" of the economic base (Williams, 1977: 70). However, Raymond Williams' 
train of thought sustains a restrictive critical judgment with which this thesis appears, 
willingly or unwillingly, to be in conflict. Williams is not radical enough. Of course, he 
was concerned with the problem of the relation between culture and hegemonic power -
or dangers that might come about from the Marxist idea of society as super-structure. 
For Williams, the future imagined in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four "is not a desirable 
one, but it is a perfectly possible one" (Williams, 1979: 301). 
Anyone can see that Williams recognizes the inequalities of the class system and how 
he supports the idea of the need for a social change, again taking from Marxism what is 
too obvious: a precognition of the connections between politics, social development, 
culture and so on. And Williams absolutely thinks of himself as a Marxist, which has 
had a phenomenal relevance on cultural and sociological studies in Great Britain and 
beyond. "It is difficult to feel we are really governing ourselves" says Williams in The 
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Long Revolution "if in so central a part of our lives as our work most of us have no 
share in decisions that immediately affect us" (1973: 332). But then he says "the human 
energy of the long Revolution springs from the conviction that men can direct their own 
lives, by breaking through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society, and 
by discovering new common institutions" (1979: 375). Williams believed in what I 
would call 'an everyday culture'. Discarding the idea that the form of any society is a 
product of its material economic development, he also discards the idea that people's 
minds are to some extent corrupted by the sheer and justifiable need of material gain, 
which has taken in our minds the form of a precept, thanks to the overwhelming 
pressure consistently exercised by bourgeois ideology. In my view, to suggest that 
people can "break through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society" from 
our current capitalist situation of "no choice and no tools",9 would be to imagine that 
people could pass through a wall of concrete six feet thick by hitting their heads against 
it; or to pretend that we could breathe underwater without any technological aid. 
In my reading of Marx, most of the time, in some sense, critical thinkers express the 
values or interest of their own class or their own social position (Marx, 1999; McLellan, 
1977; Dietrich, 1988. Lukacs, 1971). Williams does not seem to break out from the 
convictions held by western liberal tradition. One of these convictions says Steven B. 
Smith, is that man has an "intrinsic capacity for reasoned jUdgment and the competence 
to conform conduct to the dictates of this judgment" (1985: 653). But the convincing 
view of the Frankfurt School would be that this is sheer fantasy. How can man "break 
through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society" when "culture makes 
classes totally unrecognizable by burying them beneath an indistinct mass culture 
shared by all" (Gartman, 1991: 426)? If, as my findings suggest, Man's thinking and 
beliefs are the product of education, propaganda, ideology, and traditional morality, all 
transmitted by the mechanical and non-mechanical channels of culture then, no matter 
how justifiable and well organized the means are, a popular revolution will always end 
in the Gulag (see Chapter I). I am not suggesting that Williams is lying or writes in bad 
faith, indeed, quite the opposite. But it is obvious that the workings of the Culture 
Industry must also affect critical theorists, just like it affects everyone else. Any 
attempt to judge Williams unconstructively - that is, without pulling together all the 
factors of his intellectual developments - would be a serious error; just as it would be a 
serious error to do the same with his disciple and successor, Terry Eagleton. 
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3.1.3. Culture, society and socialism. 
Interestingly, both Williams and Eagleton came from rural working class families, and 
both reproach the language of the post-Marxist political left at every given opportunity. 
"For Raymond Williams", says Eagleton agreeably, "Establishment-bred leftists who 
finally revert to type can be seen as cases of what he calls in Culture and Society 
'negative identification'. The dissident offspring of the upper middle class throws in his 
lot with the militant proletariat, largely because they serve as a metaphor for his own 
quite differently motivated revolt.,,10 It is a discourse that Eagleton has not changed 
since his work The Ideology of the Aesthetic in which he says: 
... twenty years ago [his book was first printed in 1990], the political left 
discovered to its dismay that the system was currently too powerful, too total, to 
be broken [ ... ] as a consequence of this gloomy revelation we have now post-
Marxism - a name which one takes to designate those who have come right 
through Marxism and out somewhere the other side, rather than those middle-
class liberals who, having remained exactly where they always were, now 
suddenly find themselves rather in fashion [ ... ] it is as though, having 
temporarily the breadknife, one declares the loaf to be already sliced. The term 
'post', if it has any meaning at all, means business as usual, only more so [his 
emphasis]. (1991: 381) 
Culture has been most affected by this kind of capitulation of the political left into a 
liberal "social consensus" - which has not been the privilege of Britain alone, but is a 
common characteristic of post-war Western Europe. And the social class whose culture 
has been most affected by it has been the working class. As David Gartman explains in 
his criticism of Bourdieu's theory of culture (1991), a working class culture based on 
decency, sense of community and comradeship, together with lots of natural enjoyment 
in the process, has been shattered not only by the strategic workings of the bourgeois 
dominant ideology. This is now characterised by the ideology of the industry, market, 
and exchange/value philosophy of production, and a disillusion with the political ideas 
of the left. In contrast with Bourdieu's "ahistorical structuralism" (Ibid.: 421), says 
Gartman, the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse among others) 
contends "that culture performs its ideological functions for the class system by 
preventing any recognition of class differences, even a mistaken one" (Ibid.: 426). That 
is why I would say that the rural working class upbringing of Williams and Eagleton 
ought not to be disassociated from their discourses. liOn the one hand they believe, as 
it were, in the goodness of people and their ability to overcome cultural dreariness 
through new forms of social intercourse, and of course, they display this optimism 
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within the framework of current times: "Through capitalism" says Eagleton in his 
critical analysis of Marx within aesthetics, "individuality is enriched and developed, 
fresh creative powers are bred, and new forms of social intercourse created" (Eagleton, 
1991: 218). On the other hand, they identify capitalism as a system which "reduces the 
bodily fullness of men and women to a 'crude and abstract12 simplicity of need'" 
(Eagleton, 1991: 198). And of course, Eagleton seems to be right in both instances. 
But Williams, and now Eagleton, seem to discard the Frankfurt's idea of total human 
reification - let alone any suggestion that the culture industry as such is a sophisticated 
and deodorized form of fascism (Horkheimer, 1979: 167). 
Curiously enough, Eagleton applies in his criticism some of the language he criticises 
unfavourably in Adorno "where the reader has no sooner registered the one-sidedness of 
some proposition than the opposite is immediately proposed" (Eagleton, 1991: 342). 
Does Eagleton's critical thinking run with the hare and hunt with the hounds? I cannot 
expand further here the discussion of the partnership between capital and fascism 
without leaving out other important arguments that need to be evaluated first before I 
enter into it fully. But this is, in conclusion, why I postulated that the basic problem 
with cultural critics like Williams and Eagleton is their unwillingness to go beyond their 
natural parameters. It is only natural, since they themselves have become part of a 
privileged class. Seemingly they are not prepared to go down the path of radical 
thinking. As Irving Wohlfarth contends, most post-Marxists critics seem to be 
entangled in the question of whether there is any true autonomy within the "knot" of 
bourgeois aesthetics (1979: 975). While handling it, they might be confusing ideology 
with reality; or what is worse, liberty with the freedom to sleep under bridges. They 
acknowledge that our social system is unjust, but they are stuck under the popular 
slogan of 'being the best of the worst' after all. But why not focus instead on creating a 
social system which could be 'the best of the best'? In my view, critics like Eagleton 
criticize the ground on which they stand, and in doing so they reflect certain autonomy 
of thought, but they do not go as far as to really undermine it. But this apparent 
contradiction - appearing to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds - is not only a 
quality of Williams and Eagleton, but of most critical thinking from Kant to Adorno and 
Habennas, and forms an integral part of what it is widely known as dialectics. 
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3.1.4. Culture as contradiction. 
There are various methods of dialectics: Plato's dialogues is one (1955); Kantian 
dialectics tries to show that any attempt to speculate beyond the limits of possible 
experience leads to contradiction; a Hegelian method of dialectics would be the 
interaction of the thesis as the contradiction of the antithesis, out of which a synthesis 
would arise. Marx applied and extended the Hegelian method appropriating it as 
dialectical materialism of Marxism. However, post-Marxists, I would argue, being as 
they are in a totally unprecedented historical situation - that is, in societies where 
culture both reifies and is a commodity, and post-Marxist dialecticians find themselves 
as part of the problem (Wohlfarth, 1979; Smith, 1885; Gartman, 1991; Lears, 1992; 
Duttmann, 2002) - have not only to take bits and pieces from the methods that best suit 
their discourses, but also the application of a kind of discourse whose tactics put 
themselves as the target of their own dialectical attacks. It might be understood as a 
Kantian contradiction but elevated to the utmost height. Indeed, Adorno stands by this 
theory of "contradiction" and calls it "Negative dialectics".l3 "Theory" says Wohlfarth 
criticizing dialecticians "is supposed to live dangerously, but it also takes the precaution 
of making reservations" (1979: 978). And adds thereafter: 
Since intellectuals are 'both the last enemies of the bourgeoisie and the last 
bourgeois, there is no way out of such entanglement'. The anti-bourgeois is 
trapped within the arrested dialectic, the 'frozen unrest', of the bourgeois self. 
(Ibid.: 981; his inverted commas) 
Hence, it makes sense that Eagleton tries to play the treacherous card of aesthetics in his 
quest for a better world (1991). So does everyone else worthy of notice before him: 
from Kant and Hegel to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, from Marx and Engels to the 
Frankfurt School and Heidegger (Ibid.: 1). In his search for a proper answer, and as a 
tool against the agents of oppression - the bourgeoisie - Eagleton proposes aesthetics, 
which in its most literal sense is "a very bourgeois concept" itself (Ibid.: 8), thus adding 
further credibility to Wohlfarth's discourses. But this action is a treacherous one 
because wherever aesthetics appears in the picture, not only propaganda but 
authoritarian systems are never far away. Aesthetics, like one of its grotesque offspring, 
propaganda, always attempts to shape people's views of the world in which they live. 
As Irving Wohlfarth contends, even when the actions are "on behalf of the 'truth'" one 
is trapped in the "contradiction between means and ends" (1979: 969). There is no 
distinction, concurs Adorno, between mass mobilization and mass manipulation, 
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because both seem to work out by the means and ends of reified lies: "propaganda 
makes language an instrument, a lever, a machine [ ... ] Deep down all men know that 
through this tool they too will be reduced to a tool as in a factory [ ... ] Propaganda 
manipulates people; when it cries freedom it contradicts itself.,,14 
Although the use of aesthetics against the bourgeoisie characterizes what Adorno means 
by "Negative Dialectics" at its purest, aesthetics - this "science" of sensuous perception 
- is identified by many as the only tool that plays against itself. This is why Adorno's 
system of dialectics, despite the parade of symptoms it diagnoses throughout his 
writings, even when they are proposed without tangible remedies, continues to be of 
paramount importance. With Adorno, one knows that there is not a negative dialectics 
as a contrast with other "dialectics". If one lives in the system, by the system and from 
the system, dialectics can only be negative; if not, to live under bridges or suicide is 
always an option. No one knows what would have happened to us without dialectics, 
but with it we know that where there is reason there is contradiction. As Wohlfarth 
pronounces, "We need Adorno [ ... ] to outwit the cunning of the system by playing it 
against itself." (1979: 983). 
Eagleton proposes aesthetics against the culture of the bourgeois ideology because there 
is nothing else to propose but the tactics of the bourgeoisie. Using aesthetics in this 
fashion becomes a kind of vaccine: using poison as antidote against poison. Certainly, 
this observation must be a motive of celebration, because it is at the origin of everything 
we do in the creative industry in liberal democracies. "Culture" says Eagleton "is 
deeply locked into the structure of commodity production; but one effect of this is to 
release it into a certain ideological autonomy, hence allowing it to speak against the 
very social order with which it is guiltily complicit."( 1991: 348). 
However, the attributes that conform to the basis of bourgeois ideology and to its very 
aesthetics - that is, individuality, originality, and/or uniqueness - also culminate in 
rivalry against others for the best positions. Even my main source of enquiry, Edward 
Bond, can be situated within the same sphere in this regard. As he told me himself, 
"very often the victories achieved [by the working class] are not through socialist 
politics, but through the successes of capitalism." (Appendix: 34). But he told me so, 
also aware that he was actually saying a "heretical thing" (Ibid.), for Bond also benefits 
from the bourgeois apparatus of commodity and exchange/value, be it via his agents, 
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publishers and/or institutions of education. As Eagleton explains above, we attempt to 
project forward utopian languages with certain ideological autonomy; but when we refer 
to the aesthetic apparatus of bourgeois ideology, this "certain autonomy" does not 
appear so clearly in the picture. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, there is a 
danger of using aesthetics to such an extent that it evolves into grotesque forms, 
bringing about the aestheticization of everything. It already happened during the 1930s, 
and back then it was called fascism. 
3.2. Section II. 
3.2.1. Negative Dialectics and Benjamin. 
In his introduction to The Adorno Reader, Brian O'Connor explains how, in the eyes of 
Adorno, "the whole notion of culture has become problematical" (O'Connor, 2000: 17). 
I would be inclined to argue that culture has not just "become problematical" as if it was 
a recent problem, but that it has always been "problematical". As I shall explain at the 
end of Chapter V, within human civilization, wherever we assess culture, we assess 
contradiction. This is in my view where the Frankfurt School made one critical 
mistake. They analysed culture as if culture had seen better times; as if somehow 
culture had been straight until our age of mechanical reproduction (Benjamin, 1999: 
211-45). "Culture" says Eagleton "is at once a document of civilization and a record of 
barbarism, the two as closely imbricated as the recto and verso of a sheet of paper." 
(Eagleton, 1991: 219). 
The Sumerian people invented written language in 3,200 BC Mesopotamia but they also 
practiced horrendous rituals of human sacrifices, a favourite being impaling people 
while still alive (Burne, 1989: 37). The aesthetic concept of virtue was as corrupted 
during the enlightenment as it was during the darkest medieval periods. Voltaire 
famously refused to discuss atheism in front of the servants because he thought their 
faith would protect his possessions, and while he was writing Candide, he was also 
investing his money in the slave trade, for its rich and fast pickings (Ibid.: 711). While 
the third president of the USA, Thomas Jefferson, was writing the draft for the 
Declaration of Independence, complete with assertions like "We hold this truth to be 
self-evident: that all men are created equal" he would, at the end of his working day, 
choose a nighttime 'companion' from among his females slaves (Ibid.: 751). This 
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contradictory pattern in human history and its values does not seem to have changed 
through the passing of centuries. A human achievement of the last century is the 
discovery of penicillin, but so is the atomic bomb. Of course, those who are still 
anchored in the eighteenth century utilitarianist philosophies of John Stuart Mill would 
argue that essential values are not timeless but relative; IS in other words, that things 
should be taken in their historical context. While this pattern of contradiction in pre-
capitalist culture can be explained as the result of historico-contextual human needs,16 
alongside the rise of the bourgeoisie, culture serves instead as a ''utopian function": that 
is, as David Gartman explains, culture expresses a need for freedom that is, 
nevertheless, "denied by the class organization of society" (1991: 440). Thus, with the 
increasing struggle of the bourgeoisie against feudal order, culture as utopian function, 
provides society with a "safety valve for discontent" (Ibid.). 
Since this time, the bourgeoisie, mastering the fabulous tool of culture, has never 
stopped using it for its own ends. Following Georg Lukacs' line of thought, Gartman 
expands this analysis by giving examples of the processes of literature before and after 
the revolutions of 184817 (Gartman, 1991: 442). Thus, "in the formative stages of 
capitalism", the narrative style of "bourgeois realists" like "Balzac, Dickens and 
Tolstoy", depict reality "as a historical creation of the strivings of human beings" within 
feudal societies (Ibid.: 441). Up to this stage, this struggle against feudalism had a 
collectivist character, because it was in the general interest of all classes to attain 
freedom of some kind. But, after the revolutions of 1848, and as soon as capitalism 
became firmly established, the bourgeois ruling class no longer had any interest in 
"progressive change, but in reactionary protection of its rule against the class to whom 
history passed the interest in freedom, the proletariat." (Ibid.: 442). As a consequence 
of this changed position of culture, says Gartman, "the descriptive style of bourgeois 
modernists like Joyce and Flaubert" came into being: 
no longer having an interest in progressive change, bourgeois writers were 
blinded to the nature of reality as a human creation and began to depict the 
world as a static, reified thing [ ... ] People and their relations are not developed 
but merely described as already constituted products of forces beyond their 
control. The reality of class and struggle is thus behind this impenetrable fa9ade 
of static things. (lbid.)18 
This cultural situation as a "fa9ade of static things" in society has not only remained 
unchanged since Joyce but, as I want to argue, has been taken to a level of hegemonic 
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proportions in our postmodern times. Dialectical theory is entangled in it and, by way 
of its rhetorical reasoning, justifies itself expecting the unexpectable: that capitalism 
would abolish itself. This is, according to Walter Benjamin, what Marx expected for 
the future of capitalism: "one could expect [capitalism] not only to exploit the 
proletariat with increasing intensity, but ultimately to create conditions which would 
make it possible to abolish capitalism itself' (1999: 212). Here we have again the 
intellectual bourgeoisie having to deal with their own demons. Seeing the impossible 
task of taking society from the jaws of the capitalist's ideology which, so to speak, 
would leave him without a solid floor under his feet, the dialectical Benjamin suggests 
taking a good sleep, in the hope that in the morning the jaws would have just 
disappeared. Benjamin's case is a very interesting one because, as Hannah Arendt tells 
us, the philosopher has had a major influence on post-Marxist modem thought; perhaps 
more than what was predicted at the time of his death on September 26, 1940 
(Benjamin, 1999: 7-58; 23). And, as I would argue now, it is in the way in which 
Benjamin took his own life, where the real character of post-Marxist dialectics takes the 
physical form of contradiction: interpreting Marxism and defining art while capitulating 
to defeatism or a commitment to failure. 
While on the run from the Gestapo, says Arendt, Benjamin was living in Paris until it 
was occupied by the Nazis. When the Gestapo confiscated his apartment - with 
Benjamin's entire and most treasured personal library I 9 - Benjamin tried to make a run 
to the Franco-Spanish borders, aiming ultimately for flight to America. In the company 
of a small group of refugees, Benjamin got to the Spanish frontier "only to learn" that 
the Spanish border officials - already operating under Franco's fascist regime - did not 
"honour visas" from France (Ibid.: 24). They were supposed then to return to France 
the following day. Instead, during the night Benjamin took his own life with an 
"overdose of morphine" (Demetz, 1986: xv). It is true that his utter desperation seems 
the dark finale to a relentless run of bad luck because, as Arendt says, "one day earlier 
and Benjamin would have got through without any trouble" (Benjamin, 1999: 24). But 
since Arendt also tells us that the border officials allowed Benjamin's group "to proceed 
to Portugal" the day after, and that even a few weeks later "the embargo on visas was 
lifted again" (Ibid.), in truth it seems that Benjamin's death by his own hand was not the 
result of the fighter who is hopelessly besieged by the enemy, but the result of a man 
overcome by his long lasting and profound pessimism.20 
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And yet few intellectuals21 have had as much influence in post-Marxist dialectics as 
Benjamin has had, especially through "The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical 
Reproduction" (1999: 211-45). Adorno criticized his friend Benjamin's "undialectic 
usage of Marxian categories" incessantly and he blamed Brecht's relationship with 
Benjamin for this (Arendt, 1999: 20).22 Still, in his magnum opus, Aesthetic Theory, 
Adorno makes continuous reference to Benjamin's thought, only surpassed by those he 
makes of Kant and Hegel (Adorno, 1997). That the two philosophers are deeply 
entrenched in the negativity of their thought, is also postulated by Eagleton when he 
says that Adorno "maintains a compact with failure"; a 'failure' that comes from their 
unhealthy and frustrated relationship with their own Jewishness (Eagleton, 1991: 349). 
"Jews today", wrote Benjamin in 1925, "ruin even the best German cause which they 
publicly champion, because their public statement is necessary venal (in a deeper sense) 
and cannot adduce proof of its authenticity" (Arednt in Benjamin, 1999: 40). The 
consequence of this Jewishness, of this 'compactness' with failure, is for Eagleton 
evident when, in the case of Adorno, the philosopher proposes the vacuity of Beckett as 
the perfect example of a work of art. Interestingly, Eagleton seems to apply critical 
thinking with the same self-inflictive parameters of those of Benjamin: if the Jew 
Benjamin seems to break away from Jewish morality, the Irishman Eagleton also enjoys 
ethnic self-flagellation and says "Like Beckett, Adorno maintains a compact with 
failure, which is where for both Jew and Irishman all authenticity must start [ ... ] There 
is something perversely self-defeating about this aesthetic" (Eagleton, 1991: 349). 
The way in which Benjamin died brings to mind a very unpleasant and bitter 
hypothesis, which might project further negativity into the discourse of culture as 
contradiction. Let us agree with Arendt and say that, from one angle, it is difficult to 
classify Benjamin's train of thought (see endnote 21); but on the other, we might 
confidently say that, in a broad sense, he was a humanist thinker, intellectually involved 
in seeking rational ways of solving human problems. Now, and as the Oxford 
Encyclopedia suggests, humanism, in its broadest sense, is a philosophical and cultural 
movement which has been in continuous development since the Renaissance and is 
most concerned with placing man at the centre of the world; a humanist believes in 
social progress and consequently dedicates his life to knowledge. In the pursuit of that 
knowledge, humanism also requires from the practitioner a certain detachment from all 
forms of morality, religion and ideology - and of course crime - for humanism is 
concerned with the wellbeing of all men. Furthermore, and as I have indicated 
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repeatedly throughout this discussion, knowledge seems to be directly interconnected 
with the survival of human species. 
Yet surprisingly enough, there is concrete evidence to suggest that, in times when 
extreme social conflicts demand from human beings to give their best in order to 
survive, some humanists (often those who are supposed to have most acquired 
knowledge) without any apparent will, seem to be the first to give up: "abandoning all 
hope, seeing nothing to make life seem worth living" (Kogon, 1960: 302). We can 
verify this humanistic defeatism from the records made by the survivors of the Nazi 
concentration camps.23 Again and again, those who survived the camps tell us how 
those who were of the "scholar and intellectual" type, quickly broke down, while those 
with fierce ideological or religious convictions found the "considerable force of 
character to overcome the difficulties that faced them" (Ibid.: 304-05; 307-10). 
"Admission to a concentration camp", says Eugen Kogon, "constituted the shock that 
immediately hurled the newcomer in one direction or the other. The indignation or 
desperation that followed the initial terror decided whether he would gradually gain 
inward perspective and thus a chance for individual adaptation to the new life, or 
whether he would swiftly succumb." (Kogon, 1960: 304-5). Brought to the camps 
where "terror is lurking everywhere" with nothing but a life of intellectual study, 
humanists did not have any social justification - like being a proletariat, a party 
member, a religious sectarian, or interestingly enough, a common criminal. People 
survived because they bred vengeance and hate for the 'other'; because, by mastering 
forms of crime, they managed to be a step ahead of the rest of the prisoners: "there were 
many dead martyrs in the camps, but few living saints" (Ibid.: 306); or because, having 
religious convictions, wishing one's own death was actually a sin. Of course, says 
Kogon, this will to survive was not something that people had all at once, "it took a long 
time for a mind, tom from the anchorages of the outside world and thrust into life-and-
death turmoil, to find a new inward centre of gravity" (Ibid.: 305). 
This appears to me as a shocking thought, and a source of deep contradiction in the 
development of a theory of culture: that in situations in which one needs to collect all 
sorts of supreme human capacities in order to survive, a humanist fails to find the 
proper devices in his own knowledge. As if an unthinkable test of human praxis, or the 
handling of a sickening experiment, the records of witnesses from the death camps seem 
to give the triumph of life to the very systems the humanist most despises: crime, 
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ideology, religion, lies, opportunism and so on. While, instead, the epistemological 
justifications of knowledge seem to lead to the humanist death - as it did to Benjamin. 
Why am I making use of such extreme historical records? In what possible way can I 
associate the extreme situation of a Nazi death camp with our current lives and culture? 
In our world of commodities, effortless communications and means of travel, pension 
schemes, supermarkets that give access to all kind of goods, social welfare, ceaseless 
entertainment, and so on and so forth, how can one dare to do such a thing? I have to 
because, when I propose a rethinking of aesthetics in the politics of theatre, I am 
proposing the train of thought of the dramatist Edward Bond. In the realm of theatre, he 
is the only one who dares to postulate the opinion that we are now living in extreme 
times. Bond does not say this occasionally; his entire drama output is based on this 
conviction. 
Philosophers such as Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that the basics of culture as mere 
transmission ended as such when culture became aware of itself (O'Connor, 2000: 231-
8). The fortunes of culture were settled with the rise of capitalism in the middle of the 
eighteenth century, at a time when the discipline of aesthetics began to be considered by 
Kant, Hume and Burke (White, 1997: 125-143). The dramatist Edward Bond dismisses 
Adorno's stance in historical terms - and certainly, as we will continue to see, Bond 
cannot be blamed for it. But Bond's philosophy of drama and Adorno's cogitations on 
art have more in common than the dramatist might have thought and desired.24 They 
both seek an art that cannot be addressed as 'art'; that cannot be included in the models 
of the hegemonic industries of cultural production. 
But whereas Adorno seems to make an accurate description of the symptoms and causes 
of the culture industry as a truly hegemonic force, he offers the shocking contradiction 
of "neutralization" - or social disassociation - as solution. "Neutralisation", says 
Adorno, "is the social price art pays for its autonomy" (Adorno, 1997: 331). Like 
Adorno, Bond is also aware of the dangers of coercive association,2S but proposes a 
very different method. While "neutralization" implies not only impartiality and absence 
of decided views, but also the conciliation of conflicts - as for example conflicts of 
class - the dramatist will not 'shut up' no matter what the outcome, and so he makes it 
clear: 
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We should have no illusions about what theatre and what drama can do. If I 
write a play and it is put on, I don't write that play to make the audience good or 
better or wiser, I want to make some of the audience worse. Because if I want to 
tell the truth and I live in a society which is unjust (and that is our basic 
problem) - if you have an unjust society, then you cannot any longer manage 
that tri-partite arrangement26 in such a way that you increase the human quality 
of minds by consent to the existing institutions, you'll only do it in acts of 
defiance. But if I write a play, then I'm not doing that from an institutional 
point of view: that I have some divine muse that will tell me total truth which 
will suddenly convert everyone into being good people. If I put on a good play 
then I want to make some of the audience more fascist. What else can I do? 
Some of the audience will go out more fascist, fine, but I will have made them 
more fascist. That's the important point. I will have defined for them more 
clearly what fascism is. Of course, I hope some of the audience will go out able 
to fight fascism and racism better because of my play but quite clearly, if I'm 
going to do that, then I'm also going to do the other. We should have no 
illusions. Art is dangerous in that way but we can't shut up because if we do 
that then forms of fascism and reaction will take over completely. 
(Bond in Byron, 1990: 20) 
3.3. Section III 
3.3.1. Demanding the impossible. 
Thus far then, we might safely say that the issue at hand is not a matter of whether 
culture is contradictory apparatus per se or whether culture is contradictory because 
there is a transcendental, 'human nature' which makes culture contradictory (I will 
discuss further this issue in Chapter V and in the overall conclusion). Instead we should 
look into culture as a consequence of the struggle between those above and those below; 
between those to whom all power is granted and those who submit to it, independently 
of their willingness or unwillingness to do so. Contradiction then is not an inherent 
element in people's lives as if it was something acquired at birth - a 'human nature' -
but a condition brought about by those situations in which people's very survival is 
determined by their reactions to the power that oppresses them. This is not solely a 
struggle for physical survival: in the struggle between power and its subjects mental 
sanity is at stake too. This is indeed where the arts come into play. Focusing their 
attention upon the almighty agents of power, artists have tried to make sense of a world 
that is predominantly unbalanced, limited in resources and unjust. 
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Interestingly, of all the arts, and especially since the Middle Ages in Europe, painting 
appears to be the field in which this struggle between power and its subjects - and the 
contradictions it entails - is most clearly observed as a fixed pattern. During the course 
of the last millennium painters have reflected the way in which power has shifted the 
object of their attentions. Firstly was God, divinities, crucifixions and saints; after that 
almighty kings, queens and their courts; and latterly painters have merely reflected in 
one way or another themes and subjects: primarily individuals (related with the 
bourgeoisie), and the almighty capital (especially after the revolutions of 1848). Indeed, 
from the end of the nineteenth century and thanks to the overwhelming success of the 
bourgeois ideology, things get very complicated. Painters, and all artists for that matter, 
seem to have had problems identifying where the power lies. It is true that some rare 
cases even shift their subject of attention altogether from forms of power to those that 
are subject to it -like common people are - as it is in the case of Van Gogh. "As far as 
I know" said the painter in one of his letters "there isn't a single academy where one 
learns to draw and paint a digger, a sower, a woman putting the kettle over the fire or a 
seamstress. But in every city of some importance there is an academy with a choice of 
models for historical, Arabic, Louis XV, in short, 'all really nonexistent figures' [his 
inverted comas]." (Van Gogh, 1959: 400). 
While Van Gogh mentions the choice of academies available, he also addresses the 
same problem of 'power-fixation' within the tradition of painting. It is not a 
coincidence then that, a few years later, the almighty power of technology was the 
primary motive of the latter futurists, celebrating machinery and both its constructive 
and destructive power. Thus, through the means of culture people have hitherto been 
able to identify power: God, the King or industrialists and their machines; they were 
above and the rest were below. For good or bad, people have had a concrete object of 
attention - a tangible power - and could consequently make decisions about it. But 
where does power dwell now? 
In spite of the above, one could argue that we all recognize specific institutions and 
agents of and with power: presidents, prime ministers, the military, constitutional 
monarchs, systems of law and so on. We even get information about the kind of 
monumental profits amassed by individual entrepreneurs which, in the eyes of most, 
position them within the boundaries of some form of power. Indeed, their decisions 
affect most of us greatly. This I am not arguing. However, all these are agents and 
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institutions of authority and they do not attain real power because their actions are 
totally subject to an entity well above their influence; an entity which complies entirely 
with the supernatural pronouncements of a bygone divinity: the arbitrary wishes of 
capital. Time and again in the media, we can see how expert economists not only 
cannot predict the outcome of the economy from one year to another, but from one 
month to the next. As with God or monarchs in the past, capital not only is 
unpredictable and capricious, as Marx explains in his Capital (1999), it exists only when 
it keeps on expanding. The agents of authority that I refer to above have indeed the task 
of organizing societies according to the needs of capital's expansion but they are not 
almighty, generational power like capital is. But while the areas of religion and 
monarchy have not trespassed the limits of conceptual transcendence, capital disregards 
this and affirms itself as both mythical and abstract, personal and impersonal. 27 
This is, in my view, why capital is blind to everything and everyone: whenever any 
given agent generates a product which generates profit, capital allows it to have a space 
in the market. For capital does not mind about the agent's intentions either; even on 
those occasions when the agent's output is a blatant manifest against capital itself.28 I 
will say it again: these days journalists like to call the President of the United States the 
most powerful man on earth, but when ex-president Bill Clinton hung the sign "it's the 
economy, stupid" all over his electoral headquarters in 1992, he knew that, in spite of 
himself, capital had the last word. 
Thus, up until the beginnings of the twentieth century artists were able to refer their 
works to a concrete power, transferring it into symbols. Now something remarkable has 
happened in our post-industrial societies: the power to which everything and everyone 
is subjected to is there - capital- but most of us seem unable to represent it, to question 
it, to paint it. "In its early stages," says Eagleton, "capitalism had sharply severed the 
symbolic from the economic; now the two spheres are incongruously reunited, as the 
economic penetrates deeply into the symbolic realm itself [ ... ] We were now [ ... ] in the 
era of postmodernism." (Eagleton, 1991: 373) Is it possible that capital has fused 
everything and everyone to such an extent? Because if that is the case, then it would be 
reasonable to suggest that the reason we are unable to talk about capital - as Fredric 
Jameson suggests (Prendergast, 2003: 109) - is because people are virtually unable to 
perceive, or to imagine for that matter, what position they occupy in society. If capital 
has fused the economic and the symbolic (and in works of art, the way in which people 
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represent things and their lives) then capital must have gone as far as to transform us 
into capital itself. This is actually what Marx and then the Frankfurt School have been 
telling us all along: that we ourselves are now commodities which accordingly are 
exchanged and valued. 
And yet one could suggest that, in spite of everything, and in a vast variety and levels of 
complexity and sophistication, we produce more culture than ever before. Does this 
culture represent real power (i.e. capital) in such a way that it is discernible to everyone 
and therefore available for discussion? I do not think so because it seems that capital 
still cannot be represented in a concrete way. This might be understood better when 
considering what capital's best representative is: money. "Money," says Eagleton 
evaluating Marx, "is a kind of monstrous sublimity, an infinitely spawning signifier 
which has severed all relation with the real, a fantastical idealism which blots out 
specific value as surely as those more conventional figures of sublimity - raging ocean, 
the mountain crags [ ... ] The sublime, for Marx as for Kant, is Das Unform: the formless 
or monstrous." (Eagleton, 1991: 213). This being the case, money (that is, capital) is 
both idealist and abstract;29 a metaphysical Absolute. 
Every time anyone suggests "we have to be realistic," money is never far from the 
object of attention. In total disagreement with thinkers like Marx, the Frankfurt School· 
and then Eagleton above, the official channels of knowledge/transfer - that is, the 
media, schools of education and so on - tell us repeatedly that we live in a materialistic 
society. As the next two chapters will hopefully make clear, this is not the case. 
Capitalism, as Edward Bond asserts (in appendix: 50), is an extreme form of idealist 
system in which people are made to believe the illusions it offers like being a winner or 
becoming rich. However, very rarely we remember those that in this process become 
the losers. As Ernesto Che Guevara indicated, rewriting the theory of reification, 
capitalism has its own intrinsic anti-human laws but we are unable to unearth them as if 
they were "invisible": 
The laws of capitalism, invisible and blind for most people, act upon the 
individual without his awareness. He sees only the broadness of a horizon that 
appears infinite. Capitalist propaganda presents it in just this way, and attempts 
to use the Rockefeller case (true or not) as a lesson in the prospects for success. 
The misery that must be accumulated for such an example to arise and the sum 
total of baseness contributing to the formation of a fortune of such magnitude do 
not appear in the picture, and the popular forces are not always able to make this 
concept clear.30 
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This is why "be realistic, demand the impossible" should not be taken as a "fatuous 
slogan" which, as Peter Conrad wants us to believe, "encapsulates [an] innocent 
incomprehension of politics". 31 Yes, it is true that Conrad might be both right and 
wrong: he is right because in 1968 the proposition "be realistic, demand the impossible" 
was delivered by the very offspring of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, creating 
contradicting slogans which ultimately worked to the detriment of class awareness, as 
has been verified by time.32 As Conrad says in the same article "[they] believed that 
revolution meant a frolicsome irresponsibility, the indefinite prolongation of 
childhood.,,33 But he is also wrong because this remarkable epigram holds in its 
semantics many of the ideas evaluated here, making it as relevant today as it was in 
May 1968, spray-painted on a wall of a Parisian Latin Quarter. If "be realistic, demand 
the impossible" has become corrupted it is because it became neutralized by the 
bourgeois' handling of it (Baudrillard, 2001: 10; Eagleton, 1991: 349; Adorno, 1997: 
325, 1990: 175; Wolin, 1990: 40). Conrad seems to ignore the Marxist evaluation of 
capitalism as the most extreme form of idealist ideology, which will be discussed 
further in due course. "Be realistic, demand the impossible" is instead realistic, non-
contradictory and above all, ethical through and through. 
To fully grasp this one needs to be aware first of capital as a universal; in other words, 
as Russell suggested, via its conceptualization (1954: 86). However, the epigraph above 
is ethical because, as I have discussed via Wittgenstein before, it requires the 
application of thinking in manners that cannot be expressed with political or moral 
languages: it is an "absolute judgment of value". It is what we ought to want to do. It is 
realistic and non-contradictory because in the real situation in which we live, a demand 
for the abolition of private property - and therefore the abolition of individual interest 
or gain from people's psychological motivations - is an "impossible," an overwhelming 
thing to ask. Thus, Max Weber's pragmatic analysis of society, through which he 
concluded that a capitalist world based in technical efficiency and undemocratic 
administration, cannot be transcended: 
More and more the material fate of the masses depends upon the steady and 
correct functioning of the increasingly bureaucratic organisation of private 
capitalism. The ideas of eliminating these organisations becomes more and 
more utopian (Bilton et aI, 1981: 730) 
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Of course it is utopia, perhaps even more today than in Weber's time. And yet, in the 
context of the field that interests us here - that is, drama - it remains the only thing we 
ought to ask: "the impossible;" that is, the realm of perfect freedom and justice; that is, 
. 34 
utopIa. 
Furthermore, what if, as Brian J. Shaw suggests, by way of this supposedly capitalist 
final triumph, a revolutionary subject no longer exists? (Shaw, 1985: 165) If for Kant 
moral beliefs were people's inability to imagine a future without God, a future without 
God's successor, Capital, seems simply impossible?5 And it is impossible because, as 
I have discussed earlier via Marx and Marxist scholars, the gain of capital has become a 
precept in our minds. We are capital too. That demanding the impossible is a realistic 
proposition is actually the finest representation I can think of, providing I had to 
associate Adorno's "Negative Dialectics" (O'Connor, 2000: 54-79) with Edward 
Bond's philosophy of drama. Syntactically, it is impossible to demand the impossible 
and yet, as I previously noted via the dramatist "we can't shut up because if we do that 
then forms of fascism and reaction will take over completely" (Bond in Byron, 1990: 
20). 
So where does power dwell now? If we accept then that it is in capital, it resides 
everywhere, even as a precept in the minds of the recipients. This makes contradiction a 
fundamental constituent of all artworks, of all dialectics. That "Artists are radical for as 
long as they lack customers" as Peter Conrad says (in The Observer, 2002) is an 
antagonistic situation evident everywhere. As Adorno explains, when we live in a 
fundamentally "antagonistic situation," contradiction is presented in and by artworks as 
a "whole" (Adorno, 1997: 323). In this holistic situation, Adorno also includes the 
artist: for success makes them members and part of that power they purport to hate. 
But how is the millenarian pattern of struggle between real power and its subjects 
fulfilled in the arts today? I need to return once again to the field of painting, bringing 
this section to an end. One could well argue that with the arrival of modem abstract art 
and its subsequent movements and 'isms' the representation of power seems to be 
totally non-existent. The progression for example from Marcel Duchamp's "ready-
made,,36 in 1912, through to the phenomenon of Conceptual art in the 1960s in which 
the process and the idea of a work is more important than the finished product (if any) 
does not seem to pose any questions about power, but about the nature of art itself. 37 
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Indeed, the influence of this approach has been so substantial that now it forms integral 
part of most artistic fields; as for example, the emerging new field of Practice as 
Research in Performance (also designated with its abbreviation PARIP).38 But, on the 
assumption that real modem power (capital) is unrepresentable, could it be that non-
representational paintings exemplified by modem abstract artworks are instead 
complying with the millenarian tradition of representing real power? 
This takes me effortlessly on to what Christopher Prendergast calls Fredric Jameson's 
"final delivery": that modernity is not just "ways of talking about capitalism" but ways 
of refusing altogether to talk about it (Prendergast, 2003: 109). Thus my deduction is 
that since capital - that is, the formless sublime - cannot be represented in concrete 
ways, non-representational art actually complies, knowingly or unknowingly, with the 
artistic tradition of "power-fixation." Indeed, when Fredric Jameson explains how 
"money [is] the fundamental source of all abstraction" (1998: 25),39 he might actually 
be offering art practitioners a good framework from which to search for the real origins 
of non-representational art. When painters and performers concentrate their efforts in 
questioning nothing but the nature of art itself, from a certain perspective it would look 
as if they were in reality celebrating power - celebrating capital - with the same 
reverential fervour with which Michelangelo Buonarroti celebrated God. 
Conclusion to chapter III 
With a sense of urgency, Edward Bond stresses through his works and writings the idea 
that we live in "extreme times." As a result, many scholars and critics including the 
Oxford Encyclopedia itself (which somehow makes it official) pin the badge of 
'controversial' on his work and persona. And from the seemingly comfortable setting 
of our liberal democracies it is easy to understand why Bond is pigeonholed in such a 
way. During the second half of the last century we have seen situations in Africa, 
South-America, or the Far and Middle-East as 'extreme' as we see them right now, but 
all from the warmth and safety of our houses. Independent of whether these areas have 
suffered as a result of our western economies, most of us have had and have easy access 
to commodities and entertainments; social security and free education. As Bond says 
himself: "very often the victories it [the working class] achieves are not through 
socialist politics, but through the successes of capitalism" (appendix: 34). And of 
course, as Terry Eagleton seems to tell me in a personal letter, Auschwitz and 
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Hiroshima seem grotesque events of a bygone era.40 But we abide to the same moral 
values on the one hand, and a form of highly evolved and sophisticated capitalist system 
on the other, which were, as I introduced before through Chapter II and will discuss 
through chapter V , behind the atrocities of Auschwitz and Hiroshima. 
Thus, Bond is not 'polemical' for the sake of it. That we live in times of extremism is 
in my view reflected precisely in our inability to identify power. Our times are extreme 
because, as Steven B. Smith suggests, it seems as if we are currently ruled by "nobody" 
(1985: 653). Even Marxist Critical Theory, argues Smith criticizing Althusser, seems to 
be a Marxism "without a Knowing Subject" (Ibid.: 641-655). It is as if one could stop 
to ponder, bewildered, upon the questions 'where is the working class? Where is the 
class struggle'? Is it possible that Marx's dictum "All history has hitherto been a 
history of class struggles" means now in art and culture "hitherto" in its literal sense -
that is, up to this point? Has history died? 
This might seem an unnecessary rhetorical question because history does not "die" as 
such. Francis Fukuyama rightly wanted us to recognise the death of history because 
class struggle seems to have vanished (1992), and Marx only thought of history in terms 
of class conflict. But nor do we have, as Walter Benjamin suggested, a theory of history 
"on the basis of which fascism can be sighted" (Wohlfarth, 1979: 972). This is why, 
considering postmodern aesthetics as the aesthetics of the invisible, we live in extremely 
dangerous times.41 This extreme capitalist situation in which all culture is industry must 
affect our perception of history in ways which Marx did not predict. Prior to suggesting 
what "responsibility in drama" means, we need to analyse the ways or mechanisms by 
which the market has industrialised culture. If there is one critic that contributes to the 
debate of how the mechanics of the culture industry affects us, while supplementing 
with further insights the abstract and philosophical dialectics of Adorno, the empirical 
perspective of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1985) is the best on offer. 
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Endnotes 
IAgain, here I am making reference to Wittgenstein's dictum what we cannot speak about we 
must pass over in silence. [Cahoon, 1996: 199]. See the introduction of this chapter p.l 03. 
2 Luke Rendell and Hal Whitehead, "Culture in whales and dolphins", in Behavioral [sic] and 
Brain Sciences, 2001, issue 24, pp. 309-382, p. 310. All the sources are from the scientific field 
of animal behaviour and are accordingly supplied in this article. 
3 I am making allusion here to one of the letters that Bond sent to me. In it he says "the cave-
paintings were painted for ME." Of course, he is stressing the intrinsic meaning that they are 
great art because they were made for all people. 
4 Irving Wohlfarth, "Hibernation: On the Tenth Anniversary of Adorno's Death", MLN, Vol. 94, 
No.5, Comparative Literature (Dec., 1979), pp. 956-987, p. 961. 
5 Pierre Bourdieu defines the first as "the field of large-scale cultural production" (FLP) and the 
second as "the field of restricted production" (FRP) (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). I will come back to 
the approach of Bourdieu later on in chapter V. 
6 Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia, see what it has to say on the word "concept" (The Learning 
Company, 1997) 
7 BBC Radio 4, Friday, 13 May 2005, "PM". 
8 The late 18th century seems a time ago: Britain has come a long way from the time when it was 
perfectly nonnal to have children as young as five and six years of age working 13 to 16 hours a 
day in the mills. In 1942, Lord William Beveridge (1879-1963) finally achieved the founding in 
Britain of the National Insurance. Nowadays it is taken for granted by all, and most forget that it 
is the product of great social struggle. Up to the 1900s British workers had only their bare hands 
- and the hope of not falling ill - to survive. Very little was added to the workers welfare 
during the years to come, right up to World War II. Unemployment was rampant, above all in 
the North of Ireland, Scotland and the North of England, due on one hand, to the U.S. Stock 
Market Crash of 1929, and on the other, to the five years from 1924 to 1929 in which Churchill 
as Chancellor "returned to the gold standard over valuing the pound, imposing serious 
handicaps on British exports, especially textile and coal-mining industries." (Cole, G. D. H, The 
Intelligent Man's Guide to the Post-war World, London: Victor Gallanz Ltd, 1947, p. 489). 
Socialist ideas, fought by the establishment as much as a democratic fa~ade would pennit, were, 
during the war, making space among hopeful British people. Those who had had access to the 
privilege of education like G. D. H Cole (1947), and those from humble classes who became 
teachers and lecturers, started to open the minds of the people with discourses like What I Take 
for Granted: 
(1) Standards of Living ( ... ) to raise this standards in our country and throughout the 
world ( ... ) to put and end to malnutrition, preventable disease and mortality, 
illiteracy and ignorance, and sub-human living and working conditions wherever 
they exist (ibid.: 35) 
According to Cole, up to then the main presuppositions of capitalism were two important points: 
(1) the contention that men are too lazy or unprincipled to work unless they are driven on by the 
whip of starvation, orland (2) that industry cannot be carried on unless those who work in it 
have the threat of the sack continually before their eyes. From 1945, people had the expectation 
that the quality of their lives should improve. During the next six years that the Labour leader 
Clement Attlee (1883-1967) was in office, vigorous programs of reform were carried through 
the nation. The Bank of England, the coal mines, civil aviation, cable and wireless services, 
gas, electricity, railways, road transport and steel were nationalized. The National Health 
Service was introduced and independence was granted to India (1947) and Burma. Europe had 
to be reconstructed. There was a pursuit of full employment which, it could be argued, in a 
capitalist society would lead to some sort of Socialism - ignoring, perhaps, that it would give 
rise to the haunting inflation. Cole, then, contended rightly that the workers, relieved of the fear 
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of unemployment "will now be in a position to exact higher wages, or as consumers, lower 
prices." (Ibid.: 199). But Adorno's predictions of his theory of "false consciousness" were 
made visible once again. Paradoxically, in 1951, one more Marxist prediction was materialized 
in the General Election, when a sick and debilitated W. Churchill was called by the British 
voters into office yet again. 
9 It is to the market that we owe our allotment; there is no way out of it. Following Irving 
Wohlfarth's criticism on Adorno's thinking, the bourgeois ideology makes us to confuse 
"liberty with the freedom to sleep under the bridges". People does not have either the choice or 
the tools with which to make choice possible; among other things because we do not have the 
tradition for it ("Hibernation: On the Tenth Anniversary of Adorno's Death", MLN, Vol. 94, No 
5, Comparative Literature (Dec. 1979), pp. 956-987, p. 975-6) 
10 "Reach-Me-Down Romantic", The London Review of Books, Vol. 25, No. 12, 19 June 2003. 
11 I am younger than Eagleton and of Spanish upbringing, and while a liberal "social consensus" 
was established in Britain in the 1950s it was so much later in Spain - in the 1980s with the 
death of Franco. That is why I, for instance, recognize this identification with a melancholic 
memory of what people of the lower classes were, but that no longer are: we were poor but the 
doors of everyone were wide open all day long; today, all doors are closed, literally and 
metonymic ally. We were not afraid of being robbed. Today everyone is suspicious of each 
other. 'Tomorrow' was not a land of "opportunity" and "success" but a land of hope and 
decency. The only one who ever lied was the shopkeeper. Today, everyone has to master the 
proceedings of lying within the law in order to succeed or succumb. I believe that Williams and 
Eagleton have experienced those same human conditions, when the working class was very 
different from the working class of today, and it becomes very difficult to 'let it go', as it were. I 
have also experienced at first hand the damage that the leaders and intellectuals of the left have 
done in Spain, societally and therefore culturally, during the 1980s and 1990s. It is true that 
Spain might have a different social and historical context, but the patterns of progressive 
damage inflicted on what were already confused public perceptions seem to me closely similar. 
I was young and an activist in the Spain of the 1980s when the leader of the Spanish Communist 
Party (Partido Comunista Espaiiol - PCE) Santiago Carrillo, during some General Elections 
incessantly made use of slogans like "no hay nada mas tonto que un obrero de derechas" (there 
is nothing more stupid than a right-wing worker). Slogans like these only cheered up those who 
were already supporters, but alienated all the rest of the workers, who were indeed right-wing 
supporters, Catholics to the core and of course, "stupid" and the silent majority. How could 
anyone expect anything else from the workers of Spain after forty years under the ideology, the 
propaganda and the aesthetics of Franco's dictatorship? Indeed, during those years under 
Franco, the ideologies of the left were run by and for the same "dissident offspring of the upper 
and upper middle classes" in exclusivity; not by the working class. Carrillo and those who put 
him as leader - indeed, the left wing intellectuals - caused far worse damage to the causes of 
socialism than the right could ever have dreamt of. 
12 "Abstract" says Eagleton, "because, when sheer material survival is at stake, the sensuous 
qualities of the objects intended by such needs are not in question" (ibid.) 
13 In the chapter "Negative Dialectics and the Possibility of philosophy" (O'Connor, 2000; pp. 
54-78) Adorno resolutely says "dialectics not standpoint" (spec. pp. 56-9). 
14 From AdornolHorkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1972); quoted in 
Wohlfarth's p. 984. 
15 Utilitarianism refers, in essence, to the idea that the goal of morality is "the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number." (See Bunnin, and Tsui-James, 1999: 617-40) In other words, natural 
rights are nonsense or as they like to put it, 'hunger is not bread'. Of course, from that 
perspective, slavery during the 18th Century had to have a justification even in the minds of 
those whose goal was equality and social justice. That utilitarianism is as functioning today as 
it was two hundred years ago is revealed by the fact that in current discussions it is mostly 
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accepted that the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were actually for the good of a 
majority, and that the bombs saved more lives than they effectively killed. 
16 That is, in this case I am refereeing to those cultures trying to make sense of a world full of 
unknowns and menacing environments, and therefore with a need to create gods, kings, 
sacrifices and all the rest. This is entirely different from the relativist moral justifications that a 
utilitarianist could make about the actions of Voltaire and Jefferson. 
17 1848 witnessed a series of revolutions in western and central Europe. They sprang from a 
shared background of autocratic government and economic unrest, as well as from the failure of 
conservative governments to grant representation to the middle classes, and the awakened 
nationalism of minorities in central and Eastern Europe. Revolution erupted first in France, 
where supporters of universal suffrage and a socialist minority under Louis Blanc caused the 
overthrow of the July monarchy and established the Second Republic. In most German states 
there were popular demonstrations and uprisings, and a movement for an elected national 
parliament to draft a constitution for a united Germany. Rioting in Austria caused the flight of 
both Metternich and the emperor, and the formation of a constituent assembly and the 
emancipation of the peasantry. Also, a movement for Hungarian independence, headed by 
Kossuth, led to a short-lived republican government from Budapest for all Hungarian lands; but 
Magyar's refusal to consider independence for its own minorities resulted in an insurrection by 
Croat, Serb, and Transylvanian forces and in Hungary's defeat by Austrian and Russian forces. 
In the Italian states there was a series of abortive revolutions which led to the temporary 
expulsion of the Austrians and the flight of Pope Pius IX from Rome, but the united, democratic 
republic dreamt of by Mazzini did not come about. A Pan-Slav Congress in Prague inspired 
Czech nationalist demonstrations to demand autonomy within a federal Austria. By 1849 
counter-revolutionary forces had restored order, but the concept of absolute monarchy and the 
feudal rights of a land-owning aristocracy had been tacitly abandoned. (Oxford Encyclopedia, 
The Learning Company, 1997) 
18 Gartman makes this analysis from Georg Lukacs' "Idea and Form in Literature", pp. 109-31 
and "The Ideology of Modernism", pp. 277-307, in Marxism and Human Liberation, New 
York: Dell., 1973. 
19 He had been able to get "the more important half out of Germany, says Arednt. (p. 23) 
20 Peter Demetz adds some interesting information on the dreadful death of Benjamin - which, 
only to some extent, might dispute my own argument on Benjamin's inbuilt pessimism: 
Benjamin [ ... ] "was told on the Spanish side by the local functionary (who wanted to blackmail 
the refugees) that Spain was closed to them and that they would be returned in the morning to 
the French authorities, who were just waiting to hand them over to the Gestapo. Benjamin-
totally exhausted and possibly sick - took an overdose of morphine, refused medical help, and 
died in the morning, while his fellow refugees were promptly pennitted to proceed through 
Spanish territory to Lisbon." (Demetz, 1986: xiv-xv). Only those who were told that "they were 
going to be handed over to the Gestapo" have the authority to talk of the terrifying feelings they 
experienced; if one adds sickness and exhaustion to it, hopefulness must sound like a sickening 
joke. And yet, the facts support my argument: Benjamin threw away that which no man can 
afford to throwaway: the precious instant of hope. 
21 Nevertheless, as Hanna Arednt argues, of all the giants of dialectical thinking, Benjamin is the 
most unclassifiable: "his erudition was great, but he was no scholar; his subject matter 
comprised texts and their interpretation, but he was no philologist; he was greatly attracted not 
by religion but by theology and the theological type of interpretation but he was not theologian 
[ ... ] he was not particularly interested in the Bible; he was born writer, but his greater ambition 
was to produce a work entirely of quotations; he was the first to translate Proust and Franz 
Hessel [ ... ] but he was not translator; he reviewed books [ ... ] but he was not literary critic; [ ... ] 
he thought poetically, but he was neither a poet nor a philosopher" (pp. 9-10) 
22 See also Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, pages 56, 79, and 299. 
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23 See Levy (1994, esp. 61 and 123); Kogon (1960, esp. pp. 300-328) in chapter twenty three, 
"The Psychology of the Prisoners"; and most recently the BBC has broadcast a series of 
documentaries on the Nazi concentration camps, from where many survivors did testify, 
bewildered, to these facts (one example was "The Nazis: a warning" on BBC2, April 30, 2005, 
time: 19:50 to 20:40). 
24 Edward Bond objects to Adorno's notorious claim that "to write poetry after Auschwitz is 
barbaric" (O'Connor, p. 210). "On the contrary", says Bond "Auschwitz is the home of poetry" 
(appendix: 7). But if one makes an attentive reading of Adorno's works, this is also what 
Adorno says and he apologies for it, albeit in a far more complicated manner. What Adorno 
suggests in reality is not that, after Auschwitz, people should not create poetry anymore; but that 
what is certainly barbarous is to make poetry - and that is, art - with the same precepts as before 
Auschwitz and go on living all the same (O'Connor, 86-7). In my view, Edward Bond 
postulates the same thought. Indeed, after reading and correcting the transcript included here as 
appendix, Bond wrote in it the following comment "Of course I agree with what you say. My 
argument about the extreme in drama is that it forces people to define themselves one way or 
the other - but I also think that by creating total situations it can force people to see through 
themselves; to see themselves in their situation." (4 July 2005). 
25 Coercive because we are compelled to live by the system in one way or another, or succumb. 
Bond himself is well aware of it: "owning a house in our democracy implicates me in murder -
in everything I'm against" (Bond, 1995: 13). We own property, property that has been obtained 
with money which itself has been reproduced by the very system one confronts. 
26 According to Tag McEntegart, the "tripartite arrangement" to which Bond refers consists of 
the dynamic relationship between the people/community, the administration/state/church and 
what he calls "the Boundary" which provides the answers at any particular moment in history to 
the basic questions of existence: Why? What? Wherefore? Wherefrom? The power over and 
therefore the control of the Boundary have shifted throughout history (Tag McEntegart, 
"Imagining The Real & Realising the Imagined ... ", The Journal of Drama in Education, Vol. 
20, Issue 2, Summer 2004, p. 13.) 
27Here I am following Oxford Encyclopedia's notions about God (1997) and Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason, specially the Chapter II of "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," Section 3 
"Opining, Knowing and Believing;" and also Chapter I, Section 3 "The Disciplines of Pure 
Reason in Respect of its Proofs." 
28 The publishing industry for example, is packed with Marxist works. And if my case in point 
is Edward Bond and his ongoing fight against capitalism as an extreme social system that works 
against human beings, the dramatist output of theory and plays is also expanding in the market 
rather steadily not only in Europe but now in the USA (According to the letter that the Parisian 
director of the Theatre National de la CoUine, Allan Francon, addressed to Bond, dated 25 May 
2005). 
29 Interestingly, according to Poulantzas, Das Capital is approached in two ways by two 
different groups of thinkers: as an abstract theory of economy by economists, and as an 
essential method of historic investigation by historians (Arico, 1976: 92). And yet, says 
Poulantzas Das Capital, is neither a work on economics nor a work on history in its "immediate 
sense:" instead is a work that allows a theoretical reconstruction of history and economics (p. 
100). However, in relation to the idea of capital as an abstract entity Poulantzas also highlights 
the fact that, by way of his own annotations, Marx himself could not grasp entirely the novelty 
of his own theory. "We can do it only through the symptomatic reading of it; of its indications, 
interpreting its own language and Marx's own mistakes" [my own translation from Spanish] (p. 
91). 
30 Ernesto Che Guevara's On Revolutionary Medicine (1999; orig. 1960). 
31 "You say you want a revolution ... ," The Observer Review, Sunday January 20, 2002. 
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32 The Italian author, Pier Paolo Pasolini, exposes this argument in full in one of his five 
tragedies, Calderon (In Teatro, Milan: Italy, Garzanti, 1995, pp.27-165). This is an argument 
that will have proper attention in the next chapter "Culture or industry." 
33 Conrad, further justifying his position of scorn towards the 68' s movement, also produces the 
example of the septuagenarian avant-gardist Pierre Boulez who was arrested by the police in 
November 2001. The French Police had been tipped off that during the 1960s he published a 
pamphlet proposing that the opera houses of Europe should be burnt down. "Had they captured 
a musical terrorist" says Conrad, "an incognito Taliban operative seeking to follow up the 
iconoclastic bombing of those giant Buddhas? Boulez had to explain that this long-ago 
incendiary manifesto was nothing more than a joke." (Conrad, 2002). 
34 When one talks of redeeming utopia, it should be specified what type of utopia one intends to 
redeem. Following Richard Wollin (1990) I do not propose here the utopianism so criticised by 
Marx: that utopian future which in essence "is a secularized version of eschatological religious 
longing." (Ibid.: 45). No. As I said before, if we ever live in ajust and perfect world that needs 
signs reminding us what is good and what is bad; what is just and unjust. That is why I think 
we need, on the one hand, Adorno's version of aesthetics as a safeguard of determined negation 
in the arts; and on the other, Bond's philosophy of drama as a shield against drama's 
neutralization. But Weber also predicted an inevitable dehumanised world as a consequence of 
the mechanics of capitalist Western culture (Bilton et aI, 1981: 731): if that comes true at any 
time, then drama would certainly become obsolete. If we were to follow Weber's views on 
capitalism, the question should not be "how?" drama is going to vanish from our mental 
mapping, but "when?" 
35 Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, electronic edition, 
(www.arts.cuhk.edu.hklPhilosophylKant/cpr; accessed: 23.08.02.) in "Transcendental Doctrine 
of Method," Chapter I, Section 3, "Opining, Knowing and Beliving." 
36 His Fountain - a bicycle wheel mounted on a kitchen stool, a bottle rack, and a urinal- is an 
example of what "ready-made" is. 
37 On Conceptual Art see Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia, 1997. 
38 On Practice as Research in Performance see Bella Merlin's "Practice as Research in 
Performance: a Personal Response," NTQ 20:1, (February, 2004), pp. 36-44. As Merlin says "I 
now appreciate that it was the process that was innovative, and not necessarily the outcome: 
anyone viewing the final theatre piece would not have seen anything [ ... ]" (p. 41). This is 
indeed the very definition of what Conceptual Art is. Nevertheless, Merlin's article is also a 
refreshing - and courageous - contribution to the debate of whether wealth and economic 
security is behind all cultural purposes: "Why do practitioners research"? says Merlin" [ ... ] 
ultimately we all need to put bread on the table [ ... ] The thought of regular salaries, a pension 
scheme, long holidays [ ... ]"(p. 39). 
39 In the same article by Jameson, read the most relevant section "The Philosophy of Money," 
pp.27-9. 
40 Letter reproduced in full in chapter V, 'culture or ideology'. 
41 Some statistical notes might help to remind us of how in the western democracies there is a 
hugely important and fundamental problem which to this day remains unresolved: "The US" 
says Anthony Giddens "appears as the most unequal of all industrial countries in terms of 
income distribution. The proportion of income taken by the top 1 % has increased substantially 
over the past tow or three decades, while those at the bottom have seen their average incomes 
stagnate or decline [ ... ] Using the criterion of half or less of median income, 57 million people 
were living in poverty in the EU nations in 1998. About two-thirds of these were in the largest 
societies: France, Italy, the UK and Germany" (200 I: 90). 
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(PART II) 
4. CHAPTER IV 
Culture or Industry 
Introduction 
According to David Hesmondhalgh, a distinction between the singular form "The 
Culture Industry" and the plural form "The Cultural Industries" is now needed 
(2002:15). Its singular form, he sustains, is a pejorative concept intended to shock, 
while its plural form "enriches" us all with its products - even to those "teachers, 
students, and writers" who "lapse into a pessimism similar to that of the 'Culture 
Industry' chapter" (Ibid.: 16). In his view, current culture enriches us with "plenty of 
exciting, interesting and funny" stuff (Ibid.: 23). Probably, but distinguishing between 
the plural and the singular form - that is, whether all culture is now an industry or 
whether culture is an amalgam of industries - might be a unnecessary distraction from a 
most relevant problem. Hesmondhalgh points to cultural industries as if he could divide 
culture into two big functioning groups: one a manufacturing culture reliant on the 
demands of market and exchange-value, and the other as an autonomous culture of a 
higher order. Culture might appear as such to a swift observer, but, as Bourdieu 
explains, both cultural fields are too compromised by their reliance on power and capital 
(1977; 1977a; 1984; 1985). On the other hand, by brandishing culture as "industries", 
culture has seemingly been grouped in the collective imaginary as part and parcel of a 
society totally engulfed by the philosophy of commodity exchange and value (Harvie, 
2003: 16). 
Following two centuries of continuous ideological clash, the current standardisation of 
culture as "industries" seems more like a final conquest of the final frontier: if real 
power is Big Capital (see Chapter V) and Big Capital is the result of industries, culture 
has been taken on by real power. Besides, could there be a culture that, in 
contemporary times, is not connected with industry/industries? Is there any cultural 
movement that has not, in greater or lesser measure, anything to do with any of the 
devices of exchange and value - publishing, publicity, marketing strategy, distribution, 
and so on? If one takes into account Nietzschean discourses of honesty, this radical 
nominative shift of culture into an industry should instead be recognized accordingly. 
4. Chapter IV 
Culture or industry 
136 
The theatre industry, the music industry, the creative industry are but a few of those 
fields that for too long pretended not to have major relations with the economic system. 
The culture industry is, actually, an accurate definition: culture is - and has been for 
some time now - an industry through and through. It produces huge quantities of cash, 
public recognition and status, direct and indirect employment, and by decantation 
culture creates industries which creates more culture and so in rapid succession. 1 Thus, 
I would not argue here whether it is wrong to address culture as industry or industries. 
Even cultural practitioners need an income and surely a decent housing and holidays 
and all the rest. Instead, in my view we ought to apply our efforts trying to understand 
whether the traditional critical tension between power and its subjects has, in culture, 
been erased. 
Critics like Hesmondhalgh celebrate the current field of cultural studies when it declares 
that popular culture needs to be taken seriously (2002: 39), but he seems to ignore the 
fact that Adorno and Horkheimer sat down to write "Dialectic of Enlightenment," 
"Negative Dialectics," and "The Culture Industry" because they took both popular and 
'high' culture very seriously indeed; but for different reasons. When Hesmondhalgh 
asks us to take culture seriously, he does so because some cultural propositions are good 
producers of financial value and creators of industries.2 Adorno and Horkheimer did 
not appear to disagree with Hesmondhalgh, because they were also of the view that 
cultural production had become "an integrated component of the capitalist economy as a 
whole" (Adorno, 2001: 9). But they also explained at length that, in mass culture, 
culture was not any longer the product of spontaneity as it ought to be, but imposed 
from "above". This is, in resumed accounts, the origin of their term the "Culture 
Industry" (Wohlfarth, 1979: 962), and if this is the case, culture's condition should be 
taken very seriously indeed. This is why when reconsidering this term, Adorno also 
advises that "industry" here is "not to be taken literally" because "it refers to the 
standardization of culture" itself (O'Connor, 2000: 233). Furthermore, as I have already 
suggested, in order to do culture, cultural practitioners have had to accommodate to the 
mechanics of capital expansion. In this process, culture has lost the sign of power, 
which enables culture to express a need for freedom. If this is the current state of 
culture, then cultural practitioners find themselves in a situation in which they are 
unable to apply culture's foremost function: its "utopian function" (Gartman, 1991: 
440). 
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As Gartman reminds us, in the struggles between the bourgeoisie and the feudal rule, 
culture was the fundamental "safety valve for discontent" (Gartman, 1991: 440). It 
enabled the bourgeoisie culture to express the need for freedom until it finally replaced 
feudal order. The important thing now is to understand whether this supposedly 
essential ''utopian function" of culture is currently at work. According to Bourdieu, in 
our post-industrial society culture's utopian function is "denied by the class 
organization of society" (Ibid.). On account of the findings presented here, my opinion 
is that it is indeed at work, but it operates as a tool of protection for the bourgeoisie's 
interests, while working to the detriment of everyone else, subjected to the wishes and 
tastes of the former. 
A responsible proposition in the age of the culture industry would be then to reclaim 
culture's utopian function for the benefit of all - a demand for the "impossible." But 
according to Pierre Bourdieu's sociological theory, if current culture acts as a "system 
of symbols" which furthers class "misrecognition" (Gartman, 1991: 421), then people 
would not know whether they need a utopian function at all - except, of course, those 
who, via the capital power they possess, know already what freedom3 feels like. So 
how could we represent in the arts the longing for freedom and justice of the oppressed 
class when, thanks to the dominant bourgeois ideology, all social classes believe they 
have as much freedom and justice as it is possible to get? Class 'misrecognition' seems 
to be one of the fundamental barriers obstructing any consequential utopian proposition. 
It does not seem accidental that there exists prolonged scholarly debate over whether 
there is a faultless communication between creative practitioners and their audiences.4 
Indeed, by writing extensively about the ways in which his work should be understood 
and staged, Bond also acknowledges this problem. This issue was considered during 
our encounter, and the dramatist agreed that, in general, theatrical audiences are mainly 
comprised of elites (appendix: 44; 61). Yet, and by definition, elites would not have in 
mind a transformation of their very society; certainly not to a point in which their own 
status and privileges could be jeopardized. From this situation, and taking into 
consideration the dramatist's obvious hierarchical position within the field of theatre 
studies, Bond has emerged with a unique strategy: while he circumvents as much as 
possible not only the theatrical stream-line, but also its habitual audiences, the dramatist 
is actively involved with children's education. In my view, Bond's latter creative 
4. Chapter IV 
Culture or industry 
138 
relocation within these spheres - the education of infants, children, and adolescents _5 
has been not only an act of social responsibility and of authenticity, but a response to 
the "impossible" grounds of current culture industry's intrinsic ethos. Thus, here I will 
explore and discuss the premise behind such shift and those cultural grounds that may 
have provoked Bond's radical or unusual change of strategy. In order to evaluate this 
process, I intend here to look at the seemingly interdependent relationship between 
culture and industry by way of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of culture, to shed further light 
on Bond's creative strategy. 
4.1. Section I 
4.1.1. Class homogeneity through cultural consumption. 
While the Frankfurt School tell us that current culture acts as reification, and therefore 
"obscures the real class relations between people" (Gartman, 1991: 422), Bourdieu 
suggests that current class relations are put out of sight by a bourgeois "symbolic 
violence" exerted upon the social classes (Ibid.: 424). The French sociologist ignores 
the theory of reification, Gartman explains, because his theory is ahistorical and so he is 
not concerned with the changing relations of production on which capitalist culture is 
based (Ibid.: 421-3). Interestingly, while Adorno's analysis of culture is most often 
abstract and philosophical, Bourdieu's is "painstakingly empirical" (Ibid.: 422). 
Nevertheless, in the task of explaining the specific aesthetics at work in current culture 
they complement each other.6 Thus, Gartman proposes the analysis of both theories as 
a new neo-Marxist theory of culture in relation to the "effects of class on culture in 
historical class struggle" (Ibid.: 423). Here, I will focus my attention on those examples 
by which it is possible to explain this apparent lack of struggle between social classes in 
current post-industrial times.7 This is, in essence, where current culture appears 
dysfunctional when situated in a historicist perspective; this is where current 
dysfunctionality of culture and Bond's nomination of current times as "extreme" meet. 
Measuring his own historicist analysis against Bourdieu's Distinction (1984), Gartman 
gives a good account of how, from the beginning of the industrial revolution, power - or 
as Nicos Poulantzas designates it, "Big Capital" (1974) - has arbitrarily allocated a 
value to each of the three historical distinctive class cultures (that is, to the bourgeoisie, 
the petty bourgeoisie and to the working class "peasants and industrial workers") by 
means of "symbolic violence" (Gartman, 1991: 424). This violence is hidden from the 
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"victims" themselves and therefore accepted (Ibid.: 425). In what ways can this 
violence be hidden? While the Frankfurt School analyses this hidden violence by way 
of their theory of "false consciousness" which obscures classes altogether (O'Connor, 
2000: 13), Bourdieu differentiates his theory from that of the Frankfurt School by 
"establishing a hierarchy of honor [sic] between them" (Gartman, 1991: 426). Thus, the 
true origins of the groups are abstracted by appearing as differences in "individual 
worthiness" (Ibid.). But how is it that these three social and cultural classes allow 
themselves to be violated, as if they were submissive victims? Gartman says that it is so 
by way of what Bourdieu calls habitus, "a practical sense that is not consciously 
formulated or chosen" (Ibid.: 425).8 Curiously, the term habitus brings to mind 
Adorno's term "false consciousness," which, as I explained in Chapter I, is Adorno's 
way of explaining Marx's theory of reification in the setting of a post-industrial 
society.9 But most important, Bourdieu's habitus provides supplementary support to the 
argument that cultural attitudes gradually become precepts in our mind, which I 
previously suggested via Russell in the introduction of this part. Thus, according to the 
French critic, habitus is "the disposition or system of dispositions, resulting from the 
invisible mechanism of alignment and regulation" (D' Arcy, 2005:325). How can this 
be? Because, as John Thompson explains, "habitus is acquired through a gradual 
process of inculcation" resulting in a "durably installed system of dispositions."lo 
Thomson's "habitus" and Russell's "precepts" appear undoubtedly to be two branches 
of the same tree. Habitus is one more contribution to the current debate about whether 
it continues to be feasible to use terms such as working class. I I This is important 
inasmuch as culture is understood to be the by-product of a struggle via symbols: that is, 
in historicist terms, first a struggle against God, then a struggle against the King and 
lately, a struggle against "Big Capital." 
4.1.2. Symbolic violence 
When Bourdieu says that power allocates value to the usual three classes, in my view he 
is adding a very important detail, further supporting the thesis that capital has become -
perhaps for as long as it has been with us - an entity all of its own. Because suggesting 
that power imposes a "value" - or a habitus that becomes a precept by way of 
"symbolic violence" - upon the working class and upon the petty bourgeoisie presents a 
logical course: in societies divided by the degree to which they can access resources, 
those who have more exert power upon those who have less. But when Bourdieu also 
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includes the bourgeoisie as a class to which a value is allocated, would it not mean then 
that "power" imposes a value on itself? Does Bourdieu mean that the bourgeoisie is a 
subjugated class too? In a sense, like Poulantzas, I think he does. 12 
Historically, one function of culture is to find ways of representing or defining real 
power to us, its sUbjects. Sources of power such as nature, a god, a Pope or a king could 
be pinpointed and its subjects could choose whether or not to revolt. But now real 
power is such an abstract and unrepresentable entity as Big Capital to which all- kings, 
popes and presidents - submit. People may demonstrate against anti-social political 
decisions, but they have little to say when these are the product of financial fluctuations. 
Thus, does capitalism give a value to the bourgeoisie itself? Has it used the bourgeoisie 
for its own purposes? George Lukacs describes this feature of capitalism several times: 
"man in capitalist society confronts a reality 'made' by himself [ ... ] which appears to 
him to be a natural phenomenon alien to himself; he is wholly at the mercy of its 
'laws'" (1990: 135). The dominant ideology offers us a precedent which will be further 
elaborated in the next chapter. In order to protect itself, Big Capital sometimes 
sacrifices some of its most direct agents, as it did during Nazi Germany with the Jewish 
bourgeoisie. Anti-Semitism has an origin in the inherent anti-capitalist side of both the 
working class and the petty bourgeoisie. However, as Poulantzas explains, it is through 
the "mystified" anti-capitalist side of the petty bourgeoisie that the image of the "rich 
exploiting Jew" is "adapted" to the needs of Big Capital (Poulantzas, 1974: 254-55). 
"This aspects suits big capital," says Poulantzas, "not only because it shifts the anti-
capitalism of the petty bourgeois masses onto the Jews but also because it corresponds 
to its colonialist and expansionist interests" (Ibid.). For the time being, this is enough 
supporting evidence: the traditional three classes seem to obtain a value from Big 
Capital, regardless of their habitus and/or status. 
Classes then, says Bourdieu, are defined by their levels of exposure to more or less 
necessity: "both economical and cultural" necessity (Gartman, 1991: 424). Within a 
scale of exposure to necessity and thanks to its "high volume of capital", the bourgeoisie 
appears as the top class, which allows them to stand so very distant from the "economic 
necessities of life." (Ibid.). This stimulates in them a "taste for freedom" (Ibid.) which 
corresponds to the bourgeois's preference for all things "removed from mundane 
material functions;" in other words, it stimulates a fondness for artistic and cultural 
objects, "an aesthetic disposition" (lbid.).13 At the bottom of this type of scale, says 
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Bourdieu, stands the working class whose low income makes them ignore tastes for 
freedom, giving preference to functional things and "practicalities of material 
existence": all "natural, unformalized and sensual" things (Ibid.). Finally we have the 
petty bourgeoisie, which is situated in between the other two social classes and which, 
Gartman says, are "distinguished by their taste for pretension" (Ibid.). In other words, 
its features are delineated by its aspirations to bourgeoisie status, but it has neither the 
capital nor the habitus to achieve it. 
Hitherto, Bourdieu's arrangement of class structures seems to fit more within the 
boundaries of late capitalism. In current post-industrial societies, thanks to an economy 
which is increasingly based on the production of services, the class-divisions between 
petty bourgeoisie and working class seem to have endured further misrecognition by 
way of ever more sophisticated "symbols", and therefore a more sophisticated 
"symbolic violence". But Bourdieu's and Poulantzas' labelling of the petty bourgeoisie 
as a class with aspirations to bourgeois status is in my view where all debate on current 
culture ought to concentrate. According to the arguments considered in the next section 
of this chapter, post-industrial class misrecognition is indeed the result of an 
overwhelming ideological domination by the petty bourgeoisie'S non-ideological (see 
below) ideology of "taste for pretension". This does not mean that all classes aspire to a 
bourgeois status: neither the bourgeoisie nor the working class aspire to bourgeois status 
because the former is already there and the latter is too far away from it. Instead, it 
means that in the current social hierarchical ladder, those classes who are competing for 
a better social status always believe they should be one level above their rightful status. 
Thus, by way of their higher wages, and therefore an enhanced access to material and 
non-material cultural goods,14 working class individuals believe they have reached the 
status of middle-class; middle-class the status of the upper middle-class and so on. 
In this sense, and mediated by Max Weber's refined definition of bureaucracy, the 
ideology of the petty bourgeoisie appears also as a highly sophisticated 
bureaucratization of a society in which individuals are made to believe that they are 
chosen on merit and free and able to progress up the hierarchy - a progress that is 
controlled by the top (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 369; 70-2-4). Consequently, in 
such a supposed society the individuals must also believe that if they do not progress up 
the hierarchical ladder, it is not a consequence of their rightful class category but of 
their own individual capabilities: indeed, that his or her low status is the result of his or 
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her own failure as an individual. Curiously, and even if Weber's kind of conceptualized 
society appears to some as hypothetical, it evokes current political slogans. In the 
United States for example, both Republicans and Democrats remind their electorate 
repeatedly that they are part of a society of opportunity in which individuals stand equal 
one to another. Similarly in Great Britain, Liberals, Conservatives and those in the 
Labour Party say the aim is to build a society based on equal opportunity.ls By natural 
deduction, within these slogans an essentially emotive content is also concealed. It is a 
pseudo-referential encoding of the imperative "if you're poor and unemployed, you 
have only yourself to blame." Unsurprisingly, after four years of sociological research 
on "The Emerging British Underclass", Charles Murray came to a very similar 
conclusion "there is a fine line between acknowledging the agency of people in poverty 
and blaming them for that poverty" (Murray, 1999: 12). 
4.1.3. Placing the petty bourgeoisie. 
The order in which I have arranged the three traditional class structures - first the 
bourgeoisie, second the working class and third the petty bourgeoisie - is not accidental 
but intentional. On account of the class analysis of Poulantzas (1974), Bourdieu (1977; 
1977a; 1984; 1985), and Gartman (1991), one could argue that during late capitalism 
the class struggle has been divided between the bourgeoisie and the working class 
solely, while the petty bourgeoisie is situated in a kind of 'reserve' class. A 'reserve' 
class because, as Poulantzas explains "strictly speaking, the petty bourgeoisie has no 
ideology of its own" (Poulantzas, 1974: 252). 
According to Poulantzas, from its very origins, the petty bourgeoisie has granted to 
itself the position of social negotiator between classes (Ibid.: 241). It sees itself "as a 
'neutral' class between the bourgeoisie and the working class, and therefore a pillar of 
the State" (Ibid). Accordingly, the petty bourgeoisie stands on the lookout for the acts 
of the bourgeoisie or the working class - the irreconcilable classes - depending on the 
social state of affairs. And the petty bourgeoisie has hitherto been able to afford such a 
position, I would say, because it has the skills that both the working and bourgeois 
classes need. "The question of control and accounting" said Lenin in his famous 
pamphlet, The State and Revolution (1999) "should not be confused with the question of 
the scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists, and so on. These gentlemen 
are working today in obedience to the wishes of the capitalists and will work even better 
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tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers.,,16 Through Lenin's words 
then, we could assume that the two historically confronting classes, the bourgeoisie and 
the working class, do not endow a specific ideology to the petty bourgeoisie: they both 
merely required it as a supplier, making use of the skills the petty bourgeoisie possess. 
But while Lenin's proletarian dictatorship did employ the petty bourgeoisie's skills by 
way of objective physical violence - that is, under the threat of the Gulag and therefore 
death (Solzhenitsyn, 1974) - the bourgeoisie, as Bourdieu explains, made use of it by 
way of a subjective "symbolic violence": through the vision of a promised land in 
which they could become rich, or at least achieve social equality. Any resistance to 
such a vision, which includes a compulsory participation in the collective race for 
success, means social obliteration: life under a bridge. 
Where does this theory appear tangible today? Advertising those who indeed become 
rich is a sophisticated means by which this modem illusion is given credibility.17 The 
social condition in which an illusion is made credible is termed by Bourdieu the 
"ideology of charisma" (Gartman, 1991: 425). Similar to a collective precept, this is an 
ideology through which people develop the conviction that they are part of a cultural 
individuality based upon personal "worthiness and/or giftedness" (Ibid.). As Bourdieu 
notes it makes "winners appear not as exploiters but as gifted individuals with superior 
cultural endowment" (Ibid.: 423). Nevertheless, Gartman contends, neither the 
Frankfurt School nor Bourdieu seem to make "explicit how and why the reified, class-
obscuring logic of capitalism infiltrates and dominates culture" (Ibid.: 428). And while 
they both agree on the notion that mass culture seems to impose upon the classes the 
illusion of a class homogenization, they defend their theories by suggesting that this is 
attained by different operative systems. On the one hand Bourdieu tell us that identical 
products are consumed by different classes, but they are perceived and appropriated 
differently according to their habitus (1985: 25). On the other, the Frankfurt School 
suggests that cultural products are appropriated similarly, thus levelling any cultural 
differences between classes (Gartman, 1991: 427; 429; Adorno, 1990: 87-9). However, 
a common notion stands out in both theories: a homogenization of classes by way of the 
cultural products they themselves consume. 
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4.2. Section II 
4.2.1. The fields of restricted and large scale productions in culture. 
As Gartman (1991) and Bourdieu (1985) explain, a homogenization of classes by 
current culture means, firstly, that culture acts as a strategic class leveller, where all 
believe they are on a fairly stable social ground, or where one believes that one has 
attained the status one deserves. It also, in tum, generates a legitimization of the current 
class structure. As Bourdieu argues, "culture and economy are intricately related in a 
web of mutual constitution" (Gartman, 1991: 421). 
By way of some specific empirical arguments, Bourdieu and Gartman bring to light 
some of the evidence needed to reveal on the one hand, objective differences in current 
class structures, and on the other, the way in which those differences are subjectively 
obscured. They do so by categorizing culture into two blocks or fields: one is the field 
of "non material culture" and the other the field of "material culture" (Ibid.: 429). 
Depending on whether "symbolic or economic considerations come first," Bourdieu 
terms the first as "the field of restricted production" (FRP) and the second "the field of 
large-scale cultural production" (FLP) (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). Included within the field of 
"non material culture" (hereafter FRP) are things like visual art, music, literature and so 
on; and "material culture" (hereafter the FLP) includes cultural products like food, 
clothing and furniture. Up to this point, the differences between the two cultural fields 
are rather plain. But in my view, when Gartman criticises Bourdieu, he overlooks an 
important point Bourdieu makes: that while producers of the FLP do not make any 
secret of the fact that their fundamental purpose is profit, the FRP's producers must at 
least pretend to be free from "external demands" (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). In addition, a 
clear differentiation between mass or popular culture and high art or elitist art is not an 
uncomplicated affair. For example, in the field of FLP we include cars and furniture, 
but we must be cautious because, by way of Bourdieu's definitions, we can also include 
in it certain elements of music, visual art and literature. 
Andy Warhol's Pop Art is a case in point. Through "institutions of consecration" (Ibid.) 
like criticism and the educational system, we can discern that there are successful means 
of transforming rightful FLP products like Warhol's Campbell's "Tin Soup" into 
rightful FRP symbolic goods. Also, in contrast with the FRP, the FLP products are 
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rather short-lived and "destined for consumers who are [ ... ] non producers and non 
competitors" (Ibid.). While the analysis of the FRP exposes the social legitimization of 
the manifested class differences and the inequalities these differences entail, that of the 
FLP explains in which ways the real situation of the subjugated classes is hidden from 
view, acting upon the masses as a hypnotising mechanism of make-believe. While the 
FRP legitimates current class structure, the FLP helps to maintain people at bay from 
disturbing that very class structure which is legitimised by the FRP. To expand upon 
this I will first commence an examination of first the social effects of the FLP cultural 
products, primarily via Gartman. 
To begin with I ought to indicate here that Gartman is offering a theory located between 
the Frankfurt School's critical theory and Bourdieu's social theory. Because for him 
both have a weakness: "while Bourdieu postulates the pursuit of freedom to be a 
structurally conditioned taste characteristic of the dominant class alone,18 critical theory 
holds that the praxis of all people is underwritten by a basic desire for freedom" 
(Gartman, 1991: 440). In other words, for Bourdieu, current culture reproduces class 
structure and therefore would not aim at a transformation of society (this is highly 
relevant in relation to Bond's contention that current society is an "extreme" form of 
society), while critical theory sustains that culture may transform society. As a 
supplementary theory, Gartman adds a "Lukacsian" theory based on the "historical 
development of class-obscuring" (Gartman, 1991: 442). Now, although Gartman could 
support the efficacy of this 'class-struggle' theory of culture with innumerable models 
of FLP, as an American, he chooses to do it with what I think is its most universal 
representative: the automobile. 
4.2.2. Hand-crafting v. Assembly line. 
As Gartman notes, the earliest cars were very expensive. They were "handcrafted" in 
very limited numbers by "highly skilled workers and consumed almost exclusively by 
the high bourgeoisie. They were part of an exclusive high culture of conspicuous 
consumption and leisure constructed by the bourgeoisie during the late 19th and early 
20th centuries to legitimate its increasingly visible authority in industry and state in the 
face of working-class challenges" (Gartman, 1991: 442). Cars then were not just a 
means of transport but a symbol of power which was reflected by way of their design 
and their inherent aesthetics: unhurriedly assembled by highly skilled workers without 
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any pressure from market and management (Ibid.: 443). But during the 1910s large-
scale commercial gain captivated the imagination of people like Henry Ford. This 
meant an acceleration of production which the skilled workers tried to oppose. Ford's 
response to this resistance became the norm throughout the industrialized world: the 
creation of the assembly-line. The assembly-line did not only mean the production of a 
"Ford T" every three minutes,19 it also meant the substitution of skilled workers with 
''unskilled, divided, and mechanized labor [sic]" (ibid), which itself affected the 
vehicle's aesthetics. "Closely fitted, curving forms" were replaced, says Gartman "with 
the loosely jointed, harshly rectilinear shapes adapted to mass production" (Gartman, 
1991: 443). Hence, the then inherent aesthetics of the cars continued to expose the giant 
gap between the wealthy and the workers: alongside the Ford's model T, which 
mirrored the true status of the owner, the wealthy were driving their expensive 
handcrafted vehicles. "These mass-produced cars [i.e. the Ford T]" says Gartman 
"symbolized the degraded class position of the lower classes" (Gartman, 1991: 443.). It 
is only up to this point, Gartman argues, that Bourdieu's theory of "class-symbolizing" 
applies within the context of FLP, for cars marked class belonging and therefore class 
"jealousies" and "emulation" (ibid.). For the short period that cars were just a form of 
transport, "the visible links of mass-produced vehicles to the alienated labor [sic] 
process were not socially problematic" (ibid.). But when cars became the cornerstone 
of the newly erected consumerism which "provided insulation [ ... ] from the ills of the 
work place," the aesthetics mirrored by cars "had to be severed" (ibid.). 
How did Big Capital sever those aesthetics which were reminding workers of their own 
degraded lives? Firstly, as a consequence of the workers' counteroffensives against the 
new "degraded process of mass production" (ibid.),20 Big Capital granted them that 
which it could afford best: higher wages. Secondly by introducing a more "organic" 
design - that is, with the use of aesthetics itself - to manufacture a product which the 
workers would be able to buy through their newly-won higher wages (Ibid., 443-44). 
By hiring industrial designers, Big Capital removed from their manufactured goods all 
the signs of the assembly-line. With their higher wages, people could buy products that 
concealed rather than revealed their origin, and so the relation between the worker and 
the manufactured good was broken: "the ugliness of factory relations" becomes hidden 
"behind beautiful, organic surfaces" (Ibid.: 444). By 1949, the bodywork of cars was 
transformed into a smoothly integral, all-encompassing shell (ibid.). The very aesthetics 
of handcrafted luxury cars which, until then, had catered exclusively to the elite classes' 
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tastes became available to the masses. Interestingly enough, artificially adopted organic 
forms were not only applied to cars, but to all the rest of manufactured products: to 
radios, stoves, and to all kinds of domestic furniture. By transforming the FLP's 
aesthetic designs, all the symbolic traces of class conflict were buried under an 
illusionistic external shell. As a consequence, Gartman suggests, today "there are no 
'working-class' cars, washing machines, video recorders, or even, with some exceptions 
concentrated on the young, styles of dress. In an urban department store or a suburban 
shopping mall, it is hard to know if a customer has a blue- or a white-collar occupation" 
(Gartman, 1991: 431). 
Nevertheless, obscuring class relations by way of aesthetic design does not mean that all 
cars were alike. As Gartman explains, people expected products to appeal to their 
individuality (Gartman, 1991: 431); an individuality that was indeed repressed in the 
environment of the assembly-line. As much as it was during the 1940s and 1950s, 
today all kinds of automobile styles are widely available in the market. These different 
car types are catalogued as 'product hierarchies'; in other words, they are "differentiated 
by their price" (ibid.). Their differences are determined by superficial embellishments 
and technological devices, but all have their origin in the mass-produced assembly-line. 
As a result, cheap cars look externally like 'expensive' cars, differing from their 
expensive counterparts by specific technological additions, which are not noticed at first 
glance. Furthermore, graded models do not indicate distinctive "class tastes or real class 
differences in power but to mere differences in income" (ibid.). It is as if the FLP itself, 
by way of its own strategic aesthetics, could reconstruct the workers/consumers' 
perception of society by making credible the slogan "this is the land of the free", while 
shattering any possible questioning of their own real social conditions. 
4.2.3. The Magnet Theory 
The repercussions of this "symbolic violence" exerted upon the classes by the aesthetics 
of FLP has found new sophisticated highs in current culture. In my view, FLP's 
aesthetics seems to have surpassed the boundaries of its own traditional areas of 
influence, progressively engulfing not only many of those considered as FRP but 
beyond. Its reach now extends not only to all kind of symbolic goods (artworks) but it 
can also be recognized in areas like politics and economics. The way in which, for 
example, politicians appear in the media wearing 'casual' clothing, while sipping from a 
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mug of tea, has become all too familiar. The strategy is very transparent: by adopting 
the appearance of the 'common bloke' he or she becomes 'one of us'. This is not the 
prerogative of the politician; the top bourgeoisie is seen using it too. 
Another important FLP cultural product brought into the ideological aesthetics of class 
homogenization and disguise are denim jeans. These hard-wearing trousers intended in 
origin as the labourers' outfit, have been progressively appropriated as the preferred 
'casual' look of the top classes. The social effect is similar to that of cars but inversely 
vectorial: while FLP like cars give to the lower classes an illusional push towards the 
top of the social ladder, the top classes adopting working class' utilities (by wearing 
FLP like jeans) allow the lower classes to pull them down towards their own lower 
status, by reasoning "look, he/she is one of us, only successful." Again, like all FLP's 
goods, jeans themselves are graded accordingly and testify not to differences in power 
but to differences in income. As Gartman explains by way of Bourdieu and the 
Frankfurt School conjunctively (Gartman, 1991: 434), this puts in evidence a 
symptomatic social confusion of class: "Naked acts of class interest are clothed with the 
mantle of the selfless pursuit of commonly recognized symbolic goods, making winners 
appear not as exploiters but as gifted individuals with superior cultural endowment" 
(Ibid.: 423). 
By classifying the relation between FLP's cultural products and the habitus it generates 
upon the social classes, an additional social theory could be constructed and applied 
accordingly: what I would call 'the magnet theory'. This would-be theory effectively 
cross-examines current political and cultural attitudes and tendencies. Take, for 
instance, two of the key factors that are continuously under debate in current Western 
societies: one, that all major political parties seem to be positioned in the centre of 
politics, proposing very similar ideas; the other is the counterpart of the former: that 
politicians declare themselves bewildered by the political apathy of the public, and the 
resultant dwindling turnout for general elections. Most critics suggest that this general 
political apathy is a direct consequence of the parties' consensual similitude of ideas.21 
In contrast, a "magnet theory" based on the relationship between classes and the FLP's 
modes of production and consumption would present a different analysis: that this 
apathetic and politically centralized relationship between political parties and the 
electorate is the consequence of a petty bourgeoisification of society. This contemporary 
society is one that aspires to be politically neutral. "The petty bourgeoisie" says 
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Poulantzas "identifies [his italics] itself with the State, whose neutrality it supposes to 
be akin to its own, since it sees itself as a 'neutral' class between the bourgeoisie and 
the working class, and therefore a pillar of the State - 'its' State. It aspires to be the 
'arbitrator' of society, because, as Marx says, it would like the whole of society to 
become petty-bourgeois." (Poulantzas, 1974: 241). 
Could it be that our times have fulfilled Marx's prediction of a petty-bourgeois strategy 
towards a total petty-bourgeoisification of society? Could it be that Marx predicted this 
current 'centralization' of political parties; this decline in social trade-unionism; orland 
the progressive dismissiveness of society at large - including the arts and its 
practitioners - for utopian propositions?22 But a "neutralization" of society by way of a 
social petty bourgeoisification does not mean that the parts involved - i.e. all classes 
and subclasses - are indifferent to all ideas or ideologies. In Poulantzas's tenns it means 
the neutralization of any conflict that impedes or might impede capital growth, and 
therefore, that all considerations outside it - included the human considerations - are 
secondary. Chapter V will, hopefully, clarify further this notion. 
4.2.4. N eo-liberalism and Big Capital. 
One could argue that a petty bourgeoisification of society, as an alternative to the 
traditional class structure, cannot be such a bad thing. The natural resolution of 
society's hierarchies is the abolition of the proletariat class altogether - and therefore 
the human exploitation inbuilt into it. Indeed, it will be interesting to see whether such 
a social system could finally offer the utopian perspective of the much sought-for 
elimination of alienated labour?3 Unfortunately, even if we apply divergent terrains of 
criticism like neo-positivism on the one hand, andlor Marxist economism and 
historicism on the other, it will become clear that this current social petty 
bourgeoisification is detennined, not by the collective pursuit of any utopian society 
made of free and equal individuals, but by the needs and wishes of Big Capital. Indeed, 
as Bourdieu explains, replacing social petty bourgeoisification with neoliberalism, "it 
ratifies the spontaneous philosophy of the people who run large multinationals and of 
the agents of high finance" (Bourdieu, 1998: 126). 
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Bourdieu's remarks on "the libertarian connotations" of current neoliberalism here are 
most significant. They fit flawlessly with Poulantzas' definitions of the petty 
bourgeoisie. On the one hand, Bourdieu observes that the libertarian connotations of 
current neoliberalism "give the appearance of a message of freedom and liberation to a 
conservative ideology which thinks of itself opposed to all ideology" (Ibid.); on the 
other, Poulantzas explains how the petty bourgeoisie's adopted ideology has the non-
ideological purpose of "neutrality" (Poulantzas, 1974: 241). Thus, a progressive social 
petty bourgeoisification would not lead to class structure being abolished, it would 
simply transform it into "contradictory class locations" (Bilton et aI., 1981: 64): that is, 
where employees increasingly appear both as the agents of capitalism and workers who 
are exploited to some degree all the same. 
Indeed, if there has been a time in which petty bourgeois individuals were, at the 
economic level, generally considered small-scale producers and/or owners of material 
goods, and by which their class boundaries had clear definitions, in current post-
industrial society this status has been broadened to such an extent that large sections of 
the working class have been progressively incorporated within the petty bourgeoisie's 
ideology. According to Martin Camoy and Manuel Castells, this is the result of a global 
capitalist consensus whose process was put into motion by Reagan and Thatcher and 
successfully enhanced by the Clinton Administration during the 1990s (2001: 14-15). 
By applying a neo-positivist perspective, we could examine British official statistics and 
see that in the last five years alone, there has been a phenomenal and constant growth of 
skilled individuals launching their own business or becoming freelancers. By 
definition, these workers are moving into the petty bourgeoisie, or at least, 'would-be' 
petty bourgeoisie. But the same statistics tells us that in 2003, while the number of self-
employed increased by 8.9 per cent, the increase in employees was a mere 0.1 per 
cent.24 "Workers," observe Camoy and Castells "are gradually being defined socially 
less by a particular long-term job they hold than by the knowledge they have acquired 
by studying and working. This knowledge 'portfolio'[their commas] allows them to 
move across firms and even across types of work, as jobs get redefined" (2001: 16). 
For neo-positivists like Ralph Miliband (1970), without "a certain sensitivity towards 
class struggle" (Poulantzas, 1976:68), this development could mean many things, or 
nothing at all, for each case needs to be studied in its precise context, ad infinitum. For 
Marxists like Poulantzas (1978; 1976; 1974; 1973) it would not mean an individual and 
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freely-taken shift from being an employee to being self-employed, but a class 
submission to the demands of Big Capital's continuous expansion, which is hidden by 
the combined mechanics ofFLP and FRP (Bourdieu, 1985: 13-44). However, by way of 
their ad infinitum empirical observations, even neo-positivists would have to come to 
terms with the fact that an upsurge of self-employment might be caused by the 
increasing lack of adequate job offers, as the 0.1 per cent might suggest. 
Language too shows signs of a progressive 'petty bourgeoisification' of society. Words 
like "globalization," "flexibility" and "deregulation" encapsulate also a neutralizing 
trend.25 This petty bourgeoisification of society is making few new winners but 
generating a lot of losers, with much consequent human suffering. It does not seem to 
reflect a society that is on route towards class abolition, but a society in which 
individuals are effectively compelled to compete fiercely against each other. The 
competition is fierce because, as we have seen, what they have to compete for are tiny 
leftovers of the bourgeois. Thus, a "neutralization" of any struggle between classes by 
way of a petty bourgeoisification of society seems to be being achieved by an 
uninterrupted interchange between the dominant ideology and culture. The dominant 
ideology will need then to be defined more closely, for there are now new forms of class 
structure which, in our current cultural setting, are effectively creating a great amount of 
confusion.28 
In this rethinking of aesthetics, we are beginning to address class obfuscation by way of 
examining FLP's cultural goods, and in doing so, we also need to be able to address the 
ways in which the factual class divisions are effectively legitimized. According to 
Bourdieu, Gartman and in great measure, the Frankfurt School, this class legitimization 
is exerted by the acquisition, practice, and application of the FRP (The Field of 
Restricted Production) cultural commodities (as I said above, non-material culture like 
visual art, music, literature and so on) and in great measure, education itself. I will 
explore these theories and their implications further. 
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4.3. Section III 
4.3.1. Industrial boundaries - intellectual responsibility 
To recap, through his analysis of both Bourdieu and the Frankfurt School, Gartman tells 
us that class structures and their differences are effectively blurred not just by way of 
the mass consumption of manufactured FLP cultural goods, but by the intrinsic ideology 
of traditional capitalism which, by a process of progressive self-renovation through its 
aesthetics, enforces itself upon the masses. If this social condition was not antagonistic 
enough, especially to those proposing utopian discourses, Bourdieu's analysis shows us 
that real class differences are further legitimized by the configurations at work in the 
FRP of "symbolic goods" (1985), by intellectuals, artists, educators and so on. 
I am aware of the implications involved when arguing that the arts and institutions of 
education legitimise class differences when the accepted wisdom has it that the arts and 
institutions of education are supposed to free people instead. But Bourdieu does not 
expose whether those involved in the practicing of the FRP may indeed experience 
some degree of personal freedom - which they do. Compared with the agents of the 
FLP, the FRP is closed to the external world by its own boundaries; boundaries based 
on the highly sophisticated specialisation of its agents. In addition, the agents of FRP 
"enjoy a high degree of autonomy," because within this field they have the "power to 
develop their own criteria for the production and evaluation of their [own] products" 
(Bourdieu, 1985:l3). By way of learning the languages and codes of the FRP, people 
can consequently gain access to it and advance up the social strata. For example, by 
way of those skills acquired within the FRP as dialectical thinkers, Raymond Williams 
and his former student and posthumous heir, Terry Eagleton, procured for themselves 
positions in the top spheres of the petty bourgeoisie as well as into the hierarchical 
spheres of academic authority, and all from humble working class origins. Having said 
that, and in accordance with Bourdieu's theory of charisma (Gartman, 1991: 425), those 
few examples in which subjects from the lower classes attain higher order status are of 
precious value to the upper and dominant classes' legitimization. By getting to the top 
by way of personal merit, they are simultaneously legitimizing not only class 
differences but the status of the highest classes; the reasoning being "only the best are at 
the top". That subjects formerly located within the masses of the lower end can obtain a 
hierarchical status - something that happens sporadically - must, at least, create a state 
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of confusion among the vast remaining masses, who eventually capitulate to the idea "I 
am where I am because it is what I deserve".29 
4.3.2. Administering the FRP. 
However, the FRP is only autonomous up to a point, because a product attains a higher 
cultural recognition, says Bourdieu, by a process dominated by "agents and institutions 
of consecration" like criticism and the "educational system" (Ibid.). Bourdieu 
emphasises that because of the FRP's dependency on institutions of consecration, its 
very members are able to bestow a symbolic legitimacy by way of competing among 
themselves (Ibid.: 23-27). This is very important: legitimization is acquired by way of 
violent symbols inherent in the attainment of academic authority, which corresponds to 
public prestige through the accumulation of published essays, specialized articles and 
books, and so on. Consequently, the whole process by which a symbolic good gains 
recognition and hierarchical status from the FRP becomes a vicious circle: the agents of 
consecration not only need to ensure the reproduction of a new generation of 
consecrating agents, but also the reproduction of a specific type of consumer who would 
have to obtain the "correct" skills - that is, pre-determined specific aesthetics, pre-
determined specific philosophy, pre-determined specific history of art, and so on - in 
order to successfully appropriate those legitimized symbolic goods. Needless to say, 
such consumers would have to procure such skills by way of educational institutions. 
Thus, the consecratory degrees or levels of educational institutions are proportional 
first, to the number of their operational agents of consecration (for example, professors 
and/or 'artists in residence'), secondly to financial agencies, be they private or public, 
and thirdly and most importantly, a long-established tradition of "excellence.,,3o To 
make matters worse, these "scholastic codifications" of the rules of the FRP, says 
Bourdieu, "are inseparable from the project of building a kind of intellectual papacy, 
replete with its international corps of vicars, regularly visited or gathered together in 
concilium" (Bourdieu, 1985: 42). 
What follows from this is a succession of uncomfortable questions which cannot be 
avoided. To what extent pursuing an academic speciality within the FRP means 
supporting and safeguarding the legitimisation of social class differences? To what 
extent are the FRP and its agents a medium for its prolongation? In the field of theatre 
studies for instance, there are close circles of "vicars" for each "papacy" of distinction: 
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- from Brecht to Pinter, from Beckett to Hare. And of course, one cannot ignore 
Edward Bond in this respect, with this thesis as a case in point. Bond has specialists on 
Bond, as Pinter has specialists on Pinter. They and their respective cognoscenti both 
compete for a very limited market of specialised consumers who are themselves 
producers or would-be producers of goods of restricted production - that is, in this case, 
students, producers and educators of drama, theatre, and/or performance. Bourdieu's 
use of the word "vicars" rather than scholars might have pejorative connotations for 
some but it defines conflicts between sections of the upper classes of the petty 
bourgeoisie; a conflict which, as Bourdieu explains (1985), eventually legitimizes class 
distinctions itself. 
Consequently, how does the FRP act as part and parcel of what Bond suggests is the 
current "extreme" situation? Firstly, both "vicars" and "popes" have need of each other 
in order to survive in the culture industry'S market of value and exchange, and this need 
obliges them to exhibit exclusive forms of language and communication. As Bourdieu 
puts it: 
[ ... ] a critic may find himself predisposed in favour of all kinds of avant-garde 
[which is a ciphered revelation] [ ... ]; accordingly he may act as an initiate 
communicating the deciphered revelation back to the artist from whom he 
received it. The artist, in return, confirms the critic in his vocation, that of 
privileged interpreter, by confirming the accuracy of his decipherment 
(Bourdieu, 1985:37). 
4.3.3. The battle for and against cultural status. 
Interestingly enough, Edward Bond is himself one of those exceptional cases with 
working class origins who subsequently joins the top spheres of the FRP. Bond himself 
acknowledges this contradictory position,31 yet he also seems to be located, we may say, 
in a very particular area of influence without parallel to any other dramatist or 
playwright. As Shakespeare's Polonius puts it: "neither a borrower, nor a lender.,,32 
Although Bond himself cannot circumvent his position as producer of goods within the 
FRP, he is nevertheless in a totally amorphous location when measured against 
Bourdieu's theory. Whilst Bond cannot avoid the formation of "vicars" or groups of 
specialists which are economically and culturally gathered around his work and persona, 
he does not make their ride trouble-free.33 
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Since he began in the 1960s, right up to present day, the dramatist has never stopped 
reassessing his own ideas and body of work (Coult, 1977; Hay & Roberts, 1980; 
Mangan, 1998; Spencer, 1992; Stuart, 1996 and 2000). Consequently, Bond's 
specialists find themselves at pains wherever they attempt to determine which subfield 
of theatre the dramatist should be located. Indeed, Bond's body of work most probably 
stands alone, not in a subfield, but defining its own new field outside the realm of 
theatre studies. In addition, the dramatist is outside the boundaries, protocols and 
internal laws specified by Bourdieu to which the theatre industry is also subordinated: 
that is, in Bond's case, the relationship between author and critic, author and media, 
author and institutions of consecration, author and publisher and agent and so on, do not 
fit within the categories and/or orders specified by Bourdieu. The appendix included 
here and Bond's personal letters to me demonstrate that Bond is perfectly aware of his 
own enduring paradox as a hierarchical agent of the FRP. As he tells me "[ ... ] by 
writing and staging plays I participate in the prevailing culture [ ... ]. This is true - but 
there are tensions and developments within a culture and you can try to be part of 
these.,,34 By being located in such a singular ethical ground, that is, being "neither a 
borrower, nor a lender," Bond is effectively engaged in a battle against his own cultural 
status because, as he sustains, success in our "extreme" situation only can come about 
by way of corrupting and corrupted channels. If Bond were to be cooperative and 
reasonable with agents and institutions of consecration he would have to abandon both 
himself and drama: "For a loan oft loses both itself and friend.,,35 
Nevertheless, the evaluation of Bourdieu's "The Market of Symbolic Goods" (1985) 
has one primary purpose: to assess whether it is justified to argue that our current social 
system is "extreme," as Edward Bond tirelessly insists it is. So far only a few like Bond 
or Bourdieu think so: most critics describe by way of Marxist economics and 
historicism a truly grim world on one hand, but on the other, they manage, by way of 
dialectics and critical theory, to synchronize through culture hopeful postulations for a 
better world. In fact, our world would not be "extreme" as such if we could sight a 
realistic solution on the horizon of current culture. Actually, even those supporting 
Bourdieu's sociology of art like Gartman does, do it with reservations because they 
think of culture as "an intervention in class struggle that may either reproduce or 
revolutionize [my italics] existing class structures" (Gartman, 1991: 445). Yet, like 
Adorno or Jameson, most thinkers subscribe to the idea that "all culture is ideological" 
(O'Connor, 2000: 17; Jameson, 2004: 44). Therefore, culture may also revolutionize 
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existing class structures as Gartman hopefully proposes, but none would be able to 
assure us that such revolution of classes would not be a restoration of the Gulag; the risk 
seems to be too high. While one says that culture could revolutionize existing class 
structures, one is simultaneously suggesting that culture could restructure those classes. 
Who can assure us that a new restructuring of classes would not become the old 
unresolved case of the oppressed turning oppressor?36 
It is true that such theoretical postures in search of a real democratic society made 
Adorno a proper scapegoat of his time: "too utopian for the right, too bleak for the left" 
(Wohlfarth, 1979: 982). However, as I have discussed, Adorno's theory is not without 
foundation. It is in his work that we see the convergence of Marx and Nietzsche, as 
explored in the second chapter, because indeed we need a revolution, but a revolution 
fulfilled in its totality - that is, not only outwardly but inwardly; not only social but 
mental as well. This would not only mean a rise above the reifying ideology of cultural 
capitalism, as Marx hoped for, but a rise above all ideologies.37 Since a utopian project 
would have to work towards the abolition of class differences and private property, a 
successful revolution towards utopia would also have to take into account Nietzsche's 
evaluation on human ressentiment jointly, or seriously risk a Stalinist restoration or 
even an analogous Pol Pot's Cambodia (Duttmann, 1991; Reginster, 1997). In other 
words, it would not be good enough to abolish the class system without universally 
abolishing human ressentiment once and for all. When Engels remarked that "there 
could be no greater historical tragedy for the working class than to seize power when it 
is not ready for it" (Solzhenitsyn, 1974: 194), he was concerned with the very same 
problem I am attempting to uncover here. And as Reginster explains via Nietzsche, the 
prospect of overcoming human ressentiment will involve extraordinary human 
conditions. For instance, even the starting point would have to include a universal 
understanding of the conditions by which human beings devise the value judgments 
good and evil; and subsequently the question "what value do we [ourselves] possess?" 
(Reginster, 1997: 281). It does not seem controversial then to suggest that in this 
capitalist world we live the "extreme": a place in which hope for a solution seems to be 
hoping for the impossible (Bond, see appendix). 
Bond, through his own philosophy of drama, is nevertheless 'optimistic'. He says that 
though he does not see a solution; at least he sees the problem (appendix: 18). But as 
this research can attest, even to discern the problem is proving to be a giant quest. 
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Because the rest of us seem to suffer from a series of blinding symptoms: reification, 
false consciousness, unrecognition of our own class location, ressentiment, and so on. 
So what will the ultimate frontier of criticism be? In my view, it would be the very field 
in which ideas compete against each other - the field described by Bourdieu as "The 
Field of Restricted Production of Symbolic Goods" (1985) - the FRP. 
Because of his "ahistorical structuralism,,,38 says Gartman (1991: 421), Bourdieu's 
analysis only partially shows current class unrecognition. In this analysis, Gartman 
seems to overlook Bourdieu's paper "The Market of Symbolic Goods" (1985) in which, 
step by step, the French sociologist investigates the phenomenon of a rather deceptive 
historical "autonomization" (Ibid.: 14) of artists and intellectuals since the Middle Ages. 
In "The Market", Bourdieu's structural analysis permits an appreciation of the 
fundamental structures of the FRP by isolating the historical elements that conform to it. 
This is historical structuralism in its most precise meaning. For the French sociologist, 
the way we are is subjected to existing class-related material conditions. Consequently, 
says Bourdieu, current culture "inclines working people to reduce practices to the reality 
of their function, to do what they do, and be what they are [ ... ] [it is] essential hypocrisy 
[ ... ] so that what people do, they do as if they were not doing it" (Bourdieu, 1984: 200). 
One further depiction of current society as an extreme condition is found in Bourdieu's 
views on the progressive expansion of current "neoliberalism": 
[a] philosophy [that] knows and recognizes no purpose but the ever-increasing 
creation of wealth and, more secretly, its concentration in the hands of a small 
privileged minority; and therefore leads to a combat by every means [his italics], 
including the destruction of the environment and human sacrifice, against any 
obstacle to the maximization of profit (Bourdieu, 1998: 126). 
Such an illustration of current culture - that is, a culture totally subjected by capitalism 
- would not seem to offer a reliable project towards class abolition. In contrast with 
Bourdieu's motionless class-structure, Marxist critical thinkers like Marcuse estimate 
that current cultural praxis reproduces unequal class structure but it may also transform 
society because of people's inherent desire for freedom (Marcuse, 1992). Gartman 
agrees with Marcuse. What interests us here is that, while these two theoretical 
discourses are different in essence, they might coexist within Bond's philosophy of 
drama. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, if we agree that a society can be 
defined as "extreme" when its "only [my italics] purpose is the ever-increasing creation 
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of wealth and, more secretly, its concentration in the hands of a small privileged 
minority" then Bond and Bourdieu assess our society in the same manner. For Bond 
capitalism is an extreme social and ideological system, where humanity is left behind 
the needs of market expansion (appendix: 26; 34). Secondly, if critical theorists like 
Marcuse contend that, by way of culture, there is at least some hope, so does Bond. The 
difference between them both rests on the fact that while Marcuse sees a gap towards 
freedom in the praxis of culture itself, Bond sees it only in Drama not in culture as such 
(appendix: 34). 
Another question altogether is whether we should start understanding culture as a 
collection of insulated, unrelated, and even conflicting groups of cultural forms. As I 
will further discuss, there are grounds enough to suggest that current culture adopts the 
appearance of being formed by distinctive cultural fields while in reality this is not the 
case. It is by way of the culture industry'S ideology, that culture seems a multi-structural 
collection of contrasting fields or disciplines, competing against each other by claiming 
that their cultural product has special and unique qualities; but their coherent and 
unified need for recognition from and by the "above" (O'Connor, 2000: 236-37) betrays 
them all. As one would expect, the "above" connotes Poulantzas' Big Capital (1974), 
Horkheimer's and Adorno's bourgeoisie (1979), or Bourdieu's institutions of 
consecration (1985). Here again, Bond reveals himself as an atypical agent of the FRP: 
his claim to uniqueness is all too obvious; but his disdain towards any recognition from 
the above is also too very clear.39 
Bond's uniqueness is, nevertheless, not a pioneering approach. As Jan Kott explains, 
that ancient Athens contained the seeds of its own destruction is a notion in-built in the 
plays of Sophocles and/or Euripides: "tragedy recalls the past and foretells the future" 
(Kott, 1974: 247). Even through a quick inspection of the works of Bond, one could 
easily conclude that one of his main motivations for writing comes from a real fear that 
current bourgeois civilization contains the seeds of its own destruction. With this I am 
not referring to the classic Marxist conviction that capitalism will eventually collapse by 
its own weight, giving way to a socialist democracy as if following the predictions of 
historical natural rhythms as Benjamin thought or Trotsky hoped. As Bond explains: 
A great weakness of communism is that it has a built-in apology for its own 
mistakes. This is part of the theory of alienation. In a way you could call the 
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theory of alienation the aesthetic side of Marxism and the economic theory the 
other side. But it isn't an option or escapist form of alienation, of course. It is 
integrated into the experience of living under capitalism, or living under any 
political form which denies freedom of choice. ( ... ) The passionate state of 
alienation is itself functionally dangerous because it is the condition of miserable 
acquiescence that enables capitalism to quietly flourish, or rather proliferate. The 
2 potential characteristics are capitalism's answer to communism. They are very 
effective answers: they are fascism and madness. Classical Marxism states that 
capitalism is pregnant with its own destruction and that it must give birth to 
communism. Had I lived in the 19th century, I would have believed this. But it 
is clear that man didn't foresee the false trend and adaptability of capitalism -
along with its ability to adapt workers to its needs. [ ... ] Now as capitalism is 
always pregnant with fascism and madness and as it is totally armed - by 
technology - communism does not become inevitable (Stuart, 2000: 134-35). 
This was a letter dated on the 13 January 1972. I think that the progress of globalisation 
is making Bond's thoughtful reflection ring truer by the day. 
While this is the ultimate synthesis of Marxist criticism, such a visionary approach 
should not be censured for appearing too ideologically charged, for it has not been the 
only pronouncement of those who have had to endure the last two centuries of 
capitalism. During their incipient democracy, ancient Greeks like Sophocles or 
Euripides manifested this very apocalyptic fear in their plays. In Sophocles' Oedipus the 
King for example, Oedipus wants to know at any cost; Jocasta seems to know but 
pretends not to; and she certainly does not want Oedipus to know.40 Both are driven to 
the same abyss. But they themselves were the source of the plague: they possessed 
within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. As Bond told me punctiliously, 
the great Greek dramatists envisioned self-destruction in their societies because they 
longed for democracy themselves, while their societies were not truly democratic (letter 
to author: 02.10.04). 
So we should not think that envisaging self-destruction in-the-making is an exclusive 
quality of modem Marxist thinkers and poets. If self-destruction is ingrained in the 
structures of our capitalist era, it is not without precedent. In a Nietzschean way, such 
visionary fears have more to do with the human struggle for power: be it struggle as 
competing for authority (that is, politics); or struggle for an accumulation of capital 
(that is economics); or struggle as competing for cultural legitimacy (that is, artistic 
production). In my view, it is precisely through the violence inherent in any form of 
struggle that different and unconnected fields tum out to be overlapping. 
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But why should the FRP - that is, the field where cultural producers struggle for 
cultural legitimacy - be of special interest, above other fields and other social classes? 
While the distinctive characteristic of current politics and economics is the organization 
and the preservation of existing social systems, only the advance skills of those actively 
involved in the FRP offer the means to erect the so sought impossible socialist utopian 
sign for all of us; the sign towards a human world where the MarxlNietzsche 
convergency is finally made universal; towards a free and equal man without 
ressentiment.41 But as Bourdieu explains, the FRP has serious problems of its own. It 
suffers from the same hierarchical relations underlying our social classes (1985: 37). If 
the signpost to socialist utopia appears 'impossible', it is because the only operators that 
could erect such a sign - that is, the advanced agents of the FRP - have serious 
problems of their own. 
4.3.4. The legitimization of class differences 
As we have said, contrasting with the Frankfurt School's theory of culture by which 
class differences are concealed by the capitalist ideology, Bourdieu manta ins that class 
legitimization is more a matter of hierarchical status. This, he says, is fed by a culture 
of personal worthiness - as I said above, a kind of "ideology of charisma" (Gartman, 
1991: 425). And this personal worthiness, says Bourdieu, is acquired by the 
accumulation of capital wealth in the fonn of cash and properties and/or cultural wealth 
in the fonn of "symbolic goods" (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). As one might expect, there are 
functional differences among all the symbolic goods we currently enjoy: functions 
which are pertinent both to the FLP and to the FRP. But Bourdieu makes an additional 
subdivision to the FRP by grouping it into two major types. One is made up of that 
which is produced for "non-producers of symbolic goods - 'the public at large' 
[Bourdieu's inverted commas]" (Ibid.: 17), including most popular art, music, movies, 
some types of novels and theatre. These are goods which, while they are produced by 
agents of the FRP, aim to be part of the FLP, stimulated primarily by a crude yearning 
for profit. Included in Bourdieu's second FRP type are those produced for a restricted 
number of clients who are "producers of symbolic goods themselves" (Ibid.). 
The first group of products are made widely available through commercial and mass 
media channels and do not need to take into account their clients' levels of education. 
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However, as Gartman and Bourdieu explain, "popular" should be treated with due care. 
For example, by way of empirical data, Gartman disputes Bourdieu's suggestion that 
there are "no rigid boundaries between popular culture and high culture" (Gartman, 
1991: 430). But in my view, Bourdieu acknowledges this when he supports the idea 
that, actually, high culture - that is the FRP - suffers the same kind of pressure as that 
exerted upon the popular by the market of consumption through "publishers, theatre 
managers, art-dealers" and the rest (Bourdieu, 1985: 16). Thus, if for Gartman some of 
the agents of the FLP acquire a FRP status and their symbolic goods are consumed by 
all classes,42 for Bourdieu the FRP suffers from the same ideological pressures and 
therefore some of their products seem to capitulate to the FLP's "lower" commercial 
pressures of market economy. Furthermore, in the FLP there are also interesting cases 
of "cultural relativism" (Bourdieu, 1985: 31) to which Gartman seems to be oblivious 
but Bourdieu is not. He takes note of those whose methods of production and cultural 
goods have the qualities of "middle-brow" cultural producers, whose ambitions are to 
take hold of the widest possible public,43 and yet are conferred the hierarchical status of 
high art by various institutions of consecration. 
Although most products within the FLP operate like proper material cultural goods (like 
cars, trousers, and so on) sometimes, a popular symbolic good operates differently and 
is consumed as if it was of a "higher" order. Consider for example the genre of 
"protest" music through which cultural relativism is accomplished: cases like the Latin 
American song-writers Atahualpa Yupanqui (1908-1992),44 or Victor lara (1932-
1973);45 North Americans like Bob Dylan; or as Bourdieu puts it, French like 
"Brassens, Jacques Brei and Leo Ferre" (Bourdieu, 1985: 32). They are effectively 
pursuing a contact with the masses, but by way of hierarchical and institutional 
"rehabilitation" by the institutions of consecration (Bourdieu, 1985: 31). They are all 
considered "poets" (Ibid.: 32). In other words, their works are extracted from the 
'mundane' or 'minor' spheres and into the spheres of those symbolic goods which 
reveal "qualities of the first order" (Ibid.). It seems irrelevant whether a given popular 
symbolic good is sold by the hundreds or by the millions, or whether its identity is 
ideological like Yupanqui and lara or "neutral" (that is, unreservedly petty bourgeois) 
like Brassens and BreI. A higher hierarchical cultural status will be obtained only when 
the agents and institutions of consecration have given them the proper authorization. 
Indeed, Jean-Paul Sartre's remark "There are qualities that we acquire uniquely through 
the judgements of others,'.46 Bourdieu concludes "this is especially so for the quality of 
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a writer, artist or scientist, which is so difficult to define because it exists only in, and 
through, the circular relations of reciprocal recognition among peers" (Bourdieu, 18985: 
19). But more interesting here is Bourdieu' s conclusion that when artists and 
intellectuals are recognized, in reality it is their own "claim to orthodoxy" that is being 
recognized (Ibid.). 
However, Bourdieu's notion on "orthodoxy" needs to be observed within the 
framework of the bourgeois ideology: that means his is an orthodoxy based in the 
traditional bourgeois principles of autonomy, difference and liberty. It is there where a 
producer of symbolic goods lives in a continuous quest for the latest anomy; or at least 
an anomy in appearance. As Russell A. Berman suggests in Nietzschean manner, 
"liberty - 'an invention of the ruling classes' [ ... ] the point however may be that liberty 
is an 'invention', i.e., a fiction which, as such, is counterfactual but which nevertheless 
is asserted by the "ruling classes," in order to continue to rule and thereby to preclude 
oppositional developments" (1989: 12). Bourdieu's conclusion above is most important 
because it reflects on all fields of intellectual and artistic creativity. Indeed, by way of 
his own analysis, Bourdieu is able to postulate that "there is not cultural position-taking 
which cannot be submitted to a double interpretation [his italics]" (Bourdieu, 1985: 40). 
For instance, his investigation also throws light on the very procedures of academic 
research, which cannot be ignored. He explains how the individual quest for a 
legitimized cultural space is also determined by the hierarchical position of each 
discipline in which scholars must have the "sensitivity necessary to sniff out [those] 
movements of the cultural value stock-exchange [sic]" (Bourdieu, 1985: 38-40). But 
over and above this, what the French sociologist is really seeking is to direct our 
attention towards a most hidden and abstract constituent of the FRP: a subtle yet 
connatural "violence." 
However, a stamp of violence within the FRP must be a perfectly logical characteristic 
of the way its agents promote their cultural products. As it is progressively transpiring, 
everything emanates from aesthetics, which, as Eagleton sustains, is coincidentally "a 
bourgeois concept in the most literal sense" (1991: 9). Assuming that the bourgeois 
ideology is strongly embedded in all sectors of our society, the subtle violence of the 
FRP's agents would seem to be the natural by-product of bourgeois aesthetics: that is, 
being fiercely competitive; having a taste for advantage and privilege; and having a 
loyal subscription to individualism or, with science as pretext, to Darwin's "survival of 
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the fittest." Of course, this violence is "subtle" because these aesthetic ingredients must 
also be watered with the ever-unforgivable bourgeois aesthetic manoeuvre per 
excellence: good manners. 
Thus, when cultural legitimacy is at stake, explains Bourdieu, consciously or 
unconsciously, intellectual or artistic preferences must be implemented by way of an 
implicit violence (Bourdieu, 1985: 42). Of course, this is mostly symbolic, but violent 
nonetheless. It is so because, as Bourdieu argues, violence is obedient to the specific 
logic of competition; again, in this case, competition for cultural legitimacy (Ibid.: 24). 
But how is it that this violent "competition" legitimizes class differences when it seems 
to be taking place intramurally - that is, only among those who form part of the FRP? It 
does so, Bourdieu concludes, by way of its own "fundamental norm" based on 
exclusivity (Ibid.: 43). In other words, whilst there are other ways of climbing up the 
social ladder - for example, by means of unlawful crime - a transfer of class, say, from 
working class to petty bourgeois, is seen as legitimate by all when it is via the 
authorization of one of the institutions of consecration. 
For Bourdieu, this is the result of an historical process of "autonomization" (Bourdieu, 
1985: 14-7). Since the middle of the 19th century,47 artists and intellectuals have been 
able to enjoy an "internal principle of change" (Ibid.). To be precise, only artists and 
intellectuals know what their fields are about and therefore only they are able to 
implement internal norms of perfection. As Bourdieu adds, "If a relatively autonomous 
history of art and literature (or of science) exists, it is because the action of 'works upon 
works' [his inverted comas]" (Ibid.). One pertinent example among many here is the 
production of academic theses, in which strategic functions are applied by way of 
quotations, among other things - or, as Bourdieu calls it, employing the means of 
"citatology" (Bourdieu, 1985: 40). We cite others for many reasons, one being to 
display a familiarity with the work at hand, or as Bourdieu notes, "to avoid the 
appearance of plagiarising even ideas conceived independently" (Ibid.:41). But the fact 
is that most theses seem to be "works upon works" which in tum produce more works 
upon works and so on. Thus, following Bourdieu's theory, one could compare the FRP 
with a kind of monstrous entity that grows by feeding on itself. How does this 
monstrous entity legitimize class differences? By the fact, says Bourdieu, that "it 
corresponds to the social reality of the exercise of some power and of the 'recognition' 
[his inverted comas] of this power or of the systems of rules emanating from it" (Ibid.: 
4. Chapter IV 
Culture or industry 
164 
43).48 The case of "Oxbridge" is again called to mind (see below endnote 30). Thus, if 
we had to look at current culture from Bourdieu's analytical perspective, the FRP not 
only legitimizes class differences, it needs class differences in order to preserve and 
justify its own existence. 
One would have also to concede that these are complex discussions which sometimes 
seem to have negative effects on meaning. Bourdieu's boundless criticism on culture as 
a battlefield of violent symbolic goods could be paralleled for example with Adorno's 
postulation that "all culture is barbaric," by which cultural events are defined as subtle 
and complex acts of violence that (willingly or not) support a class system based on 
severe class differences (Adorno, 1990: 73-94). This reveals once again that there are 
more similarities than differences between the Frankfurt School's conceptual critical 
theory and Bourdieu's positivist sociology of culture.49 It seems rather contentious to 
sustain, as Adorno does, that current culture is effectively supporting current class 
systems by way of being itself inextricably "involved in the class struggle for 
dominance" (Adorno, 1990: 81). But here he does not mean that classes are in a 
struggle with each other. On the contrary, Adorno is consistent in his evaluation so far: 
that thanks to its bourgeois aesthetics, class dominance ensues through a bourgeoisified 
culture in which any struggle between classes has faded away from sight. It seems to be 
true that bourgeois culture looks vigorous and dynamic but, like Adorno explains, it is 
thanks to its fundamental elements like "conflict, intrigue and development," while the 
conflict among the social classes has in truth been liquidated (Adorno, 2001: 76_7).50 
"Intrigue" says Adorno, "is the aesthetic cipher for the bourgeois triumph over the 
feudal order, the triumph of calculation and money over the static wealth of land and the 
immediate repression through armed force" (Adorno, 2001: 76). It is the same intrigue 
used by bankers and tycoons that gave the fascists into the reins of power in the 1930s.51 
Thus, not only via Bourdieu but also via Adorno it is possible to argue the theory that 
the bourgeoisie, since its emancipation from the feudal yoke, and through its dominant 
process of mass industrialization, has managed to weld the bourgeois world and art 
itself into a single amorphous entity (Adorno, 2001: 61-97; 98-106). And as startling as 
it might sound, this seems to be one of the fundamental conclusions extracted from 
Bourdieu's sociology of culture: that wherever one says that aesthetics is through and 
through a bourgeois concept - as Adorno and specially Eagleton appear to suggest -, one 
must therefore also be saying that art itself, as the end result of aesthetics, is itself a 
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bourgeois event through and through. "That is why" says Adorno, "the existence of all 
the great forms of art is paradoxical" (Adorno, 2001: 77). Consequently, artists and 
their products must per force endure a constant and insurmountable dilemma: on the 
one hand the practicing of art ought to be done with a liberating function in mind, but 
on the other it is also inadvertently a celebration of our bourgeois social condition. 
Bond seems to have been aware of the artists' precarious position within our culture 
industry for a long time. "A rational, free culture" said Bond as far back as 1977, "is 
based either on a classless society or at least on the conscious struggle to remove class 
structures and the economic, ecological, psychological, and political distortions they 
cause. [ ... ]The answers aren't always light, easy, or even straightforward, but the 
purpose - a socialist society - is clear" (Roberts, 1985: 68).52 Unsurprisingly, the 
dramatist is effectively avoiding contact with any agent of consecration, or with 
established theatrical circles of authority like the Royal Court or the National - which, 
incidentally, conferred to Bond his hierarchical reputation in the first place.53 As a 
result, the very elements of the FRP that at one time legitimized Bond's works as 
symbolic goods of the first order, now tag the dramatist as "controversial", "difficult," 
"polemic," or even "bolshie".s4 I hope that this thesis will make clear that this is not the 
case, and that Bond's attitude stands in accordance with authenticity'S strict criteria 
(Benjamin, 1999: 218-19; Kemal & Gaskell, 1999:82).55 
"Extreme," I would say, is that those classes hitherto living under the bourgeois' yoke 
do not seem to have a proper idiosyncratic and emancipating language as did the 
bourgeoisie when it liberated itself from the feudal yoke. And all indicates that this is 
precisely the task that Bond has pursued - and pursues - consistently throughout his life 
as a dramatist. He seeks to find a proper emancipating language within a culture which 
is being subjected to an unrelenting industrializing processes. Even if he has found, or 
will find, that emancipating language, he also needs to find those interlocutors 
predisposed to speak it. Seeing that "the culture industry," concluded Adorno and 
Horkheimer, "[ ... ] impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals 
who judge and decide consciously for themselves" (Adorno, 2001: 106), the task of 
finding proper interlocutors seems to me a dilemma from which there is no escape; in 
other words, a strict Catch 22. Yet Bond is adamant because, in his view, there is a gap: 
"I think the truth is that it is a Catch 21 and a half," Bond told me at the time of our 
encounter. "There is this gap [ ... ] you see, it's not as sealed as it seems. We just behave 
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as IF it is but I think it is not. And I do think this is very important: each new 
generation goes back to the very basic problems, and therefore the very basic questions 
are never settled" (appendix: 36). 
But where is that gap situated if, as he says, we are now living in "extreme" times? 
Bond also thinks that our current social system, in which the majority does not seem to 
have real choices, corrupts, and therefore its subjects are corrupted in greater or lesser 
measure. 56 And he wants to erect a sign towards the socialist utopia, but not through the 
usual channels of mainstream theatre and its regular audiences; not through the 
neutralising institutional channels of a society undergoing a relentless petty 
bourgeoisification. As I said above, he has refused - and refuses - major institutions 
like the National Theatre or the Royal Shakespeare Company permission to stage his 
plays, though they "have regularly asked him" (Davis, 2005: xvii). Despite his self-
exclusion from the mainstream, the dramatist is now as active as ever, focussing his 
energies on writing plays and giving workshops for the youth and their education - his 
"Catch 21 and a half'. To me it seems natural to conclude that, when the dramatist 
concentrates his efforts on the young, he is also trying to construct an emancipating 
language in that context, where it is more feasible. The young provide a place, as Bond 
says, where it is possible to fight "for the common future" (Davis, 2005: 22). However, 
whether the masses are unable to develop one emancipating language for themselves by 
way of their disadvantaged position, or are methodically dissuaded from developing one 
through the means of a relentlessly expanding capitalist culture, will continue to be a 
matter ofperspectivist critical analysis. Paraphrasing Fredric Jameson (1998; 2004), no 
matter what the critics' perspective would be, and what dialectical interpretation they 
extract from it, they all would be looking at the same subject: capital. 
Finally, the evaluation of Bourdieu's "The Market of Symbolic Goods" (1985) in my 
view, gives us a most compelling conception: that the exercising of power through 
culture - especially through the educational system - is enacted by means of "symbolic 
violence" (Ibid.: 24-6; 39-40). "Theories and schools, like microbes and globules, 
devour each other and, through their struggle, ensure the continuity of life" (Bourdieu, 
1985: 14). Borrowing this remark from Marcel Proust, Bourdieu gives us an accurate 
epitome of what is in fact his entire sociological theory of art and literature. Substitute 
"life" for "capitalism" or for "social hierarchy" and the expected denouement will 
finally come to light. With Bourdieu one can formulate that violence does not like 
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competitiveness; that violence likes to exercise power on its own. Historically 
speaking, most ruling systems have secured their requests via the implementation of 
forms of violence. And by definition, violence is only inflicted upon non-violent 
subjects or social groupings. Thus, Bourdieu's theoretical contributions further explain 
why the forms of power are never at ease with art: because, when it applies its rightful 
utopian function, art is - or ought to be - a form of violence in itself. 
The conceptualisation of art as a form of violence impels me to recall here Bond's mode 
of viewing art, which for him can only be fascist or socialist: "in our time the basis of 
art must be socialism: all other art is fascist. There is no art in between" (Stuart, 1996: 
126). This and other ideological issues will be discussed in the next chapter because, as 
I hope to demonstrate, discussions on fascism require the supporting analysis of the 
serious problems of identification. Without it, we are in danger of "depriving it 
[fascism] of any specific content" (Allardyce, 1979: 387). Because fascism has content; 
the problem is that, to make it visible, one must 'peel' off its complex layers. I will 
discuss this more in the next chapter but must just note at this stage, that the main 
characteristic of fascism seems to be its ability to conceal itself behind form - that is, 
behind its aestheticization of everything (Diittmann, 1991). 
For the moment I will propose, not a border line between socialist and fascist art, but 
between symbolic violent art and symbolic non-violent, submissive art. One difficulty 
here is that totally new discourses would be needed in order to discern different kinds-
or subdivisions - of violent and non-violent art. For example, elements like 
performance art: "Agit-Prop, Celebratory Protest, In-Yer-Face theatre" and so on 
(Kershaw, 1994: 67-93), seem to be charged with an intrinsic aggressiveness which 
might have been wrongfully associated with the kind of symbolic violence characteristic 
of Bond's drama.57 As Michael Billington and Aleks Sierzs suggest, there are certainly 
plenty of "aggressive" plays out there;58 so much so that Billington considers it right to 
conclude that "we are living in an aggressively post-ideological age" (in Sierzs, 2000: 
240). Yet, have these aggressive plays of In-Yer-Face theatre anything to do with the 
kind of violence needed to sustain a sign towards Jameson's utopia (2004)? Ifwe had 
to follow Gartman's views - which he has procured for himself via George Lukacs 
(Gartman, 1991: 442) - they do not. Instead, they seem to comply, consciously or 
unconsciously, with one of the fundamental strategic principles traditionally applied by 
bourgeois cultural practitioners, especially since the beginnings of the 20th century: the 
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idea that the world as it is, is static. As Joyce and then Beckett did before them, In-Yer-
Face playwrights describe their characters as passive, surrendered beings, whose 
attitudes are submissive towards existing social facts. Unearthing an additional theory 
of culture perhaps more historicist than those of Bourdieu and the Frankfurt School, 
Gartman indicates, 
No longer having an interest in progressive change, bourgeois writers were 
blinded to the nature of reality as a human creation and began to depict the 
world as a static, reified thing. [ ... ] these writers merely described the 
established facts of society and created characters who passively adopt various 
subjective attitudes toward them. People and their relations are not developed 
but merely described as already constituted products of forces beyond their 
control. The reality of class and struggle is thus obscured behind this 
impenetrable fa9ade of static things (Gartman, 1991: 442). 
In In-Yer-Face plays we are represented as wild and dysfunctional in a world which is 
run by forces beyond our control (Sierzs, 2000: 240). It is thus, effectively, not only the 
theatre of symptoms, but the theatre for and by the bourgeoisie. By representing a world 
run by forces beyond our control, the bourgeoisie and its capital virtually eludes any 
criticism, accusation or identification. When eminent critics as Billington and Sierzs 
regard our age as "post-ideological," they are giving one view while concealing another. 
Their view announces that the struggle between ideologies has finally ended. Since the 
end of the Cold War, this seems to be a publicly shared assumption, but this view 
simultaneously conceals the fact that, as a result of the latest ideological struggle, one 
ideology has triumphed over all things: the bourgeois ideology.59 
Thus, In-Yer-Face theatre seems to be an art-form which displays on the one hand, an 
array of aggressive symbols, but on the other it appears as a non-violent, submissive art-
form. Indeed, because power in it appears as non existent or too abstract, it is a force 
beyond human control. Just as Sierzs notes when he records Sarah Kane, many might 
think that In-Yer-Face's playwrights are to a certain extent the result of a Bondian 
influence (Sierzs, 2000: 101). If such influence has occurred, this has come to be only 
by way of the abstract essence of its form, while doing away with its content. As a 
result, what Adorno called its "truth content" (see diagram in chapter I) has been 
seriously perverted. As Bond says in The Worlds: 
Anger and apocalypse aren't enough. Theatre must talk of the causes of human 
misery and the sources of human strength. It must make clear how and why we 
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live in a culture of nihilism. And because the understanding of history has been 
contaminated with mythology it must rewrite it to make sense of the future 
(Bond, 1980: 109). 
However, there can be no simple answer to the question of violence's manipulation. It is 
a clash between those who use a specific form of violence in order to preserve the 
power they have and those who use another specific form of violence against the former 
and for a 'common future'. As Alexander Garcia Diittmann meticulously explains, 
"violence directs itself against eloquence, against enlightenment, not only in a bourgeois 
and capitalist society but generally" (Duttmann, 2002: 113). And Bourdieu pinpoints, I 
think, a very important problem within the FRP - that is, among those of us trying to 
secure a space in the academia - which has rarely been approached: an overwhelming 
complicity with an ideology that has nothing to do with the ethical imperative. "What 
does it mean to be a human being?" Bond incessantly asks. While they were in the 
United States, Adorno and Horkheimer noted that the total effect of modem culture on 
humans was that of "dependency and servitude," and concluded by designating it as an 
era of "anti-enlightenment" (Adorno, 2001:106). In their view, the culture industry 
promises enlightenment, by way of "the progressive technical domination of nature" 
which, eventually, "arouses a feeling of well-being" (Ibid.). But that "feeling of well-
being" we enjoy now becomes, says Adorno, "mass deception and is turned into a 
means for fettering consciousness," and adds on the same page: 
If the masses have been unjustly reviled from the above as masses, the culture 
industry is not among the least responsible for making them into masses and 
then despising them, while obstructing the emancipation for which human 
beings are as ripe as the productive forces of the epoch permit (Adorno, 
2001:106). 
Conclusion to chapter IV 
As it can be noted in the appendix included here, Edward Bond shows great contempt 
for explanations or understandings of humanity that are reached via scientific 
methodology. This is not unjustified. Apparently neither Adorno nor Horkheimer 
regarded social empirical research favourably. This is an instance where, even against 
Edward Bond's wishes (appendix: 6; 10; 12; 33) the parallels of the dramatist's 
philosophy of drama and the Frankfurt School's critical theory encroach once again. 
According to H. T. Wilson, empirical research (in other words, positivism), was for 
Adorno the demonstration of "how far 'rationalisation' and 'standardisation' had gone: 
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neither mass communications nor sociology in America was free of it any longer" 
(Wilson, 1986: 135).60 If for Adorno empirical research was far-fetched, for 
Horkheimer it was "stupid": 
The average empirical scientist these days, said Horkheimer, is totally naIve vis-
a-vis the prevailing schematism. Through the concept of 'facts', he posits as 
absolute both a form of perception which is conditioned down to the most 
insignificant detail, and all the conscious interests which organize the world, and 
then calls 'theory' the systemic presentation of these 'facts' But such a theory 
lacks self-awareness. It is stupid [his inverted commas]. (Shaw, 1985: 176). 
Like Bond, critical theorists show no alliances with anything or anyone. Both the 
Frankfurt School and Bond object to positivism - to empirical research - because both 
seek to evaluate and question the dynamics of human beings within the capitalist 
location conceptually, which is indeed Marxist analysis in its most strict terms (Bilton et 
aI., 1981: 170-82). There are, I think, enough philosophical arguments to support them. 
For example, by following Bertrand Russell, Daniel Cory sets a fundamental principle 
that can be observed recurring repeatedly throughout his paper "A Philosophical letter 
to Bertrand Russell" (1960: 573-587). This is: "if we could perceive in detail every 
thing that goes on in our environment [as Cory says, in a "spatio-temporal" way] we 
would be overwhelmed and unable to cope with it" (Ibid.: 581). Thus, our human world 
and what it ought to be - or the "problem", as Bond calls it (appendix: 18) - can be 
conceived only by way of imagination and logic. 
Science, usually in concurrence with reason, needs to concentrate its attention on one 
detail at a time, and then another and so on. As the Oxford Dictionary tells us, science 
perceives truth by way of theoretical principles and by systematically classifying facts 
rather than by intuition and/or imagination. The latter is the very essence of Bond' 
philosophy of drama, and of the ethical as ultimate reality. Both the Frankfurt School 
and Bond object to the understanding of human beings through scientific theories 
because we are neither machines nor things. Science would study a painting by isolating 
minute fragments of it bit by bit; it could tell us the painting's chemical composition, 
the ingredients used in it and even the date in which it was painted. As Bond notes, 
"science is concerned with what and when [his italics].,,61 But by doing this, science 
cannot see the painting as a whole; it doesn't ask why. Science and reason are needed 
because complex societies need to have certain levels of organization - or else certain 
chaos. However, it is also irrefutable that behind Auschwitz and Hiroshima were the 
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best science and reason of the time, as Bond pointed out to me himself (appendix: 38). 
But Bond's philosophy of drama is not proposing a separation of science and reason-
that is, the whats or whens - from the conceptual form of conceiving the world - that is, 
as he calls it, from "the cognitive holistic mind" - the whys. As he says: 
There is no necessary conflict between what-and-when and why unless one is 
proposed as the other. Why is concerned with value. Science has instrumental 
values of measurement and proof, but it looks at the world as if it were a great 
time-table. We know the train has arrived because we see it in the station. Why 
is its arrival on time good? Because the passengers can begin work on time. Is 
Mussolini good because his trains run in time? Suppose a train is arriving at 
Treblinka? Many whats-and-whens seem good in themselves. Health, for 
instance. Is it better that Himmler is dead or alive? Good is a universal derived 
from the holistic mind in response to why (Bond, 1998:3). 
If our current postmodern condition is characterized by a general "incredulity toward 
metanarratives" (Palmer, 1998:16), Bond's holistic theory must be enduring against a 
wall of cultural opposition. In my view, incredulity toward metanarratives has been the 
product of a process in which the whats-and-whens of a 'scientized' society have 
progressively overlapped the whys of imagination and logic across all fields. In the 
field of theatre for example, as Richard H. Palmer demonstrates, deconstructionism has 
influenced most playwrighting and its staging during the 1980s and 1990s (Palmer, 
1998: 16), and practitioners do not seem to bring to a final conclusion this pointillist era. 
Yet deconstructionism's own technical quality - that is, the fragmentation of a given 
text into innumerable and even contradictory meanings - seems to me all too related to 
the mechanics of scientific analysis. Thus, explains Palmer: 
pointillism [breaks] down the phenomena of history into the smallest, most 
elementary units - the individual actors of history - and then connecting those 
units by means of 'juxtapositions' rather than causes. The reader would then be 
free to make 'what links he thinks fit for himself: a methodology that accurately 
describes Caryl Churchill's Top Girls [his inverted commas] (Palmer, 1998:16). 
The risks, though, seem to me all too clear. To begin with, such deconstructionist 
history might be nothing but a toll-free highway to individualistic self-indulgence. It 
does not seem so different from the soldier who happens to know that he is being part of 
an unjustified war and yet concludes "anyway it is my job; that's what I'm paid for". If 
Palmer is correct, both the spectator/reader and the soldier are able to go on living in an 
unjust situation because they can take whatever fits better their whats-and-whens, 
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brushing aside the whys. But the problem is that we cannot do differently. Our current 
society is extreme because there is not in it a proper gap from where to face the whys -
unless the rightful choice is, again, living under a bridge. Bond is very aware of this 
and it is reflected in his plays. He is not the idealist some would like to suggest. Bond 
knows that if we could implement perfect justice and freedom "tomorrow", it would be 
chaos and murder (appendix: 4). Lenin knew this too. Although he had in mind the 
utopian socialist society as the ultimate goal, he had to bring in the communist 
dictatorship in order to get there. 
Furthennore, as it is manifested in his work, Bond is neither unrealistic nor dangerously 
naive. As he tells me, drama is not going to solve the world's problems: "Of course no," 
and he adds, "that's all an organizational thing; it's a question of political organization; 
of social administration and all those things. But what I want to do is to try to provide a 
better understanding of what the situation is, so that then one can know what you should 
fight for and what you should aim for" (appendix: 33). The dramatist believes in drama 
because it is an event where human beings can make conceptual choices about freedom 
and justice. And as atypical as it might seem, by way of his empirical data Bourdieu's 
sociological theory of culture seems to support Bond's postulation even further, that 
indeed we live in an extreme situation. As Gartman says: 
Bourdieu's actors do not really act or choose anything - these enacted choices 
imply no acts of choosing - for their actions and choices are predetennined by 
their habitus [which itself is] produced by conditions of existence which rule out 
all alternatives as mere daydreams and leave no choice but the taste for the 
necessary [my italics] (Gartman, 1991: 438). 
In other words, a taste for whats-and-whens. 
Thus, we cannot, in my view, oversimplify an opposition between critical theory - that 
is, the evaluation of culture by conceptual means - and, positivistic, empirical 
demonstrations. In "The Market of Symbolic Goods" (1985), Bourdieu apprehends the 
full meanings of his theory of "symbolic violence" to such an extent that all modem 
cultural activity is put into question; that regardless, all critical thinking and empirical 
research fonn part and parcel of a culture that nevertheless is imbedded in capitalist 
structures of the acquisition of power: 
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If the relations which make the cultural field into a field of (intellectual, artistic 
or scientific) position-takings only reveal their meaning and function in the light 
of the relations among cultural subjects who are holding specific positions in 
this field, it is because intellectual or artistic position-takings are also always 
semi-conscious strategies in a game in which the conquest of cultural legitimacy 
and of the concomitant power of legitimate symbolic violence is at stake. 
(Bourdieu, 1985:40) 
As I discussed through the second chapter, our current times are not only "extreme" 
because we can support with overwhelming evidence the fact that we live in an unjust 
world, but because the well embedded ideology of the bourgeoisie (by way of 
traditional moral values, pursuit of status, social recognition, and successful acquisition 
of forms of power) irremediably steer us towards our own identification with characters 
like Adolf Eichmann. Indeed, our times are "extreme" because we continue to be 
compelled towards situations in which we say "yes" when we ought to say "no", or vice 
versa. By way of Bourdieu's analyses of capitalist culture, and even if it can be only 
perceived through its symbolic value, culture and intellectual activity itself appear as a 
fierce, violent battle for supremacy. For every single intellectual activity appears to have 
an implicit relation with our consequent dominant ideology: competition aimed at 
dominance (1985: 40-3). 
Last but not least, it would not be particularly bold to argue that, if people have 
surrendered any claim to the utopian idea of perfect freedom and justice to the power of 
market and value, it has been out of a pure but grim Leviathan instinct. It is the fear of 
violent death under which individuals give up their natural rights to the absolute power, 
nowadays not of the state, as Hobbes asserted in his philosophy of self-preservation 
(Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999:530-37), but to the power of our current market. In 
capitalist societies the distortions of class recognition produced upon the classes by 
culture seem to be fundamentally of an ideological nature. How could it be otherwise? 
If Western societies are based on evident social imbalances which are formed by huge 
and unequal levels of accessibility to resources, how is it possible that social classes 
misrecognize their real social positioning and real power? That the working class 
struggle is beginning to be regarded in many venues as obsolete,62 in times where the 
boundaries between classes are perhaps sharper than in the last fifty years,63 reflects, I 
think, the problem accurately. 
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As I said above with the assistance of Richard H. Palmer, there seems to be among most 
modem theatre practitioners a natural disposition towards the re-making of history as if 
it was made of a series of interrupted dots, which can be removed and relocated when 
and how it suits. Such an approach not only allows social self indulgence but, in my 
view, is the product of the now traditional bourgeois view that our world is both static 
and hopeless. This is a view that has come from Joyce, through Beckett and finds a 
contemporary voice in Pinter. Fortunately, Marxist historicism and economics help us to 
locate correctly some of the questions in this hugely problematical post-industrial 
setting. Because, from its platform, we can conceptualize history as if it was a 
sempitemal long rope, whose strands are twisted and woven by us and by our human 
struggle for domination - that is, we create concepts from necessity and therefore 
through a theoretical process.64 How else could Bourdieu or Poulantzas explain factual 
class misrecognition? How else could have Bond seen the problem? As Leon Pompa 
concludes, "the present is not simply an addition to the past but a development of it" 
(Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 1999:438). If this is so, Auschwitz and Hiroshima must 
also have something to do with our current society and its industrialized culture. 
Bond's philosophy of drama would ask, why? 
Endnotes 
1 "The performing arts alone" says Harvie "earn an annual revenue of half a billion pounds, 
employ 74,000 people, and produce export income of £80 million." (2003:21) 
2 Hesmondhalgh makes evident this position when he defends, not without commiseration, those 
institutions that finance cultural production. As he illustrates with the following series of 
numerical statistics, these companies undertake considerable "risks" (2002: 17): 
Nearly 30,000 albums were released in the USA in 1998, of which fewer [sic] than 2 
per cent sold more than 50,000 copies [ ... ] in publishing 80 per cent of the income 
derives from 20 per cent of the published product. (Ibid. 18) 
3 I will not enter fully into the discussion about what "freedom" or forms of freedom I am 
referring to. This continues to be a source of heated discussion in academic Journals. However, 
the sense of freedom that interests me here relates more with a given situation in which an 
individual is able to make responsible social choices within a situation of equality among 
individuals. A wealthy person in our society might very well make personal choices but it 
would not have anything to do with social responsibility, for the simple reason that personal 
economic wealth is indeed the product of social inequality (see "the ruling class theory" (Bilton 
et al., 1981: 207-08); "elite recruitment" (Ibid. : 208-11); and "elite integration" (Ibid.: 211-15). 
4 To what extent there is a correct communication between artworks and audiences continues to 
be a problem treated in greater or lesser degree by the majority of theorists and critics of culture 
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and the arts in modem times. Indeed, if there is a foremost subject matter within the fields of 
the arts this surely must be the one. Some specific examples are Aleks Sierzs' "Big Ideas for 
Big Stages, 2004" (New Theatre Quarterly, vol. 21, issue 1, February 2005, pp. 96-8); Gary 
Kemp's "Meaning and Truth-Conditions" (The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 48, no. 193, 
October 1999, pp. 483-493); John Gibson's "Between Truth and Triviality" (British Journal of 
Aesthetics, Vol. 43, no. 3, July 2003, pp. 224-37, especially his section "texts as truths?" p. 
226); Kathleen Gallagher and David Booth's How Theatre Educates: Convergences and 
Counterpoints with Artists, Scholars, and Advocates, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2003; and above all William O. Beeman's "The Anthropology of Theatre and Spectacle," 
(Annual Review of Anthropology, no. 22, 1993, pp. 369-93). Interestingly, and as far as I can 
confirm in the course of my evaluations, most seem to ignore Bourdieu's studies on the 
immutability of class differences and class misrecognition, which, in my view, should be at the 
forefront of discussions on relations between art and audiences. 
5 However, as Tony Coult remarks, Bond's creative dedication to and interest for children's 
education is not a recent decision; it goes back as far as during the 1980s (Davis, 2005: 11). But 
also Coult concedes that now is mainly his only concern; that lastly his "energies are channelled 
largely into work for young people (Ibid.). 
6 It is interesting because Adorno and Horkheimer regarded empirical research as "stupid" 
(Shaw, 1985:176). But they - Adorno and Horkheirner on the one hand and Bourdieu on the 
other - arrive to similar conclusions. If for the former two the existence of classes is concealed 
by "ideological appearances" (Gratman, 1991:427), for Bourdieu class differences are hidden 
by the ideology of "charisma" (Gratman, 425). 
7 Still today many of us refer to society as "post-industrial" without relating it to a specific date. 
In the words of the Oxford Encyclopedia (1997) "the modem concept was elaborated by US 
sociologist Daniel Bell in his The Coming of Post-Industrial Society" (1973). For Bell, a post-
industrial society (the USA is taken to be a model) places a high value on "knowledge" and 
most of its citizens are well educated. The reduction in industrial production entails the 
shrinking and eventual abolition of the traditional working class, most citizens being employed 
in clerical or professional jobs. Nevertheless, "Critics" says the Encyclopedia "also suggest that 
the expansion in education and research has largely been concerned with improving industrial 
production processes rather than with pure knowledge." Thus, questioning the real aims of 
institutional education is of utmost importance in relation with the discussions of class 
identification and cultural distinctions. I will come back to it later on in this section. 
S Gartman refers to Bourdieu's "Vive la Crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science." Theory and 
Society 17:773-87, 1988/89, p. 783. 
9 See again O'Connor (2000) in pages: 3,5, 12-14, 36,65, and specially 230-238 among few 
examples. 
10 Quoted in D' Arcy 2005, p. 325. 
11 See Endnote no. 29, in Chapter I, "General Introduction." 
12 However, I am not alluding here to Michel Foucault's relativist idea that "power is 
everywhere" (1980: 137); power is not everywhere. It seems to me incontestable the fact that 
most of us, for a start, are powerless as a matter of fact. The nihilistic notion that one can assert 
a type of power through extreme/radical measures - i.e. suicide or going to live under a bridge -
is just that, a nihilistic interpretation of what power could be. As he says: 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere [ ... ] power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of 
nonegalitarian and mobile relations [ ... ] where there is power, there is resistance, and 
yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation 
to power [ ... ] these points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. 
(History of Sexuality, 1980: 93-96). 
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On the other hand, if one looks into Foucault's thesis on power from a certain angle, his 
suggestion of power as being everywhere coincides with what I am attempting to suggest 
through the next discussion above that power is there but cannot be identified. If one thinks of 
Big Capital as real power, then power is everywhere, in the trivial and the important things (all 
around us there are signifiers of power: in front of me as I am writing these lines in the form of 
technology; the roof which shelters us is another signifier because it is in reality a mortgage; a 
credit card and so on). The problem I am suggesting is that real power cannot be identified in 
our post-industrial societies because the abstract nature of Big Capital; Foucault suggests that 
power cannot be explained, which seems to me rather a similar evaluation of power. For 
Foucault explaining power would mean observing power from outside, which, I would agree, is 
impossible; as he says: "there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and 
ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix" (1980: 40). 
13 The origins of the bourgeoisie's "aesthetic disposition" are exceptionally important in 
discussions related to the appreciation of the sublime. Schopenhauer was outraged about the 
fact that the locals of a beautiful rural area (peasants and small farmers) did not seem to 
appreciate the "transcendental" scenery in which they lived as educated and naturally gifted 
people did (1981:33-4). Of course, for the philosopher the appreciation of the sublime was not 
purely a matter of economics - or by the fact of being on the safe side of society - but by way 
of being "naturally gifted." He did not think of it in economic and historical terms, and I have 
found no evidence that Schopenhauer read Karl Marx at any time. To this day, this continues to 
be a false assumption which is being fed by the "theory of charisma" explained by Bourdieu. 
Interestingly, Burke also proposed the same argument from a different perspective, when he 
suggested that the appreciation of the sublime was proportional to the level of safety in which 
the contemplator was situated (Battersby, 2003:69-70). If for Burke "safety" was related to 
physical and geographical distance - for example, the contemplation of a volcano's eruption; for 
Bourdieu it is down to the distance one has from the "economic necessities of life - that is, the 
amount of capital one has access to. Thus, Schopenhauerians enjoy the scenery aesthetically 
because the do not have to live from the very thing they marvel at; peasants and farmers cannot 
get pleasure from the "sublime" in which they live because it can also be the very thing that 
kills them. 
14 In Gartman's account culture is divided in two fields: non-material and material cultural 
goods. Non-material cultural goods are related to artistic production like visual art, music or 
literature; while material cultural goods are things like food, clothing, and furniture. 
15 This was made evident once more in the speech given by Tony Blair to the Labour Party 
members in Brighton (Tuesday, 14:30, 27 September 2005). Although the British era from 
1945 to 1979 had been characterized by a consensual style of politics, the motto "being part of a 
land of opportunity" did not form part of the British's political language until Margaret 
Thatcher was elected. (See Peacock, 1999:5-25). 
16 In Part 4 "The Higher Phase of Communist Society," of Chapter IV "The Economic Basis of 
the Withering Away of the State." 
17 Clearly, this can be related to all enterprises: the example of the former "employee" tycoon 
whose billionaire status began in the humble space of hislher garage (like the founders of 
Microsoft or Amazon) is celebrated daily in the media. This example must leave most people in 
awe wondering whether these tycoons are truly a kind of super-human. Because how is it then 
that while they are indeed exhausted by work and not precisely mentally impeded, most people 
do not manage to make ends meet each month. But it is in the field that interests us most, that 
of practicing theatre, where one could painstakingly observe at first hand this "imposed 
illusion." From 1985 to 1994 I did acting studies and its praxis in countries like Spain, Italy and 
France. Some of the institutions in which I practiced it were notable like the Piccolo Theatre 
Studio in Milan (pertinent documents can be supplied if required). During those years, the one 
and only thing that the many acting students I met hoped for, the fundamental reason for them 
making such huge personal sacrifices was to become 'famous'. Success was not just being able 
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to make a decent living from acting skills, but to become the next Bruce Willis, the next Sean 
Connery. Yet, thousands of acting diplomates emerge every year from acting schools 
throughout Europe, of which only few secure placements as an actress/actor - usually within 
modest provincial companies; while the remaining majority stand forever in limbo, hopelessly 
waiting for that 'magical' moment in which they are "discovered" by the almighty agent. 
Furthermore, the schools of acting feed this 'illusion' to the students by saying only the "best" 
and most 'hard-working' access the podium of riches and fame. In fact, the very entry 
procedures of selecting students in these acting schools feed this "ideology of charisma": by 
way of hand-picking, for example, twenty four from three hundred aspirants following a 
'methodical' individual selection. Those chosen few students will believe of course to have 
"especial, magical or superior" personal qualities in relation to those which have been not 
accepted. But then, even those few "privileged"(which are, in a European context, thousands) 
must find a job when they finally leave their schools. As a result innumerable castings, 
commercial or not, are dealt with, while in the process considerable personal resources are 
wasted. The example of how success is achieved is constantly repeated in the media: like a 
lottery, one was in the right place at the right the moment. As a result, the goal of theatre- that 
is, to tell a story to which people can relate - is, in the process, forgotten. 
The U.S. is generally viewed as the most vigorous location for actors/performers but its 
governmental Department of Labour makes it clear that "of the nearly 100,000 Screen Actors 
Guild (SAG) members, only 50 might be considered stars. The average income that SAG 
members earn from acting is less than $5,000 a year." (Bureau of Labor [sic] Statistics, 
www.bls.gov;accessed:21.11.03). My observations over ten years can be applied to the rest of 
artistic fields. Up-to-date British research for instance, supports my empirical example, 
showing that "men studying arts subjects could, on average, end up worse off financially over 
their working lives than if they had skipped higher education completely." (Neasa MacErlean, 
"Future Shock as Degrees bring no Profit", in Cash (Student Special) The Observer, 4 
September 2005, p. 2; Source: "The Return to a University Education in Great Britain" by Nigel 
O'Leary and Peter Sloane, Swansea University). MacErlean's article also charts how, while all 
the degrees' earnings in a lifetime have been nevertheless substantially reduced to an average of 
+/-£175,000, those who graduated in the Arts do not get above £22,458 (However, the earnings 
I am noticing here concern solely "Men;" because interestingly the chart also shows how 
statistically, all "Women's" degrees earn in a lifetime well above those of "Men" - specially in 
the Arts where "Women" even earn five times as much. Nevertheless, I do not have space in 
this thesis to explore such a subject as "gender and the culture industry," but it would certainly 
be a thesis of extreme relevance and interest). 
18 Assuming that a taste for freedom is an aesthetic disposition, and that aesthetics is an inherent 
component of the bourgeois ideology, Bourdieu is therefore here supported also by Terry 
Eagleton (1991). 
19 From Oxford Encyclopedia, 1997. 
20 Needless to say, one could argue that Gartman seems to unfold here the particular historical 
class-struggle of the United States, for workers' counteroffensives against big capital brought 
about different results in different countries. If workers' actions granted higher wages in the 
States, it brought Civil War in Spain. Nevertheless, I continue to believe that Gartman's 
conclusions about the historical development of cars in America, in post-industrial 
consumeristic societies are all too universal. It was a matter of time - in Spain by way of the 
Francoist state - before Gartman's American positivism could be applied every where else 
including Spain. 
21 Parallel to these discourses appears Baudrillard himself when he discusses the European 
Referendum on the latest proposed European Constitution and how, in his view, the French 
voted "no" because they feel trapped in a consensual "there-is-no-alternative; all are offering the 
same" (Baudrillard, 2005:24-5) 
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22 Polly Toynbee presents an unusual and refreshing article on the gradual disappearance of 
utopian propositions which she calls it a "strangulation of dreams." Toynbee argues how 
"unions themselves are hollowed out, emptied partly by years of devoting more resources to 
baronial priorities than to recruiting the lowest paid and most vulnerable." (The Guardian, 
"This Strangulation of Dreams is Creating a Phantom Party," Friday, September 30, 2005, p. 
31). 
23 It would be interesting because things have taken an unexpected twist after the collapse of the 
USSR. Paul Auerbach for example, portraits in his article an interesting view about the real 
possibility of a socialist future by way of injecting more resources into schooling: indeed, 
increasing a petty bourgeoisification of society. As he contends: "we live in a period 
unprecedented in its possibilities for the development of socialism" (1992:5). But this was his 
thinking in 1992. If then one could visualize a gap in the system towards that utopia, today that 
gap might have been once again sheltered by insurmountable distractions, be it the US and 
UK's direct involvement in the political shaping-up of oil producing countries, international 
islamo-fascist terrorism, unstoppable growth of extreme poverty in developing countries, and a 
countless list of other, no less important issues. As Bond contends, "extreme times" seem to be 
here to stay and do not seem to get better. However, as Bond also contends, we have drama to 
make visible a gap through which it might be possible to look forward to a humane future. 
24 The latter phenomenal increase of skilled individuals launching their own businesses and 
becoming free lancers - from builders to professors, from plumbers to engineers - testifies to this 
rather general embracing of "ideological" petty bourgeoisification. According to the Office for 
National Statistics, since the Spring of 2001, there has been a constant increase in self-
employment of around 17 per cent per year. But this transformation of class-status - from 
employee to self-employed - has not only been the preference of those "managers, senior 
professionals and skilled traders," like builders and plumbers; there is a very similar percentage 
increase for other occupations like "machine operatives and elementary occupations", like 
cleaning and catering. (Cray Lindsay, Claire Macaulay, "Growth in Self-employment in the 
UK," Labour Market Trends, October 2004, Vol. 112, no. to, pp. 399-404, (Labour Market 
Division: Office for National Statistics» 
25 On current relations between the State, Globalization and Capitalism read the accomplished 
article by Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells (2001, pp. 1-18). 
28 For instance, not only are middle and petty bourgeois classes fragmented and sub-fragmented 
into what are very thin divisions, in which the working class is effectively included, by way of 
acquired skills. Now we must take also into account unemployed classes - now more than 22 
million only within the E.E.U. - and a rapidly emerging underclass classes. Although these 
later classes might exhibit in some cases an overlapped status, their habitus is in most cases 
totally dissimilar. (See SEN,1997; Coates, 1998; Murray, 1999; Davis, 2004). 
29 The bygone era in which an altruistic landlord would fund the education of one of his 
servants' children (eg if they were considered specially talented) perhaps offers a more 
concentrated idea of class legitimization by way of charismatic conferment. In many ways, the 
top classes bestowing grants upon subjects from the lower classes continues to be a sort of 
tradition, and a universally accepted social function which might have become a precept in the 
minds of the collective imaginary. It is hard to overestimate here the importance of Nietzsche's 
On the Genealogy of Morals (2001), and his evaluation of "Men of Ressentiment". For 
Nietzsche's evaluations of modern morality, the distinctions between good and evil, the feelings 
of moral guilt, and the aesthetic ideal, piece together the origins of this educational "charity" of 
the rich towards the poor. 
As a matter of fact, it is not clear who gets more benefit from the action of bestowing grants to 
those who cannot afford a place in a highly reputed academic institution. Obviously, the grant's 
recipient acquires a higher status, but it is also all too obvious that the donors of that grant 
procure for themselves a highly valued and socially cherished good: moral capital. As Nietzsche 
argues throughout his writings, this is the real end that was being sought. The consequent 
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question is all too blatant, but nevertheless impossible without substantial amounts of naivety: 
should human beings need the charity and compassion of other human beings - or institutions -
in order for them "to be?" To close this point, Terry Eagleton gives us a very pertinent 
example: "St Catherine's, the college to which I have just migrated, [ ... ] began life in the 
nineteenth century as a society for matriculating students too poor to gain entry to the 
University, which is not least [one] of the reasons why I am honoured to be associated with it." 
(1992:29). But Eagleton, which seems aware of Nietzsche's indictments, lets us know that he 
does not forget his own genealogy by concluding on the preceding: "But since being a professor 
is better than having a job, I don't intend to look a gift horse in the mouth" (lbid.:30). 
30 Among the most unequivocal cases in the whole of Europe are the Universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge - 'Oxbridge'. But it is perhaps the University of Oxford that exemplifies 
Bourdieu's ideology of charisma to a greater extent: the roster of distinguished scholars from its 
lecture rooms is incredibly long if compared with any other university (see Bilton et aI., 
1981:208-11). Since its founding in 1823, the Oxford Union, effectively an elite club, has 
numbered among its members many of the United Kingdom's most noted political leaders 
(Oxford Encyclopedia). 
31 See again Bond, "Notes on the War Plays", The Journal for Drama in Education, Vol. 12, 
Issue 1, 1995, pp. 6-16: "owning a house in our democracy implicates me in murder." (p. 13). 
32 Hamlet: Act I, Scene III (Shakespeare, William, The Complete Works of W. Shakespeare, 
with a preface by Sir Donald Wolfit C.B.E., London: Spring Books, printed in Czechoslovakia 
(no date supplied», p. 950. 
33 As Bond tells me in a letter dated 14/07/2004: "I've also been writing theoretical guides to 
help eight authors who are contributing chapters to a book on my plays (Edward Bond and the 
Dramatic Child) [2005] to be published this autumn. There were many theoretical 
misunderstandings I had to clean up." 
34 Bond is referring to his reading of the last section "culture or contradiction." Letter dated 5 
December, 2005. 
35 In April 2006 The Royal Court will celebrate its 50th anniversary proposing among other 
things "A full season of new plays involving acclaimed artists from 50 years of British theatre" 
(see: www.royalcourttheatre.com/support.asp) Of course, such a specific event without Edward 
Bond's presence in it cannot have the intended significance. And it seems that the dramatist has 
been accordingly invited to attend to it, but Bond is adamant: "I've told my agent Tom that I 
don't want to be part of the Royal Court 50th celebrations next year. He said people will say 
you're being difficult. .. " Letter, 7 July 2005. 
36 Coincidentally, Dan Baron Cohen sent me a paper in which the question of the oppressed 
turning oppressor appears as a fundamental source of argument in his own studies (letter 
received on the 14th of July, 2003). In my view, Nietzsche's evaluation of men of res sentiment 
illustrates how this problem is and will continue to be of highly complex resolution. 
37 And to surmount ideology is going to be a very complex affair indeed. Jameson himself, 
whose subject-matter and defining concern throughout his work is precisely utopia, says: "The 
point about ideology is not a particularly complicated one: it sets out from the conviction that 
we are all ideologically situated, we are all shackled to an ideological subject-position, we are 
all determined by class and class history, even when we try to resist or escape it. And for those 
unfamiliar with this ideological perspectivism or class standpoint theory, it is perhaps necessary 
to add that it holds for everyone, left or right, progressive or reactionary, worker as well as boss, 
and underclasses [sic], marginals [sic], ethnic or gender victims, fully as much as for the ethnic, 
race or gender mainstreams." (Jameson, 2004:47). 
38 When a phenomenon is analysed through structuralism this is to be seen as a system of 
structures, which are regarded as more important than the isolated elements that make them up. 
Structuralism derives from the linguistic theories of the Swiss Ferdinand de Saussure in the 
early 20th century. Structuralism as a method of study was also at the core of the well known 
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anthropologist Jean Levi-Strauss, whose works argue that people's thought processes exhibit the 
same structural properties the world over, which has had major consequences in all fields of 
knowledge. On structuralism see Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 240; 716-17. 
39 We ought to make clear considerations between an artist declining recognition from the above 
and a transgressive artist, which Bond is not. When I refer to the "above" I am indeed referring 
to the agents and agencies of authority: those that, in a social system of class differences, are in 
a position of conferring honours and awards. Instead, as Anthony Julius explains, a 
transgressive artist seeks indeed recognition from "the above" but he/she has only one audience 
and he/she attacks it. This thesis is confirmed by Julius's example on Cindy Sherman's lament: 
"I wanted to make it very clear what my concerns were about, and try to be different and 
challenging. I've always been so well received publicly that it started to bother me" (Anthony 
Julius' "Death by Exhaustion," The Guardian Weekend, 28 September 2002, pp. 18-24, p. 24). 
Bond seems to me more linked with the spirit of Goya: by enhancing violence he intends to 
diminish the reactionary influences of a social system which is inherently violent. Thus, like 
with Goya, Bond has two audiences: one to which he appeals and one that he attacks; and, in 
contrast with the transgressive artist, there is no overlapping between these two. 
40 In my view this is clearly manifested in the following section in which Sophocles' Jocasta 
finally understands that her husband Oedipus is also her own son, and yet she clearly gives the 
impression that she wants things as they are: 
As for marrying your mother, you're not the first 
To have dreamed that dream; every son 
Is his mother's son in imagination 
Or in day-dreams. Its commonplace. 
If a man broods on his most private fantasies 
His life won't be worth living, believe me! (Taylor, 1998:41). 
When the shepherd gives Oedipus all the evidence he needs to understand his own origins, 
Jocasta replies: "(Jocasta is white with fear, hardly able to reply) What man ... ?What does it 
matter ... One shepherd or another ... What difference does it make? None of it matters. Forget 
it. The whole thing. Don't pursue it (lbid.:44). 
41 Here again the reader might need to take into account the second part of the first chapter 
where the implications of Nietzsche's men of res sentiment are assessed. Further reading can be 
found in the exceptionally important paper by Bernard Reginster, "Nietzsche on Ressentiment 
and Valuation" (1997). 
42 However, the data submitted by Gartman clearly shows that, although all classes participate in 
the consumption of both popular and high culture, the upper classes express a greater preference 
for "legitimate art" like classical music, painting, literature, playwriting and so on. The tiny 
minority of manual workers preferring "legitimate art" shows an exception which confirms the 
rule. This verifies even further that a particular cultural habitus goes alongside the status of 
class. (Gartman, 1991 :429-30). 
43 According to Bourdieu, "middle-brow" art is aimed at a public referred as "average". It is 
also correct to include middle-brow artists in the FLP because their works, says Bourdieu, are 
"entirely defined by their public" (Bourdieu, 1985:28). Middle-brow artists' ambitions are to 
take hold of the widest possible public. Bourdieu, quoting the remarks of a prominent French 
writer, which is also the beneficiary of the Prix Interallie and the Grand prix du roman de 
I 'Academie Fran~aise, clearly designates the great social relevance that middle-brow art exerts 
upon my own argument that our society is currently undergoing a progressive petty 
bourgeoisification: "My sole ambition is to be easily read by the widest possible public. I never 
attempt a 'masterpiece', and I do not write for intellectuals; I leave that to others. For me a 
good book is one that grips you within the first three pages." (Bourdieu, 1985:28). It follows, as 
Bourdieu postulates, that middle-brow art relies on "accessible aesthetic effects", and on a 
systematic exclusion of all "potentially controversial themes"; in other words, it pursues a 
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public distinguished by its petty bourgeoisie's "neutral" ideology (Poulantzas, 1974:241) - the 
majority. 
44 The case of Yupanqui is one of the most remarkable because although he always intended to 
be a singer of the people, and often enough his song-writing takes on themes related to the 
underprivileged classes - that is, Gauchos, Indians, workers, immigrants and so on - during his 
life he has been awarded innumerable prestigious institutional honours, from international 
awards to Doctor Honoris Causa (for further information see www.todo-
argentina.netlbiografias/Personajes/atahualpa yupanqui; accessed: 18.04.02). In my view, and 
following Bourdieu's analysis, this has effectively extracted Yupanqui from his association with 
the masses of working classes, allocating him among the high spheres of hierarchical superiority 
and dominant classes. The effect on the masses is of course of admiration, but now it is an 
admiration more related to a theological mysticism as if Yupanqui's symbolic goods had more 
to do with a "divinely superior intuition or inspiration"; in other words, here again legitimizing 
strong class differences by way of implementing the bourgeois "ideology of charisma". His 
songs could have had an intrinsic utopian function but, if we follow Bourdieu's sociology of art, 
it has been effectively "neutralized" by honorific institutional conferments. A very similar case 
can be found within our very terrain of theatre practice, where we have for example the Nobel 
Laureate Dario F o. That his original works are intended for the popular masses is beyond 
question, however the continuous recognition by the institutions of consecration have positioned 
Fo at the pinnacle of the artistic hierarchical ladder (for a full account on international awards to 
Dario Fo see http://nobelprize.org/literature/laureates/1997/fo-bio.). 
45 Victor Jara (1932-1973) was a Chilean folk singer assassinated during the Coup of General 
Augusto Pinochet while detained with thousands of others in the infamous Football Stadium of 
Chile. Jara's songs were also focused on the lives of the workers and simple people of Chile 
which, straightforwardly, denounced injustices and political corruption. Of course, we will not 
know whether Jara would have attained the artistico-hierarchical status ofYupanqui, but among 
most Spanish speaking University students for example he is certainly considered a "poet" 
through and through (further information on Victor Jara in www.msu.eduljaralevida; accessed: 
18.04.02). 
46 Bourdieu quotes from: Sartre's "Qu'est-ce que la litterature?" Paris: Gallimard, (1948), p. 98. 
47 Here again is where the suggestion forwarded by Gartman that Bourdieu' s theory is 
ahistorical is not well justified (Gartman, 1991:421-3). When Bourdieu notes the middle of the 
19th century as the true starting point of the FRP's autonomy, he is also stressing the year 1848 
in which the European monarchies started to collapse and the bourgeoisie emerged from the 
feudal yoke as an independent and autonomous class. 
48 "The state" says Bourdieu, "after all, has the power to orient intellectual production by means 
of subsidies, commissions, promotion, honorific posts, even decorations, all of which are for 
speaking or keeping silent, for compromise or abstention" (Bourdieu, 1985:27). It calls to mind 
again the case of Jiirgen Habermas accepting the highly prestigious Spanish Principe (prince) of 
Asturias Prize (2004). 
49 We might need to keep in mind that this is a similarity that would please neither Horkheimer 
nor Adorno, for empirical research - positivism - was regarded with contempt by both (Shaw, 
1985: 176). 
50 Then again, when one reads Adorno's theories, to a certain extent, a seemingly intrinsic 
antinomy might become a familiar feature of his writings. But this also might be a problem 
more related to the level of attention a reader might put upon Adorno's writings. Just as it is 
true, I would say, that all theorists need a through reading, Adorno's writings "demand of the 
reader an unusual level of concentration in order to be able to stay with the vastness of detail, 
complexity of argument" (O'Connor, 2000:1). And we ought to admit, many within the 
scholarly milieu apply the old tradition of reading works by way of random paragraphs, 
adjusting ideas to preferred discourses. This seems to be an old problem which was noted 
already by Nietzsche. "The worst readers" protested Nietzsche, "are those who behave like 
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plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, 
and revile the whole" (Hollingdale, 1977: 16). 
51 Although this is a historical fact repeated throughout critical theory studies, it is a most 
uncommon observation within the classrooms of standard education and institutional textbooks. 
As far as I can account for, only the recent BBC documentary "The Nazis: A Warning," has 
been a refreshing attempt to set history straight with the general public (BBC2, 30 April, 2004). 
In it, it is stressed the fact that President Hindenburg disliked Hitler enormously and considered 
him a dangerous nutter. Only after great pressure from powerful figures of the business and 
financial world, did Hindenburg appoint Hitler with the German Chancellery in 1933. 
52 From a letter addressed to Tony Coult, dated 28 July, 1977. 
53 I cannot now examine in detail the situationists' arguments that surrounded Bond's 
momentous period during the 1960s and 1970s. Discussing the parameters by which Bond 
attracted the attention of some of the critics, scholars, and theatre practitioners of the 1960s 
would be too speculative - whether the young Bond would have been offered the same 
opportunity of staging his plays today. However, Bourdieu's social theory based in historicist 
and economicist Marxism, might offer an interesting degree of relation between the seemingly 
"revolutionary" days of the late 1960s and the fact that an author without academic training like 
Bond gets, as exceptional as it is, a hierarchical status within the FRP. As Gartman says via 
Bourdieu, "Historic shifts in the relative scarcity of resources within fields disrupt the 
equilibrium established between the objective opportunities for success within it and the 
subjective expectations (habitus) of individual participants. Such disruptions give rise to 
cultural struggles between established and parvenu cultural fractions that change field. [ ... ] in 
the field of education the increase in the number of students and teachers in the 1960s caused a 
devaluation of their credentials on the job market. This, in tum, produced a discrepancy 
between the career expectations they internalized under the previous structure and the changed 
structure of the field. The result of this discrepancy was the revolt in the universities 
culminating in May 1968" (Gartman, 1991:439). Whether a dramatist like Bond, profoundly 
anti-establishment as he was and is, managed to get the attention of critics and theatre 
practitioners during the 1960s as a result of a protest induced by a devaluation of students' 
credentials in the 1960s, or whether Bond attracted them because they, like the dramatist, were 
also looking forward to a utopian socialism, could very well be ample material for another 
thesis. 
54 For example, see Brian Logan's interview with Bond, "Still Bolshie after all these years," The 
Guardian, Wednesday 5 April, 2000. 
55 As Nicholas Davey remarks quoting Gadamer on authenticity, "the artwork cannot be 
considered an object, as long as it is allowed to speak as a work of art and is not forced into 
alien relationships such as commercial trade and traffic" (in Kemal & Gaskell, 1999: 82). 
56 In which ways we are corrupted has already been extensively discussed here. Another thing 
altogether would be to argue over the terminology employed. Being corrupt not only implies 
decay and putrefaction; it also implies, says the Oxford Dictionary, "acting dishonestly in return 
for money or personal gain." However, another author somehow not dissimilar from Bond, Pier 
Paolo Pasolini (1922-1975), on whose works I have worked extensively in the past, referred to 
the Western masses not as "corrupted," but as "contaminated." The signifying connotations are 
fundamentally the same: all means of communication have primarily bourgeois foundations, 
and therefore art, language, and so on must be affected - that is, contaminated - in one way or 
another. (see Pasolini, 1991:63; 1995:713-32; and Rumble, 1996:13-4 orI6-7). 
57 Regardless of the fact that In-Y er-Face playwrights like Sarah Kane identify Bond as one of 
their most important original influences. As Kane said herself: "The first draft of Blasted was 
dreadful, full of huge dense monologues about the characters' backgrounds, every feeling 
stated, every thought spoken. A friend read it, and didn't say very much, but he gave me a copy 
of Saved. I'd read this years before, but I read it again in 1993. And that really was where I 
learned to write dialogue" (Sierzs, 2000: 1 01). 
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58 Billington and Sierzs allude to plays and playwrights like Patrick Marber's Closer (2000), 
Mark Ravengill's Shopping and Fucking (1996), Phyllis Nagy's Never Land (1998), and of 
course Sara Kane's Blasted (1996). 
59 Needless to say, I cannot discuss here whether this applies to those countries supposedly 
under the yoke of communist dictatorships like China or religious fundamentalists like Iran. 
However, all indicates that behind their autocratic facades, capital growth is as much an issue as 
it is in our western liberal democracies, with their consequent class system based on difference 
and status. 
60 I must note that when Adorno refers to empirical research he does so from his own American 
experience which, as he himself describes, was not free from obstacles like access to funding 
and consequently prearranged stipulations. For example, Wilson also quotes Adorno saying 
"Naturally there appeared to be little room for critical social research in the framework of the 
Princenton Project. Its charter, which came from the Rockefeller Foundation, expressly 
stipulated that the investigations must be performed within the limits of the commercial radio 
system prevailing in the United States [Wilson's italics]. It was thereby implied that the system 
itself, its cultural and sociological consequences and its social and economic presuppositions 
were not to be analysed [my italics]. I cannot say that I strictly obeyed the charter." (Wilson, p. 
136; footnoted: Theodor Adorno, "Scientific experiences of a European scholar in America," in 
The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America. 1930-1960, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard 
Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. 1968), pp. 338-70, p. 343) However, Adorno's 
American experience rings a bell throughout European Universities: funding for theses in 
Humanities where pure speculative thinking is the subject, is progressively becoming atypical in 
relation to other scientific fields. Only recently the BBC4 documentary "Under Laboratory 
Conditions" (21:00-22:00, 27 January, 2006) showed quite clearly that academic research in all 
fields is getting adequate funding only in those cases where the project meets the requirements 
of viable commercial profits. Humanities studies are under a great risk of extinction. 
61 In Bond's "Rough Notes on Drama," as part of "Building Bridges - Laying the Foundations 
for a Child-Centred Curriculum in Drama in Education," a collection of papers an articles 
published following the 1998 Annual Conference ofthe National Association of the Teaching of 
Drama (NATD), held at Newman College, Birmingham; copyright for The National Association 
for the Teaching of Drama, 1998; supplied to me by the British Library Document Supply 
Centre (Request Ref. No. LSI8764), pp. 1-178, Bond's "Rough Notes on Drama:" pp. 1-11, p.3. 
62 See one example among many: Steve Morris' "Working class still there ... up to a point" in 
The Guardian, 22 February 2003, p. 13. 
63 "In 2002 two-thirds of the population had incomes below the national average of £396 a week 
[ ... ] the media income - the middle point in the income distribution - was £323 a week. The 
richest 10% take home nearly 28% of total income, while the poorest 10% take home just under 
3%, the IFS said." (Charlotte Denny and Larry Elliot, "Labour is tackling deprivation but 
inequality is rising," The Guardian, Wednesday March, 31 2004, p. 20). 
64 This is an epistemological position based in the "production of knowledge" which occurs in 
the "thought process." For a detailed account about Marxist historicism and ways of 
approaching it, see Poulantzas: 1976:63-83. 
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(PART II) 
5. CHAPTER V 
Culture or ideology. 
Introduction 
In one of his letters Edward Bond contends: "The basis of art must be socialism: all 
other art is fascist. There is no art in between" (in Stuart, 1996: 126). Whether art can 
be specified only as socialist or fascist is one of the prime motivations behind this 
rethinking of aesthetics in the politics of theatre and one which, in my view, urgently 
needs a viable articulation. Not just because, as Kate Katafiasz suggests, Bond's 
assertions are "too provocative to be ignored",1 but because such a claim continues to be 
the unresolved paradigm that has hung over modem and postmodem criticism on 
creative activities. Art, Adorno has told us in Chapter I, is supposed to be neutral, but he 
also says that that is the impossible situation of art: its "negativity". In a society 
characterized by class differences and inequality, resulting in class struggle and/or class 
resentment, art is trapped by one side or the other: by the oppressors or by the 
oppressed. 
As I will point out below, Trotsky also lamented a culture divided by social groupings -
that is, whether particular art is part of a proletarian culture, or of a petty bourgeois 
culture, or of a bourgeois culture. Art, he said, should be part of human culture as a 
whole but that this could only be possible in a classless society. However, many would 
argue now that ideological neutrality - or at least appearing as if outside ideological 
discourses - is at the base of cultural practice in the postmodem. For example, noting 
that radical actions, criticism and ideas have become a rarity in theatre, Baz Kershaw 
examines whether the radical "may [my italics] survive and flourish through the 
excesses of performance" (1999: 56). His study on the radical is a reaction to the 
failures of political theatre to continue its once-flourishing discourses on justice and 
egalitarianism. He hopes that the vacuum left by the disappearance of political theatre 
can now be occupied by "radical performance" (Ibid.: 17). Nevertheless, Kershaw tells 
us that the most "acute" definition of radical is made by Raymond Williams: "radical 
seemed to offer a way of avoiding dogmatic and factional association while reasserting 
the need for vigorous and fundamental change" (Ibid.: 18). 
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Through Poulantzas' theory of fascism I intend to explore whether the radical to which 
Kershaw refers has similarities with the kind of "social" neutralism the Greek 
sociologist attributes to the petty bourgeoisie: autonomy, opposition to capitalist 
oppression, ideological neutrality, change towards a better world, requesting a fair and 
neutral state, and so on. As Kershaw himself acknowledges, quoting Jan Cohen-Cruz, 
"radical performance encompasses left- and right-wing politics. Broadcasting the 
Aryan ideal to the masses ... the 1934 Nuremberg Party rally is a paradigm of street 
theatre as media opportunity" (Cohen-Cruz in Kershaw, 1999: 20). 
Can art be ideologically "neutral", and avoid "factional association", or is it only 
socialist or fascist? Major figures of critical thinking - such as Benjamin, Adorno, 
Horkheimer, Marcuse or Lukacs - have dedicated great amounts of time to the 
evaluation of this modem question. And yet, today the claim seems to be buried under 
the dust of our post-industrial condition. In the realm of mainstream politics it has been 
buried altogether. As Rodney Barker observes, for the new left as much as for the new 
right, "socialism [is] either dead or suffering distant exile[:] the old arguments [are] no 
longer to be found, the old proposals [have] vanished" (1997: 252). Reviewing David 
Miliband's Reinventing the Left, Barker notes the "almost complete absence of the word 
'socialism' from its pages" (Ibid.: 251). He points out the ironical characteristics of 
current politics: while the new left declares the death of socialism, they find themselves 
on the rise - of course, he was referring to New Labour in 1997. As I am reviewing 
these words, one of the new contenders for the Liberal Democratic Party's leadership in 
Great Britain announces that its main political plan is "to look forward to the future, 
without regard for the old left and right approaches.,,2 This kind of political posturing 
seems to function as one more example of current socio-political neutralisation; 
incidentally vindicating Poulantzas' sociological theory which, as I have already 
indicated, claims that our western societies are enduring a progressive petty-
bourgeoisification - that is, a class neutralization. If the word "socialism" barely 
appears in current literary texts, the word "fascism" has even been stigmatised. For 
instance, in a personal letter, Terry Eagleton tells me that he dislikes "the loose use of 
the word 'fascist' by the political left,,,3 and I think very few critics would disagree 
with him. A far more basic and critical matter has arisen in the course of this research 
though: not just whether art can be socialist or fascist, but whether these terms are used 
appropriately. Eagleton's letter on this subject is a most providential contribution 
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because it allows me to explore important yet inconspicuous loopholes of the term 
"fascism" and its meaning - or better still, what it does not mean. 
5.1. Section I 
5.1.1. Preliminary reflections on socialism 
Would it be possible to verify dialectically whether any artwork is only one of the two: 
fascist or socialist? This question is a deeply complicated one. If Marxist critical theory 
or Fascist studies can tell us something definitive about it, this is that socialism as much 
as fascism are terms yet undefined. The first has not as yet come into existence, and the 
second has yet to be "deciphered" (Poulantzas, 1974: 253; Allardyce, 1979: 368; 
Schnapp, 1993: 90). Without underestimating the importance of making a systematic 
analysis of the human values behind the term "socialism", it is not possible to evaluate 
both concepts fully here. Thus, I shall concentrate my discourse mostly on fascism, 
which, in my view, is in need of urgent attention. Before going on to define what 
fascism is not, I shall first make some important points about the ethical value of a 
utopian socialism. 
A starting proposition is, then, that socialism is a generic concept and will continue to 
be guesswork; whereas fascism is a generic term but not a generic concept. In the 
strictest meaning of the word, "fascism has no meaning beyond Italy"(Allardyce, 1979: 
3 70). One thing is clear though: as Gilbert Allardyce puts it, if the study of what 
fascism is "begins with the study of capitalism" (1979: 369), the study of what 
socialism could be begins with the study of Marxism. Trotsky himself had socialism 
quite clear in his mind. In his essay "What is Proletarian Culture and is it Possible?" 
(1923) he observed that real socialist art would only come into being when class 
differences were finally dissolved into a socialist community, the proletarian class 
freeing itself from "its class characteristics and thus ceas[ing] to be a proletariat.,,4 For 
Trotsky there is no such thing as a proletarian culture and in fact "there is not reason to 
regret this" (Ibid.). This argument is exceptionally important because in reality the 
socialism that Trotsky had in mind had more to do with ethics than with ideology. His 
socialism wishes to get rid of class culture "in order to make way for human culture" 
(Ibid.); and very suitably he adds, "We frequently seem to forget this."s 
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Interestingly, Trotsky's conclusion on what culture ought to be, once his utopian 
socialist society had come into existence is not, in my view, incompatible with that 
branch of dialectical criticism headed by Adorno, which situates art within the spheres 
of neutrality and autonomy (O'Connor, 2000: 239-65). On the contrary, it throws light 
on the perennial problem of paradox in Adorno's theory of art because art itself is 
confronted by a colossal set of contradictions: trying to explain art within the 
claustrophobic frame of capitalism; and, therefore, art within a "class culture". Like 
Trotsky before him, Adorno states "there is nothing in art that is directly social" 
(O'Connor, 2000: 242). And of course, he is also more or less correct if only for two 
reasons: first, because he understands the damaging effects of those creators that, like 
Brecht, use art as an ideological device (in Brecht's case, Stalinist communism),6 and 
second because, while Adorno seems to think of art in the same manner as Trotsky, he 
always reflected upon art within the modem bourgeois framework; roughly from the 
bourgeois revolution of 1848 to his own days. Adorno recommends that art and artists 
be autonomous for the same imperative reasons that an entrepreneur seeks autonomy for 
himself and for his industry; not because, like Trotsky, he sought in any way a society 
of equals. In fact, like his partner Horkheimer, in the end Adorno resigned himself to 
the idea that "a total revolution [ ... ] was not possible" (Shaw, 1985: 179), which is as to 
say that a society without private property and without class differences is not possible. 
They both wanted people "to believe", Brian J. Shaw reasons, but offered "nothing to 
believe in" (Ibid.). 
In his essay "Culture is Ordinary" (1958) Raymond Williams - who continues to be one 
of the most influential cultural critics in modem Britain - defined as "absurd" the 
"leftist" claim that certain art forms were or were not "socialist" (Gray and McGuigan, 
1993: 5-14). I will not expand too much on the cultural critic, but Williams was not 
drawing a distinction between terming an artwork "socialist" in the sense of "left-wing" 
politics, and applying the term because the artwork proposes in its structure a future 
utopian socialist society, as Bond does. What was absurd for Williams was to be 
accused of being hostile to socialism for saying that George Eliot was a good novelist 
(Ibid.: 14), which still does not preclude Bond's assertion that art is or is not socialist. 
Williams makes obvious his celebratory but factionalist relation with bourgeois culture 
which, according to him "has given us much, including a narrow system of morality" 
(Ibid.: 9). And then he criticises the "Marxists" for identifying the culture of his time as 
bourgeois which, he says, is a "mistake" that everyone seems to make. But neither does 
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a Marxist necessarily have to be a member of the Communist Party or Fourth 
International as Williams seems to imply all the way through his essay, in that he 
repeatedly uses the formula, 'the Marxists say [so and so]" (Ibid.). 
The problem with Williams, I think, is that he did not think of socialism as an ethical 
ultimate reality as Bond does (Stuart, 2000: 56), instead he posits bourgeois culture as 
the best possible option. My final reflection on Williams' criticism is to identify the 
highly paradoxical position the critic takes; a position which, I would suggest, has been 
of great influence in our western world: he protests in the strongest terms against the 
Marxist claim that "we live in a dying culture, and that the masses are ignorant" (Gray 
and McGuigan, 1993: 9). But a few pages later he displays a need to reflect upon it, 
bringing out into the open what are the real starting points of his protest: 
[ ... ]: the people we meet aren't vulgar [my italics] [ ... ] a few weeks ago I was in 
a house with a commercial traveller, a lorry driver, a bricklayer, a shopgirl, a 
fitter, a signalman, a nylon operative, a domestic help. I hate describing people 
like this, for in fact they were my family and family friends. Now they read, 
they watch, this work we are talking about; 
But he knows better and therefore adds: 
Very well, I read different things, watch different entertainments, and I am quite 
sure why they are better. But could I sit down in that house and make this 
equation we are offered? Not, you understand, that shame was stopping me; I've 
learned, thank you, how to behave. 
(Williams in Gray and McGuigan, 1993: 13). 
Of course, as Williams says, people are not vulgar; we people have human qualities 
which ought to be considered as the top of our agendas in every enterprise we do. But to 
me it is as if Williams is pretending for us to believe that ignorance and vulgarity are 
two conditions of the same token. He reads and watches better things than his friends, 
he says, and he cannot tell them why they are better because of shame? Good manners? 
Or because he is less ignorant than them, and in order to maintain a coherent discussion 
between each other, his less learned friends would have had to invest a time and 
energies which they obviously never had - for numerous social reasons? Certainly, 
Williams does the right thing with his less learned friends, but it appears as 
incontestable that he cannot talk with them about the things he thinks are best and most 
valuable.7 In my view he is stressing even further the notion of culture as an 
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assemblage of cultures subjected to class differences; differences which ought, 
according to my argument here, to be abolished. 
That socialism has so far not occurred anywhere in the world seems to me incontestable, 
despite years of communist dictatorships whose ultimate end was supposed to be indeed 
the creation of a socialist society of equals.8 To be equals in the full sense of its 
meaning, must per forza entail phenomenal difficulties: not only in the sense of any 
individual having equal rights and equal responsibilities to any other individual, but also 
an equal faculty of knowing and reasoning. It is a matter, I think, of differentiating 
between socio-political means - that is, an ideology and its implementation - and the 
ultimate aim of those means. The Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia (1997), with its 
characteristic circumspection, is able just to tell us that communism is rightly an 
"ideology" but that socialism is nevertheless "difficult to define with precision." Indeed, 
something that has not come into existence cannot be identified in the first place. Erich 
Fromm suggests the following definition of socialism: 
Socialism is the abolition of human self-alienation, the return of man as a real 
human being. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and 
nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between 
existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between 
freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is a solution of the 
riddle of history and knows itself to this solution. For Marx, socialism meant 
the social order which permits the return of man to himself, the identity between 
existence and essence, the overcoming of the separateness and antagonism 
between subject and object, the humanization of nature; it meant a world in 
which man is no longer a stranger among strangers, is in his world, where he is 
at home. (Fromm, 1992: 69) 
We, like Jameson, can in reality only fantasize about the idea of socialism. While one 
could define a socialist condition as a social world where human beings are truly equal; 
another definition could be posited, that socialism is about universal employment, or the 
abolition of labour altogether (Jameson, 2004: 47), or a state of existence without class 
differences or private property, where people are free to engage in true responsibilities 
and make true choices that will concern not only the individual but all- those living and 
those that have yet to be born - where everyone is welcomed as a human being in a 
human world. The path to socialism would necessarily be very complicated indeed, if 
only because it would be trampled by endless discussions. If a socialist condition would 
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be a state of perfect democracy and therefore perfect justice, socialism is then an end-
product or an 'absolute value'. But according to Wittgenstein's critique on ethics, 
socialism would not be then an ideology but an ethical end in itself: it would be the 
"impossible" utopia; an absolute value; that which ought to be (Cahoon, 1996: 192-8). 
Yet, there has been, I think, a kind of strategic reasonmg - through the media, 
education, the church and so on - during the second half of the last century, determined 
to confound communist dictatorships with Communism's intended end - that is, 
socialism (Jameson, 2004: 35-54). This incorrect conception of socialism has become a 
precept in the collective imaginary and, as Russell explains, to challenge a precept 
becomes a very difficult operation (Cory, 1960: 581). For example, through major 
media channels, to millions of people and apparently totally uncontested, such an 
informed novelist as Frederick Forsyth tells us that, according to history, socialism is a 
proven "failure".9 Nothing would persuade people like Forsyth that, thus far, socialism 
has never been tested as it has never come to pass anywhere in the world. However, 
theorists like Poulantzas tell us that Forsyth's conceptualization of socialism needs to be 
taken in its right context, and thus he says: 
History has not yet given us a successful experience of the democratic road to 
socialism: what it has provided - and that is not insignificant - is some negative 
examples to avoid and some mistakes upon which to reflect. It can naturally 
always be argued, in the name of realism (either by proponents of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat or by the others, the orthodox neoliberals), that if 
democratic socialism has never yet existed, this is because it is impossible. 
Maybe. [ ... ] But one thing is certain: socialism will be democratic or it will not 
be at all (Poulantzas, 1978: 87). 
There can be no doubt, then, that this general failure to distinguish with due rigour 
between ideological, moral or ethical discourses has had detrimental consequences 
within Theatre Studies. For instance, as a consequence of his philosophy of drama -
and of statements like the one that opens this chapter - Bond is too often accused of 
"politicizing art" as literally as Ahmed Hasaballa Elhag does all the way through his 
doctoral thesis (1989). This is tantamount to saying that Bond, whose entire work and 
theory is motivated by a vital yearning for a future socialist democracy, has the same 
dramatic strategy of Brecht which, as Benjamin clarifies in his letters, clearly stood for a 
Stalinist communist dictatorship (Demetz, 1986: 215-16). 
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If anyone has taken a stand in the strongest tenns against the philosophies and dramatic 
practices of Brecht within the field of theatre, it surely is Bond himself. And he does so 
in a totally uncompromising manner - which might be one of the reasons why most 
scholars and practitioners seem not to know how to fit Bond's techniques and 
philosophies into their institutional academic agendas. In explaining Bond's own 
location in opposition to Brecht, even a well-known Bondian practitioner like Peter 
Billingham tries rightly to stay within the due boundaries of scholarly debate when he 
says "Bond has argued that the ideological base of Brechtian methodology has fulfilled 
its historical context and purpose and that political theatre needs to re-occupy - or 
discover a new - essentially anthropological questioning of the ontological site of 
human existence". 10 For Bond, however, Brecht is not just a question of due historical 
regard; as he told me himself during our encounter, in our current social situation the 
dramatist is "far more desperate than that: [ ... ] So, this is why I'm not interested in 
Brecht - you know, find the gestures, find the abstract thing ... I'm not interested in that 
any more. [ ... ] I need something that will take me further. I need to be able to look at 
the stage and see ... the invisible object presenting me!... with the necessity of making a 
choice" (Appendix: 27).11 When the Le Monde's journalist, Fabienne Darge, asked 
Bond in what ways his vision of the tragic was different from that of Brecht, the 
dramatist replied unambiguously: 
Pour moi, Brecht est un irresponsable, un gangster politique, Ie poete 
d'Auschwitz et du Goulag. II a trahi la pensee d'Aristote, il s'est fait Ie serviteur 
d'une dictature abjecte, l'Allemagne de l'Est, ou regnaient l'injustice et Ie 
mensonge. Et maintenant, des metteurs en scene montent ses pieces en pensant 
que c'est du theatre politique ... Je trouve cela obscene. 12 
[My translation: "For me, Brecht is irresponsible, a political gangster, the poet of 
Auschwitz and the Gulag. He betrayed Aristotle's thinking, becoming the 
servant of a despicable dictatorship, East Gennany, where injustice and lies were 
the rule. And now, theatre producers put on his work thinking that this IS 
political theatre... I find that obscene"] 
Evidently, this is quite different from saying that Brecht's methodology "has fulfilled its 
historical context and purpose"; Bond is trampling on Brecht's theory of theatre, as if it 
were an infectious bug. Conversely, it would not be appropriate to reproach Elhag or 
anyone else for thinking of Bond as a "political" or an ideologically overcharged 
dramatist; there is a logic to it. We need to acknowledge comprehensibly the dialectical 
position of those that would take Bond's assertions as "shocking", "too provocative" or, 
5. Chapter V 
Culture or ideology 
192 
as Terry Eagleton tells me in a personal letter, "in need of dialectics". I3 Maybe. In 
more than one sense, I myself imagine that scholars like Elhag think of Bond as one 
entering a crowded Catholic church and then shouting "You believe in God because that 
preacher there is a liar; to go on living you need the lie, and you know it." Of course, I 
am certain that the dramatist would not do such a thing and I hope I am forgiven for my 
hyperbolical prosopopoeia here. Bond knows that these kind of tactics would not do 
any good - this is made repeatedly clear in his plays, other published writing and the 
included Appendix. But he achieves a similar stridency through the apparatus of drama. 
In order to avoid ideological misjudgements, perhaps we need to set once and for all an 
ethical space where we can use the terms "fascist" or "socialist" without instantly being 
categorized as "political". 
The notion that both fascism and socialism have been surmounted and dealt with in 
history is all too widespread: the former with the victory of the Allies over the Axis 
Powers in 1945, and the latter with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. In 
addition, there does not seem to be any familiar or historically archetypal symptoms by 
which it is possible to identify whether an artwork is socialist or fascist in current 
western society. As I said earlier via Walter Benjamin, neither do we have a theory of 
history "on the basis of which fascism can be sighted" (Wohlfarth, 1979: 972). But 
Walter Benjamin's letters make me think that, actually, it is dialectics which is in 
serious need of thinkers like Bond. By stating that art can only be socialist or fascist, 
Bond could be accused of practising not dialectics but just crude thinking. But when 
Bertolt Brecht told Walter Benjamin that "the main thing is how to think crudely; Crude 
Thinking, that is the thinking of the great." the latter added: "There are many people 
whose idea of a dialectician is a love of subtleties ... [His ellipsis] Crude thoughts, on 
the contrary, should be part and parcel of dialectical thinking, because they are nothing 
but the referral of theory to practice.,,14 Bond's crude thinking is, in my view, as much a 
referral to practice as it is to reality; that is why, within the ambit of Theatre Studies, his 
philosophical proposition about drama is a very unique one. 
Bond, as he told me himself, does not see a solution, as surely did Brecht by way of a 
proletarian dictatorship and its Committees of Public Safety; Bond sees "the problem." 
What does he propose then, for unmasking injustice in a society in which we cannot 
make real choices or offer real solutions - unless, as I have said before, we make the 
ultimate decision to sleep under bridges? The answer is drama. For drama provides the 
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place where people can make choices without being crushed by the overwhelming 
forces of Big Capital;lS the place where, paraphrasing Wittgenstein's theory of ethics, 
we can make decisions through the still unresolved language of ethics: "silence." We 
still need to understand what freedom and democracy really mean; having the chance to 
make choices and being responsible for them might help towards this goal. Of course, 
in drama these are choices that can only be made within the spheres of the conceptual, 
but it is a start. We need dialectics in order to unfold the synthesis, more complete and 
nearer to the truth than its confronting elements, the thesis and its antithesis. Yet, as 
Adorno indicates all through his symptomatic and punctilious descriptions, in our 
bourgeois modem society all dialectics become Negative Dialectics. That Adorno 
proposes Beckett's figuring of vacuity and failure (O'Connor, 2000: 319-50) and 
Schoenberg'S discordant scores (Ibid.: 280-303) as solutions "to world starvation and 
threatened nuclear destruction" (Eagleton, 1991: 360) is not accidental. On the contrary, 
it is one of the few instances in which Adorno's theory does not appear contradictory 
but ratifying: his theory of art corresponds to the bourgeois aesthetics of forecasted 
failure and mass dysfunctionality. It is a dialectics whose synthesis always ends 
negatively. As Terry Eagleton advises, Adorno's solution "is a solution that is clearly 
part of the problem".16 
Raymond Williams observed that "socialism would be much more complicated than 
capitalism," and before him Oscar Wilde complained that it would take "too many 
evenings" (Jameson, 2004: 43, quoting Williams). The view is that utopian socialism 
appears to be beyond the bounds of possibility while fascism is all too clearly within it; 
implying the ever present danger of its re-establishment. This is tantamount to saying 
that to undertake a path towards socialism is the difficult way while fascism is the easy 
one. Could this division be applied to artists and their artworks? Between those who 
surrender their artworks to production schedules, popular taste and fashion, to profits,17 
and those who do not? I have already proposed via Bourdieu a division between 
"violent," non-submissive art and "non-violent," submissive art. Earlier via Garcia 
Duttmann, I also brought into the discussion the urgent task of "inventing" concepts, 
languages or settings that are entirely unusable for the purposes of fascism; a task 
which, by its multi-dimensional characteristics, the field of theatre practice seems to be 
better equipped to undertake than other creative fields. But the letter from Eagleton 
below prompts me to suggest that there is too much confusion concerning fascism. 
How can we undertake such a task if we have such contrasting and even opposing 
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conceptions of what fascism is or is not? Would it help if one could suggest 
dialectically that neither the general concept of socialism nor the undefined fascism 
have anything to do with ideology? That the former never came into being and the 
latter perhaps never died? And above all, would it help if one could establish in which 
ways socialism and fascism meet their roots in people's intrinsic yearn for justice? 
This is to me a new question of cardinal importance, triggered by the philosophy of 
drama of Edward Bond. As he says: 
The desire for justice becomes the psychological need for injustice. Traced to its 
roots, the good motivates the bad - but the roots are hidden in human chaos. It 
is a paradox. It makes the world-home a place of hate, revenge and enmity. 
That is why the individual's desire for justice becomes at the same time 
society's need for injustice" (2004: 25). 
If in 1979 Allardyce was already complaining that fascism was "too hot to handle" 
(1979: 369), nowadays it has either become dead cold by a progressive "loss of heat" or 
so hot it has been "vaporized". In this chapter I will examine the concept of fascism, and 
at the same time attempt to put its questioning back on the agenda of Theatre Studies. 
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5.1.2. Eagleton versus Bond - 'one' socialism versus 'another' 
socialism 
There is, throughout Terry Eagleton's writings, an easily recognisable and constant 
objection to the idea that our current liberal capitalism could also be defined as another, 
more sophisticated form of fascism. If by way of Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, or 
Marcusel8 one was to suggest that our current post-industrial liberal capitalism is a 
deodorized form of fascism, for Eagleton this would be a gross misrecognition. He 
says: 
It is by now widely agreed that Adorno's experience of fascism led him and 
other members of the Frankfurt School to travesty and misrecognize some of the 
specific power-structures of liberal capitalism, projecting the minatory shadow 
of the former sort of regime upon the quite different institutions of the latter 
(Eagleton, 1991: 359). 
However, this prominent critic does not specify to whom he is alluding when he says 
"widely" anywhere in his The Ideology of the Aesthetic. With that question in mind I 
sent him a letter and, making the most of it, I also included some arguments defending 
the Frankfurt School's case. For example, I suggested that there are disturbing 
similarities in the basic psychodynamic principles of Fascism and Liberal Capitalism. 
As Adorno explains, psychological dependency and social conformism are two of the 
most conspicuous constituents in both systems (Adorno, 2001: 135-45). It ought to be 
disturbing indeed to find that Hitler's Mein Kampf proposes the same tautological 
tactics that are at work today in many of today's "soap-operatic" commercial and 
political events: from sports to adverts, from news and broadcasting to general 
elections, from television and radio serials to literature, and so on. "The art of 
propaganda" wrote Hitler, "lies in understanding the emotional ideas of the great masses 
and finding, through a psychologically correct form, the way to the attention [ ... ] people 
do not have multiple shadings; [propaganda] has a positive and a negative; love or hate, 
right or wrong [ ... ] the masses are slow-moving, and they always require a certain time 
before they are ready even to notice a thing, and only after the simplest ideas are 
repeated thousands of times will the masses finally remember them.,,19 
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Is Adorno's conclusion such a 'ridiculous misrepresentation' of fascism; a "travesty" as 
Eagleton suggests? Addressing his audience in Nuremberg (1934), Hitler said, 
"Propaganda took us to power. Propaganda helps us to remain in power. Propaganda 
will help us to conquer the world" (endnote 19). We should not need further supporting 
evidence to conclude that the successful globalization of liberal capitalism and its 
intrinsic idealism comes as a result of a worldwide systematic dissemination of the 
riches that we supposedly enjoy in our western "democracies" (Abu-Lughod, 1997).20 
Capitalism does not need now to impose its dominance through sheer force under the 
leadership of this or that lunatic because we have advertisements which, as Judith 
Williamson suggests, "are one of the most important cultural factors moulding and 
reflecting our life today. They are Ubiquitous, an inevitable part of everyone's lives: 
even if you do not read a newspaper or watch television [they] form a vast 
superstructure with [ ... ] autonomous existence and immense influence" (1993: 188). 
The dominant ideology is pushed within ourselves, she says, not through the things we 
produce, but through the things we consume (Ibid.: 190). Neither should we ignore the 
dangers connected with an aestheticization of everything which, as DUttmann explains 
in his most pertinent essay "Tradition and Destruction" (1991), is one of the 
fundamental malaises of the postmodern. I also pointed out to Eagleton that, like the 
Frankfurt School (O'Connor, 2000: 9), Marcuse (1992: 15), Lukacs (1971: 23), 
Benjamin (1999: 234) and quite a good number of prominent scholars, Edward Bond 
also thinks we could be now 'living a kind of fascism,;21 I repeat, however 
'deodorized'. As Bond tells us: "To call Reagan, Thatcher and Major, Hiders would be 
grotesque. But Hitlers are no longer necessary. In the media age democracy can 
destroy itself. It does so when it makes icons of its lies. Fascism occurs only when -
but always when - the real causes of social injustice are denied" (Bond, 1995b: 20). 
Summing up, I wanted to put to the critic that, if so many prominent thinkers arrived at 
the same conclusion, surely such arguments must be made up of at least some "truth 
content" (see diagram based on Adorno's theory in chapter I, section III). Promptly and 
kindly, Eagleton sent me the following providential letter; providential because it will 
allow me to explore here these important yet inconspicuous loopholes within the 
meaning of the term fascism itself - or better still, what it does not mean. 
Dear Cesar Villa, 
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[ ... ] Among the 'widely', when it comes to Adorno on liberal capitalism, I was 
thinking I suppose of Jay, Jameson, Anderson and Habermas. Fascism and 
liberal capitalism clearly have much in common, as you suggest, and the former 
grows out of the latter; but I dislike the loose use of the word 'fascist' by the 
political left, which I think devalues the notion, and the distinctions between the 
two regimes are surely as vital as the affinities. Bourgeois democracies are 
typically characterised by contending political parties, parliamentary rule, non-
dictatorship, formal (if not always actual) civil liberties, relatively autonomous 
media, the non-militarisation of everyday life, labour movements and trade 
unions, rationalism rather than mythology, liberal-bourgeois rather than 
totalitarian ideologies etc. None of this is true of the classical fascist regimes -
which is not for a moment to underestimate the sinister corporatism, shrinking of 
civil liberties, attacks on the labour movement, curbing of free speech and so on 
of many bourgeois democracies. (The United States is in practice a one-party 
state, but not in principle - and I think the principle matters). To claim with 
Bond that we are now living fascism seems to me a dangerous hyperbole, and an 
emotive rather than rigorous use of the term. To say that this is as bad as 
fascism is to say that fascism was as bad as this, which seems to me a grossly 
self-indulgent underestimation of the evil of the fascists. Marx of course had 
undying praise for liberal democracy (as well as vehemently opposing it): it 
seemed to him to spring from the most revolutionary class in history (the 
bourgeoisie), and to be at once emancipatory and enslaving. I doubt he would 
have said the same had he lived to see the Nazis. Mr Bond needs a little more 
dialectics ... (30 April, 2005). 
I might be at fault here because I wish I had sent Eagleton a detailed introduction to 
Bond's social evaluations and line of thinking, seeing that his reply shows an all too 
obvious unawareness of them (see endnote 21). What is interesting is that while they 
both manage to perceive the same object/problem, their perception of it is 
conspicuously different. They both might claim to be socialists in one way or another 
but certainly their different conclusions about our current social system can only be the 
result of different ideological positions. They agree that "fascism and liberal capitalism 
clearly have much in common", as Eagleton says above; the problem is that, while 
Eagleton seems to make clear that that commonality of fascism and liberal capitalism 
does not make liberal capitalism an "extreme system", it does for Bond. In fact, in the 
conclusion of his work "The Illusion of Postmodernism" (1997), Eagleton even seems 
almost to have been coerced into coming to terms with the fact that, with capitalism, 
fascism could be a threat, as he says: "I must end, regretfully [my italics], on a minatory 
note. Postmodern end-of-history thinking does not envisage a future for us much 
different from the present, a prospect it oddly views as a cause for celebration. But 
there is indeed one such possible future among several, and its name is fascism" (1997: 
134). 
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As he has with aesthetics (1991: 9), Eagleton has on capitalism quite a doubled-edged 
view. In his paper "Capitalism and Form" (2002), he discusses bourgeois capitalism not 
as a "stable, predictable and enduring" social system but, like Brecht did before him 
(Brecht, 1983: 47), as a neverending extreme revolution "perpetually agitating, 
unmasking, disrupting, dissolving" (Eagleton, 2002: 121). Even more, Eagleton also 
recognizes how liberal capitalism "enjoys a kind of horrified intimacy with fascism" 
(Ibid.: 128); and this is a "horrified intimacy" that he acknowledges repeatedly 
(Eagleton, 1991: 379; 1996: 134). Now, Eagleton's evaluation on fascism and 
capitalism appears almost identical to Bond's own philosophical assessments - at least 
up to his points of "intimacy," and of capitalism as the true "extreme" system (Stuart, 
2000: 134-35; 2001: 70-2; Bond, 1995: 20; Roberts, 1985: 38-41). However, if their 
placement of fascism and capitalism as entwined systems is almost identical, this 
'almost' makes all the difference. As I said before, critics like Eagleton criticize the 
ground on which they stand, and in doing so they reflect certain autonomy of thought, 
but they do not go as far as to really undermine it. For example, while critiquing the 
bourgeois agent as "criminal" (Eagleton, 2002: 119), "selfish," "gargantuan," and even 
as the "true anarchist" (Ibid.: 128), there is also a kind of self-indulgent celebration or 
even admiration towards the bourgeoisie in Eagleton's writing. For him in capitalism 
there is "something ignoble", but there is "something epic about it" as well (Ibid.: 125). 
Accurately enough, Eagleton seems fascinated by the fact that our ongoing ruling 
bourgeois system is itself the product of an ongoing revolution - which one could safely 
suggest is one of its most embarrassing characteristics. On the one hand, it fiercely 
defends capital growth and class difference - that is, social stability - and on the other it 
is unrelentingly and rapidly transforming social infrastructures precisely because capital 
growth must be sustained at all costs. And the critic reaches such ambivalent 
conclusions because, in my view, he seems ultimately to suffer from the very ideology 
he criticises. Thus says Eagleton, "the honest bourgeois may reject the artist as a 
dangerous transgressor, but the virulence with which he does so, rather like the puritan 
denouncing pornography, betrays the fact that part of what he is rejecting here is an 
intolerable image of himself' (Ibid.: 128). Ideology reaches everywhere. Eagleton 
seems here to be saying that the bourgeois knows deep inside how to be the true 
"artist": the "innovator", the "revolutionary", the "transgressor". Yet, to compare 
capitalism and its agents with anything epic, anything heroic, seems to me a grotesque 
joke of cultural criticism. The achievements of the bourgeoisie are in more than one 
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sense quite remarkable, but there is nothing heroic or epIC III its capitalistic 
machinations. Capitalism has endured fights against nature, but it is hardly a "heroic 
struggle". It is not like saving the human race as in Milton's epic Paradise Lost (1998; 
orig.1667), nor even just a community, at the expense of his or her own life. In some 
sense, capitalism or the bourgeoisie might have helped humanity to be safer - indeed 
many lives have been saved due to such innovations as penicillin - but within the 
bourgeois system all reasons are easily undermined by economic imperatives. 
5.1.3. Socialism is too difficult; fascism is too easy. 
Knowing that for many Marxists he would be saying something "heretical", Bond 
himself told me, "the victories it [the working class] achieves are not through socialist 
politics, but through the successes of capitalism" (Appendix: 32). But if capitalism has 
achieved extraordinary results, it is for the same reason that it has accomplished 
extraordinary crimes: for the sake of capital growth. For the epic hero, all human 
imperatives come first; for the bourgeoisie human imperatives are ultimately not just 
peripheral but, as historicism and economicism show quite clearly, in many cases they 
have been an inconvenience.22 For the bourgeois there is no ''us'', only "I", and thus its 
deeds cannot be epic. I refer here, of course, to Milton's sense of the epic because I do 
not expect Eagleton to think of the epic in relation to our own field, theatre studies. It is 
not appropriate, for example, to assess his definition of the epic against that of Piscator 
or Brecht (Taylor, 1992: 94; Demetz, 1986: 213). Eagleton defends his idea of the 
commercial as epic by diagnosing the classics' definitions on the epic as unsuitable to 
current times because, he says, "no classical epic ever imagined that you could wring 
from commerce the kind of prodigious vitality, tragic destructiveness, titanic characters 
and panoramic vision that could be derived from martial, mythological and political 
matters" (Eagleton, 2002: 124-25). One could see it differently: that the classics could 
never imagine that one day social critics would envisage as epic, the pursuit of capital 
growth, the enterprises and machinations of money-makers. More suitable here would 
be Edward Bond's definition of epic, which seems to me the most correct and pragmatic 
of all because it takes from Piscator and Brecht's ideological sense of the epic, and 
relocates it to the totally new ontological heights of ethics; thus transcending ideology. 
As he says on the epic: 
The form of the new drama will be epic. This name is often misunderstood, 
partly because the form isn't yet fully developed. An epic play tells a story and 
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says why it happened. This gives it a beginning, a middle and an end joined 
together in a truthful way. This isn't true of the theatre of the absurd. It sees life 
as meaningless: it has a beginning and an end but not middle. The bourgeois 
theatre is concerned only with anecdotes: they have a middle but not beginning 
and end. 
Epic plays don't need to cover centuries or have a cast of annies. The essence of 
epic theatre is in the way it selects, connects and judges. Even when it deals 
with two people quarrelling in a kitchen it draws its method and values from the 
understanding of the history of all men. How else should you judge between 
right and wrong? Bourgeois writers believe that only they write with subtlety 
and sensitivity. They see epic theatre as abstract, inhuman and cold. But what 
they call subtle and sensitive is only arbitrary and incomplete. They try to 
derive meaning from the incidental. No, the broad structure of history must be 
understood before the incidents in it can be given meaning. That's why the epic 
is the only fonn of theatre that can be subtle and sensitive - and have good taste, 
wit, nuance and human intimacy. Bourgeois theatre lacks this sense of purpose 
and this makes it inhuman. It would be unfair to judge its subtlety and 
sensitivity on the fodder it gives to tired businessmen and their bored clients. 
That would let it off very lightly. It ought to be judged on the crudity, 
shallowness and VUlgarity of the plays admired by its intellectuals. (Bond, 1980: 
109). 
I will not list here the innumerable instances in which both critic and dramatist arrive at 
the same theoretical conclusions, but it will be useful to examine one example. As he 
tells me in his letters, the interpolation of fantasy into reality is for Bond one of the most 
pronounced sicknesses of our modem times; be it by way of cultural production, 
mainstream politics, media, education, or religion. Eagleton identifies this interpolation 
in the same way, but for him it is not a problem: "we must come to tenns, with the fact 
that fantasy, desire and disruption are in some sense part of the given order" (Eagleton, 
2002: 121). Yet, to say that "we must come to tenns" also means literally 'to reconcile 
with'. Eagleton appears to suggest that postmodem society at large has capitulated to a 
world that feels more at ease when delimited by fairy tales. However, as I will note 
here, several examples demonstrate that for the critic there is not final, unambiguous 
thesis: first the critic sees fantasy in the postmodem as an opportunity to encounter 
liberatory languages - a way to the transcendent through fantasy as an "anarchic [ ... ] 
dynamic operation of capitalism" (Ibid.: 121-24); and then as "pure negation" of reality 
itself (Ibid.: 126). From his dialectics, one ideas seems conclusive though: for Eagleton 
fantasy might be a way to transgression which, he says, becomes transcendence; fantasy 
is a fonn of desire and, therefore, of salvation. As he says: 
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This is part of Goethe's great achievement in Faust. With Faust, transgression 
becomes transcendence-a perpetual spiritual striving which refuses to rest in 
the present, and so an angelic version of demonic desire. Indeed, Faust will be 
damned only for ceasing to strive, and his spiritual quest is as much a defiance 
of Mephistopheles as the fruit of a pact with him. In a masterly equation, desire 
is salvation, and so is stripped for the most part of its disruptive, hubristic 
qualities (Eagleton, 2002: 130). 
Fantasy becomes transgression which becomes transcendence, then becomes desire and 
then finally salvation. Bond clearly would not only never suggest such an idea but he 
would refute it (see overall conclusion). Of course, within a middle class setting reality 
might seem dull, grim, and boring - and current mass culture, which is mostly based in 
pure entertainment, ratifies this. Break free from that context and reality is also soaked 
with blood, brutality and tyranny; a world of injustice that needs to be repaired. 
However, it will not be repaired with fantasy but, as Bond insistently suggests, with 
imagination. Fantasy forms part and parcel of the problem because it displaces the 
latter. "Our fantasy fixation is worrying," remarks Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, "fantasy 
doesn't just feed on the imagination, it drains it. Virtuality erodes reality [ ... ] we flee to 
fantasy in recoil from truth.,,23 Fantasy is delusory imagination and we theatre 
practitioners should ask whether and when the former has been or is being confounded 
with the latter.24 Only through imagination might we foresee the product of our actions. 
As if it were a drug, in our minds we might "fly" with fantasy and levitate among 
clouds without any need for wings, but if we fly for real it is only because some people 
put imagination into it. "Fantasy is imagination free-wheeling," Bond tells us, "but 
imagination is impregnated with reality and reality with imagination [ ... ] imagination is 
the search for meaning" (1998: 7). And concurring with Fernandez-Armesto he adds: 
"When the imagination is fantasised it becomes destructive" (Ibid.: 11). 
Through his VIews on the epic above, Bond reinforces one of my prior critical 
suggestions: that in contrast with what Eagleton assumes about Bond, he and Bond 
appear to recognize or visualize the same problematic structures that form our bourgeois 
culture. But, while they see the same problem, they draw, not opposing, but contrasting 
conclusions. Here again we have the case of socialism being problematic or difficult by 
praxis. Capitalism instead is unproblematic: capital growth and profits are the aim of all 
capitalists. Of course, problems arise from the need to organize societies in such a way 
that capital growth and profits are constant, but a consensus is pre-established by all 
concerned. Those who might jeopardize or question the consensus are subtly pushed to 
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the fringes and become ostracised - or they are accused of being anchorites, as some do 
with Bond (Logan, 2000). If they become a source of social conflict, and therefore 
affect production and domination, they are simply "annihilated" as was the case with 
Victor Jara in 1973 Chile. 
That most of us will always choose an easy route of action instead of an arduous one -
or rewording Bond, a route through whats-and-whens instead of through whys (Bond, 
1998: 3) - is a matter of serious concern to me. And it should be for all those who are 
involved in humanistic studies and who make a living from it in one way or another. As 
exposed by the recent BBC4 documentary, Under Laboratory Conditions, there is 
already a palpable and progressive reduction of university departments of Humanities, 
and the remaining departments are finding it increasingly difficult to find funding for 
humanistic research, fundamentally due to the fact that "money is allocated principally 
to those research projects which can demonstrate to have a viable commercial profit.,,25 
If the culture of whats-and-whens continues to expand at this rhythm, eventually only a 
few institutions in the academic world will offer humanist studies and only in cases of 
outstanding excellence and/or privilege. That I ask about the whys does not mean that I 
have the answer; at least not the kind of answer the "non holistic mind" expects to 
obtain (Bond, 1998: 3) - nor a civil servant with the responsibility of distributing 
funding according to governmental policies. Some whys sound like a "why" but are 
really what-and-whens. For example, if one asks a school teacher "why does it rain", 
the teacher is likely to explain evaporation, condensation and so on, and that kind of 
answer would in reality be answering whats-and-whens. Only if the student replies 
"yes, but why?" would things need to be reconsidered. The whys Bond is referring to 
form part of a cognitive questioning which permeates the holistic mind; Bond, applying 
a logical truth, reminds us that "there is a universal good but not a universal bad" 
(Ibid.). Of course, I am talking again of ethics and Wittgenstein's ethics as "silence." 
Garcia Diittmann evaluates this line of argument in relation to Adorno on one hand and 
Heidegger on the other but, in my view, he becomes entangled and frozen by the 
enigma of whether it is possible to uncover meaning from the question - the whys. His 
position is in keeping with the fact that, actually, he is not a dramatis or a poet. 
Nevertheless, in the following excerpt he shows his position to be closer to Wittgenstein 
and Bond than to Adorno: 
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One who raises the question of meaning has already lost meaning, is asking too 
much or too little [ ... ] the answer both is and is not the meaning of the question. 
It is the meaning of the question because the question calls for an answer, and 
does not exist prior to the answer. But it is not the meaning of the question 
because the question does not include the answer within itself "as something 
intended" [his quotations marks] (DUttmann, 2002:106). 
If I can paraphrase DUttmann, the answer would then consume the question, because the 
question, "is not the question yet [my italics]" (Ibid.). And I think DUttmann is right in 
the sense that the meaning contained within our answers to the whys made by a holistic 
mind becomes meaningful only within the parameters of drama, when the problem is 
dramatized.26 However, I do not think DUttmann is thinking of tragedy - even as a 
'specialist' on Benjamin - when he thinks of questions and their meanings' answers; let 
alone Bond's fonn of trag edyl drama. 
The idea of Eagleton as a socialist is as contentious as his own suggestion that Oscar 
Wilde was a socialist. In his paper "Saint Oscar: a Foreword", he addresses Wilde as 
"the Oxfordian socialist proto deconstructionist" (1989: 126). And he adds, "Wilde is 
political in all the most fundamental senses of the tenn [ ... ] political, for example, 
because he is very funny, a remorseless debunker of the high-toned gravitas of 
bourgeois Victorian England. He is radical because he takes nothing seriously, cares 
only for fonn, appearance and pleasure, and is religiously devoted to his own self-
gratification" (1989: 127). If the problem of applying dialectics within a petty-
bourgeoisified milieu is that it always ends negatively, in his enthusiasm for Wilde, 
Eagleton seems to offer a perfect example, while he loses any residual sense of 
historicism and economicism. Now the very definitions of bourgeois decadence -
taking nothing seriously, caring only for fonn, total commitment to self-gratification -
are also supposed by Eagleton to be socialist traits. I am not saying that a socialist is a 
kind of anchorite aesthete in the veins of Schopenhauer - who was by no means a 
socialist. But if a socialist democracy implies freedom and equality, it also implies the 
abolition of religious or moral principles; and therefore, fun and pleasure could not be 
called sinful. Thus, while in different works Eagleton tell us that being "self-gratifying", 
"radical," and "all aesthetical" are characteristic traits of the bourgeoisie (1991: 168; 
2002 : 130), in relation to Wilde he decides that these are socialist traits. 
Furthennore, Eagleton surely commits the mistake of non-dialectical reduction, by 
designating Victorian England as simply "bourgeois". Victorian England was in 
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practice bourgeois but still feudal in principle and this makes all the difference. Both 
the Houses of Commons and Lords gained constitutional rights in relation to the 
monarchy as far back as the reign of Richard II in the 14th century; and surely we would 
not identify those times as a bourgeois era. Most surviving documents about 
Shakespeare tell us that he was a successful businessman and very little about him being 
the greatest playwright of all time - not even his death certificate. Historians have 
located the installation of the bourgeois order in Europe from the year 1848, yet it does 
not mean that the monarchic myth was swiftly annihilated - especially in Great Britain. 
Every single day I pass by a War Memorial with the words "For King and Country" 
engraved on it; first King, then Country. The bourgeois ideology has taken a grip of 
society progressively, not instantly. Thus, if Wilde "debunked" the gravitas of the 
"bourgeois Victorians", it was because they were, yes bourgeois, but also monarchists. 
The bourgeois Wilde was indeed a threat to the then given order because it was not 
bourgeois order in its full meaning, but a moribund feudalism. It was thanks to the 
bourgeoisie's taste for freedom (Gartman, 1991: 439) and, thus, to bourgeois artists like 
Wilde, that the bourgeoisie emerged finally from the feudal yoke. Wilde pastiches the 
emergent aspects of dominant bourgeois ideology and threatens its residual elements, in 
order to make it an adequate fit to the class's true historical condition. It is interesting to 
observe how Eagleton suffers from the same ambivalences he observes in others - as, 
for instance, Adorno. 
Now, in his letter above, Eagleton accuses Bond of being "hyperbolic" and "emotive". 
But Bond is neither related to utopia in the sense of an impossible imaginary, nor, as it 
were, in a fantasized idealism. As he tells me in a recent letter, "Wilde said that a map 
that doesn't have a place on it for Utopia is useless. That sounds nice but is dangerous 
nonsense. A map of Utopia that doesn't have a place for reality is a map of hell.'.27 If 
Eagleton's terms refer to Bond's words as the product of the dramatist's strong feelings 
in relation to our current social state of affairs, I think he is right. After all, we are 
human beings; and some of us are poets, who can access intense emotions. Only 
machines do not have emotions. I will not discuss here emotive theory, and its relation 
to logical positivism. Bertrand Russell, through his re-establishment of empiricism, tells 
us how ethical and value judgments are expressions of feelings, not of descriptive 
statements (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 200-02; 704-05); in other words, the whats-
and-whens characteristic of scientism. But, if in relation to Bond, the intended meaning 
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of "emotive" is for Eagleton extravagant, self-indulgent, or wishful thinking, then I 
think he is quite wrong - and I hope to demonstrate it here. 
Through close reading of both the critic and the dramatist, I feel confident to suggest 
another of their common similarities: a fierce honesty. Of course, whilst situated in 
their respective 'ideological constituencies', in the case of Eagleton, his honesty reveals 
(or betrays) to us his position not just as a bourgeois critic, but to his having capitulated 
to the same spirit of failure he so criticizes in Beckett and Adorno (1991: 341-366). For 
instance, in one of his previous papers, "The Crisis of Contemporary Culture" (1992), 
Eagleton begins by making an appreciative introduction about his then new position as 
professor at St Catherine's College, Oxford and, after an erudite mixture of 
embarrassment, humility, and gratitude, he closes it by saying: "when I reflect on my 
own dubious genealogy and penchant for mimicry, I can't avoid the overpowering 
feeling, not least in the small hours of the morning, that I have become Warton 
Professor by a kind of mistake. But since being a professor is better than having a job 
[my italics], I don't intend to look a gift horse in the mouth" (1992: 30). Now, contrary 
to what some would argue - and despite Eagleton's own evident rhetorical construction 
of a 'joke' - I do not see any motive for irony or sarcasm in his use of this proverb; on 
the contrary, if aesthetics and ideology encapsulate all and everything, we ought to take 
it with the importance it deserves. Because, by analysing it closely, it would tell us of 
the ways in which the bourgeois ideology of charisma and difference (Bourdieu, 1984; 
1985) pervade every part of our lives. 
Through his comments above, Eagleton has told us two things about his own 
ideological location. With the first, "better being a professor than having a job", the 
critic confirms Bourdieu's thesis by acknowledging the fact that to be a professor 
situates him in a position of privilege, reproducing on the one hand, and legitimising on 
the other, traditional class structures. The irony is that Eagleton is totally correct: 
having to endure a 'job" is mostly demeaning, alienating, and uncreative - especially if 
one is unfortunate enough to be amongst those millions of Chinese employees working 
in an assembly line for five pence per hour. But his remark also underlines the fact that 
his cultural criticism is revealed more as "intrac1ass strife [that is, occurring within his 
own social class] which never fundamentally challenges the class structure of 
capitalism, since all bourgeois fractions have an interest in their joint domination of the 
working class" (Gartman, 1991: 439). And of course thinkers like Eagleton are 
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prominent because they make a difference: but only within the realm of authority. 
Since his struggle is for symbolic capital, it often leads to changes in literature, 
education and art, but not beyond them; not beyond his own class. "Better to be a 
professor than having a job" through Eagleton'S mouth is a coup of sheer honesty but 
also a reaffirmation of Bourdieu's sociological theory of culture (1985); especially 
when our world is basically structured by a majority who must either endure a job (or 
worse, have to find one) and a minority that does not. With his second comment, 
namely that he does not "intend to look a gift horse in the mouth," Eagleton reaffirms 
even further the thesis that if there is class conflict, in the Field of Restricted Production 
(FRP) this takes place solely "within the predetermined confines of the field," but 
without challenging "the rules of the game" (Gartman, 1991: 438). Conversely, the 
critic exposes his own position as a dominated fraction of the bourgeoisie, because after 
all, his status is determined by the "gifts" offered to him by the dominating fractions of 
it. 
It is not coincidental then that among all those giants of thought that Eagleton criticises 
in The Ideology 0/ the Aesthetic, Jiirgen Habermas is situated quite positively and 
parallel to the theory of his mentor, Raymond Williams (1991: 404). Thus, by way of 
Habermas and Williams, the critic lets us know also that "only in the context of radical 
democracy [ ... ] would truth properly flourish" (Ibid.: 405), but because we live in a 
continuous state of inequality and domination, this is an "idealized future condition" 
(Ibid.); in other words, "if we wish to know the truth," says Eagleton, "we have to 
change our way of life" (Ibid.). This is a pure Catch 22 based on anticipated failure: no 
truth is possible without real democracy, but nor is there real democracy without truth. 
How are we supposed to change our way of life? With cooperation and linguistic 
communication, says Eagleton quoting Habermas, which "must o/necessity [his italics] 
rely on reason" (1991: 405). In summa, paraphrasing Habermas, Eagleton's answer is 
"that we simply have to talk it over" (Ibid.:412). 
Interestingly enough, when he agreed to receive awards from a traditional agency of 
authority such as the Spanish monarchy (Mendieta, 2004: I), Habermas, like Eagleton, 
did not "look a gift horse in the mouth" either. In my view, to achieve the true 
democratic ideal, we will need far more than the social communicative negotiations 
Habermas and Eagleton suggest; we will also need from them some move that really 
represents all of us; if only a symbolic gesture. "Decorations," says Bourdieu 
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pertinently, are all "for speaking or keeping silent, for compromise or abstention" 
(Bourdieu, 1985: 27). Eagleton, like Habermas, certainly has not kept silent, but would 
his "decoration" - his "gift horse" - have been granted if he had not found an 
intermediate way of criticism in between the agents of liberation and those of 
oppression: that is, a "compromise." If success in our society can be attained by way of 
making compromises and mutual concessions, in my view keeping silent is by far the 
preferred method for most of us - if not to attain success, at least to procure a living for 
ourselves. 
"If A is success in life", formulated Albert Einstein, "then A equals x plus y plus z. 
Work is x; y is play; and z is keeping your mouth shut.,,28 As I have indicated, Bond 
possesses an enviably high status within the "Field of Restricted Production:" he is 
noted in the most prestigious encyclopaedias as one of the most important dramatists of 
recent and current times, his writings and plays give rise to all kind of theses and 
papers, influencing new generations of playwrights, theatre movements, and so on 
(Shank, 1996: 66-77; Spencer, 1992: xiii; Sierzs, 2000: 92). Yet, he does not "keep 
silent" nor compromise, and at a dear cost to him: as I could verify for myself during 
my visit, Bond does not enjoy a life of riches as one might expect from a man with such 
cultural status. Of course he would agree that it is better to be a professor than to have a 
job, but this is precisely the logic underlining the serious problem we have at hand; and 
we can be absolutely certain that Bond would look a gift horse in the mouth. George 
Lukacs observed that an important section of the political intelligentsia of the left "carne 
more and more strongly under bourgeois influence" (1990: 227). The theory of 
reification tells me that bourgeois ideology permeates everything; including critical 
theory with a penchant for socialism, and this I think it is the case with critics like 
Eagleton. And as Bond says: 
The problem isn't that we are different characters, have different opinions, but 
that when there are different ideologies there are different realities (letter to 
author: 06.10.05). 
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5.2. Section II 
5.2.1. Fascism or fascisms. 
It is not my intention to call into disrepute the well-deserved intellectual reputation of a 
thinker like Eagleton. Certainly without him this work of rethinking aesthetics would 
have been far more difficult than it already is. What I am trying to assess here are the 
reasons for which a prominent critic like Eagleton would rightly identify fascism as 
"enjoying a horrified intimacy" with liberal capitalism (2002: 128),29 and then complain 
against any paralleling of current capitalism with fascism, because the latter is only such 
when it is the product of "evil ... fascists". Of course, the critic would be right if fascism 
was only the physical elimination of political opposition; the gassing and enslaving of 
social "inconveniences" or social scapegoats - racial minorities and communists; the 
assassination of humanist thinkers, and other monstrosities. But, as an important 
number of studies of fascism demonstrate (Epstein, 1964; Turner, 1972; Allardyce, 
1979; Schnapp, 1993; Coupland, 2000; Kershaw, 2004; but esp. Poulantzas, 1974), 
these examples are only part of a "type" of fascism among many others. The atrocities 
of Auschwitz are accurately located within fascism, but the latter is not only the 
extremes of the former. 
I was a ten year old living in Spain when Franco finally died in 1975. As Eagleton 
notes above on fascism, the dictator banned all political opposition of any kind, but I 
can confidently assert that an overwhelming majority of Spaniards would protest if 
Franco's forty years dictatorship were called fascism; they would prefer it to be called 
Franquismo instead. Yet, whilst incontestable that Spain has lived under the yoke of 
fascism for forty years, it was not "bad" in the sense that Eagleton deems fascism either. 
On the contrary, powerful memories of my working-class background tell me that 
everyone around me had a voluptuous joie de vivre of a kind that now seems to me 
extinct. One could argue that such 'collective happiness' was the result of a successful 
ideological isolation of the natives; or in other words, the natural "happiness" of the 
ignorant (Kiernan, 1980).30 But then they would have to explain why so many people 
from the 'advanced' democratic European countries of the north thought of Francoist 
Spain as a "wonderful" place to live to the extent that a good number of them decided to 
stay there permanently. To this day I have English friends who have lived permanently 
in Spain for many years, including during Franco's last ten years in power. Tell them 
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that Franco's Spain was a fascist regime and they would immediately answer 
"nonsense". Of course, had they admitted that indeed it was a fascist regime, they then 
would have had to deal with the question of whether they were fascists themselves -
again, because during the 1960s, Spain was for them such "a great place". During the 
last twenty years or so of Franco's dictatorship, Spain was in general terms poorer than 
it is today, but there was full employment, free health care for all, very low levels of 
crime and so on. And the assassinations and political purges committed during the first 
years of the regime were, through many years of political indoctrination, forgotten. 
Thus, within a criterion of daily basis, one could say that a Spain governed then by 
fascists was not such a "bad" place after all. It is more than interesting to know that 
Oxford University declared two minutes of silence as an act of respect for Franco's 
death in 1975.31 If they had had the suspicion that such a public manoeuvre would have 
identified them with fascism in any way, would the Oxford Dons have consented to it? 
Would Eagleton call the Spain of Franco fascist? Of course Franco's Spain was seized 
by fascism; but it was a different type, a different form of fascism and, among all the 
forms, there are not two alike. Fascism does not have to kill millions with gas to be 
fascism. 
This is why fascism is so difficult to define. There are two compelling reasons for this: 
one, that fascism is not a "generic concept" (Allardyce, 1979: 370); and the other, that 
fascism "is not an ideology" (Ibid.: 378; Poulantzas, 1974: 253). Thus, as Eagleton 
urges in his letter, let us then make a "rigorous use of the term". Firstly, fascism does 
not have a set of principles or a theory from which it can seek guidance like 
communism does. "To recognize the variety of fascism," observes Allardyce, "is to 
recognize the need to free it from the tyranny of concepts" (1979: 369); and he has good 
grounds for claiming this. For example, Jacques Doriot, the leader of the French fascist 
party, the Parti Populaire Fram;ais, protested against the claim that they were fascists 
because they did not have any thing to do with the Italian Blackshirts or with the Nazis: 
"those regimes would not fit in our country," he declared (Ibid.: 370). Even more 
significant, ''when Mussolini invited the leader of the Falange Espanola, Jose Antonio 
Primo de Rivera, to attend the international fascist congress at Montreux in 1934, he 
flatly refused. The Falange was not fascist, he protested, it was Spanish" (Ibid.: 384). 
Furthermore, if fascism was, as Allardyce critically notes from other scholars' work, "a 
developmental stage in the modernization that advanced and industrialized a nation's 
economy," even Hitler was not a fascist, in the sense that Germany "was fully 
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industrialized when Hitler came to power" (Allardyce, 1979: 372). As a matter of fact, 
the people of Nazi Germany surrendered their wills to Hitler in ways not matched by the 
peoples of other fascist regimes. And there were many other fascist regimes during the 
same period - such as Croatia from 1941, Estonia from 1939, Latvia from 1934, 
Lithuania from 1926, Romania from 1930, or Hungary during the 1920s, 1930s and 
1940s - each one of them with its own and unique national version of fascism, which 
was inappropriate for export to any other country's political and cultural context. 
It would also be a great mistake to ignore Sir Oswald Mosley in the Great Britain of the 
1930s. His National Union of Fascists party did not achieve any significant social 
prominence or support - the violent marches and rallies staged in the East End of 
London by Mosley's fascists found considerable public and political opposition. But 
fascist movements found as much opposition in other countries - if not more - where 
fascism did nevertheless seize power.32 Mosley has found his way into the annals of 
history as a "patriotic traitor" (Allardyce, 1979:370), but other substantiated reasons 
have made scholars rethink this viewpoint. The most important reason for his failure 
was that Mosley tried to emulate Mussolini's fascism, oblivious to the fact that the 
fascism of the latter was fit only within the historico-economical particularities of Italy. 
Even Mosley realized his mistake in later life, footnotes Allardyce (Ibid.). But to me 
this is as to say that Mosley's fascism did not emerge in Britain because Mosley himself 
was not "bright" enough; that his fascism failed because he did not comprehend the 
values of the British people of the time. Scholars in fascist studies such as Allardyce 
ought then to explain that the leaders of fascist Europe are indeed remembered for being 
anything but "bright". Franco was famously stubborn, cruel and totally indifferent to 
human suffering "because idiotic" (Julia et al., 2004: 34); Mussolini and Hitler were 
clearly better suited as histrionic actors for the masses than the Spanish dictator but their 
absurd military strategies are all too well recorded as a source of bafflement to their 
commanding officers and to subsequent historians.33 As Hannah Arendt and then Simon 
Wiesenthal concluded, if fascists were anything, it was certainly not cunning. "The 
trouble with Eichmann," wrote Arendt, "was precisely that so many were like him, and 
that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly 
and terrifyingly normal" (Levy, 1994: 296). 
So, why was it different with Mosley in Britain? The answer lies within the second 
reason why there are not two fascist states or movements alike: that is, that fascism is 
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not an ideology in itself. As Eagleton himself seems to concede in his criticism (though 
in a rather ambiguous manner) it sprouts from the mighty tree of bourgeois ideology; 
and only when bourgeois ideology is under threat or experiencing an ideological crisis. 
However, Eagleton seems unaware of Poulantzas' major studies on fascism which 
demonstrate how it does not just bloom in capitalist societies as an accident, or by way 
of a natural relationship between good and evil as Eagleton wants us to believe in his 
paper "Capitalism and Form" (2002: 128). If I can extract a conclusion from Eagleton's 
letter, it is that there is a wide confusion with and apprehension towards the term 
"fascism" and its meaning. And if reassessing aesthetics in the politics of theatre means 
re-evaluating the way we perceive our human world, our values and our experiences, 
"fascism" is a term calling for a cautious resolution of its own; if only to demonstrate 
that Bond and the Frankfurt School might be sighting it in a more accurate and 
materialistic way than critics like Eagleton like to think. 
5.3. Section III 
5.3.1. Rethinking fascism: class neutralization by 'other' means. 
Fascist studies is a field of numerous and contrasting definitions. If one study suggests 
that fascism was a sophisticated incident in the course toward modernization (Turner, 
1972: 547-64), another one rightly objects that it might be true in the case of 1930s' 
Italy, but not in the rise of Hitler's movement in an already modernized Germany, 
which at the time was one of the most advanced countries in the world (Allardyce, 
1979: 375). As a matter of fact, during the 1920s and 1930s any scientist or humanist 
with certain self-esteem had to be as fluent in German as today we must be fluent in 
English. On the other hand, if Nazism "bedevils" this theory of fascism as a "mass-
mobilizing, developmental dictatorship in modernizing nations", then, Allardyce tells 
us, scholars like Turner must also explain the cases of anti-fascist regimes like those of 
"Stalin, Castro, Ho, Nkrumah and Nasser", which, with modernization and 
mechanization as a goal, were - and are in the case of Castro - also authoritarian and 
mass-mobilizing (Allardyce, 1979: 375). Turner answers that this is so because they are 
also "fascists" or "fascistic", which, as Allardyce says, rightly outrages most historians 
(ibid.).34 To make matters worse, while one might propose fascism as a vicious thrust 
towards modernization, another one finds that, actually, fascism is an anti-modernist 
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reaction, against the liberal decadence of the big metropolis on the one hand and for a 
"revival of the cults of sword and soil" on the other (Turner, 1972: 551). In fact, and 
especially during the period of Nazi and Italian-fascist gestation, their leaders sought 
not only a revival of medieval myths, but also that of "pre-Christian, even pre-civilized 
ones" (Ibid.). 
Fascism then even had a utopian anti-capitalist outlook which they referred to as 
"socialism" (Ibid.), which in Germany resulted in a Nazi party with the incongruent 
name of National Socialist Party. This anti-modernism was not just the visionary 
revolution of a horde of obtuse middle-class peasants like the poultry farmer Heinrich 
Himmler. The existentialist Martin Heidegger, whose overarching question "what is 
being?" made him one of the greatest philosophers at the time, was deeply involved 
with the Nazi party.35 The involvement of Heidegger with the Nazi Party reflects the 
missionary spirit reigning at the time,36 bent on saving Germany from human depravity 
and moral decay. This redemptive struggle had clear roots in an accumulation of 
devastating economic events like the Versailles Peace Settlement and then the Great 
Depression of 1929, that left Germany under the sway of staggering inflation, street 
crime and six million unemployed. Then again, the argument that fascism - or Nazism 
- is an anti-modernist movement is highly contentious: "as soon as they realized that the 
industry was a source of immense power [ ... ] industry grew still bigger in the Third 
Reich" - as it did in the Italy of Mussolini (Turner, 1972: 557). Allardyce notes other 
scholars for whom fascism is also understood as an international movement by way of 
some cross-national features or "shared traits". Salutes, uniform shirts, squads, and so 
on all contribute to this suggestion (Allardyce, 1979: 378); but these, suggests 
Allardyce, are "features too limited and external to provide a compelling generic 
[international] classification [as well as] too mixed, diverse, and exceptional to be 
collected [into anything concrete]" (Ibid.). And neither can we ignore the suggestions 
about the origins of fascism which questions whether there exists a fascism with an 
intellectual content. As Allardyce explains, "historians disagree not only over who the 
intellectual forebears were, or whether there were any forebears at all, [and therefore] 
whether fascism itself is an ideology in the first place" (Allardyce, 1979: 379). 
Indeed, the ideological origins of the fascists leaders highlight this problem. Hitler 
might have been formed by "influences of the Right", as Allardyce says, but the French 
fascist leader Jacques Doriot was an ex-communist formed by Marx and Lenin, and 
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Oswald Mosley was a fonner Labour MP known to be influenced by the social 
economist John Maynard Keynes (1979: 386), whose principles underpinned the 
foundation of the British welfare state (Cole, 1947: 35). Even the fonner school teacher 
Benito Mussolini, the originator of the tenn fascism, initially became a prominent 
Italian figure as a socialist journalist.37 In fact, if scholars like Fritz Stern (1961) and 
Hannah Arendt (1964) are so baffled by fascism it is because, among other obscurities, 
they cannot find a specific common ground for "prefascism" nor for a "protofascism". 
Of course, on "prefascism" they find Hitlerism as the "big bang" triggered by a "long 
fuse" (in the case of Gennany the ignominious Versailles Peace Settlement of 1919). 
But France and Italy were direct beneficiaries of the Peace Settlement and they went 
down the fascist road anyway.38 On "protofascism," throughout Europe there can be 
found diverse clusters of self-appointed followers of Hitler, Franco, or Mussolini, but 
one cannot compare their pitiful, clownish, melancholic, and folkloristic displays with 
the real "thing". When Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini died, their type of fascism died 
with them. 
Now, different definitions within fascist studies ultimately flow into numerous and 
disparate lines of thought, but here I will draw a line only between two groups. Once 
again, they both seem to perceive the same problems concerning the tenn fascism but, 
by way of their clearly separated ideological positions, they come to different verdicts. 
One is defined by scholars like Allardyce (1979), Turner (1972), Epstein (1964) and 
Kershaw (2004) - who to me seem to represent a mainstream line of thought in fascist 
studies. The second is defined by Nicos Poulantzas (1974). 
Both lines of thought demonstrate quite successfully that fascism is not a general 
concept, not an ideology, not even a cult of personality type - that is, a "reduction of 
fascism to mental processes" (Allardyce, 1979: 386). Having said that, what the first 
group really aim at is a final eradication of the tenn fascism from the "political rhetoric 
of our own times" (Allardyce, 1979: 388; Turner, 1972: 563-64; Epstein, 1964: 320). 
For them, fascism was first coined not just by Mussolini, but by ill-infonned Marxists 
whose anti-fascist fervours made them blend Nazi Gennany with Fascist Italy and then 
with the rest of similar - but ''unrelated'' - multinational "phenomena" into one 
"generic label" (Turner, 1972: 564). For the Marxists, says Turner, all were fascists; all 
were "agents of finance capital" (Ibid.). Wanting to dislocate Nazism from fascism as a 
unique, bizarre, and separated historical episode, Ian Kershaw asserts "Nazism was 
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Hitlerism, pure and simple" (2004: 242). In other words, for this group fascism ends up 
divided and subdivided between radical and traditional, and moderate and less-
traditional, and more-radical and so on, to such an extent that fascism is finally erased 
from their discourses. When it was too radical, it was not fascism, it was Nazism; when 
it was too moderate, it was not fascism, it was traditionalist nationalism (Ibid.: 247). In 
fact, their final reckoning is such, that fascism becomes situated within the meaningless 
spheres of "romanticism": it meant nothing and it is "dead" (Allardyce, 1979: 388). Of 
course, "the memory of the Final Solution," says Allardyce, "will [ ... ] always keep 
fascism immediate and alive for scholars of human sciences," but his recommendation 
is that the term fascism should be confined within the time limit of history (Ibid.). This 
is then one line of thought; it does not find major connections between different 
fascisms and when it does, they are superficial - like shirts, salutes, barbed wire, 
insignia and so on. F or them fascism should become a foreign word "again", and 
"untranslatable outside of [sic] a limited period of history" (Ibid.); in other words, they 
propose to study fascism in the same fashion a biologist might study a dodo. 
Nicos Poulantzas's sociological study (1974) exemplifies what I would call the second 
line of thought on fascism. Like the first group, it also demonstrates that fascism is not a 
general concept, not an ideology, nor a cult of personality type but, unlike the first 
group, its fascism is not a foreign word, dead and buried. It is, rather, a living social 
element which surfaces by way of greater or lesser extreme measures, depending on the 
needs of the dominant ideology. Certainly, it cannot be pointed at as if it was a concrete 
particular, but only because the sine qua non condition for fascism to exist is an all too 
perennial struggle for domination and exploitation (Ibid.: 143). I will not speculate why 
the first group above (we might as well include critics like Eagleton in it) ignores the 
fact that fascism always arises where class struggle truly threatens the dominant class's 
real power.39 This seems to me incontestable not only in the historical terms of 1930s 
and 1940s in Europe but all around the world and throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century. Thus, through Poulantzas' line of thought we can on the one hand 
see fascism as an amalgam of different fascisms having distinct and unconnected 
contextual features - thus acknowledging the first group; but also on the other see a 
common denominator through which it is possible finally to picture the rise of all 
fascisms as definitive of one fascism - ignored by the first group. The rationale is this: 
that the rise of fascism corresponds in all cases to the ideological crisis of all three 
historico-social classes - that is, not only to the ideological crises of the dominant 
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bourgeoisie, but also of that of the petty bourgeoisie and of the working class. Now, in 
my view this is a highly important analysis which situates fascism in a totally new light 
in relation both to an obvious non-Marxist line of thought like that of Turner or 
Allardyce, but also against an increasingly exercised "Marxist" one since World War 2 
- that of guilt and mea culpa.4o 
Without Poulantzas' analysis, Marxist historicism and economicism - and especially the 
Marxist-Leninist branch (Lenin, 1999) - rightly concludes that, in all cases, the rise of 
fascism corresponds only to an offensive step and an offensive strategy on the part of the 
bourgeoisie. In "Reconsidering the Spanish Civil War", Ronald Fraser is compelled to 
conclude: 
The war served another purpose in the Franquista [sic] camp. Politically, the 
hegemonic fraction of the ruling class had been discredited by its inability to 
legitimize ruling-class domination under the republic. This failure was now to 
be made good. Hegemony would be exercised by a dictator: ruling-class 
domination would now become an overt dictatorship of the bourgeoisie 
(1981 :49). 
Many of us have had the opportunity to corroborate Fraser's conclusion recently. 
According to the recent documentary broadcast by BBC2 "The Nazis: A Warning," in 
the Weimar Republic of 1933 only Hindenburg, its president, could appoint a German 
Chancellor. Apparently Hindenburg thought Hitler to be a "maniac lunatic," a 
"dangerous" man and disliked him deeply. And yet he appointed him German 
Chancellor. The documentary's conclusion is that Hindenburg handed over the 
Chancellery to Hitler because he was under "enormous" pressure from powerful 
capitalist figures of the banking and manufacturing industries.41 Indeed, says 
Poulantzas, what does a crisis of the dominant ideology mean? Why was it 
"discredited"? During the 1920s and 1930s a growing mass of oppressed classes started 
to question and attack the ideology of the dominant class - "the real 'cement' of a social 
formation" (1974: 76) - affecting the very "relation of the bourgeoisie to its own 
ideology" (Ibid.: 77). As the aforementioned documentary told us, Hindenburg did not 
just capitulate to the pressures of powerful capitalist figures; he had to take into 
consideration the threat of a Bolshevist revolution. We ought to remember, like 
Poulantzas does, that the ruling of the dominant classes was rarely questioned by the 
lower classes; the aftermath of the First World War, and especially the 1917's Russian 
Revolution contributed firmly to a class consciousness among many millions of workers 
around the world (Poulantzas, 1974: 17). We can only speculate about the kind of 
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mental tunnoil that went through the minds of the dominant classes when their power 
and authority started to be challenged by the "inferior" masses during the preceding 
years of fascist Europe. 
However, Poulantzas compels us to bear in mind that the rise of fascism does not 
correspond entirely to a crisis of the bourgeois ideology. As soon as fascism began to be 
a concrete movement, the strategy of the oppressed classes - that is the working class 
movements and parties - moved from a state of attack to that of defence (1974: 78). In 
my view, among the numerous episodes corroborating Poulantzas' thesis, one particular 
event embodies the general disorder and dilettantism (see also endnote 42 below) of 
anti-fascist organizations not only in Gennany but throughout Europe. "On the night of 
22-23 February [1933]" notices Poulanztas, "the night of the Reichstag fire, 4,000 
communist organizers were arrested at one fell swoop, without a blow being dealt. [And 
he adds] For a party which believed in imminent revolution, this seems incredible" 
(Poulantzas, 1974: 186). The KPD (the Gennan Communist Party) were then virtually 
"caught as1eep,,,42 but was the position of other political factions of the left also a 
"defensive" one? To what extent did they bear responsibility for the rise of fascism? 
Through Poulantzas' thorough examination we may answer this complex question by 
noticing first that the social and ideological functioning of the remaining parties were of 
the "social-democratic type" (Poulantzas, 1974: 147-56). Social democracy is rather a 
negotiating social apparatus between the working class and the bourgeoisie in order to 
offer the necessary "means for big capital to carry out its policy [of capital growth]" 
(Ibid.: 155); in other words, for Poulantzas social democrats are "employees" of big 
capital - virtually fonned by the petty bourgeois classes - and their policies are 
conceived only within the frame of social consensus (Ibid.: 156). Nevertheless, while 
Poulantzas disagrees with the Marxist-Stalinist line of theory in which social democracy 
is envisaged as a collusive ideology of fascism,43 his theory shows that social 
democracy bears grave responsibility in the success of fascism. Once the bourgeois 
dominant ideology began to collapse under its own ideological crisis, social democracy 
became an obsolete instrument for carrying out its policies (Ibid.: 156). As soon as 
bourgeois support had been suspended - for example, in the fonn of funding - the 
social democratic parties could not continue their parliamentarian opposition to the 
communists on one side and to the fascist thrust on the other, with their consequent 
capitulation (Ibid.). Again, in the documentary, "The Nazis: A Warning," we were 
offered the contrasting testimony of those who were parliamentarians during the 
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preceding days of Hitler's final settlement as Fuhrer. According to their recollections, 
Nazism took them by "surprise" because although they understood the gravity of 
Hitler's speeches and actions they thought "to be able to control him through 
parliament". It seems to me difficult to subscribe to this idea that the apathy of the 
social democrats then was the result of a kind of social or political naivety. Poulantzas' 
study cannot be more categorical about the social democratic movement and its 
acolytes, the petty bourgeoisie: they had to choose between a proletariat dictatorship -
and therefore a sure loss of gained status - and a fascist dictatorship which would, 
nevertheless, maintain a social status quo. And they choose the latter; not by supporting 
or colluding with the Nazis (who were petty-bourgeois themselves) but simply by 
getting out of their way. 
On the other hand, Poulantzas also exposes quite clearly that in all fascist forms of 
State, there is a period from the start of the process, which includes the bourgeoisie's 
support and the petty bourgeoisie's political withering, to the "point of 'no return' [his 
inverted commas)" (Poulantzas, 1974: 66). At that stage, there is a point of 
irreversibility in fascism's growth and all the essential elements of the coming fascist 
system have the sense of a fait accompli. Surely there must have been at least some 
bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements who might have foreseen the forthcoming 
extremes of some of these fascist States; but by the time they came to fully appreciate 
the true extent of the social damage, it was too late. 
At the same time, this "point of no return" - as if an unexpected shock - makes me 
question my own judgement as to whether the contemporary parliamentarians were 
affected by a kind of dysfunctional social naivety. If this were so, it might have some 
pertinence today. This critique corresponds to the case of the Italian Giacomo Matteotti 
(1885-1924), a notorious socialist parliamentarian assassinated during the initial rise of 
Italian fascism. In an Italy where few people dared to speak their minds, Matteotti 
denounced the fascists in parliament, giving details of the extent of the fraudulent 
practices used to obtain fascist majorities; and demanded that the elections be declared 
void (Burne, 1989: 1085). Poignantly, at the end of that speech he told the deputies 
"and now get ready for my funeral." Indeed, a few days later he was abducted never to 
be found again (Ibid.). It is difficult to conclude whether, on completing such an act of 
bravery, this statement verifies that Matteotti knew the true gravity of the situation, 
whether he was simply suicidal, or whether simply naive. 
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I think of Matteotti's case in this way because it reminds me of Bond's deliberations 
about current times. Our dramatist writes extreme plays because, he says, the 
"situation" in which we live continues to be extreme and urgent (Appendix: 20). Most 
people think that this is an exaggerated view of our liberal democracies because we 
have freedom of speech and all the rest - Eagleton is a perfect example of this position. 
But, as Bond underlines in his last play The Under Room (2005)44 (I will return to 
discuss this play in the conclusion), there is nothing in our liberal democracies that 
guarantees that it will not be lawful to gas him in twenty years' time because of what he 
writes here now. This is what continues to make our times extreme: the "problem" 
which resulted in a fascist Europe continues to be among us without being resolved. 
The "problem" which Bond - with his holistic mindset - repeatedly refers to, is of 
course the universal human condition of social inequality; a condition which seems to 
be the ordinary situation: 
Dante seems to have needed a place called "Hell" - which is very much like 
Auschwitz - because he was exiled from Florence. Therefore one can say that 
there is something extreme going on in Dante's mind. It is true that these huge 
historical crises are of great importance, but there is also a continuity of 
humanness: it never snaps; it never breaks; it can find the extreme problems in 
[ ... ] what might appear to be quite ordinary situations (Appendix: 7). 
While fascism corresponds, then, to a position of attack by the bourgeoisie and defence 
by the working class, it also corresponds to an economic and ideological crisis "for the 
entire petty bourgeoisie" (Ibid.: 247; 251). Poulantzas' analysis of the petty bourgeoisie 
is of particular importance here because it answers a series of ideological conundrums 
which seem ingrained within the postrnodem, the current culture industry, and even 
within the current discussions on globalization. As I have discussed in Chapter IV via 
Bourdieu, while differences between classes are today sharper than ever,45 effectual 
class struggle appears instead as to have vanished; not just from the West, but from the 
world at large.46 I am referring here to previous discussions on current social petty 
bourgeoisification or also social neutralization of classes. Through Bourdieu's theory I 
have discussed how on the one hand the culture industry acts as a sedative of the masses 
and on the other, how actual class differences are legitimized by a petty bourgeoisie 
situated at the top of the culture industry itself; in other words, by the agents involved in 
the Field of Restricted Production (FRP). However, I could not explain through 
Bourdieu's theory the contradictory languages, symbols, or messages that are usually 
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produced by the advance sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. How to explain, for example, 
the ambiguous position of a critic such as Eagleton, whose anti-capitalist discourses, 
declarations against "Big Capital," appeals to social justice, parliamentarianism and so 
on, are visibly entwined with his own support for the status quo. This is, according to 
Poulantzas, a contradictory characteristic caused by the ideological identity of the petty 
bourgeoisie (1974: 241); indeed caused by its own class position between the two 
irreconcilable classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In short, when the Greek 
sociologist illustrates the contradictory characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie, in my 
view he is simultaneously shedding light on the postmodemist problem of class-cultural 
homogeneity and social neutralization as much as on the rise of fascism. 
5.3.2 Historical parallels of the petty bourgeoisie and fascism 
Poulantzas classifies the petty bourgeoisie as if it was composed of various levels. I will 
consider here just the two major ones: the economic and ideological levels. The 
economic level is, Poulantzas says, rather obvious: the petty bourgeoisie are small-scale 
producers and/or small-scale owners (including those in possession of skills); a fact 
which positions them both close to the bourgeoisie "(through ownership) [his brackets]" 
and to the proletariat, because they are also "labourers" (1974: 241). But this very 
position makes them also "opposed to both the bourgeoisie, which progressively 
crushes them economically, and to the proletariat, as they fear proletarianization and are 
fiercely attached to (small) [his brackets] property" (Ibid.). Now, at the ideological 
level the effects on the petty bourgeoisie are both comparatively rather complex, but 
also, I think, too relevant to ignore here when the matter at hand is rethinking aesthetics 
in the politics of theatre.47 On this account, Poulantzas identifies the following three 
effects (I paraphrase for the sake of brevity): 
(1) "Status quo anti-capitalism:" while the petty bourgeoisie is against "big 
money", they approve of the status quo, because they fear proletarianization. 
They like to be associated with "egalitarianism" "and equality of opportunity" 
on one side, and "parliamentary cretinism of equal suffrage" on the other. 
However, the petty bourgeoisie want change without changing the system; they 
also aspire to participate in the "distribution of political power", without 
"wanting a radical transformation of it" (1974:241). 
(2) The myth of the "ladder": fearing proletarianization "below," and attracted to 
the bourgeoisie "above", they [the petty bourgeoisie] aspire to the bourgeois 
life-style though the individual rise of the "best" and "most able". This form is 
helped by high levels of education, including the ideology of "culture" as 
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"democratic" and "neutral", and a "neutral educational system". Some "elitist" 
factions of the petty bourgeoisie even replace some of the bourgeoisie "for not 
doing its job" but society remains unchanged. (Ibid.:241-42). 
(3) The "power fetishism": because of its economic isolation [his italics] (which 
also gives rise to "petty bourgeois individualism"), and because of its economic 
closeness and antagonism to both bour~eoisie and proletariat, the petty 
bourgeoisie believes in the "neutral" State. 8 Moreover, the petty bourgeoisie 
identifies itself with the State - "its" State aspiring to be the "arbitrator" of 
society, because as Marx says, it would like the whole of society to become 
petty bourgeois [all inverted commas and italics as in the original] (Ibid.: 241). 
Resentment, frustration, and/or fear: these are conditions characteristic of the petty 
bourgeoisie which correspond again and again to the rise of all forms of fascist States.49 
But if it is important to evaluate the direct relation of fascism with the petty bourgeoisie, 
it is because it clears up the predicament of why fascism is not an ideology; and as such 
is not a field of research in the same way that "the ideological ensembles essentially tied 
to the bourgeoisie and the working class" are (Poulantzas, 1974: 253). It is primarily 
because its ideology is a projection of the bourgeois ideology - that is, it is an adopted 
one - but also because, at the political level, the petty bourgeoisie is difficult to define, 
being as it is divided itself in different groups, sectors and interests. As Poulantzas says 
above, the petty bourgeoisie not only ostentatiously displays a fierce individualism; it 
has traditionally been understood and categorized as such by all - especially itself. In 
fact, as Poulantzas explains very clearly, the petty bourgeois are so fractionated as a 
class that they do not have "long-term political interests 'of their own' [his commas]" 
(1974: 243). When they manage to organize a political party they do so "directly 
through other apparatuses of the State [but only because they see the State as] opposed 
to the bourgeoisie's interests and in agreement with its own" (1974: 243). However, 
Poulantzas warns us against misunderstanding or underestimating the petty bourgeoisie, 
simply because its unstable nature and changeable class location do not prevent it from 
becoming, upon necessity, an authentic social force. Only Trotsky and Gramsci, 
Poulantzas tells us, had a correct understanding of the relationship of fascism to the 
petty bourgeoisie: 
While he stressed the fact that fascism represented the interests of big capital, 
Trotsky still insisted that fascism was "basically (the) program of petty 
bourgeois currents [ ... ] [which shows that] the self-determination of the petty 
bourgeois masses of the people is for the whole fate of bourgeois society". 
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Gramsci too, while emphasizing that fascism was "the servant of capital and of 
the landowners", was the first to point out (in 1921) that fascism was at the same 
time "the ultimate political incarnation of the petty bourgeoisie" [his inverted 
commas and brackets throughout] (Poulantzas, 1974: 245, fn.7). 
Thus, Poulantzas tells us, the rise of fascism can be formulated as follows: (a) All 
instances start with an initial fear of social revolution on the part of the ruling 
established classes. (b) As a result, they welcome fascist movements or actions which 
function as a counter-ideology and counter-organization to the revolutionary threat. (c) 
Because the fascist movements are fundamentally formed by agents of the petty 
bourgeoisie, they attract the support of large sections of the petty bourgeoisie - that is, 
everyone who possesses something that could be for sale: small and medium 
landowners, skilled labourers, professionals, white collars, academics and so on.50 But 
fascism attracted the petty bourgeoisie for the simple reason that it itself is as much "an 
amalgam of contradictory elements" (Poulantzas, 1974: 253) as is fascism itself. In fact, 
if fascism is not an ideology and it is impossible to extract a definition from it, this is 
because hitherto, fascism has been a projection of the petty bourgeoisie's own 
contradictory elements: they are hostile to communism but also denounce the abuses of 
capitalism (Epstein, 1964: 306); they celebrate mythical legends in an anti-modernist 
fashion and with anti-modernist aims but through a society built by an advanced 
industry (Turner, 1972: 557); they condemn liberal parliamentary democracy as 
"degenerate, corrupt and incapable of dealing with current problems" (Epstein, 1964: 
306) - which, as Epstein says, was unhappily all too true. (d) And finally the point of 
"no-return": once fascism has settled in as a form of State, "it accelerates the 
consolidation and stabilization of the economic supremacy of big fmance capital over 
the other dominant classes and class fractions" (Poulantzas, 1974: 98). 
But fascism does more than just represent the interests of big capital: the decisive 
domination of big capital is achieved by a progressive and effective "neutralization" of 
the contradictions among classes and domineering factions (Poulantzas, 1974: 98). In 
other words, class differences remain untouched while the class struggle is finally 
erased. In fact, as historical records tell us, the big industrialists were so desperate to 
recover lost production - lost, because of the preceding years of social skirmishes and 
labour unrest - that they put the industrial machine at full speed. Their industrial 
development, technological innovation, and a tremendous increase in the productivity of 
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labour were a source of admiration of the remammg capitalist non-fascist nations 
(Pitigliani, 1940: 381; Smith, 1936: 170).51 
Full employment also became a reality among the working classes of the fascist nations, 
which historically has brought forth a subsidiary consequence: inflation - a problem 
that our current monetarist governments are extremely eager to avoid, with dear 
consequences for many of us. 52 This had to be counterbalanced through economical and 
geographical expansionism; that is, imperialism - which, as it happened, had perforce to 
clash with the imperialist interests of other capitalist nations. Of course, I cannot 
address in full here the causes of World War II, but it seems to me also true that through 
Poulantzas's social theory Western modem history acquires a rather contrasting 
"outfit". If we can now assume that fascism is but an extreme fonn of the capitalist 
State - that is, an exceptional capitalist State - and a consequence of the crisis of the 
dominant bourgeois ideology, then the anned conflict between the Allies and the Axis 
was not just a war between two different, antagonistic fonns of capitalism - one 
"extreme" and one "moderate" - it was a conflict between a bourgeois dominant 
ideology who first suffered and then resolved its own crisis and another bourgeois 
dominant ideology whose hegemonic dominion was never put in doubt. As the historian 
A. 1. P. Taylor remarked, "it very quickly became clear that it was not a war against 
fascism, but a war against the Gennans", the "traditional" enemy (Boyer, 1977: 50).53 
Fascism then does not come as a bolt from the blue: it is the product of a social 
development towards an ideological homogenization of society for the purposes of 
capital growth through the means of force. As Poulantzas notes via Gramsci, it 
represents the forceful final fusion of all classes into a single social phenomenon and 
under a single leadership, resolving the ideological disparities and confrontations which 
are intrinsic to class differences and inequality (Poulantzas, 1974: 75). And it is only 
through this conclusion that the failure of Mosley's fascism in 1930s Britain can finally 
be answered. Britain and the United States were as affected by the transition to 
monopoly capitalism and by "economic crises" as were Gennany or Italy (Burne, 1989: 
1098), but as Poulantzas points out, the "State power, State apparatus and fonns of 
State, [their] national unity nowhere shows weakness comparable to those of Gennany 
and Italy" (1974: 34).54 In other words, the reason why fascism did not settle in Britain 
was not because Mosley was less "smart" than other fascist leaders, or because there 
was an "active" British anti-fascist national unity; it was because the bourgeois 
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dominant ideology was as strong, secure, and formidable as ever. Thus, by way of 
(among other factors), its own empire, the British establishment had already in Britain 
what Hitler, Mussolini and Franco ultimately sought in their respective countries: the 
neutralization of the petty bourgeoisie's and bourgeoisie's conflicts of interests. 
Having said that, in discussions related to fascism we cannot bypass the fact that, since 
Britain crushed European fascism - the "foreign monster" - the British collective mind 
must be predisposed to stand in a position of moral superiority. In relation to Germany, 
Garcia Diittmann tells us that "Adorno anchors the concept of the people in a national 
consciousness which is capable of constituting itself as a consciousness of guilt" (2002: 
130). In my view, the opposite case of Britain should also be regarded with opposite 
consequences: a national British consciousness which is capable of constituting itself as 
one of innocence, shamelessness or a sense of virtue. This constitutes in my view a kind 
of fuse in waiting, which the powers that be can ignite at any 'needed' time without 
having to endure a real popular opposition. In all probability, this has kept the people of 
this country in a forsaken condition of ideological defencelessness, unable and 
unwilling to perceive with clarity what Bond calls "the problem": when Britain makes 
war, it fights "evil". As Garcia Diittmann formulates, "what one identifies with, the 
essence of one's own group, unwittingly becomes the good; the alien group, the others, 
become the bad" (Duttmann, 2002: 133).55 
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5.4. Section IV 
5.4.1. The enemy within: equivalences in the postmodern. 
That fascism is not just nothing, but nothingness is a very real danger of our times. It is 
impossible to extract a proper value from it; it is there and it is invisible; it does not 
even have a name. Instead of fascism it could have been called Xb+02 by some lunatic 
petty bourgeois but that would not have altered the horrific end-product. What is worse: 
trying to study fascism to the exclusion of everything else is actually like to trying to 
understand a disease just by observing the contorting symptoms of some poor infected 
creature. If fascism is the product of fear, fascism must be real and occurring. It 
compensates for and thus exploits fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of being 
left behind, fear of the "other", fear of death; and if cruelty and violence are the 
offspring of fear, it is no wonder that cruelty and violence have been hand in glove with 
fascism. Asking "How is Hitler possible in a liberal constitution?" Anustup Basu 
rightly highlights how difficult is to conceptualize fascism in the postmodern "without 
the formalist baggage of secret police or concentration camps", which in the public 
domain, he says, "constitutes a historicist definition of fascism" (2004:68).56 Let us 
reassure Basu as well as Eagleton: if what they fear is either Hitler or his fascism, they 
will not find them; not now, not ever in the future. 
And yet the memory of Vietnamese children running away from their napalm-bombed 
village with their scorched skins hanging like rags is all too fresh. An old Arab holding 
up a stump of blood and dust with his hands - a two-year-old dead baby - while 
pleading "Why! Why!" has formed part of our domestic decorations.57 And violence 
and cruelty are not just deployed in a physical manner in faraway countries. There is 
such a thing as psychological violence and psychological cruelty and it forms part and 
parcel of our intrinsically unequal liberal Western society. The imposition of sheer 
poverty is one way of enacting violence and cruelty and the world at large is in real 
terms a "planet of slums" (Davis, 2004:5-34).58 
Unemployment, as another example, is a problem which seems to be taken into account 
only during pre-electoral manifestos, and appears to be without solution. And yet it is, at 
the level of the capitalist system, a problem without solution. For as long as capital 
growth takes precedence in our social system, full employment will not be possible 
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because it would effectively trigger inflation which equals to a devaluation of financial 
assets.59 It is a simple and logical equation which does not allow middle strategies.60 
And the human consequences are dire. As empirical research shows, it plays "havoc 
with the lives of the jobless, and causes intense suffering and mental agony [ ... ] with 
elevated rates of suicide [ ... ] morale damaging [ ... ] and a motivational impairment with 
long psychological consequences" (SEN, 1997:161).61 And if one of fascism's basic 
devices for the control of the masses is the induction of fear, the reality of 
unemployment functions by way of very parallel psychological effects in the minds of 
those who actually have a job. "We as individuals," Jameson suggests "entertain a 
relationship with money and greed, with property, and we are thereby led to wonder 
what life would be like without these things" (Jameson, 2004:39). It is a pure 
existentialist problem. As I have already said in the overall introduction, if for Kant 
moral values were due to people's inability to imagine a future without God,62 in my 
view, our moral values nowadays are due to people's inability to imagine a future 
without capital. Thus, Jameson adds: 
we are most of us employed, but familiar with the fear of unemployment and the 
lack of income, and not unacquainted with the psychic misery involved in 
chronic unemployment, the demoralization, the morbid effects of boredom, the 
waste of vital energies and the absence of productivity - even if we tend to grasp 
these things in bourgeois and introspective ways (Jameson, 2004: 39). 
Could it be that, what I will define below as a petty bourgeois aesthetics of denial (a 
type of class response more in tune with a sophisticated form of fascism or capitalist 
dictatorship) is actually the result of enormous amounts of information, as Anustup 
Basu suggests (2004:68)?63 Or could it be that, supporting even further Jameson' 
theory of "fear" above, people are in truth "fully aware of what is going on", and that 
the critical matter is personal security? "Security," say Martin Camoy and Manuel 
Castells, ''ultimately translates into economic growth and improving living standards. 
In this sense, even social inequality is not a major issue. If people see their lives 
improving, they will not be ready to lose what they have only to correct the injustice of 
the rich getting richer" (Camoy and Castells, 2001: 3). In my view, both theories are 
correct but in the sense that they form part of a series of contributions that point to a 
single problem: capitalism. 
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Nevertheless, the absence of an effectual class struggle in liberal modem societies 
seems to me extraordinary in historical terms. Of course, there are occasional signs of 
opposition or protest against very specific policies, or against grotesque governmental 
decisions like the recent invasion of Iraq. But these are always popular demonstrations 
against particulars, not against the current state of affairs; against a system of inequality 
and class difference itself.64 This is why the theory of reification is so important: as I 
said before in the conclusion of Chapter II, we need to overcome human reification by 
constantly disrupting our reified structure of existence "by becoming conscious of the 
immanent meanings of these contradictions" (Lukacs, 1990: 197). 
Bond asserts that our current societal system - that is, based on capitalism - is extreme; 
and that this social condition in which people must live in the extreme makes people 
mad. If that is the case, it is no wonder that we are "resigned to a world of illusion and 
the paralysis of all understanding" in the postmodem (Vattimo, 1988: xlix-I). For 
communication is surely impossible amidst maddened people. As Bond responded 
during an interview with Brian Logan "the people who went off in 1914 were socially 
mad; the people who dropped A-bombs on Hiroshima and named the bombs after their 
mothers, they were mad - there's no other way of describing it. But it's totally 
acceptable. Why is that so? Because our societies are unjust" (Logan, 2000). 
Regardless of whether the accuser is a great poet, I suspect people might find it hard to 
accept such judgements on humanity at large: "Who? Me mad? How dare you!" 
Too often, politicians, artists and intellectuals criticize their adversaries by way of 
indulging the popular ego with congratulatory statements like "the public is far more 
intelligent than they think", or "that's one way of patronizing the public". And yet, as 
Aristotle concluded, true poets are more philosophical and more worthy of serious 
attention than any historian, philosopher or scientist, because poets are not concerned 
with particular facts but with universal truth (1987: Chapter 9, 5-6). But as supported 
by the latest research on socioeconomic determinants of physical and mental health, 
Bond might be more accurately materialistic and realistic than many would like to 
believe. Answering the question, "Why is Violence More Common Where Inequality is 
Greater?" the epidemiologist Richard Wilkinson substantiates Bond's intuition that 
inequality harms health in all its domains and is "socially corrosive" (2004: 1). 
Through Wilkinson's investigations one thing is made apparent: social violence and 
individual levels of health are proportional to the levels of inequality within a given 
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society. In other words, levels of physical and mental health are not related to income 
differences between the developed societies, but to income differences within them -
"even among the non-poor middle classes" (Ibid.: 5). 
Evaluating inequality does not only mean pinpointing the striking differences between 
those who are poor and those who are rich, analysing the asocial effects of low material 
living standards, or centring the attention on the damage done by poverty. Evaluating 
inequality for Wilkinson also means to observe the health effects in relation to social 
status, social position, and dominance and subordination. The United States, for 
example, is supposed to be far richer than say Costa Rica yet, in general terms, medical 
research shows that the people of Costa Rica enjoy a far better level of "psychosocial 
wellbeing" and health than the people of the United States do (Wilkinson and Marmot, 
2001: 1233). The most conspicuous cause is the most logical one: the inequalities of 
income and status of the people of Costa Rica are far smaller that those of the people of 
the United States. These studies do not ignore the fact that sheer poverty is lethal, but 
they also underline the fact that the mere social status of individuals objectively affects 
their health. In Britain for instance, "absolute mortality has been falling [but] 
inequalities in mortality have increased" (Ibid.). Furthermore, Wilkinson and Marmot 
do not believe that improving access to resources without resolving social inequalities 
would resolve the psychosocial ill health of individuals: 
If, in the spirit of neo-materialism, you give every child access to a computer 
and every family a car, deal with air pollution, and provide a physically safe 
environment, is the problem solved? We believe not. The psychosocial effect 
of insecurity, anxiety, social isolation, socially hazardous environments, 
bullying, and depression remain untouched (2001: 1233). 
It has been said that ignorance is more dangerous than atomic bombs, but even more 
dangerous is, I think, to cultivate a field of inequality where the only possible harvest is 
resentment - and resentment, I would argue, is a form of madness. It is very interesting 
to consider Wilkinson's observation that "the most frequent trigger to violence is 
disrespect, loss of face, and people feeling looked down on" (2004: 8). He builds up his 
argument quoting from the prison psychiatrist James Gilligan, who says that after 25 
years collecting information on inmates, he has ''yet to see a serious act of violence that 
was not provoked by the experience of feeling shamed and humiliated, disrespected and 
ridiculed, and that did not represent the attempt to prevent or undo this 'loss of face' 
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[his commas] no matter how severe the punishment" (Wilkinson, 2004: 8). However, 
just like the major fascist movements did before them, many would ask whether 
violence is an inbuilt, indeed an evolutionarily successful, characteristic of humans; 
because, after all, the history of ancient and modem civilization is based on continuous 
and violent struggle. 
This is indeed the subtlety I read in Eagleton's "Capitalism and Form" (2002). For him 
the relation between the bourgeoisie and fascism is a "pact with crime" (2002: 127). 
And this pact, he says, is the result of a "natural" attraction for "crime and villainy" 
which has carried an aura of glamour since the early modem society (Ibid.: 128). 
"Othello and Iago, Goethe's Faust and Mephistopheles, Ahab and Moby-Dick" 
Eagleton tells us: "it is impossible to decide whether the partners are allies or 
adversaries [ ... ] they enjoy the kind of "horrified intimacy with the Satanic [ ... ] that 
liberal capitalism has with fascism" (Ibid.). In his criticism, Eagleton offers two 
additional readings: first, that if the relation between liberal capitalism and fascism is 
one of a pact with crime, he is also intrinsically saying that the bourgeoisie nevertheless 
represents the non-criminal, "good" element; and second, that this ambiguous 
relationship is also the result of a "natural" attraction for violence, for crime. This line 
of thought is not unusual. It brings to mind the fragment that Orson Welles felt 
compelled to include in Graham Green's screenplay The Third Man (1949): "Italy for 
thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed-they 
produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they 
had brotherly love, five hundred years of democracy and peace and what did that 
produce ... ? The cuckoo clock." 
The problem with this line of thought is that it seems to consider the development of 
human beings not very differently from the way Hobbes or Hegel did. For Hobbes, 
human societies only seem to begin with civil societies - already there when individuals 
agreed to recognize political and hierarchical authority. Without this "contract", Hobbes 
thought, violence and disorder would be the "inevitable condition" of human beings 
(Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 530).65 The modem usage of the term civil society is 
perhaps a more Hegelian version based on economic and social order by way of a 
supposedly "free co-operation" between individuals, involving private property, market 
exchange and so on. But obviously, inequality and status were not issues of concern for 
the prominent idealist Hegel (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 612-14). Now, 
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Wilkinson's studies on the relationship between violence and inequality tell me that 
human existence should not be measured exclusively against the history of human civil 
societies; on the contrary, human civil societies are the very last link of a long chain in 
the development of human beings. In fact, "during 90 or 95 percent of our existence as 
'anatomically modem' [his commas] human beings," argues Wilkinson, "we lived in 
remarkably egalitarian hunting and gathering societies, based on gift and food sharing" 
(2004:9). He supports his argument by pointing to more than a hundred anthropological 
reports on recent hunter-gatherer societies spread over four continents, from which he 
draws the conclusion: "they share food, not simply with kin or even with those who 
reciprocate, but according to need even when food is scarce," and adds: 
There is no dominance hierarchy among hunter gatherers. No individual has 
priority of access to food which [ ... ] is shared. In spite of the marginal female 
preference for the more successful hunters as lovers, access to sexual partners is 
not a right which correlates with rank. In fact rank is simply not discernible 
among hunter gatherers. This is a cross cultural universal, which rings out 
unmistakably from the ethnographic literature, sometimes in the strongest terms 
(Ibid.: 10). 
Parenthetically speaking, I cannot stress enough the importance of Wilkinson's 
evaluation on equality in relation to Bond's ethical questioning of what he ontologically 
calls "the problem". It would be wrong to assume that violence/crime is intrinsic to 
human development; if Wilkinson is correct, it is intrinsic to the latest 5 or 10 percent of 
our human development in societies based on inequality. We should ask, as Wilkinson 
does, "why [is] inequality, or social hierarchy ... so antithetical to better social relations 
and to community life?" (2004: 9). The actions we take are not an inbuilt characteristic 
of our species but are the result of our type of social relationships: whether the social 
status type (that is, vertical societies) or on the friendship type (that is, horizontal 
societies). If violence is based on social status we will fiercely compete against each 
other for scarce resources, much the same as any other animal species. As Wilkinson 
notes, "for members of almost any species, the worst competitors are not other species, 
but other members of the same species" (Ibid.). Thus, whether other people are the best 
or the worst does not depend on whether "evil" or "good" is part of their character, but 
on the nature of their social relationships. 
But the most relevant point extracted from Wilkinson's study is the acknowledgment 
that social inequality makes human beings sick in one way or another by transforming 
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them into obsessive individuals: obsessed with status, standing, reputation, career and 
so on. It is not humanly relevant whether we are poor or rich then. "The world's most 
primitive people have few possessions", anthropological studies confirm, "but are not 
poor [ ... ] Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is it just a relation 
between means and ends; above all is a relation between people. Poverty is a social 
status. As such it is an invention of civilization" (Wilkinson, 2004: 7). Bond has been 
trying to tell us for many years now that humanity will only have a future when "the 
human imperative acknowledges the human imperative in everyone else".66 Psychiatry 
considers obsession as a mild type of mental illness: a morbid preoccupation which can 
be psychotic or neurotic. When the obsession has a delusional quality, psychiatrists call 
it a psychotic obsession. When the person knows the obsession is irrational, but is 
unable to control it - that is, it is an endlessly recurrent, intrusive thought, such as 
continuously doubt: "Am I really the important person I ought to be?" - then it is a 
neurotic obsession.67 It does not seem outrageous to argue that fascism is the result of a 
social psychosis produced by social inequality; a condition very much with us now. 
5.5. Section V 
5.5.1. Civilization through inequality. 
Of course, neither Bond nor the Frankfurt School is saying that our current situation is 
as "bad" as the fascism endured by the Germans between 1933 and 1945. However, 
neutralization of the human/class conflicts which unequal societies inevitably produce, 
as well as the elimination of class struggle, was the end result of the exceptional fascist 
State. How long liberal capitalism and its culture will be able to keep at bay a clash of 
classes is something about which we can only speculate. This rethinking of aesthetics 
makes one thing clear though: if one day human beings finally achieve to construct 
socialist societies, it will be because they will be truly democratic or they simply will 
not be socialist. Eagleton seems to consider fascism only from the perspective of 
economically advanced Western Europe, leaving out the rest of the world. But as 
Allardyce says, we have seen fascist regimes "everywhere in the Third World" during 
the whole of the last recent century (Allardyce, 1979: 375). In fact, Mussolini's 
prophesy that "the twentieth century would be the century of fascism" (Ibid.), has not 
been too far from the truth. The most conspicuous case, South America, has endured 
brutal fascist dictatorships throughout its vast geography and during most of the last half 
of the Twentieth Century. And Western liberal democracies like the United States have 
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effectively provided the financial, strategic and political support to install dictators in 
most of these countries at one time or another (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993).68 
Baroness Thatcher interceded for Augusto Pinochet while he was under house arrest in 
Britain in 1999, addressing the dictator as "a friend which the UK is in debt to," and her 
call was all too true. 
The UK owed Pinochet, not just because, as she said herself, Pinochet helped the British 
army during the 1982 Falklands War, but for a less symbolic, more substantial episode 
which might help to pinpoint better the real problem. Up to the time of Allende's 
presidency, copper in Chile - the world-largest producer of it - was being mined by the 
US company Anaconda Copper. While Chile's copper had been exploited by Anaconda, 
its price had been artificially slashed (Ibid.: 170). The true beneficiaries of that situation 
did not include the people of Chile, but financiers at London's Stock Exchange, where 
most of the world's copper was traded (Ibid.: 170). The nationalization of the copper's 
mines by Allende and the consequent rise of its price was a terrible blow, not only to 
London, but to the international financing and trade industry. With his coup, Pinochet 
promptly amended Allende's Chilean 'misfit' to the needs of international 
merchandizing, returning Chile's copper to Anaconda with the consequent restoration of 
the UK as principal beneficiary of it. Now, could the young students and trade unionists 
who were thrown from military airplanes into the ocean by Pinochet's executioners 
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1993:94), have had the thought: "this is not as bad as the 
evil of the fascists?" The Chileans of Pinochet (1973-89), the Argentineans of Videla 
(1976-83), or the Nicaraguans of Somoza (1930-79) to mention but a few, were 
murdered not because fascists are "evil", but because the history of class struggle, 
secured by its ideological constituents of dominator and dominated, converts capital 
growth into an imperative above any other human imperative. It becomes all-that-
matters and makes people commit "evil" actions. This is very different from asserting 
that "Tom, Dick and Harry" are "evil". 
The importance of this approach to analysing human events cannot be stressed enough. 
The fundamental problem is not whether Pinochet and his executioner are "evil", as 
Eagleton might suggest, but rather, as Bond's philosophy of drama asks, whether their 
repugnant actions are the result of human beings being convinced they are doing an act 
of justice: one question approaching justice via Hobbes and the other via Marx. Would 
the relation executioner/victim have changed if they had exchanged roles? Not at all. 
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The victim would have become the executioner and vice versa; perhaps, like Brecht, by 
way of a Committee for Public Safety which sends people to death in a Gulag instead of 
by way of an airplane.69 This is why Bond would ask "why" they did what they did 
instead of "what and when". Had thinkers like Eagleton put this perspective to work, 
they would have been forced to dig under the "evil" human beings, unearthing a system 
- indeed the bourgeois moral and ideological values suggested by Eagleton as 
"liberating" or "epic" (2002: 125) - from which those "evil" human minds feed. In this 
regard, Bond sent me this very pertinent letter: 
French educational authorities are publishing two books and they send me (late) 
chapters to read - and sometimes they are worrying and I have to correct them at 
length (They write about "evil" and "good" and I don't - except perhaps now 
and then rhetorically). I write about justice and injustice (and hence site, as prior 
to character and even motive). I think it's a different way of looking at reality -
and indeed [it] changes reality into realities. The problem isn't that we are 
different characters, have different opinions, but that when there are different 
ideologies there are different realities (6 October, 2005). 
After 1945, the world at large thought it was entitled to point a finger at the Germans, 
but, when hundreds of thousands of them were subjected to conditions resembling the 
worst features of Nazi concentration camps in the Gulags of Soviet Russia, they all kept 
silent (Kogon, 1960: 320). To people like Eugen Kogon - a survivor of Buchenwald -
this "collective complicity" of silence was a terrible blow because he knew it to be the 
result of unchanged moral and ideological values; the very values that had driven the 
world to commit such atrocious crimes during earlier years. For Kogon the only 
conclusion was this: "the spirit of Hitler lives on in others as well" (Ibid.). In my view, 
Edward Bond's entire philosophy of drama arises from perceiving the world in the same 
manner as Kogon: the meaning of justice is desperately in need of a resolution, or will 
face dire consequences. If for Bond our current society is "extreme", it is because 
within capitalism it is impossible to acknowledge the now old human imperatives of 
"liberty, equality, and fraternity". 
However, Bond's philosophy does not justify the executioner. I am perfectly aware of 
the negative connections that such discourses might raise in unprepared minds (I was 
there myself and am sti11learning). I argued earlier that the path to a socialist utopia 
seems a very difficult one indeed. In some senses, it would be easier for me to follow 
Eagleton's line of thought than that of Bond, and believe that Auschwitz was the 
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creation of "evil" people who happened to be called fascists. But then I would perforce 
have to believe in fairies, ghosts, witches, demons, and, of course, in gods. Then it 
would all appear as if it had a divine purpose and it would be easier. Actually, despite 
the detailed readings I have made of Eagleton's works - including his self-
representation as an ''unreconstructed'' socialist (1992: 31-2) - I have not been able to 
determine whether he is a secular or religious person.70 Had he been a religious person, 
his ambiguities in relation to capitalism vis-a-vis fascism could have been explained in a 
stroke: if a divine being is the creator of our predicaments, then crime and injustice 
must be part of a divine strategy or as a result of the sporadic or periodic actions of evil. 
But if Eagleton is a secular thinker, then his reading of the fascists as "evil" becomes 
the verification of my own hypothesis: rethinking aesthetics is rethinking the "whole", 
through a holistic mind like Bond advises, and therefore requires conceptualizing with 
imagination, reason, and logic our human world. 
Yet, years of ideological hammering have left us in a place from which it is very 
difficult to imagine a world without capital. I cannot help but recall Adorno's aesthetic 
formula on the "Truth Content" of an artwork (Adorno, 1997: 354; see also my diagram 
on chapter I, section IlL). Take away only one of its components - be it determinacy, 
openness, form, content, or experience and thought - and the "Truth Content" of a work 
of art will have vanished from the picture. As Bond tells me in another of his letters, 
"But the situation is difficult to read"; and as if he was himself answering Eagleton's 
letter, he adds: 
All systems of morality are corrupt because their effect is to reconcile us with 
injustice - and as the effect is always justified by ideology, it is the unspoken 
intention of morality to reconcile us to injustice, to live unjustly - and because 
of the contradiction in the self this leads to the paradox that crime (acts against 
morality and law) may be expressions of the human need for justice [ ... ] the 
contradiction is also in ourselves. We are driven by the need of justice, but 
ideology distorts this into the performance of injustice - and the ideologized 
mind is part of the ideology [his underline] (2 October, 2004). 
When considering the problem of making socially responsible drama I cannot ignore the 
psychosocial aesthetics of denial. This, in my view, is the social by-product resulting 
from the petty bourgeoisification of society at large and must surely be impregnating 
most culture and thinking. It is not new, and as can be observed through Poulantzas 
above and Bourdieu in Chapter IV, it is not just a class characteristic of the petty 
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bourgeoisie, it comes with the baggage of being part of unequal societies. Like Martin 
Carnoy, Manuel Castells (2001: 3) and Richard Wilkinson (2004: 1), I think that most 
people are in truth aware of what is going on; that most of us intuitively know already 
that unequal societies are humanly corrosive. But as Fernandez-Armesto claims, we 
tend to recoil from truth. Not because we do not like the truth (because I think we do), 
but because deep inside, human beings need instinctively to live in equilibrium with 
everything and everyone else. The problem is that, while we all want to live in a just 
world - do not exclude anyone; no matter what the crime - as Bond tells us through his 
whole body of work, we have not yet learned to recognize that longed-for justice in 
everybody else. This has self-evidential consequences all around us. We find ourselves 
living in a chaotic, unbalanced and ugly world. In order to go on living, we create a 
'balanced' world within ourselves and in our immediate localities - for example, in our 
gardens, in our home decorations, our jobs, in most art ventures and so on. Even the 
lowliest individual, living in a chaotic and unordered environment, has a secret comer 
with a particular photograph, or a secret box where she or he has precious symbols 
neatly assembled. While the smoke rose out of the chimneys, even concentration camps' 
inmates tried to recreate this feeling of balance with their niggling residue of 
"recreation" time with "music", "sport," the practicing of some "painting", or the 
cultivation of a flower in an empty tin (Kogon, 1960: 133-40). We "stare" away from 
the world, but only because we need to survive the "wrongful situation" in which we 
live. 
Schopenhauer thought clinical madness was actually a protective device of nature. He 
formulated that, since a person can be driven to suicide by enduring a great suffering, if 
nature protects life at all costs then madness might be a kind of circuit-breaker of nature 
impeding the suicidal from actually committing the act. In the words of the philosopher 
"then nature in the throes of self-preservation destroys the thread of memory" (1981: 
79-80).71 Certainly we are the victims of a long-standing syndrome, which now appears 
to me not just to be the product of the later bourgeois ideologies and their intrinsically 
contradictory moralities, but the product of an entire human civilization which has been 
based on inequality, the mother of all crime and injustice. I would like to call it the 
"Picasso syndrome". The story goes that Picasso told Roland Penrose, "My mother said 
to me, if you become a soldier, you'll be a general; if you become a monk, you'll end up 
as the pope. Instead, I became a painter and wound up as Picasso."n How many of us 
expected to be popes, generals or Picassos and ended up as "ordinary" as the next man? 
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Or what crimes have been committed in order to be one of them? Our theatres are 
awash with "problem plays" - whether Tony Blair is a liar; whether a train killed 
people because of corporate greed; whether women are as ambitious as men - or plays 
without any problems at all. But what we urgently need are "answer plays" and only 
Edward Bond seems to be working to fill that gap. There is plenty of space for more 
activists, poets, writers, thinkers, scholars, or theorists in that gap. We may try with all 
our might to resolve as many problems as "civil societies" throw at us, but if we forget, 
ignore, or neglect that they all have an origin in the real problem of inequality, 
problems will go on being neglected. We will seek nothing more than a way to make a 
living from them.73 As Bond has told us for many years now: 
A rational, free culture is based either on a classless society or at least on the 
conscious struggle to remove class structures and the economic, ecological, 
psychological, and political distortions they cause. A writer's work should be 
part of this struggle. [ ... ] now I've become more conscious of the strength of 
human beings to provide answers. The answers aren't always light, easy, or 
even straightforward, but the purpose - a socialist society - is clear (Roberts, 
1985: 68). 
The mother of all problems is inequality. Concluding this study with the simplest of 
arguments feels, in a way, as if one has been cheated. And of course, there is nothing 
original about it. But what is new is the setting, the new social structures and 
complexities surrounding the problem. That is why it will always require new insights, 
new poets: as Bond says "each new generation goes back to the very basic problems" 
(appendix: 36). The question is whether this celebratory bourgeois culture that we have 
discussed has managed to blur these basic problems to such an extent that they have 
become unrecognisable to most of us. 
Conclusion to chapter V 
It has been said that when Poulantzas developed his theory, society was very different 
from today, and that therefore, his work does not provide us with the necessary answers 
to today's problems (Carnoy and Castells, 2001:18). "Social theories are not supposed 
to provide answers forever," they say (Ibid.). It is true that the world at large has 
experienced great socio-political changes since the 1970s. Through ongoing monetarist 
globalisation, the relative autonomy of the state as an organization with legal supremacy 
over a specific territory and popUlation is, in overall terms, "fading away" (Ibid.: 17).74 
Poulantzas formulated his social theory while thinking of workers as a solid class with 
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traditional identities that are now all but disappearing. By being individualized, their 
social networks - the group of friends in the company, the after-work hangouts, the 
trade union - have lost much of their social function; as Camoy and Castells say "they 
are as 'pennanently temporary' [their commas] as the work itself' (Ibid.: 16). 
But we can agree with Camoy and Castells' analysis only up to a certain degree. Since 
Poulantzas wrote Fascism and Dictatorship (1974), capitalism has been frenziedly 
active transfonning both itself and worldwide societies, but only because, in order to 
'live on', it continuously needs to readjust to its principal criterion of constant capital 
growth and profit. The familiar three-class pyramid-like model, though substantially 
mutated by way of class transpositions, still applies (Bilton et aI, 1981 :64): the minute 
triangle situated at the top still represents the owners of the means of production, the 
bourgeoisie; while the lives of the wide middle section still depend on wages, no matter 
whether they are higher or lower, and at the bottom comes the strata of the poor. I have 
discussed the social petty bourgeoisification of our liberal democracies and the 
dangerous side-effects produced by a class characterised by perennial frustration and 
resentment. For these reasons Poulantzas' social theory remains as relevant now as it 
was thirty years ago because the idiosyncratic aspirations and fears of the petty 
bourgeoisie have not changed fundamentally since then. 
Whoever followed the electoral results of the local elections in England and Wales 
during May 2006, might have observed a worrying increase of local counsellors from 
the BNP - from 20 to 46.75 Furthennore, Labour MP Margaret Hodge has recently been 
criticised for saying that "80% of white middle class families are tempted by the BNP" 
(Ibid.). But the detail which has really awakened the interest of a "bewildered" press is 
that many of those who helped the upsurge of the BNP were long standing supporters of 
the Labour Party itself. The media at large has interpreted such an ideological shift as a 
protest vote against the Labour Party, but the conversion seems to me all too divergent; 
unless - and this is where Poulantzas' theory would strictly apply today - Labour Party 
supporters themselves fonn part of the large sections and sub-sections of the petty 
bourgeoisie. Then such a move is not inexplicably contradictory, but, according to 
Poulantzas, the natural and spontaneous outcome of a class conditioned by intrinsic 
idiosyncrasies: sempitemally frustrated by the impossibility of fulfilling their ambitions; 
frightened by the continuous prospect of becoming poor; threatened by competition for 
resources, and therefore in fear of immigrants, legal or illegal; intimidated by the 
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unlawful incursions of new and growing minorities like the underclass;76 and subject to 
an ever-growing pressure from the new rules of engagement of big capital - that is, 
market globalization - which demands to continuously update their acquired skills or 
"perish", and so on ... 
I consider the ongoing petty bourgeoisification of society not dangerous because of the 
conspicuous growth of the petty bourgeoisie class itself, but because of its symptomatic 
social consequences; namely, a concoction of ambition and frustration. In Thatcher's 
Theatre (1999), D. Keith Peacock notes the petty bourgeoisie's palpable growth as the 
upsurge ofa "New Class" which he describes as "college-educated people [ ... ] [a] post-
industrial society working for state institutions: scientist, teachers, and educational 
administrators, social workers, lawyers, etc. [ ... ] It is a numerous class and expanding; 
it is a disproportional powerful class, ambitious and frustrated" (Ibid.: 25). 
"Marx," Poulantzas concludes, "following Hegel, said that history can sometimes repeat 
itself: but what the first time was tragedy, is the second time farce. The formulation is 
striking, but it is true in one sense only: there are such things as black comedies [ ... ] 
And there are funny men in history who only kill others" (1974:358). In my view, the 
fascist "bogey", as the sociologist calls it, will not be a danger when it takes 
unsophisticated or familiar forms, but when it reasserts itself by way of new and 
unrecognizable forms. Capitalism will sooner or later have to deal with the new 
political frontiers like ecological sustenance, energy supply, the unbalanced growth of 
an ageing population in the Western societies, and/or the immense numbers living on 
the breadline throughout the world at large which will surely seriously threaten capital 
expansion. Civil liberties that we all take for granted today will be affected to some 
degree by the consequent social conflicts, which might produce a crisis of the dominant 
ideology, reproducing the very social situation that unleashed fascism in 1920s' Europe; 
only this time it will not be in some European countries but in the world at large. In the 
1970s, Poulantzas was still able to take into his social studies notions like "the 
revolutionary fervour of the working class and the masses" (Ibid.). I do not think this is 
the case any longer. 
Trotsky thought that the fundamental stages of the development of mankind could be 
established as follows: "prehistoric 'history' of primitive man [his commas]; ancient 
history, whose rise was based on slavery; the Middle Ages, based on serfdom; 
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capitalism, with free wage exploitation; and finally, socialist society" (1923). The 
ultimate purpose of Bond's drama is also a future socialist society, but as he told me, he 
is not optimistic about solutions; he knows that such a future might be as unreachable as 
the past itself. "I have melancholy for a future," he said to Peter Billingham.77 Bond 
believes that capitalism is too cunning to collapse under its own weight as many other 
Marxists like Benjamin like to think; and least of all, if it does, that it would be in a 
quiet or pacific way. Poulantzas might have recognized a revolutionary fervour of the 
masses in the 1970s, but today it is extremely rare to hear or read someone suggesting 
the abolition of both class differences and private property - not even in "melancholic" 
tenns. Social petty bourgeoisification affects everyone, at every level of wealth or 
poverty, by way of uncontested propaganda, commercial adverts, education, and so on. 
As 1 have said above (see endnote 20), infonnation and propaganda is even reaching 
remote and still-ancient tribes, from the tribes of Papua Guinea to the hunter-gatherers 
of southern Africa. It is affecting cultural traditions that have hitherto been based on 
communal equality and sharing. 
It is no longer appropriate to apply the three class model to a specific state in isolation, 
now that we are dealing with a production process that is directed by a globalized 
economy. As a good number of contemporary sociological studies reflect, the rapid 
changes in the class structure (like the expansion of clerical - or white collar -
occupations, the rise of the affluent worker andlor social and generational class 
mobility) makes sociology a field in continuous need of updating. But the traditionally 
capitalist mode of production has not disappeared; it just has been displaced to Third 
World countries where it is easier to amass surplus value78 - owing to the fact that 
labour is even cheaper. According to Poulantzas' Marxist theory, "the production 
process [his italics] is defined not by technological factors, but by the unity of the 
labour process and the relations of production" (Poulantzas, 1973:30). In my view, the 
three class model becomes clear cut on a global scale; but it also tells me that if, at any 
time, this global, dominant ideology suffers sufficient deterioration or threat to the point 
of unleashing a crisis, the prospect of an exceptional fascist regimen on a global scale is 
real and terrifying. 
Bond does not think there are solutions, or that the knowledge that might take us to that 
ultimate solution is attainable - at least not through teaching, not through dialectics, not 
through most of our current fonns of art. He does not even believe that we can learn, 
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acquire, or perceive knowledge, but that "knowledge perceives us" (appendix: 16). And 
I think he is absolutely right. I think there are ontological truths which cannot be 
transmitted by way of written words, or teaching, or political discourses but through the 
"problem's" dramatization. As Bond tells me: "the way we think is 'we've got a 
problem, solve it' - and the answer is 'no; we've a problem, make it creative'" 
(appendix: 49). I only hope that with this thesis and its conclusive chapter I have been 
able to "enact" - in the sense of inspiring but also in the sense of performing - in 
written words the conceptual significance of Bond's cognitive perception; of Bond's 
crude thinking: "the thinking of the great" (Benjamin: 1999: 21). 
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Endnotes 
1 From the conference "Reputations: Edward Bond," held at the Theatre Museum in London on 
the II th March, 2005, which was made available through the Theatrevoice.com website 
(accessed: 25.04.05); chaired by Aleks Sierzs, the speakers were: Peter Billingham, Kate 
Katafiasz, Chris Cooper and Mark Ravenhill. 
2 BBC News, 19th January 2006. 
3 Letter received on the 30th March, 2005 
4 Trotsky, Leon, (1923) "What is proletarian culture and is it possible?" Transcribed in the 
Philosophy/History Archive Online: www. arxists.orglarchiverrrotsky. 
S Brecht does not agree with Trotsky, a fact that, in my view, he makes clear all through his 
writings and theory of theatre (Escritos Sobre Teatro - Writings about Theatre Schriften zum 
Theater - Vol. I, 2, and 3, 1983). As I translate what he says from a Spanish edition: "a 
proletarian art is an art as any other art, in other words, it is even more art than proletarian art" 
(Vol. I, p. 70). 
6 In his "Conversations with Brecht" Walter Benjamin notes: "Yesterday morning Brecht came 
over to show me his Stalin poem, entitled "The farmer to His Oxen." At first I could not see the 
point; and when, after a moment, the thought of Stalin crossed my mind, I did not dare hold on 
to it. This effect corresponded roughly to Brecht's intention. [ ... ] It did indeed pay tribute to 
Stalin - who in his view had immense merits." Letter dated July 25, 1934 (Demetz, 1986:215). 
But, in case one feels like contesting that, at the time, Brecht did not know anything about what 
the Stalinist regime was doing to its own people, Benjamin adds in the same letter: "He [Brecht] 
was following Russian developments, and equally the writings of Trotsky. They prove that 
grounds for suspicion exist; justified suspicion that called for a sceptical view of Russian affairs. 
Should the suspicions one day be confirmed, one would have to oppose the regime - and that 
means publicly [his italics]." Furthermore, by recording Brecht's words, Benjamin also reveals 
Brecht's intransigent ideological position: "On the other hand" says Brecht according to 
Benjamin, "the fact that certain criminal cliques are at work in Russia itself is beyond doubt. It 
can be seen periodically from their misdeeds [ ... ] We have paid for our position; we are covered 
by scars. It is natural that we are also particularly sensitive" (Ibid.:216). 
7 I am actually well acquainted with Williams' sort of defence of the working class. Coming 
from a Spanish working class background myself I have witnessed at first hand the "good 
manners" of the superior Spanish patrician families towards their "friends" workers, with the 
occasional 'pat on the back' conversation about the "good things oflife" and it is very similar to 
that described by Williams above. I am not comparing Williams to a post-Francoist Spanish 
patrician family of course. We are not born vulgar, but beautiful and pure; but we are born 
ignorant and it is up to a society to make complete human beings out of the innocent beings we 
are at birth. As a matter of fact, this is what culture is supposed to be: a continuous transfer of 
knowledge. It is not a coincidence that the preferred poet of the Spanish bourgeoisie is without 
doubt Garcia Lorca: because with Lorca one knows that class differences actually produce 
culture; "wonderful ordinary culture." 
8 As it was with the Soviet Block, this can be verified in the written constitution of Cuba as one 
of the surviving communist regimes. In article 50 it makes clear that their end is "towards the 
construction of socialism [hacia la construction del socialismo ]," though they seem to be caught 
up in a neverending communist dictatorship with a seemingly unmovable leader Fidel Castro 
(see the Cuban Constitution at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/cuba; accessed: 03.08.03). Of 
course, there is on this subject a plethora of discussions to take into account. Cuba is as far 
from a utopian socialism today as it was during the initial days of the revolution. Whether it is 
so by internal or external causes, or by the sum of both - a dictatorship and the long-standing 
US embargo, among many other things - is rightly the source of long theses (read for example 
Miguel Angel Centeno (2004), or Frank O. Mora and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2003». 
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9 In an interview with the journalist Jeremy Paxman, BBC2, NewsNight, 16 September 2004. 
10 From the original draft version sent to me by Billingham on the 26 of June, 2003; eventually 
published as a 15,000 word essay for the series Dictionary of Literary Biography, Vol. 310: 
"British and Irish Dramatists Since World War II," USA: Thomson Gale, 2005. 
11 For a full definition on the Invisible Object as Bondian term see Bond, 2004:24-32; Katafiasz, 
2004:7-11; and Davis, 2005:45; also in the conclusion of this study. 
12 As it appeared in the printed edition of Le Monde, 19 April, 2003. 
13 Letter received on the 30th of April, 2005. 
14 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, Plimbico, 1999, p. 21 
15 For the meaning of "Big Capital" see Nicos Poulantzas' Fascism and Dictatorship, trans. by 
Judith White, NLB 1974, esp. pp. 97-111. 
16 For Eagleton there are two different Adornos: (1) the one who "retreats from the nightmare of 
history into the aesthetic [ ... ] It is the most caricatured side of his thought: Beckett and 
Schoenberg as the solution to world starvation and threatened nuclear destruction. This is the 
Adorno who deliberately offers as a solution something that is clearly part of the problem, the 
political homeopath who will feed us sickness as cure. And (2) Adorno the theorist for whom 
the aesthetic offers a paradigm, rather than a displacement of emancipatory political thought" 
(Eagleton, 1991:360) [For a critical account of Adorno's use of the aesthetic as political 
paradigm, see Albrecht Wellmer, 'Reason, Utopia and the Dialectic of Enlightenment', in R J 
Bernstein (ed.) Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, 1985)] 
17 Ampersand' editorial, the Arts & Business Newsletter, is quite clear: "Arts & Business will 
continue to make the case for the arts, because we genuinely believe that they can aid the 
competitiveness of a business [ ... ] we suspect that some businesses may use the current 
situation as an excuse to jettison unrewarding partnerships [my underlining], but we will 
campaign for increased investments in the arts" (200112002:2). 
18 One could ask why I do not say in short the Frankfurt School. Because while Jiirgen 
Habermas was part and parcel of that school, he has palpably taken a very different 
philosophical path - that of social negotiation and mediation. "Under other historical 
conditions," said Habermas, "the juxtaposition of the categories 'revolution' and 'reform' 
constituted a sharp line of demarcation. In industrially advanced societies it no longer 
discriminates between possible alternative strategies of change" (Wilson, part II, 1986:290). On 
this Wilson adds: "the foregoing is not offered as evidence that Habermas is no longer a 
Marxian thinker; on the contrary. But it does suggest a new direction for the critical theory of 
society given its earlier retreat from Marx's revolutionary solution into 'negative dialectics' as 
the basis for a theoretical [his italics] materialism" (Ibid.). 
19 Browsed from Internet: http://members.theglobe.comlJenablhistoricallmkvlch01.htm; 
accessed: 13.10.00. 
20 In her article "The Interpretation of Culture(s) After Television," the author examines how 
television has influenced all cultures ideologically. The ideology of mass-consumption is 
affecting all cultures around the globe - from the tribes of Papua New Guinea to the slums of 
Egypt or Morocco. Television acts as a window, observes Abu-Lughod, through which the 
illusions of riches, values, and aesthetic ideals of the Western democracies are propagandised. 
21 As I will attempt to demonstrate here, there is a terrible irony in an imaginary encounter 
between Eagleton and Bond: in my view they would be suggesting the same idea about whether 
fascism is there "somewhere" with us or not, and yet they would scoff at each others' 
discourses. They both speak English, but they both speak totally different 'languages'. For 
example, in his short article "Postmodern Art and Auschwitz," Bond is telling us crudely yet 
poetically what the dialectician Eagleton says subtlety: "we do not live under the police tyranny 
of Stalin or Hitler" says the dramatist, and adds: 
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"Western Consumer Democracy [sic] is a soft tyranny. But its lies lead it into 
barbarism. Each day here and in America there is more greed, destitution, despair, 
violence and crime. We return to the fears of the twenties, the stalking ground of 
fascism. And our response to it is still Hitlerite [sic]: more barbarism - punish, 
imprison, regiment. The Americans have imprisoned a man for twenty-five years for 
stealing a slice of pizza. Its [sic] a matter oftime before they televise their executions. 
This is the language of our press and Parliament, the chattering of the Auschwitz-
classes. To call Reagan, Thatcher and Major, Hiders would be grotesque. But Hitlers 
are no longer necessary. In the media age democracy can destroy itself. It does so 
when it makes icons of its lies. Fascism occurs only when - but always when - the real 
causes of social injustice are denied" (Bond, 1995b:20). 
22 Until The Mines Act of 1842 children as young as five were employed hauling trucks in 
passages too narrow for men. Thereafter, only those of ten and above were allowed to work 
underground in the coal mines of Britain. However, the bourgeoisie did not give up without a 
fight; the Mines Act was implemented not without the industrialists' fierce objections because 
then it was "a time of adverse trade figures" (Burne, 1989:889). During the whole of the 19th 
Century and well into the beginning of the 20th, child labour was in high demand not only in the 
textile mills, "but the food, drinks and tobacco industry, brickworks, paper mills, and the 
chemicals, printing machinery and metalworking sectors" (MUhlberg, 1988:21). Three were the 
fundamental reasons: one, automatized machinery did not require special skills, but small body 
sizes -like children's little fingers - were very convenient; two, although they worked as many 
hours as adults - up to sixteen hours per day - they received far lower wages; and three, "the 
children were completely defenceless" (Ibid.:81). However, as I will discuss later on, these 
progressive yet small improvements on people's human conditions - which were nevertheless 
attained by way of the ruling class' concessions - might have had more to do with the way the 
ruling classes have viewed the world through their sensuous perception (that is, the prevailing 
aesthetics) than by way of any acquired moral or ethical value. Today most of us, liberal minds, 
contemplate with horror the vision of children working; I wonder if in fifty or hundred years 
time, a more advanced and just society would consider the current working conditions of many 
women and men as horrific. Not just of those workers we know on the Third World - because 
already many regard them as horrific - but also of those that now are regarded as "normal," 
"decent" jobs like driving, working on an assembly line, secretarial work and so on. Would the 
aesthetics of the future regard them as a waste of human creativity? 
23 "On Cultural Impoverishment," The Guardian, Saturday December, 21 2002, p. 4. 
24 A closer look at some of the leaders' views of our theatre industry shows the West End 
producer, Thelma Holt, telling The Independent, "while no one would deny the industry has its 
problems,it also enriches the lives of many people. What I often experience is sheer magic" 
(The Independent, 3 March, 2001). 
25 BBC4, 21:00-22:00, Wednesday 15 November 2005. 
26 I will illustrate further this complex reasoning with some personal experiences in the 
conclusive chapter. 
27 Letter dated 31 October 2003. 
28 Quoted in the Observer of 15 January 1950. 
29 In fact, Eagleton acknowledges the relationship between fascism and liberal capitalism 
repeatedly: as he says in his letter to me, he would identify fascism as "growing out" of 
capitalism; or that fascism is very much a possible future (1997: 134); or that liberal capitalism 
and fascism are kind of cousins from the same family: the latter reappears when the first is 
being threatened (1991 :379). 
30 Needless to say, many other internal and external historicist causes like Catholicism, 
progressive loss of the Spanish empire, unfortunate cultural traditions and so on, might be at the 
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heart of the Spaniards' collective dysfunctionalities during the Franco's era (I(ierman, 1980:97-
107; see also Julia et al.:1999; Barea, 1984). 
31 We know this suitable fact thanks to an inconspicuous article in the media about Ken 
Livingstone's current companion, who apparently became prominent when she refused to 
observe the silence for Franco's death while she was a student in Oxford (The Guardian, 10 
October 2001, p. 17). 
32 As Allardyce notes, the fascists were noisy and extravagant throughout Europe but they never 
obtained popular support. "In Spain, often considered the third fascist homeland, the Falange 
(numbering no more than twenty-five thousand members) received only [ ... J 0.7 percent of the 
total national vote in the last pre-Franco election of 1936" (1979:376). The Nazis - the most 
"successful" fascists of all- only got 37.4 percent at the depth of the depression in 1932 and it 
remained its best vote. 
33 Edward Bond punctiliously noted to me that, in persptective, "it might very well be that if 
there had not been a Hitler, Heisenberg and others like him would have provided the German 
army with Atom Bombs. And then God only knows what would've happened; it leaves the 
uncanny thought that perhaps the world was saved by Hitler" (Apendix, p. 33). 
34 There has been for some time now an attempt to put fascism side by side with communism 
which seems to me dangerously wrong. It is not accidental that such arguments usually come 
from right wing sources. Although both are totalitarian systems, their aims are quite opposite, 
and that should not ever be erased from our minds. The basic law of human existence for the 
fascists is "eternal struggle" - and, in many senses, there is not very much to add to it (Kershaw, 
2004:252); while the communists followed a specific Marxist-Leninist theory which aimed for a 
society made of free and equal men and women. Were there - and are there - crimes committed 
in the process? Absolutely, but to mix up the principles would be a huge mistake. Nor can we 
ignore the historical connections between the attained social welfare of the working class all 
through liberal Europe during the last half of the twentieth century, and the ideological 
pressures exerted by the Soviet Union upon our liberal capitalists states during the Cold War. 
As I said before, the path toward socialism is a very difficult one, while fascism is quite 
uncomplicated. 
3S In fact, according to John Bauville, Heidegger's involvement was such that he gave his 
university lectures wearing a Nazi uniform (In John Bauville's broadcast play, Todtnauberg, the 
author discusses the paradox of Heidegger imagining an encounter between Heidegger, the poet 
Paul Celan - a Jewish survivor of the Nazi's camps - and Hannah Arendt in Heidegger's own 
cottage in Todtnauberg - a little village situated in the Black Forest, Germany (BBC Radio 4, 
Friday 20 January, 2006). 
36 In my view, there is a strong contextual relationship between fascism as anti-modernist and 
anti-scientist movement and Heidegger's variety of philosophical existentialism. For Heidegger 
the world had succumbed to the game of power politics where the "peoples of the earth have 
become masses, human life has been levelled down, and the Gods have fled from this darkening 
world" (Wild, 1963:667). As a matter of fact, Heidegger was not pointing only to the Versailles 
Peace Settlement as the cause of Germany's problems; for him the events of the 1920s were the 
culmination of a gradual impoverishment of the meaning of Being which had already begun in 
Greek times (Ibid.:670). To me it appears clear that Heidegger could not let pass the 
opportunity of the Nazi idea as an "elaborate web of responsibilities and restrictions" (Turner, 
1972:551); this was effectively the utopian possibility of "Being" what we were not but we 
always wanted to be - that is, superior beings with superior "honourable" values. Indeed, for 
the philosopher was no longer thinking of philosophy as philosophy but as anthropological 
ontology. How else could Nazism convince the German masses to such an extent that their 
Reich would go on for thousand years? No other fascist regime conquered the collective mind 
of a country's people in such a complete way. Of course, as happens with deceiving ideas in the 
struggle for domination, there is a point of no return with fascism which took everybody by 
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surprise, Heidegger included (Wild, 1963 :664-77). This is discussed later on, through 
Poulantzas' analysis. 
37 Oxford Encyclopedia. 
38 Whether France was already fascist when the Germans marched up the Champs Elysees 
continues to be a source of great controversy. In my view, a crisis of the dominant ideology in 
France was as certain as it was in Germany and Italy. The fascists Frans:ois Darlan and Pierre 
Laval formed the Vichy Government of Marshal Petain, and had an overwhelming popular 
support. Arturo Barea, the Spanish Republican author of the celebrated autobiographical trilogy 
The Forging of a Rebel, fleeing from the victorious Spanish fascists via the Pyrenees depicts a 
France with an unreserved aversion towards communists, socialists, and minority races - not 
only the French authorities but the population at large (Barea, 1984:384-86). Most of the 
Spanish refugees were given eight days to live the country under the threat of being arrested and 
"dumped on the German frontier to their fate" (lbid.:384) (Barea himself came to live in 
England from 1939 until his death in 1957). 
39 I have found it very strange not to be able to relate Poulantzas' conclusion here in any way 
with any other scholar - not just with the above first group (which seems to me a non-Marxist 
approach), but also with Marxists and Trotskyites at large, scholars like Arendt or the Frankfurt 
School. Even if, by way of a footnote, some scholars of the first group seem to evaluate 
Poulantzas' studies on fascism as a major historicist, didactic, and - most important - "de-
Stalinized" work of scholarly precision, (Allardyce, 1979:369). And yet, while Poulantzas' 
theory is footnoted, it is then completely ignored in the framework of their analysis. This seems 
to me inexplicable. 
40 It is common knowledge, I think, the sense of guilt dragged along by many Marxists and 
Marxist critics. Critical Theory is indeed one of those all too obvious examples. Brian J. Shaw 
illustrates Horkheimer's own deterioration to capitulation, but as if failure was already inscribed 
in the first of his theories for human salvation: "Horkheimer offers resignation as the only 
possible course of action precisely because reality is irrefutably irrational" (1985: 176). 
41 "The Nazis: A Warning," BBC2 19:50-20:40,30 April 2005. This documentary has offered a 
very different, refreshing, and courageous account of history within the public domain; 
especially when most historical studies I know could only tell me that "Hindenburg did not 
oppose" the rise of Hitler - full stop. 
42 Of course, we are dealing here with the general context of the KPD, whose tactics were 
considered by observers of the time as dillettantisch (dilettante) (Poulantzas, 1974: 186). 
However, during 1932, Poulantzas tells us, illegal pamphlets and books on the 'art of 
insurrection' abounded, and in the month following Hitler's accession there were street battles 
and skirmishes, but they were always defensive battles against Nazi attacks (Ibid.: 187). It 
would be wrong to say, notes Poulantzas, that communist parties at large capitulated entirely, 
but it is nevertheless true that they bore a heavy responsibility for the rise of National Socialism 
(Ibid.). 
43 Poulantzas examines the Fifth and Sixth Communist Congresses of 1924 and 1928 
respectively by which a series of theories of fascism were established; among them the theory 
that "fascism and social democracy are two sides of one and the same coin of the dictatorship of 
big capital. Social democracy is already transforming itself from the right wing of the labour 
movement into the left wing of the bourgeoisie and therefore of fascism" (poulantzas, 
1974:148). But the one idea repeatedly quoted among activist communists was the diagnosis of 
Stalin: "Fascism is the bourgeoisie's fighting organization that relies on the active support of 
Social-Democracy. Social-Democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism ... These 
organizations do not negate, but supplement each other [Poulantzas quotes from Works, vol. 6, 
Moscow, 1952-5, p. 294)" (Ibid). 
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44 Still unpublished at the time of the performance, which I attended, it was staged in the Mac 
Studio Theatre of Birmingham by the Big Brum theatre company and jointly directed by Chris 
Cooper and Edward Bond, on November 8th, 2005. 
45 "Today's filthy rich are wealthier, healthier and more secure than ever," says Max Hastings in 
his article "They've never had it so good," in which he exposes current times as "the perfect age 
and place to be a fat cat" (The Guardian, Saturday August 6 2005, p. 19). 
46 I think it is incontestable that the longing for a socialist utopia of true democratic equality has 
been eradicated from human minds at large. In those few countries where they have still 
communist regimes, like China, Cuba or North Korea, if there is dissidence against the oligarchs 
it is not for a final conclusion of communist dictatorship into democratic socialism, but in order 
to replace communism with liberal capitalism (Centeno, 2004; Mora and Wiktorowicz, 2003). 
The same is applied to those Arab countries currently subjected to tyrannical regimes of despot 
monarchs like Morocco or Saudi Arabia or subjected to the lunacy of religious forms of State 
like Iran. 
47 If only because, indeed, theatre practitioners and theatre scholars are part and parcel of the 
petty bourgeoisie by way of the skills they supposedly possess - and, in my view, displaying the 
very symptomatic contradictions defined above by Poulantzas. In a symposium held at the 
University of London entitled "Beyond Postmodemism" (19 September 2005) I had the 
opportunity to verify not only Poulantzas' theory, but that of Jameson and Bourdieu. "How can 
theatre contribute to unmasking and critiquing injustice?" was one of the questions proposed by 
the organizers of this symposium and the very reason I attended it. There I found well known 
figures of the theatre industry, including Baz Kershaw, Alezs Sierzs, Graham Ley and scholars 
and lectures from all over Britain. My immediate thought was "if theatre is not already 
contributing to unmasking injustice, what is it all about?" However, although the numerous 
attendants presented a good deal of important matters in their papers, none of them - at all -
were directly or indirectly discussing capitalism itself, or the final abolition of class differences. 
Some suggested a "role for theatre in calling to account the executive and the judiciary" (Tom 
Maguire); other talked of "re-energising communities culturally, socially and politically through 
theatrical explorations" (Wallace McDowell); and all of them had hostile words against 
postmodemism, globalisation and economic domination - all examples which are vindicated by 
Poulantzas's petty bourgeois definitions. However, to me the whole series of contributions and 
discussions in this symposium were denoted by Alezs Sierzs' last remark: that postmodemism is 
typified by Tony Blair being a liar and getting away with it. With supportive laughter all 
present assented with Sierzs. I then remembered my conversation with Bond and pointed out 
that also the Archbishop of Canterbury thought that Tony Blair was a liar and that he was going 
to hell for it. Of course, what I had in mind with my remark was an attempt to take the 
discussions away from particulars and, as I indicated, to call the attention to our capitalist 
system itself. Because like Bond, I do not think Blair is a liar in the sense that he does not go to 
bed thinking "I hope they don't catch me," or something similar (appendix:42). Blair is a petty 
bourgeois putting to work his skills like the rest of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie 
expect him to do; which is, first and foremost, to take care of capital growth. I was answered 
with a general and all too long silence. It is difficult to know in those cases whether it is because 
people were unprepared for my comment or because they thought me idiotic. However, more 
frustrating was the fact that a few scholars approached me afterwards - three of them, in actual 
fact - whispering that they agreed with my remarks and that they wanted to know more. Why 
they did not shared their thoughts at the right time with the rest of the audience instead of 
leaving me there cornered and wondering? It has become all too obvious to me that terms like 
political theatre, fascism, socialism, or capitalism have been erased from the vocabularies of 
most theatre practitioners; like in this symposium, now these terms have been supplanted by the 
term "ethics". This is both a hopeful and a worrying situation because ethics might become 
another sophisticated edged tool with which to cut our own fingers; in other words, that ethics 
ends reconstructed in such a way as to become one more tool for the petty bourgeoisie's 
aesthetics of denial. 
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48 Interestingly enough, in the above symposium "Beyond Postmodernism," there were quite 
few papers pointing to the "failures of the state to fulfil it responsibilities in respect to the The 
Law" (Tom Maguire), and a call for a "fair" and "neutral" State. 
49 On the other hand, the profiles of authoritarian communist leaders like Stalin seem to me fit 
enough to be included within the psychological conditions of resentment, frustration and fear. 
Stalin was the son of a successful shoemaker, initially trained to be a priest in a religious school, 
and therefore a proper petty bourgeois at the outset of the Russian Revolution (Oxford 
Encyclopedia). However, I think that Stalin as a typology of a permanently resented petty 
bourgeoisie is better recognized by way of Nietzsche's evaluation on men oj ressentiment, 
which has been extensively treated here in the first chapter. 
50 I will not include in the primary text of this evaluation the large chunks of the working class 
who were effectively lured towards the fascist call. Not because it would be a complex 
discussion, but mainly because, after all, the actions of the working class depend entirely on its 
leadership which are mostly petty bourgeois agents themselves. Thus, Poulantzas explains, in 
my view incontestably, how trade unionism is a social democratic expression of the petty 
bourgeoisie ideology, and therefore of the bourgeoisie ideology (1974:143-47). Tracing the 
trademarks of trade unionism's revolt, he illustrates the ways in which these are in reality 
expressions of the petty bourgeoisie in revolt: 
(a) Anarchism: [ ... ] which combines contempt for organization and political objectives 
with ignorance, under the pretext of the "lived experience" ofJactory life. 
(b) Spontaneism: i.e. contempt for organization, and the abstract cult of direct and 
'spontaneous' action - the expression par excellence of petty bourgeois 
"individualism. " 
(c) "Putschist jacquerie:" [ ... ] rejects Marxist-Leninist ideology and mass political 
struggle: it is based on a totally abstract cult of the exemplary "violence" of "active 
minorities," characteristic ofthe rebel petty bourgeois (1974: 145). 
On the other hand, psychology and the traditional-aesthetic were factors exploited by the fascist 
movements, especially in the case of the working class peasantry: in Spain, for example, great 
numbers of peasant workers fought for Franco because they were vehemently Catholics by 
tradition. For them Franco was fighting against the anti-God - against the burning of Churches 
and the killing of priests. Other workers sided with Franco simply in order to survive: because 
they were caught geographically on the fascist side and so on ( see Julia, 2004). We cannot 
ignore the fact that the rise of fascism corresponds with a disenchantment of the workers 
towards "leftist" parties. Once fascism was installed as a form of the capitalist State, the 
neutralization of the working class within the fascist regimes came to be by way of concessions 
in "social" legislation. But we should not forget that, again, the leaders of "leftist" parties were 
petty bourgeois themselves. In the section "Fascism and the Working Class," Poulantzas 
explains in detail how the working class had already been thoroughly defeated by the time 
fascism came into power, and the bourgeoisie did not have to pay for this defeat with any 
catastrophic equilibrium. In fact, the fascist State provided "insurance which was established 
for industrial accidents, illness, old age, childbirth, etc," for the workers, which in Italy - as well 
as in Spain - had previously been practically non-existent during parliamentarian democracy 
(1974: 165-67; 218-22). 
51 And the extent of the industrial thrust had no boundaries. Those who designed the Final 
Solution did not only have in mind the extermination of the Jewish populations; it was also a 
properly rationalized exercise based on economic priorities. Hundreds of thousands of men and 
women fit for work and/or with skills were virtually worked to death (Kogon, 1960:88-107). 
Without the cost of living maintenance, transport, or housing, slave-labour provided 
phenomenal profits not only in the manufacturing of arms, but in all kind of works like 
masonry, rail lines, clerical work and so on. The thousands dying of exhaustion were 
supplanted immediately by "men already in a wretched physical state" (Ibid.: 1 04). 
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52 As a matter of fact, in the EEC there are roughly 27 million unemployed, most of them 
chronically so; and we should not ignore the fact that a great number of unemployed are not 
accounted for. This seems to be widely known and even accepted as "natural." Referring to the 
Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve System, a newswoman of "BBC World Business 
Report" (on BBe News 24) reported, with the same mood one would deal with trivia, that "they 
don't want too many people getting jobs [ ... ] it is a delicate balance [ ... ] they have to control 
inflation" (7 April 2006, 00:40 hours). To me this is one more social case which illustrates 
when the extreme becomes ordinary. 
53 As a matter of fact, Britain continued to do business with Germany and Italy as usual until the 
invasion of Poland on September 1939 - and the USA until Pearl Harbour in December 1941. 
They did so even after the German bombers destroyed the Basque town of Guernica with 
incendiary bombs on 27 April, 1937 (an indiscriminate bombing of civilians which did not 
have, until then, a historical precedent). Noel Monks, a British reporter, arrived soon after the 
bombing and reported in the British newspapers "soldiers were sobbing like children [ ... ] the 
smell of human flesh was nauseating" (Burne, 1989:1111). They did so even after Hitler's 
occupations of Austria and of the French controlled Rhineland, the Czech controlled 
Sudetenland; and they did so even after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. When Britain finally 
declared war to Hitler, Neville Chamberlain said: "[ ... ] consequently this country is at war with 
Germany" (Ibid.: 1117). Why were the terms fascism or Nazism disregarded in his radio 
broadcast speech? 
54 "The British Empire reached its zenith in the 1920s when German and Ottoman mandates 
were acquired, and over 600 million people were ruled from London," the Oxford Encyclopedia 
tells us. In fact, to the British petty bourgeoisie the Empire offered promises of positional 
success and riches well beyond the aspirations of the German and Italian petty bourgeoisie. We 
should not ignore the fact that nationalist British mantras like "Britannia rules the waves" have 
been a phenomenal device of national unity which, in my view, continues to influence the 
psychology of the British social classes at large. The mental effect of such a device of 
propaganda is quite simple and similar to that of a commercial: in a land of inequality, we all 
are sailing in the same boat, the worker, the shopkeeper, the banker, and the industrialist - and 
the illegal immigrant cleaning their offices at five in the morning? 
55 Diittmann's The Memory o/Thought (2002) proposes the idea that after World War II a kind 
of general catharsis was experienced by the German peoples - and perhaps also by the Japanese 
- which necessarily had a positive humane outcome, at least during the first stages of post-war. 
"Because we feel the collective guilt," contends Diittmann via Karl Jaspers, "we also feel the 
enormous task of renewing human existing from out of its origin - the task which all human 
beings on this earth share together, though it manifests itself more urgently, and more feelingly, 
there where a people that has become guilty stands before nothingness" (2002:128). In fact, via 
Diittmann I could cite another new problem which as far as I know has not been addressed by 
anyone: that the fascist peoples of nations like Spain, Italy or France have not been compelled to 
experience any catharsis at all. Franco's regime went on until 1975, followed by a process into 
a constitutional democratic monarchy without any significant changes among the dominant 
classes or institutions of authority. When the Allies entered Italy, there was not a fascist to be 
seen and the execution of Mussolini in Milan acted as a factual end to fascism. In France they 
still find it difficult to discuss the fact that the country was virtually divided between the 
resistance and the collaborationists. In my view, the absence of any collective cathartic 
experience has left these countries exposed to a "naturalization" of fascist parties and fascist 
idealisms, considered as "outrageous" in countries like Germany (as the historical guilty party) 
or Britain (as the historical indicter). 
56 I gratefully acknowledge Professor Mick Wallis for sending me this most pertinent article. 
57 We can only speculate about the ultimate mental effects produced by the images of such 
human destruction within the safe environments of our own houses: those flowers, colourful 
paintings and comfortable sofas that surround our television screens - especially in the minds of 
our youngsters. 
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58 During the Reagan and Bush administrations, the IMF and the World Bank implemented a 
world wide "Structural Adjustment Programme" (SAP) during the 1980s and 1990s. These 
policies included: "devaluation, privatization, removal of import controls and food subsides, 
enforced cost-recovery in health and education, and ruthless downsizing of the public sector" 
(Davis, 2004: 18). They effectively made the middle classes of developing countries disappear 
into the poor classes and the poor poorer (Ibid.). Now a staggering one third of the global urban 
population reside in slums half of whom are under the age of 20 (Ibid.: 13). 
59 There are two clear lines of practice within the capitalist system: one is the European 
Keynesian form of fiscal policy and relatively free social security and the other the monetarist 
based on Milton Friedman's economics and characteristic of the individualist "self-help" found 
in the USA. It is becoming clear that European policies are trying to install monetarism 
progressively, especially in Great Britain, a trend begun by Thatcher in the 1980s. Monetarism 
concentrates on achieving and maintaining the stability of the price level, which monetarists 
believe depends on proper management of the money supply mainly through monetary rather 
than fiscal policy. Hence "monetarism". Observe that "money supply" is the amount of money 
circulating in an economy at a moment in time, and "fiscal policy" that part of government 
policy concerned with taxation and public-sector expenditure (Oxford Encyclopedia). Now, as 
Amartya SEN [sic] explains, one of the basic characteristic philosophies of monetarism is "self-
help": that is, where people must take care of themselves and the governmental support for the 
poor and the ill is very limited (1997:168). The principal- perhaps the only fundamental one-
task of a monetarist governments is to tackle inflation through the control of money supply, 
while any other social imperative must adjust to that control. As a result the rich are richer, the 
top middle-classes are also better off but at an increased distance from the rich and the distance 
from the poor - whose numbers also grow out of proportion - escalates. The results are clear 
for all to see. At Western international level there are two contrasting results: The USA and the 
Keynesian European type. In the USA type unemployment is lower but 43.6 million people are 
virtually without any kind of medical coverage or any kind of insurance, increasing at a rate of 
2.4 million per year (U.S Census Bureau, 2003). Social security is an integral part of the 
Keynesian European type but unemployment stands at the level of the 1932's Depression with 
27 million without jobs (Vlieghere and Vreymans, 2006), not including many of those who, like 
me, are effectively without a remunerated job and not included as unemployed. However full 
employment is neither desirable in the European Keynesian type because inflation would have 
to be prevented at all costs. 
60 No one is either expecting solutions from the leftist parties of social democracy or "socialist" 
parties; as scholars such as Ken Coates remark, these parties have passed their "sell-by dates" 
(1998: 133). In spite of everything, critics like Coates are optimistic and believe in direct actions 
of struggle against unemployment by way of "organizations of the excluded" [my commas] like 
the European Network of the Unemployed which unites unemployed people from fifteen 
European countries (Ibid.:131-34). However, as their last 10 years of action attest, their actions 
do not seem to have improved the situation whatsoever. And, recalling Poulantzas here, nor 
will they, because they propose change without changing the system. 
61 With the addition of "loss of current output and fiscal burden" (SEN, 1997:160), "Loss of 
freedom and social exclusion" (Ibid.), "Skill loss and long run loss of confidence" (Ibid.: 161), 
"Ill health and higher rates of mortality" (Ibid.: 162). 
62Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, electronic edition, (www. 
arts.cuhk.edu.hklPhilosophylKantlcpr; accessed: 23.08.02) in "Transcendental Doctrine of 
Method," Chapter I, Section 3, "Opining, Knowing and Beliving." 
63 As Basu points out via Walter Benjamin "No information, whatever it might be, is sufficient 
to defeat Hitler?" (2004:68). 
64 In fact, all these seem to me cases in which people ask for changes but not for a change of 
system; a feature which defines Poulantzas's theory with precision. In Spain for example more 
than 1 million protested in the streets of Madrid against the then Spanish president and right-
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wing leader Aznar, and his decision to send Spanish troops to Iraq. Such popular numbers of 
dissent were unprecedented in the history of Spain, but their protests did not produce any 
changes whatsoever. 
65 Even more so knowing that he developed his philosophy during the terrible events of the 
English Civil War (1642-49). 
66 Bond's letter to Graham Saunders dated 7 November, 2004; a copy of it was sent to me by the 
dramatist. 
67 Oxford Encyclopedia. 
68 See also the latest declassified CIA documents relating to the military coup in Chile in 1973 
against Allende. Among them a description of the CIA Project FUBELT stands out: a 
codename for CIA covert operations to promote a military coup in Chile for fear that Allende 
"could end" democratically elected president (www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv). 
69 In relation with this line of thought, quite important are the social explorations of Dan Baron 
Cohen, which question "the capacity of the oppressed to turn oppressor." For Cohen this 
complex question is worth examination only when our social relations are constantly taken into 
account, asking "Why do the cultures of our radical organisations and popular administrations 
tend to become so conflictual, authoritarian and self-destructive?" This is essentially why a 
clash of classes is neither desirable in a world divided by the moralities of "good" and "evil:" 
we need to understand first the profound meaning of human justice and equality. But, would we 
ever get to abolish human resentment as defined by Nietzsche? 
("Reflections on the path - towards a pedagogy of self-determination," a 21-page paper sent to 
me by the author and received on the 14th July, 2003). 
70 As far as I know, in Eagleton'S works God comes to mind only in those instances in which 
Nietzsche is part of the discussion (Eagleton, 1991:234-61; 1992:33). And even then it is not 
clear whether he regards Nietzsche's death of God with a melancholic sentimentality or regret, 
or whether he is suggesting that God is not dead enough. In his view, Nietzsche tells us that 
"history must learn to be self-generative and self-legitimating, open its ears to the hard lesson of 
the aesthetic. This whole proliferating network of dominance, aggressiveness and appropriation 
must confront the death of God and have the courage to be its own rationale. The death of God 
is the death of the superstructure; society must make do instead with the 'base' [his italics] of its 
own productive forces, the will to power." But then he says without ado: "Viewed in this light, 
Nietzsche's work signals a legitimation crisis in which the brute facts of bourgeois society are 
no longer easily ratifiable by an inherited motion of 'culture' [his italics]. We must tear aside 
the 'mendacious finery of that alleged reality of the man of culture' [he quotes from The Birth 
of Tragedy], acknowledging that none of the social legitimations on offer - Kantian duty, moral 
sense, Utilitarian hedonism and the rest - are any longer convincing" (1991:258-9). In other 
words, for Eagleton, Nietzsche celebrates power - "violence and domination" (Ibid.) - as an end 
in itself, and Eagleton concludes that this ought to be instead the "glamour of the cosmic 
ideologies we should supposedly surpass" (lbid.:259). Is he engaged on a graveside eulogy of 
spirituality? What his paper "The Crisis of Contemporary Culture" seems to offer is that we 
have to work out a "good" capitalist system against a "bad" capitalist system (1992:32-4). 
Indeed, because for Eagleton - as it is for Habermas - it is better to work out a consensus with 
the bourgeoisie (1991 :259), than the possible horrors of turning an aesthetic against another 
(Ibid.). Which might be also true, but in my view and as I made clear in the second chapter, 
Eagleton makes a rather incorrect reading of Nietzsche. It is not that Nietzsche wishes the death 
of God; instead his is a reaction to the hypocritical Judeo-Christian morality of those who, while 
they say they believe and do acts in the name of God, have effectively killed God with their 
gargantuan appetites for success and riches. As Albert Camus rightly observed "Nietzsche has 
not conceived the project of killing God. He found [God's] death in soul of his era" (1985: 83). 
Edward Bond declares unambiguously that he longs for the death of God because only then, he 
says, we will be truly free (appendix: 13). Instead with Nietzsche it is not clear to me whether he 
wishes or declares the death of a certain god - that is praised by hypocrites - or God. And if 
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someone could point to me to the section, the line, the sentence, or the passage through which it 
is incontestable to assert that Nietzsche longs for or finally declares the death of God, as 
Eagleton asserts, in the very same sense of that of an atheist, I will then be eternally indebted. 
71 Of course, people have endured different levels or degrees of extreme situations. In July 1944 
Maidanek was the first Concentration Camp to be liberated by the Red Army. Apparently the 
Allies were not prepared for the kind of horrors they were about to record therehence. Yet, the 
Nazis had begun to forcibly transport hundreds of thousands of people to the Arbeitslager 
(Labor Camps) as far back as 1934: long columns of people were made to walk through major 
German cities daily and then transported as freight. The Final Solution was set in motion in 
1942; by May 1945 1.5 million children, and 5 million women and men had been gassed in the 
Vernichtungslager (extermination camps). When the Nazi Germany finally capitulated and the 
extent of savagery in the Nazi camps was officially revealed, none seemed to have imagined 
that such a colossal slave-labour movement could be connected to human mass extermination: 
not the Allies' Intelligence Agencies, not even the people living in the immediate districts of 
Auschwitz, Belsen, Dachau, or Buchenwald; as Simon Wiesenthal tells us, not even the Jewish 
Councils' leaders like those Rabbis who indeed were made the ghetto's organizers and lists' 
suppliers to Adolf Eichmann, "deciding which names should be put on 'transport lists' [his 
inverted commas] for the death camps" (Levy, 1994:84) - at least that is what they told us. 
Of course, as Eagleton tells me, now things seem different: we have the "p'rinciples" of 
bourgeois democracies: "contending political parties, parliamentary rule, non-dictatorship, 
formal (if not always actual) civil liberties, relatively autonomous media, the non-militarisation 
[sic] of everyday life, and so on." However, now most people also know that most of the 
United States's economy rests in the manufacturing of weaponry for its military machine. In 
fact, its $522 billion of military spending in 2006 dwarfs frightfully the $62.5 billion of its 
closest rival, China (in Nick Mathiason's "Facts and Figures - The Military Money Machine," 
Business and Media - The Observer, 19 February 2006, p. 6). As a result the American elderly 
and disabled must endure further cuts in their public allowances; Bush proposes to save a 
further $36 billion in their Medicare health programme, and of course, education and 
environmental spending also face severe cuts (Ibid.). But not even through his dialectics could 
Eagleton justify the fact that if a country's economy and growth of capital rest in the 
manufacturing and supply of its military machine as much as the United States does, it is likely 
to be in need of an enemy, real or imaginary. Surplus of manufacturing goods is not an option 
in any industry, and missiles and bombs do not enjoy an exception from this rule. Of course 
there are other conceptual problems that need to be taken into consideration. I, for example, 
think that most people are not measuring properly the gravity of the information we received 
because most of us are not intellectually prepared for it. I agree with the professor of 
mathematics John Allen Paulos when he says that we suffer from innumeracy. We are 
bombarded through the media with millions here and there while these kinds of numbers do not 
mean much to us anymore. As he says "many educated people have little grasp for these 
numbers and are even unaware that a million is 1,000,000" (1990:8). So, just to put the meaning 
of the above numbers in their proper context, I am compelled to point out here that if we had to 
count 1.5 million children at a rate of one child per second, it would take us for example 432 
hours or roughly 18 days without any break in counting; 5 million people would take us 58 
days; and a queue of 6.5 million people would cover more than half the earth's diameter at the 
equator; or that $522 billion are $522,000,000,000. 
72 Hilary Spurling's review on Elizabeth Cowling's book Visiting Picasso: the Notebooks and 
Letters of Roland Penrose, The Observer Review, 23 April 2006, p. 21. 
73 This is why I consider Cohen's criticism of Augusto Boal refreshing, relieving, and overdue. 
In the form of an internal monologue, the scholar's critique of Boal and his method of theatre 
intervention - the "Theatre of the Oppressed" - as a theatrical approach which has finally lost 
its initial task of understanding and construing paths of human liberation by way of its own 
institutionalisation. As Cohen says "internally" while he is listening to one of Boat's public 
speeches: "Why is no-one whispering? Why is no-one restless? Why is no-one crying 'stop'? 
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Stop sensationalising misfortune! Stop trivialising the epic! Stop appropriating the narratives of 
the oppressed into your own grand narrative!" (Cohen, 1999). It is not "the problems" I would 
say to Cohen; it is "the problem." Could it be that for Boal, like for Picasso, the most important 
thing was/is to be Boal first? 
74 Actually, in so many countries the state has lost its autonomy altogether. As Camoy and 
Castells confirm in their recent socio-political analysis, many states are captured by specific 
groups - like in Russia, Mexico, Nigeria, and many others - becoming "predatory states"; other 
states have lost also autonomy when captured by "fundamentalist identity movements", be it 
religious or nationalists - as in Iran (2001: 16). 
75 "BBC News," 5 May 2006. 
76 It is only now that I make reference to this new class while, nevertheless, it has been the 
object of considerable attention in my studies. On the one hand, I have not included this class in 
discussion of class differences because it would not add anything significant to the principal 
thesis on injustice and inequality. On the other, though a good number of research studies show 
that this is a class of difficult definition and growing, the underclass' especial qualities appear to 
me more as an active and radical social protest - of course disorganised and regardless of 
whether this is a conscious or unconscious protest - and I think that its intrinsic nature similar to 
civic boycott is worth of notice. According to Charles Murray's four years of research, this 
group cannot be located within the poor classes; the underclass appertains to another type of 
poor class (1999:24). As he suggests, "people who live on low incomes have aspirations just 
like others in society: they want a job; a decent home; and income enough to pay the bills" 
(Ibid.:8). But the underclass is distinguished by their undesirable behaviour: "drug-taking, 
crime, illegitimacy, truancy from school and violence" (Ibid.: 19). However, this unruly 
behaviour seems to me the logical response to a society which celebrates the very condition of 
inequality. Their poverty, as Allan Walker explains, is not just caused by factors beyond their 
control - like traditionally poor people are - but, in large measure, "by their own behaviour" 
(1999:67). And this is a behaviour which, from a certain perspective, is revealed to me more as 
activist behaviour. Just consider the following empirical example: 
To make a decent living, a youth of 21 explained to me, you need £200 a week - after 
taxes [would the youth say today £300/400 a week?] He would accept less if it was all 
he could get. But he conveyed clearly that he would feel exploited [my underline]. As 
for the Government's employment training scheme, YTS, that's "slave labour" [his 
inverted commas; my underline] [ ... ] [this is quite a fracture with the old working class 
attitude of an older generation, as it was told to Murray by an old worker:] "I was 
brought up thinking work is something you are morally obliged to do" [his commas] 
(Murray, 1999:40). 
77 Conference: "Reputations: Edward Bond," 11 March 2005. 
78 Surplus Value: a term employed by Marx to specify the difference between the use value of 
labour (the value of the productive output oflabour) and its exchange value (wage) in his labour 
theory of value. Surplus value occurs only in the case oflabour, not other factors of production, 
and it is appropriated by the capitalist in the form of profit (see the "Theories of Surplus Value" 
in Marx's Economic Manuscripts freely available in www.marxists.org/archive). 
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Overall conclusion 
The task of rethinking aesthetics in the politics of theatre has been generally ignored or 
avoided. Aesthetics had been allowed to become the exclusive domain of the realm of 
philosophy, while politics seemed to be the jurisdiction of theatre practitioners. Yet, I 
have found that quite recently there has been an upsurge of academics and practitioners 
of theatre and drama showing a very special interest in this matter. In my view this 
recent activity merely indicates a state of constant malaise, not only in theatrical affairs, 
but in the arts in general. 
I have verified, among other things, that aesthetics is inseparable from morality and 
politics. In doing so I have not supplied anything really innovative or original: it was 
so also for both Aristotle and Plato. It has continued to be so all the way through the 
most prolific periods of human creativity like the Enlightenment, or the age of 'reason' . 
It was so for Kant and Hegel and all the subsequent thinkers of modernism. But in 
undertaking an evaluation of this fonnula and its values, I have found that this 
inextricable combination is also the recipe that, in recent history, has driven us to 
Auschwitz and Hiroshima. In fact, even Hitler's Reichsminister of Infonnation and 
Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, an enthusiastic connoisseur of expressionism and an 
expressionist dramatist himself, thought that aesthetics is inseparable from morality and 
politics - and he applied it quite successfully with known consequences (Barnett, 2001: 
161-185). 
However, aesthetics is a complicated and contentious issue. As Terry Eagleton explains 
(1991), if aesthetics is always conditioned by the dominant ideology, it must necessarily 
have an impact on everything we do and think; for aesthetics mediates our taste and 
values. When artistic representation, say theatre, is used as a medium for treating 
discourses of justice and freedom, the result seems always to be debatable, inconclusive, 
and/or negative. Aesthetics as the 'mirror' of the dominant ideology reverberates 
through George Lukacs' final, unambiguous delivery: "modem drama is the drama of 
the bourgeoisie; modem drama is bourgeois drama" (Bentley, 1992: 425); through 
Adorno's thesis that dialectics ends always negatively (O'Connor, 2000: 54-79); it 
pulsates in all fonns of fascism (Chapter V). I believe the Bondian philosophy of drama 
offers a feasible doorway towards that sought-for platfonn where justice and freedom 
can be, as he says, "problematised" (Davis, 2005: 173). 
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Edward Bond is generating a new field of thought. It is complex and developing 
continuously, bewildering scholars and practitioners at large - and he is very aware of 
it, as he says: 
Rereading Freud reminded me how I am involved in a basic disagreement with 
much of what is the foundation of modem cultural consciousness: Freud, 
Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Hegel, Marxism reduced to mechanical-materialism 
(copy of letter to Graham Saunders sent to the author: 20.10.04). 
Some of them regard Bond as one of the greatest dramatists and philosophers of the last 
and current century; many do not seem to take him seriously. As he lets me know 
through one of his letters, even scholars who have been faithful to the Bondian field for 
decades do not seem to capture its right meaning completely: "I've have also been 
writing theoretical guides to help eight authors who are contributing chapters to a book 
on my plays to be published this autumn (he refers to the last work Edward Bond and 
the Dramatic Child, Davis, 2005). There were many theoretical misunderstandings I 
had to clean up" (letter to author: 14.07.04). 
I have said in the general introduction, this conclusion is not the end of the road; it is 
just the beginning. I can only hope that we are now nearer to Bond's philosophy and his 
theory of the logic, to his "crude thinking - the thinking of the great" as Brecht put it (in 
Benjamin, 1999: 21). The next stage ought to be its praxis: the ways by which such 
philosophy becomes a practical social activity. And there is a great deal of work to do 
when the task is finding ways of communicating with our ideologized minds; when the 
task is to re-define a human meaning which capitalist reification progressively conceals 
under "the essence of commodity-structure" (Lukacs, 1990: 83) - as Lukacs suggests, 
the central problem of capitalist society "in all its aspects" (Ibid.). This central problem 
would be made perceivable once we are able to consciously apprehend that the "state of 
emergency in which we live against fascism" is not the exception but the rule, which, as 
Benjamin contended, is manifested to us by the "tradition of the oppressed" (1999: 248-
49). This was within the fundamental scope of this study and it is my contention that 
Bond is effectively working in that area through his drama. 
This conclusion is thus intended more as an introductory discussion of Bond's latest 
developed theory: looking forward at Bond's engagement with Drama in Education 
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(henceforth DIE), it will attempt to detennine some of the potential arguments which 
might arise from this association and therefore to suggest some recommendations. 
Section I 
The problem of communicating through the ethical 
Strong parallels have appeared between Lukacs and Benjamin's lines of thought and 
Bond's strategies and devices of drama through this study. First, through his drama, 
Bond attempts to project Benjamin's state of permanent emergency, of danger, against 
fascism and in a way which requires urgent attention; that requires choices. As he says, 
"to consciously [my italics] make a choice is the human dilemma" (appendix: 12). 
Secondly, he does so through a dramatic strategy - or a series of drama-devices - which 
recalls Lukacs' "essence of commodity-structure", He presents it as a problem that 
penneates our lives universally - that is, "in all its aspects" - be it through the trivial or 
the important; through the private or through the collective. One of Bond's more 
recently developed specific devices (which recalls the MarxistiLukacsian notion that 
capitalism's essence is a hidden problem - yet perceivable everywhere) is his tenn "The 
Invisible Object" (henceforth 10) (Davis, 2005: 90; appendix: 26-7). However, before I 
discuss the relationship between Bond's 10 and Lukacs' capitalist "essence", I will first 
briefly clarify the general principles of Bond's latest description of what his drama is: 
the Theatre Event (henceforth TE). 
One should mention that TE is the result of Bond's continuous theoretical development. 
Up to the 1970s and since his first perfonned play, The Pope's Wedding in 1962, Bond 
referred to his drama as Rational and/or Epic Theatre: in his own words, where theatre 
is thought of as a fonning part of a "conscious struggle to remove class structures" and 
towards a socialist society as ultimate reality (Letter to Tony Coult, 28 July 1977; this is 
also quoted in A Companion to Post-War British Theatre, Barnes, 1986: 75) (Roberts, 
1985: 68). However, Bond was very keen to remark that his RationallEpic Theatre 
opposes that of Brecht. While Brecht, he said in one of his letters, "attempts to create a 
gap between reason and emotion - so that we can be emotionally free and thus re-
describe the social world more rationally (Stuart, 2001: 7; and in Brecht, Vol. 3, 1983: 
17), for Bond "reason is not free to describe the world unless it is free to redistribute 
emotion" (Ibid: 8) (on Bond's definition of Epic and Rational Theatre see also "A Note 
to Young Writers" in The Worlds, 1980b: 106-9). If for Bond it is wrong to totally 
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separate emotions from reason - because, Bond argues, "if the audience is alienated 
they can't experience empathy at the same time" (Davis, 2005: 166) - his philosophy 
also opposes in the strongest tenns the Stanislavskian approach where "feelings 
predominate" (Ibid.). As he said in a letter to John Doona (Manchester, 4 March 1996), 
"[ ... ] "I tell the actors to play the play not the character" (Stuart, 2001: 24). 
"Stanislavski's system puts the audience in the same confused state as the characters," 
Kate Katafiasz argues, "denying them the vital opportunity to reassess the relationship 
between reason and imagination" (Davis, 2005: 27). This is, I think, not somewhere in 
between Stanislavsky (1977; 1981; 1983a; 1983b) and Brecht (1983), but way beyond 
any of the old staging techniques. As David Davis argues: 
What Bond wants in his own theatre is a relationship between actors and 
audience where the audience is engaged with the action of the play, with the 
possibility of empathy and emotion, but where the imagination is stimulated 
which then has to seek reason. Imagination and reason predominate. With this 
approach, he seeks to alienate from within the act, which is without breaking the 
empathetic relationship forged between actors and audience (Davis, 2005: 166). 
Thus, Bond seems to be attempting a difficult balance where imagination and reason 
have equal prominence; this is the result, I would argue, of the dramatist's own 
progressive shift into the ethical realm. With this I do not mean that ethics was not 
already a fundamental part of Bond's philosophy from his very outset; but it was not as 
unconditional and as consciously a part as it is now. As I argue through Chapter V, to 
long for socialism is, in its strict meaning, to long for the ethical - what it ought to be: a 
society made up of equal individuals. However, at some point during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s,1 Bond's predominant use of the word "socialism" started to be displaced in 
his writings by tenns such as 'justice", the "ethical", and "the imperative to be human"; 
as much as he has replaced RationallEpic Theatre with IE in his writings. Now, in the 
Bondian philosophy, a "socialist society as ultimate reality" has been substituted for 
"ethics as an ultimate reality" (in Stuart, 2000: 56). When I commented on his shift of 
language to him during our encounter, Bond answered: 
"the problem about socialism is that. .. there're two things: there is the long tenn 
pattern from Hegelian to Marxist theory. And then there's a rational structure of 
history that must classify everything and therefore that Marxism is a science -
and that socialism is a science because it's inevitable. And I don't believe that at 
all. What I see is that you have to talk about the logic. Now that's very, very 
different (appendix: 31). 
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It is indeed the "logic ofhumanness,,2 which marks Bond's dramatic strategy today; and 
interestingly, as Bond argues through his revised reconstruction of Brecht's Mother 
Courage (see chapter I: 31; appendix: 24-5),3 ideological decoration does not seem to be 
compatible with a logic whose ultimate purposes are but the understanding of 
humanness; for Bond's drama does not suggest solutions to the societal- the realm of 
politics: "drama seeks understanding" (Bond, 1998: 9). In the Bondian philosophy, 
human events are seen as the product of a fundamentally unjust society: crimes might be 
in reality cries for justice; the best human intentions might end up as horrible acts 
against humanity; none is guilty in ancient tragedy. Thus, plays like The Children, 
Have I None (2000) or the latest The Under Room (2005) - which I had the opportunity 
of attending in Birmingham - might appear to be profoundly complex but their 
structural and thematic simplicity is incontrovertible.4 The changes in Bond's 
philosophy and output throughout his productive life as dramatist tell me also of his 
unbroken anti-bourgeois spirit. As he says in the appendix, "when you have a thought, 
the world changes" (appendix: 19). But the world does not change in the bourgeois-
Joycean mind, which is unchangeably static. Changing is actually a strategy for 
liberation. Accordingly, Bond says: 
What is truth? How could I live with the truth? Well, you live with the truth by 
creating it. It's not "Dh, I'm going to see the truth". If I'm going to see the 
truth, I have to change myself. So I change my understanding - and in 
important things. It's not that I change my understanding about "that"; I change 
myself in order to be able to understand, because that tells me how I will see the 
world. So, there are ideological structures in ME, which are lies and truths, and 
that is what I'm interested in. (appendix: 20-1) 
TE is then a mental ongoing development of Bond's definition of his own drama and of 
what, in his view, drama ought to be: 
TE drama proceeds by constantly recreating the meaning of its events [ ... ] In 
contemporary theatre violence, sentimentality and pessimism are taken to have 
meaning in themselves and are used to give meaning to a play's events. That is 
decadence [ ... ] TEs are analytic, not stylistic [ ... ] They close the gap of empty 
effects and aesthetics between drama and life. They make drama radical in a 
time of show-biz, reductive entertainment, TV drama and 'show productions'. 
TE restores to the Tragic and the Comic their formidable power. It opens up 
vast new areas of meaning and drama and places it back at the centre of our 
lives. [In other words] TE invalidates received and ideological meanings and 
establishes new meanings in their place (Davis, 2005: 84-5). 
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Thus, returning to our initial question, in which way does Bond's 10 - TE's 
fundamental dramatic device (Davis, 2005: 90) - recall Lukacs' notion that capitalism's 
essence is a hidden problem, yet perceivable everywhere and in everything? With the 
10, Bond attempts to make visible that which is "hidden in ideology and convention" 
and which, he says, only an actor can make visible; not acting but enacting (Ibid.). 
"Acting can just be copying," Bond argues, "but in English to enact something has a 
double meaning: if you enact an act of parliament, it becomes the law and changes 
reality" (appendix: 52). Bond advises us to look at the example in his play I Have 
None, in which "Sara's lOs are drawn to their extreme expression when she poisons 
herself and leaves the room"; a poison which is firstly and consciously intended for 
another of the play's three characters, Grit (Bond, 2000: 86-7). The 10 attempts to 
expose "contradictions we accept in life in order to survive [ ... ] when contradictions 
lose their historical purpose [for example, he says, Aristotle's validation of "slavery 
during ancient times"] they are destructive, but they become deeply interwoven into 
daily life" (Davis, 2005: 90). 
As I said above, 10 seems to me to echo Lukacs' essence of capitalism, which is 
identifiable even through the most inconspicuous objects or instances. For example, 
Bond recently sent me a letter. From a distance I immediately recognized his 
handwriting. As I picked it up, I realized the stamp's content: on it there is a 
reproduction of Queen Elizabeth, smiling broadly at a horse's face; the stamp is a 
celebration of her birthday, of the monarchy - the celebration of a contradiction -
which has lost its purpose. I do not think Bond's hostility towards any kind of 
monarchy needs further comment; it forms part and parcel of the Bondian philosophy. 
His play Early Morning (1967), in which he portrays Queen Victoria ("Call me Victor") 
in a lesbian relationship with Florence Nightingale, is a hilarious statement highlighting 
the absurdity of monarchic states. As it was expected, the play was banned in its entirety 
by the Lord Chamberlain whose office stated tersely "His Lordship would not allow 
it".s Putting a stamp on a letter is by all means one of the myriad of inconspicuous 
actions we carry out during our lives; but the picture of Bond, of all people, playing a 
part in Queen Elizabeth's celebrations, even through such an indirect and insignificant 
act, might help to illustrate both the universality of Bond's 10 and Lukacs' "essence of 
commodity-structure" which affects all aspects of our lives (Lukacs, 1990: 83). 
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Bond's tenninology undergoes continuous mutations but not because he is inconsistent 
in his attitudes. He attempts to look into the same question - the same "problem" - again 
and again, but from different angles. "How can you unpeel the layers of ideological 
obfuscation that destroy reason" he says, "not by appealing to reason. That is the whole 
problem [ ... ] how can you talk humanness to Hitler?" (letter to Graham Saunders, 
07.11.04) (in Davis, 2005: 185). Indeed, in this letter to Saunders there is already a hint 
that now, for Bond, 10 is not just a fundamental device of TE; but, as I had thought 
through my readings, that 10 and TE are actually prone to be the same thing: one 
concept through two multidimensional tenns. As Bond eventually says to Saunders: 
This is what TE/IO is. I do not hold a mirror up to nature but a spanner 
up to the universe. Nature is not the human universe. For that there is 
no mirror because we create the mirror - otherwise the blind cannot see. 
The mirror then becomes reality - it is a matter oflogic (Ibid.). 
It has not been within the scope of this study to describe minutely each and every one of 
the lately-developed tenns of the Bondian philosophy. However, Bond's journey 
towards the praxis of his own philosophy seems to uncover a site where the traditional 
meaning of words is not good enough; precisely because, as the theory of reification 
shows us (see Chapter II), ideology also seems to recreate or reconstruct a 
superstructure of meanings which contributes to subvert humanness for its own 
purposes. So Bond is creating, we might say, his own idiosyncratic vocabulary. The 
latest book, Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child (2005) confinns this claim: its 
"glossary of terms used in Bondian Theatre" (Ibid.: 201-20) for example, offers a series 
of key technical expressions which attempt to reflect Bondian tenninology and its 
complexities. One significant quality of this terminology is that, often, some of these 
Bondian concepts result from the combination of two, three or more different concepts 
that are often apparently opposite. Thus we encounter "accident-time" (Ibid.: 90; 201-
02), the "tragic and the comic and the imperative to be human" (Ibid.: 217-19; 
appendix: 4; 10), the "lie/truth" (appendix: 4; 8; 21), and so on. On account of this 
study, I am in a position to suggest that Bond's compositing of concepts comes about as 
a result of the ethical mind - or also, the holistic mind - which attempts humanizing 
ways of connection with the ideologized mind. As I said in Chapter V (p. 187) via Bond 
"The problem isn't that we are different characters, have different opinions, but that 
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when there are different ideologies there are different realities (letter to author: 6 
October, 2005). 
Most forms of art display an intrinsic need for change but, as Baz Kershaw seems 
compelled to admit while defending his thesis for Radical Performance, the resulting 
change may be also for the worse (1999: 20). Through the ethical mind all thinking and 
creativity is always an opportunity to change the human world only for better, and 
humanitylhumanness is always at the top of the agenda; with it, Auschwitz cannot be an 
option and neither can the Gulag. In my view, Bondian terms do not come about just as 
a result of, say, the dramatist's poetic impulses or the artist's power ofinsight;6 they are, 
above all, the result of the dramatist's commitment to the ethical platform. This ethical 
approach does not allow mental processes towards final "solutions" or "theories", nor 
through ambiguities, uncertainties or protocols of communicative engagement. Thus, 
not just complex concepts like justice, truth or humanness are reconsidered; even the 
simplest of terms cannot be used without prior reflection in the Bondian field. 
On the back cover of Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child, the publisher describes it 
as "the first book in English fully to explain Edward Bond's new form of theatre". Of 
course, these lines are designed to deliver a swift, marketable introduction but, in my 
view, the use of "fully", "new," and "theatre" within the ethical parameters of Bond's 
philosophy might seriously misguide a casual reader. Firstly, for some "fully" might 
imply a resolved theory or problem but when the subject is humanness and/or the 
human paradox, Bond does not intend to resolve the problem; he attempts to make it 
creative. Thus, while the book seems to me a very valuable guide to Bond's latest 
philosophical development, it is more of an introduction than a "full" explanation of 
Bondian complexities. Secondly, his drama might seem to be a "new" form of theatre, 
but only because, as he says, "our definition of drama is inappropriate to modem society 
and so it is not taken seriously" (Bond, 1998: 1). In my view, Bond's dramatic 
approach is not new but closer to that of Sophocles and Euripides. We call them the 
classics but, as he tells me, surely they did not write their plays thinking they were 
creating "classic" tragedy (letter to author: 02.10.04). With ancient tragedy, no one is 
guilty, and so it is with Bond's plays. Bond's drama seems "new" because in our 
capitalist society humanness has been put aside by ideology. As the French director, 
Alan Fran90n, claimed in Le Monde "I consider Bond as a colossus of modem writing 
[ ... ]; Bond is a contemporary Shakespeare" (1995).7 And thirdly, when Bond uses the 
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term "theatre" he does so in a figurative sense - that is, out of the simple need to 
communicate. As I have pointed out through numerous examples in this study, he is 
very insistent throughout his writings that the drama he has in mind has nothing to do 
with any of the current forms of theatre and/or performance. Bond puts it as follows: 
"Theatre" deals with the psychological-self. It turns the stage into the site of the 
psychological-self. It is never wholly free of ideology. The ideology may be 
benign or virulent. Its method is style, convention, mannerism. It animates it 
self by reverberations within imagination but closes off the relation to objective 
reality. It uses acting skills, which may be eminent, shock effects and emotive 
lighting and music. It reaffirms, consoles, reassures and entertains but 
enervates. It is as if there were styles in sickness. It does not touch reality. It 
takes the dog for a walk and pretends it is discovering a new country. 
[ ... ] "Drama" uses the stage as the site of the pre-self. [ ... ] This is the site of the 
imperative to be human, of the Tragic and Comic and of creativity and justice. 
[ ... ] what is drama's purpose? Administration cures or punishes. It cannot 
resolve the complications of being human. Law may be better or worse but it is 
never justice. How can a practical judge understand crime as an affirmation of 
justice? [ ... ]. The human mind is a dramatising structure. We have only one 
way of creating humanness: drama. (Bond, 2004: 27). 
Finally, through his drama, Bond is not proposing some form of irresponsible idealism 
either; not suggesting the immediate abolishing of capitalist social administration and 
the law, as some might interpret from the above. Far from it. Bond is perfectly aware 
that, for the time being, the human paradox is trapped within the impossible site of 
ideology, and that the ethical mind does not tolerate adventurous anti-human 
suggestions: "It would be disastrous if administration and law tried to resolve the human 
paradox. We have not learnt to live without ideology. We need administration and 
law" (Bond, 2004: 27). Technology might be giving us the impression of experiencing 
history and the 'future' but, inasmuch as the human paradox, our humanness, is not 
appropriately approached - that is, as he says "dramatised" or "problematised" - we will 
continue to be trapped within the boundaries of prehistory. This is why, following 
Marx, Adorno rightly called our social situation "man's ongoing prehistory" 
(Wohlfarth, 1979: 961; see also Chapter III: 72).8 To me, the question now is not 
whether Bond's philosophy is "too provocative to be ignored", as Kate Katafiasz argues 
(see quotation at beginning of Chapter V), but to understand the reasons of why many of 
us feel provoked or angered by what the logical-minded Bond says.9 The dramatist's 
output is copious and diverse yet, in a sense, he seems to be telling the same story again 
and again: our lives are ruled by the extreme - that is, by ideology - which supersedes 
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or supplants our humanness. On this Michael Mangan seems to make a similar 
observation: 
Bond's plays comprise in effect one long, and as yet unfinished, poem. It is true 
that, despite the great variety of theatrical modes, genres and styles which he 
employs, Bond's plays are in a sense all telling the same story. But it is a story 
so big and so important that it encompasses a multitude of other narratives: it is 
the story of what it costs to find our humanity (in McEntegart, 2004: 12). 
Section II 
The problem of grouping and/or classifying the Bondian realm. 
In order to find that "lost" humanity, Bond argues, we must make choices which cannot 
be formulated within the routine of our everyday lives but in the act of dramatising it; 
because, in his view, science will not answer this either. Other important philosophers 
have approached the same question - what does it mean to be a human being - but if 
one scrutinizes the dramatist's philosophy seriously, it seems to be rather in a class by 
itself. For example, through a swift reading, Bond's preoccupation with the self could 
seem to correspond to Martin Heidegger's Dasein - or "What-is-being" (Dreyfus, 
1991); even some of the important idiosyncratic qualities of the former seem to be 
defined by the latter. On the one hand, like Bond, Heidegger's philosophy argues that, 
while science has become dominant in our times, "it is incapable of giving us an 
adequate grasp of our existence in the world. It is blind to what is essentially human 
and, if left to itself, will destroy us" (Heidegger in Wild, 1963: 671; Bond in appendix: 
34). On the other, Heidegger points out that many of the things he wishes to say about 
Dasein "were better said by Holderlin [Friedrich, 1770-1843] than by any possible 
philosophical discourse" (ibid.); in other words, that Dasein is the terrain of an 
undistinguishable association between the thinker and the poet (in Wild, 1963: 671) -
which seems to me a rather good description of Bond the dramatist and the thinker. 
With his drama, Bond does not intend to teach or to persuade us of anything, as he says: 
"they think that drama can be a lesson but it is not [ ... ]. It's the creation of justice. It is 
not TEACHING you to be just" (appendix: 8); and adds: "what knowledge is there that 
can teach you to be human? As far as I know I can't teach anyone to be human; all I 
can do is to set up those situations where you have to say to yourself 'what do I choose 
to do in this situation?'" (Ibid.: 10). Again, Bond's philosophical framework here 
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continues to be similar to what Heidegger expects of a thinker who focuses on the 
meaning of Being: "the thinker is not interested in achieving mastery or control. He is 
seeking only to understand what he himself and other beings are" (in Wild, 1963: 671). 
Thus, one could say that both philosophies, those of Bond and Heidegger, seem to be 
involved within the ontological realm but, in reality, they could not be more antithetical 
to each other: Bond, as all scholars dedicated to his work contend, is a strict Marxist-
materialist thinker (Davis, 2005; appendix: 50); while Heidegger is totally engaged with 
the languages of transcendentalism and therefore approaches humanness as a 
metaphysical idea, abstract, incorporeal essence as if there was or could be a "human 
nature" which needs to be extracted from its hidden place (Guignon, 1990; Wild, 1963; 
Dreyfus, 1991).10 But transcendentalism does not mean much in the Bondian 
philosophy: "there is no 'human nature', we create our humanness", Bond says (in 
Davis, 2005: 218). As George Bas and Jerome Hankins explain: 
Because Bondian terminology results from the fact that he recognises no 
spiritual or eternal dimension, conceptual and permanent, outside the material 
world, Bond challenges various religious mythologies, ideologies, morals, 
beliefs etc, created by all those that set themselves up as Authorities - societies, 
churches, nations or states - in order to achieve domination, the arbitrary and 
imposed nature of which make them in fact "transcendences". That includes, for 
example, patriotism, racism and original sin. This surprising and paradoxical 
aspect is what makes Bond's thinking and radical criticism of all transcendence 
both original and difficult (Davis, 2005: 220). II 
Bas and Hankins regard Bond's line of thought on humanness and transcendentalism as 
"original and difficult" because, in my view, in a world of ideas conditioned by the 
tradition of doom, to suggest that there is no human nature, that we create it, is a plainly 
optimistic attitude. Like Bond, Fredrick Jameson also contends recalling Brecht that "if 
there have been not just one human nature but a whole series of them it is because 
human nature is not natural but historical" (2004: 37) - that is, human nature is not 
innate. If that is so, then the so-called human nature can be changed by changing 
history, "the result of human praxis" (Ibid.). However, thinkers like Bond and/or 
Jameson face an overwhelming contender: the long-established Christian notion that 
"man's greatest crime is to be born" as Calderon de la Barca ultimately delivered in his 
Life is a Dream (1635) (2000: 106). Indeed, three hundred years later and for Beckett 
and Beckettians "we all are born mad" (in Waiting for Gadat, Act II, 1973: 80). And 
when Pinter asserts that "I am not interested in people ... I know nothing about people ... 
I know only of my characters",12 he is actually chasing such tradition: he is voicing 
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distaste for people as if we were already born mad or criminals, as if a pre-established 
human nature was conducting our acts: some of us are good, and some of us are bad. 
Imagination is another of the central constituents of the Bondian philosophy which adds 
further originality and difficulty to Bond's idiosyncrasy; and Bond and Bondian 
scholars are very keen on differentiating the dramatist's conceptualization of 
imagination with the imaginary, its opposite (Davis, 2005: 209). While the latter 
concept is understood as a mental evasion from reality, the former "desires reality" or 
aims at becoming reality (Ibid.). Furthermore, Bond's imagination is more about 
imagining others imagining (Ibid.: 210) which, in my view, is a philosophical position 
prompted by Bond's commitment to the ethical platform. 13 There is a logical 
correlation between two of the dramatist's arguments: one that imagination can be 
constructive but also destructive (letter to author: 31.10.03) and the other that art can be 
only socialist or fascist: "There is no art in between" (Stuart, 1996: 126). As I have 
illustrated in Chapter V, the validity of Bond's 'line of demarcation' of the arts lies 
precisely in its non-ideological intention; in its ethical content. In a sense, we can now 
say that fascism is both the ultimate consequence of a complex combination of fear and 
frustration, and imagination made real. The petty bourgeois class, and very influential 
social class, fears poverty and squalor on the one hand, and is frustrated because Big 
Capital oppresses them, rarely allowing the fulfilment of their bourgeois aspirations on 
the other. The fact that our current societies are subjected to an ever-increasing petty 
bourgeoisification and that fascism can comfortably side, unnoticed, with transcendental 
and transgressive languages - which seem to be on the rise in many cultural fields -
should be an issue of serious concern; especially when such languages are primarily 
intended as liberatory devices in justice's name. 14 By contrast, through Bond, 
imagination seems to construct languages unusable for the purposes of fascism and thus 
avoid this serious threat. 
Thus, while imagination is not intended as a solution in the Bondian philosophy - it is 
more about trying to understand the ever-latent human paradox; that is, imagination as 
part of the human paradox which always seeks justice - imagination itself can be 
destructive, because its functioning is relative to its site. This is a difficult problem in 
itself and one of Bond's important peculiarities which, in my view, makes of him such 
an extraordinary author in the current cultural spectrum. For him "imagination and not 
reason makes us human [ ... ] reason seeks the rational, imagination seeks the logical" 
Overall conclusion 
264 
(McEntegart, 2004: 12). At the moment its site is ideology and imagination is abused 
by it. Through her attempt to support Bond's philosophy, Tag McEntegart uncovers 
imagination - "a phenomenon that cannot be simplified" - as being "naturally inclusive 
and inconclusive" simultaneously. It is inclusive because it draws all of our other 
qualities (common sense, intuition, and/or reason) together; and inconclusive because it 
does so in a "prolonged swirling uncertainty" which protects us from the "temptation of 
premature conclusions" (2004: 21). As she says through Ralston Saul's On Equilibrium 
(2001): 
How do you leap off a cliff and fly? First you imagine you can do it [then] you 
work out how to do it. [However, imagination] doesn't know enough about 
where it's going to claim solid respectability. Jump off cliffs? How? Why? To 
save people? To transport them? To visit them? [ ... ] To drop bombs on people 
from the above? [ ... ] imagination accepts naturally all the above [ ... ] unless 
ethics intervenes [my underlining] (McEntegart, 2004: 21) 
It cannot be stressed enough: imagination might also be destructive unless ethics 
intervenes. This is one factor through which Bond's philosophy is revealed to me as an 
urgent social necessity. Attempting to imagine a future made up of equal individuals 
living in a true democracy, goes beyond the ideologized mind's comprehension; and 
Bond seems to know the kind of struggle we are dealing with. As he says, "ideology 
attaches meaning to things and institutions and then they do our thinking for us" (Bond, 
2004b). In this study, I have made a journey through the theory of reification - from 
Marx, through Lukacs, the Frankfurt School, and to the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu on 
the one hand and Nicos Poulantzas on the other - assessing ideology's distortion of 
meaning. It has explained to me the socio-political factors behind the praxis of culture 
as industry, but also the bureaucratic blindness of characters like Adolf Eichmann and 
the nightmarish and exceptional fascist States as inevitable social events when 
capitalism is threatened to the point of crisis. Through imagination ideology feeds fears 
and fear of "otherness": it gives rise to all types of negative, psychotic feelings like 
envy, hostility, inferiority and impotence; in other words, it gives rise to what Nietzsche 
depicted as men of ressentiment (Chapter II) which eventually justifies all-out violence 
and destruction. (As I note in Chapter I, p. 24, the Futurists thought of war as 
"necessary" and "beautiful", but so did Kant.) Ethics, as Wittgenstein repeatedly 
claimed, cannot be explained - likewise attempting to explain what we ought to be, 
what we ought to need. However, for Bond, ethics is at work when the human paradox 
is dramatized, and no-one is guilty in his drama. 
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I believe McEntegart is absolutely correct when, through Henry Plotkin (Professor of 
Psychobiology at University College, London), she claims, "culture is an imagined 
world made real" (2004: 20). This thought stimulates the last of Bond's plays, The 
Under Room (2005), only his is a world where, as he told me during our encounter, "the 
impossible becomes inevitable" (appendix: 34). What the ideologized mind imagines 
"today" becomes reality "tomorrow". In The Under Room, for example, we are 
presented with a near-future situation where it is lawful to gas illegal immigrants and/or 
shoplifters. A woman finds a stranger from another country on the run in her cellar, 
which is where all the action develops. As the stranger discloses his own enforced 
choices the woman's cultural certainties disintegrate. A tripartite relationship is created 
when a people trafficker comes into play promising "papers and a new life" for money. 
The play, directed by Chris Cooper and Bond jointly, is itself a master-class on the 
Bondian terminology: characters do not take prominence on the stage. Instead, Bond's 
attempts to reach our consciousness through the Invisible Object of simple objects - a 
knife, a piece of cloth, cups, a table. As David Davis remarks, Bond "is centrally 
concerned with putting value into objects rather than characters. He would be searching 
for objects which could connect with the radical innocence remaining in us. This is why 
he tends to use cups, chairs, tables: everyday objects not already overloaded with 
ideology" (Davis, 2005: 176). In order to avoid any ideologized affectation, the 
immigrant is represented by a dummy - a nobody - while an actor on stage speaks his 
words. Bond construes The Under Room taking as reference imagined worlds such as 
that of the Daily Mail paranoia which becomes "real" when the immigrant tells Joan, 
the woman, that he is a shoplifter; but Joan corrects him: 
Joan: it isn't called shoplifting any more. That's what our parents called it. It's 
called shoplooting. 
The dummy - the immigrant - who is trying to get to "the North", says: 
Immigrant: in the north life is more easy. They do not shoot you for shoplifting. 
They could not shoot you for shoplifting here. It was not nice. They 
change the name. They shoot rou for shop looting. That is nice. People 
like it. Not only shopkeepers. l 
Anti-human ideas seem "impossible" in an age of reason; but when do they become 
inevitable? "It all depends on how that situation defines itself," Bond argues. 
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Expanding on this, I think the dramatist gives clear signals that, there and then during 
our encounter in October 2004, he has started to map The Under Room when he says: 
If I say "look, in seventy years time, it might be that, if you are a shoplifter, you 
just would be gassed." And people say "c'mon! But that's bizarre!" And I say 
"no, look, it depends on how that situation defines itself'. Because, if 1'd said in 
1870 [ ... ] "in seventy years time, if you are Jewish, you will be gassed," people 
would have said "this is fantasy!" They wouldn't believe it (appendix: 34). 
The systematic killing of Jews together with those human groups who were considered 
socially undesirable by the Western-European majority - gypsies, homosexuals, the 
physical and/or mentally deformed and so forth - did not become a reality through a 
sudden un-historical twist, like a bolt. In a letter dated 15 February, 1886, August 
Strindberg wrote a letter to his brother, Alex, which reflects the social ethos of those 
days: "[ ... ] And in Germany they have divided the country so that eighty per cent of it 
belongs to them [the Jews]. [ ... ] we have the right too - to flee from them, since we 
cannot beat them" (Meyer, 1988: 171). We will never know what would have been 
Strindberg's answer if another dramatist had told him that in 60 years the Jews would be 
gassed systematically, but I am of the view that he would not have believed it. Ifwe fly 
because we have imagined it first, did Auschwitz become a reality because it was 
imagined first? 
The 19th century cultural ethos of Strindberg has not changed much; as a consequence 
of ideological reification, ressentiment continues to inhabit the vacuum left in the 
human self. As I say with the aid of the Buchenwald's survivor, Eugene Kogon, in 
Chapter V, p. 225, "the spirit of Hitler lives on" (Kogon, 1960: 320). Bond says it 
would be immoral not to do a drama of extremes in a society ruled by the extreme 
(appendix: 4; 7; and 12). Much of the time, as Lukacs would say, the object which will 
make us conscious of our extreme situation is hidden by ideology, so the extreme 
presents itself as trivia, as common, ordinary, or routine (like the stamp on an envelope). 
This is why Bond rightly talks of attempting to make visible the 10. Mass information 
faces us with extreme events of course - and 24-hours a day if we wish - but as 
Benjamin demonstrated in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," 
information via mechanical reproduction, ahistorical and aestheticized, always ends up 
reproducing the dominant ideology to us (Benjamin, 1999: 211-45; also Basu, 2004: 64-
71 and/or Chapter V: 218). However, sometimes the extreme might face us crudely and 
without subtleties, which is what I will attempt to illustrate below. 
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If I thought it necessary to start the introduction of this study by condensing years of my 
own theatrical experiences in a few lines, here, my task is to enlarge that which, in real 
time, was no more than few seconds. Some years ago we were visiting in Spain. Our 
car needed some mending and I took it to a garage nearby. I stood chatting with two of 
the mechanics, trying to learn what was wrong with the car while they were working on 
it. Soon, two gypsies (gitanos), a child holding hands with his father, approached the 
mechanics just to say that, as they had agreed, they were leaving with them the car 
whilst they went to a supermarket. (There was a time in which Spanish gypsies were 
truly peoples apart: out of the ordinary manners, language and clothing, always on the 
move. In this instance, apart from their distinctive facial features - their prominent 
cheekbones and darker skin than most non-gypsy Spaniards - there was nothing out of 
the ordinary about this child and his father. I did not give a second thought to their 
immaculately combed hair, their conventional and clean clothing, polite manners, and 
average car). Without saying a word, the mechanics looked at the gypsies, making a 
slight, silent nod with their heads as if they had understood. This account would not 
have been of any interest had it not been for the fact that, as soon as the child and his 
father were at a safe distance from hearing anything, one of the mechanics said with the 
utmost seriousness: "ojala les tiraran a todos por un barranco" (I wish they were all 
thrown down a cliff). The mechanic seemed to say this to his companion but he was 
also anticipating agreement in my eyes. His search for my agreement - to a person who 
was a total strange to him - demonstrates that his hatred towards gypsies was not an 
isolated example: it must form part of the Spanish social imaginary at large. I froze. My 
mind was inundated with all sorts of questions and visions; I felt it was imperative to do 
or say something yet, I did not say anything. 
I have regretted my silence ever since; it made of me an accomplice to an imagined 
crime. Now this study tells me that, there and then, silence was the only possible ethical 
answer; that my only option to get through to the Spanish mechanic's resentful mind 
would be through a dramatization of "the problem". If the situation defines itself, if 
culture is an imagined world made real, I would have to confront the Spanish mechanic 
standing at the edge of a cliff with a gypsy child in his arms and giving him a chance of 
choice before he throws the child onto the abyss; perhaps a chance of choice before he 
throws his own father, secretly a gypsy himself, or then his own children. Would he 
have taken responsibility for his imagined actions? Through Bond the question is, how 
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long before the mechanic's imagined world becomes real? Now it is said that the law 
protects minorities but, as Lukacs and then Bond would contend, the law cannot 
circumvent ideology - one, because ideology is part and parcel of the law and two, 
because punishment does not tell us why it is wrong even to imagine to throw a whole 
community from a cliff - otherwise minds like that of the Spanish mechanic would be 
unthinkable. 
Now I live in England and the wheel has turned around. My physiognomy, dark hair 
and brown skin, make some people think that I am of Pakistani origin (unsurprisingly 
so, considering that even some Pakistanis I have met here have thought at first I was of 
Pakistani origin). As a result, now and then I must face a "Spanish mechanic" silently 
nodding at me. I have come to realize that I have become a "gitano"; the "other".16 We 
need to stop the proliferation of hatred for the "other" before it becomes a tool for 
power once again, but it will not be possible with only human rights which just cure or 
punish. As Bond says, we need to imagine totally new worlds of justice, and explore 
and then recognize our own "right to be human" (letter to author: 31.10.03). This is 
indeed Bond's essential theme in The Children (2000): not just the right to be human, 
but the right to be Antigone, which for Bond stands as a symbol of humanness. As Bond 
pointed out in an interview with Helen Nicholson on 1st December, 2000, "retaining 
your Antigone self, your right to be in the world" is imperative (2003: 19). 
In a rapidly changing world in which technology makes capitalism ever more 
sophisticated, the ethical will need to test different strategies or approaches; so that the 
human paradox becomes a time of discovery for all, a time of creativity and, hopefully, 
a chance to imagine the unimaginable: a human world without class differences and 
without capital (Bond in Stuart, 1998: 118). As Graham Saunders indicates, Bond, 
contrary to what some think, has not withdrawn from the public. Indeed he is as active 
as ever (2004). He has changed his strategic approach, not going into 'exile' as some 
have suggested, but abandoning the British mainstream theatre into DIE, and claiming 
to be very satisfied with his choice. As he said to a journalist in 1994: "I last had a new 
play [Summer] professionally staged over here [the UK] over twelve years ago. Yet 
critics seem strangely obsessed with me [ ... ] Why don't you forget me? We are now no 
bother to each other. I'm very happy with what I'm doing and my good fortune still 
surprises me" (Saunders, 2004: 263). 
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The involvement of Edward Bond with the field of DIE, together with conferences, 
workshops and directing his own plays attests to his tremendous vitality and 
productivity. Now The War Plays (1987) have been set as an optional text in the French 
Baccalaureate (letter to author: 01.06.05), and Bond is the second most produced writer 
in France after Moliere. 17 Bond's current writing with the young in mind indicates an 
optimistic dramatist who looks forward to the future. However, as he says, looking 
forward to a future in which the "problem" - the human paradox - might be finally 
liberated from the net of ideology, but not resolved. As he says: "I'm optimistic about 
the problem, but I'm not that optimistic about the solution" (appendix: 18). As 
proposed during the 1998 conference "Building Bridges" organized by the National 
Association for the Teaching of Drama (NATD), drama could become an invaluable 
tool to humanize formal learning (p. 19); and there are clear signals that ideology affects 
individuals from the very start of their formation - perhaps when individuals are more 
vulnerable to ideology's pernicious effects. From his observations on some of the 
workshops currently arranged in schools by Big Brum and with the occasion of staging 
The Under Room, Steve Williams reports: 
It was difficult to tell whether what they [the children] said reflected their own 
thoughts and feelings or whether they echoed things they had heard at home, on 
the streets or in the media. 'Immigrant' was linked with Twin Towers, cheap 
labour, people sneaking into the country in lorries and the French who 'let 
foreigners into the country in lorries and won't let them back into theirs' 
(Williams, 2005: 19) 
Bond's full involvement with DIE seems to me the logical development of an author 
whose dramatic map-making seems to be mainly focused, not on any instant reward like 
social success, but on a de-ideologized and then humanized future. Of course, if the 
future is the goal, the youngest are its most suitable deliverers. The literature on DIE 
reveals a series of relevant concerns about institutional education, some of which are not 
dissimilar from those found in the Bondian philosophy. For example, there is a 
suggestion that institutional education needs to include drama in the classroom as a 
counterbalance to its "culture of silence [ ... ] - the dull transfer-of-knowledge classes -
[ ... ] through a curriculum based on facts; facts that can be measured and examined [ ... ] 
from kindergarten to high school" (Innes et a1.: 2001: 207). In other words, drama 
might help the young to construct a voice of dialogue in a world of monologues. Others 
sustain that drama might help students to construct "visions of the world 'as it is' in 
itself' (Bleeker, 2004: 31); or that drama in the classroom might help to experience 
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notions of trust, responsibility, and/or perceptions of integrity, encouraging students to 
become active participants on ethical and moral dilemmas (Bundy, 2003: 178; Berry, 
2002: 236; Editorial, 2005: 123). 
Then again, I do not think the Bondian approach will be free from conflict with other 
DIE scholars, practitioners and theorists because, among other things, it appears to be a 
field constituted of a series of conflictual agendas, principles, and/or philosophies itself. 
Ethics and systems of thought concerned with humanness, for example, are recurrent 
within the literature at large on DIE but, while most use similar linguistic symbols or 
signs, the reflected meaning is in contrast from one DIE context to another. Some 
would say this is a problem of semantics, for signs have different meanings to different 
recipients - ethics itself, for example, would mean one thing to a corporate executive 
and a very different one to, say, Edward Bond. Instead, I would say, this is a problem 
not of semantics or of culture or of opinion or character but, as I have discussed 
throughout Chapter IV and V, of ideology. Ultimately, as Marx and Engels stated, 
addressing the bourgeoisie in their "Communist Manifesto", a problem determined by 
the "economic conditions" of the bourgeoisie's existence itself (in Tucker, 1972: 17). 
Thus, while Bond's education work is more designed to encourage young people on a 
journey of self-creation (Nicholson, 2003: 13), it refuses to be part of any environment 
where, as DIE's scholars Maureen Innes, Tim Moss, and Heather Smigel propose, the 
"teacher of drama teaches and the learner learns" (Innes et a1.: 2001: 211); even if that 
which is attempted to be taught by the teachers and learnt by the students is "drama for 
understanding" (Ibid.). Some DIE variants like Role Drama and/or Therapy Dramal8 do 
seem to evoke Bond's philosophy in principle, suggesting indeed a "Drama for 
understanding" within the classroom. But this is an "understanding" where DIE seems 
to be a system to teach "persuasive writing [ ... ] survival, self-belief, motivation and 
discipline" (Ibid.: 210); a platform where students develop communication skills: 
"talking, listening, negotiating, defending and responding" (Ibid.: 211). This is even a 
drama used as a catalyst of violence and/or aggression "exploring 'ways of being in the 
world'" (Bundy, 2000: 265) which, incidentally, seeks "to build self-esteem and self-
confidence" both within the boundaries of the prison system and the classroom (Ibid.), 
evoking these two environments as if they were an extension of each other. In other 
words, to me this DIE appears more like the operational platform of social workers, 
whose aim is the social rehabilitation of those individuals who are social outsiders - and 
therefore, a source of social conflict - or in danger of becoming one of them. I am not 
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criticizing the important social function of social workers, nor the attempts of DIE 
teachers at instructing the necessary social skills which are so needed in our competitive 
societies at all, but as Bond observes, the allocation of social expectations does not 
address the need of changing the system. The dramatist's own visual imagery on this 
case says it all: 
It seems to me that most people are actually thrown into a huge great big rubbish 
dump outside a city, and told to go and find themselves ... it's somewhere in that 
rubbish. And I have this image of kids scrabbling around looking for 
themselves. And they are punished if they don't get it right, and rewarded if 
they can see the trick (in Nicholson, 2003: 16).19 
Persuasive writing, self-esteem, andlor negotiating skills undoubtedly are crucial 
"tricks" to promote one's self and an advantage in the climbing race for social position 
and resources. Bondian philosophy recognizes our need to acquire "tricks" in order to 
pull through in life but aspires to expose it as a situation that engenders injustice. To 
acquire "tricks" in order to compete against others is not a choice, it is an imposition. 
Thus, as it is/was with British mainstream theatrical venues, I do not think Bond's 
involvement in DIE will be an untroubled venture, embraced by all. David Davis, 
perhaps the one leading scholars on both DIE and the Bondian philosophy, also 
acknowledges that, although Bond "has allied himself with drama and theatre in schools 
[ ... ] it is surprising that he has so far made no major impact on drama in education 
theory and practice" (Davis, 2005: 163). Davis primarily criticises the institutional 
syllabus of one of the GCSE (General Certificate in Secondary Education) drama boards 
unreservedly, even regarding the situation within DIE as "alarming" (Ibid.: 165). As he 
says "the pressure to test and write attainment targets has tended to drive what is taught 
in drama down to the level of examinable skills. In this climate it is understandable for 
teachers to reach for a formulaic approach" (Ibid.: 164). In his essay, Davis observes 
some similarities between Bond and other important approaches to drama in schools -
such as that of the influential DIE figure Dorothy Heathcote (1990; 1996). Davis finds, 
for example, that both, Bond and Heathcote, "see drama as fundamental to humanity" 
(Davis, 2005: 171), but observes that their goals are opposite: that Heathcote sees 
herself as an educator and drama as didactic, whilst Bond seeks in drama a platform for 
human self-questioning; that the former sees drama as a site in which to solve problems 
and the latter where "human relations are to be problematised" (Ibid.: 173). As I noted 
above with other DIE literature, there are, as Davis calls it, points between the Bondian 
Overall conclusion 
272 
philosophy and Heathcote's approach which might appear as 'connected' at first glance, 
whilst in reality, they occupy different ideological sites altogether (which confirms my 
suggestion above that even if we can find similar terminology throughout DIE literature, 
Bond's DIE is, again, a philosophy of drama apart) as Davis' essay reflects with such 
points as the following: 
• From the start Heathcote subordinated dramatic action to meaning; Bond 
sees the essence of theatre as dramatizing meaning. 
• Heathcote emphasizes the significance of actions and objects; Bond 
focuses on how objects can hold human values and how actions and 
gestures etc. can form the basis of theatre events. 
• Heathcote sees drama not as telling a story but the 'story' coming out of 
how the attitudes and actions of the people in the play shape events; 
Bond shapes his theatre form by providing the potential for a series of 
Theatre Events, which explore the relationship of the characters to the 
social world and each other. Story is more important to Bond than to 
Heathcote. 
• Heathcote writes: 'Drama, expressed as Theatre, has fundamentally a 
didactic purpose presented as an aesthetic experience;' Bond would 
never say this. In fact he would refute it. Heathcote sees herself 
primarily as an educator; Bond does not. (Davis, 2005: 169-71). 
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Epilogue 
I opened this study considering J. M. Bernstein's claim that we do not have an art which 
could be "both social and authentic, as Brecht wanted to generate" (see overall 
introduction: 1). I, too, do not think that such art is truly attainable inasmuch as human 
beings are denied the capacity to act, the ability to make or create their history, and are 
instead regarded as an inert or recalcitrant mass by the powers that be. In other words, 
social and authentic art will be beyond us for as long as inequality constitutes the 
foundational framework of our societies. In order to be, art needs a human culture, not a 
class culture. Lukacs started his celebrated study "The sociology of Modem Drama" 
(1914) stating unambiguously: "Modem drama is the drama of the bourgeoisie; modem 
drama is bourgeois drama" (in Bentley, 1992: 425). He observed that, in modem 
drama, the divisional line between man and his environment [ ... ], between the hero and 
his destiny", so characteristic of Greek and of even Shakespearean drama, had been 
abandoned (Ibid.: 427). While in ancient drama, destiny came to the hero "from 
without", in modem drama there is no destiny because in it the world 'within' 
predominates, engendering, therefore, extreme forms of pathological individualisms; the 
human world becomes thus perennial, unchangeable and/or unhistorical. Lukacs asked 
whether there can still be a drama which, as it was with that of the ancient Greeks, sees 
ahead to the collapse of an entire world, of an entire social system, replacing the old bad 
with the good, "or by something better than the old" (in Bentley, 1992: 427). He asked 
whether the heroes of bourgeois drama - passive, defending rather than attacking, 
desperate with anguish (Ibid.: 429) - could be replaced with an up-to-date version of 
Oedipus, Antigone and/or Orestes. Through his study, Lukacs came to realize that 
tragedy has become highly problematic in contemporary bourgeois culture primarily 
because, unlike in ancient Greece, mythology is absent. That is why bourgeois drama, 
Lukacs says, has replaced mythology with the only device available - character -
ultimately converted into a pathological case which justifies everything. Thus Lukacs 
says: 
When the motivations are wholly based upon character [ ... ] the wholly inward 
origin of this destiny will drive the character relentlessly to the limits of 
pathology. The non-pathological Orestes of Aeschylus was driven from without 
by what drives Goethe's from within; what once was destiny, becomes character 
for the modem poets (in Bentley, 1992: 448). 
He is saying that modem drama treats the human paradox as if it was the result of 
supposedly inbuilt human nature - that is, only explained by way of the transcendental-
Overall conclusion 
274 
which, I would say, distracts our attention from the real cause of our Athens' pest: class 
difference. Thus, Federico Garcia Lorca, to name a celebrated modem author, offered us 
characters that, in reality, are static in time, built as if they were born to be what they 
are. As with La Zapatera Prodigiosa [The Shoemaker's Wonderful Wife] (1978; orig. 
1930), Lorca celebrates folklorist differences represented by the shoemaker, the wife, 
the major, the priest, the guard and so on, without offering them any destiny. Only death 
will finally change them into something else: corpses. Lukacs concludes his study by 
asking whether there is, within the bourgeois culture, any possibility that remains open 
to drama; whether we have something that could replace the equilibrium which was 
offered to us by the lost mythology. His answer is most pertinent: "this equilibrium can 
be achieved only in the medium of ethics" (in Bentley, 1992: 450). However, and most 
interestingly, for Lukacs, as it is for Bond, ethics is not a solution. As I indicated above, 
if for Bond drama is the ethical site where "human relations are to be problematised" 
(Davis, 2005: 173), for Lukacs ethics is the platform through which the problem really 
"commences", as he explains: 
So long as tragedy did not become ethically problematic, either inwardly or 
outwardly, the pure aesthetics of structure functioned quite naturally: from a 
given beginning only a given result can follow, since the ethical structure is a 
given precondition known to the poet and public alike. But when ethics cease to 
be a given, the ethical knotting within the drama - thus, its aesthetics - has to be 
created; whereupon ethics, as the cornerstone to the artistic composition, move 
necessarily into the vital centre of motivation. In this way the great and 
spontaneous unity of ethics and aesthetics, within the tragic experience, 
commences to be the problem (in Bentley, 1992: 450). 
I think that, through Bond's philosophy and drama, we have a momentous opportunity 
to work towards a society that one day could be made up of free and equal human 
beings - towards ethics as the ultimate reality, as Bond likes to call his philosophy - no 
matter how far and precarious that aim might be. I believe that through his involvement 
with DIE, the dramatist has chosen the only platform viable, and also, I think, the most 
demanding. Think for instance of one pertinent example which I am sure will resonate 
with most parents: my eight year old son returned recently from another child's 
birthday party. As usual, at the end, he was given a little bag containing some toys and 
sweets. Reproduced in the bag was one of those comic strip super-heroes with 
overgrown muscles and futuristic guns, fierce and aggressive - its name, "Justice". It 
was all too evident that justice in that context meant the elimination of those who are 
bad; it meant vengeance. My son asked me then what justice means and my attempt at 
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answenng him demonstrated just how difficult and complex it is to answer such 
question. Firstly, it was difficult because I found myself competing against the strong 
message projected by the figurine in his little bag - a message found in most of the 
merchandised entertainment-products designed for children. The second problem came 
about because, as I have come to realize through Bond's philosophy and this study, 
justice is not about punishment; indeed justice could only be created with the proviso 
that we all are living in true democracy; in other words, as Bond claims, once it has 
become problematised. Drama would have been the best apparatus for providing my 
son with the answer to what justice is: that which has not yet come into being. As Bond 
says: 
'Being human' is not an instinctive thing, it is learned in the psyche's drama ... 
The psyche and society are a theatre or a prision. Education for the market's 
needs could be a prison. We must educate children for democracy. At the heart 
of all democracy is drama (in Nicholson, 2003: 13). 
What is drama for Bond? For him it is as demanding as the meaning of ethics itself: 
There are two cups, one white and one blue. The white cup has a handle. The 
blue cup has none. We break the two cups and trample and scatter the pieces. 
We carefully reassemble them. No fragment is left over. There is no crack on 
the cups, not one sign of breakage, each cup is perfect. But the blue cup has the 
handle and the white cup has none. Drama changes reality.20 
In conclusion, I have been drawing this thesis from the ideas of Edward Bond and I 
have found my discourse going towards 'another' Edward Bond and beyond: terms like 
radical, justice, humanness, drama, enacting, not acting, the tragic and the comic, and 
lies and truths have acquired new meanings. Edward Bond has become the DOOR to 
something beyond himself - and, as the appendix reflects (Volume II) I like to think he 
thinks so too. 
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Endnotes 
1 For example, Jenny S. Spencer makes only a short note about Bond's TE at the end of her 
Dramatic Strategies (1992: 257). By 1995 TE appears to take a distinctive form in the 
dramatist's philosophy when in one of his letters says: "I think the TE isn't an aesthetic device 
or theatrical gimmick: it is the only way I know that we can make theatre profound again. [ ... ] 
You have to alter the critical image and the critical description. That's why I think theatre is 
philosophy and not psychology (Stuart, 2001: 15). 
2 "The logic of humanness" is one more of the latest Bondian terms; Bond describes it thus: "A 
scientific age understands human beings reductively. We are said to be determined by our 
biology. Literally, it is claimed that science knows more about us than we know about 
ourselves. This makes science the enactment of paranoia. It ignores the fact that we do not 
evolve as animals in their environment. Our environment is history and we create our own 
humanness in culture [ ... ] Drama is the logic of humanness" (Davis, 2005: 91-2). Bond also 
defines humanness as that which "is socially, culturally created within the mind's excess 
capacity" (Lambley, 1992: 40). 
3 See also Kate Katafiasz's most illustrative Bondian discussion against Brecht's theatre of 
alienation in Davis, 2005: 33-4. 
4 I must say parenthetically that, in a sense, the development of Bond's dramatic creativity, from 
that of his major epic landmarks like Lear (1971) or Human Cannon (1986) - which require 
considerable casting and stage-production - to the simplicity of his latest plays, resembles to me 
the progressive thematic simplicity of great composers like Bach or Beethoven. Observe, for 
example, the elaborated themes of Beethoven's earliest thirty-two piano sonatas compared with 
the Ninth Symphony, which is an immense structure constructed from the simplest thematic 
cells. This is why I ask myself whether Bond's TE and current output could be also the natural 
consequence of a dramatist who has now reached the masterful heights of dramatic creativity. 
5 Peter Billingham's original draft version of an eventually published 15,000 word essay for the 
series Dictionary of Literary Biography, Vol. 310: "British and Irish Dramatists Since World 
War II," USA: Thomson Gale, 2005 (sent to me by the author on 26th June, 2003). 
6 I am referring here to the conference "Reputations: Edward Bond", made public on 
www.theatrevoice.com. A series of recordings made at the Theatre Museum of London with 
the Bondians Kate Katafiasz, Chris Cooper, and Peter Billingham among others as panelists 
(date: 11.03.05). 
7 Quoted from Big Brum's director Chris Cooper in the conference "Reputations" 
8 Indeed, as Marx said: "When this antagonism between man and man, and man and nature is 
resolved the prehistory of man will come to an end and truly human history will begin 
(Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, trans. By T. B. Bottomore (Online). 
9 One recent example in which Bond seems to inspire anger and repulsion can be found in John 
Doona's article about the first reading of Bond's The Short Electra - one of the latest plays 
inspired by Euripides's Electra (a copy of it was given to me by the author himself in 2004 and 
can be supplied if required). Observe how some of the teachers of drama involved in this 
reading responded with horror and revulsion, leaving the room while the reading was taking 
place and defining Bond as a "mad old git asking kids to think about killing their mothers" 
(Doona, 2004: 43). 
10 I have already discussed the dangers which might arise from transcendentalism and 
transgression through the total involvement of Heidegger with Nazism in Chapter V, section III. 
And the influence of Heidegger's philosophy continues to be, in my view, phenomenal. The 
philosophy of Jose Ortega y Gasset for example, one more of Heidegger's pupils, permeates 
thoroughly through many aspects of the Spanish culture to this day, especially academia 
(Rodriguez Hm!scar, 1964: 21). This is, as far as I know, a fundamental and serious problem 
which is still in need of a proper evaluation. 
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II From "A Glossary of terms used in Bondian Theatre" which was "written for the French 
edition of The Hidden Plot" (L'Arche Editeur) by Bond's French translator George Bas with 
Jerome Hankins (in Davis, 2005: 201-20). 
12 "Harold Pinter Celebration," BBC 2, Arena, Saturday, 26 October 2002. 
13 See also Bond's "Notes in Imagination" which is published in conjunction with his play 
Coffee (1995). 
14 I am thinking here of the one-day symposium held at the University of London on the 19th 
September 2005 "Beyond Postmodemism - Performance, Politics, Publics", among others. See 
for example endnote 47 in chapter V, p. 237. 
15 My own notes taken while attending the play. 
16 This is what a couple of plumbers working on my own house told me few years ago when, 
relieved after discovering that I was a Spaniard, told me "we thought you were a paki". 
17 Billingham: see endnote 4. 
18 See for example Bundy, 2000 and 2003; Innes et at, 2001; Fleming et at, 2004; Gesser-
Edelsburg, 2005; Coppens, 2002, among many others. 
19 Personal interview with Helen Nicholson, 1 December 2000. 
20 This is part of a piece sent to me by Bond which he calls "Two Cups". It has not got a date 
but it was part of a letter dated 08.11.04 
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